



Molotov

Letter to the Central Committee of CPSU

On the personality cult
and
the Programme of CPSU

Svitlana M
Erdogan A

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Committee of CPSU

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In memory of Comrade Gokhan Edge who was murdered in torture chamber (1953- 1976 Turkey).

Dedicated to the communists and anti-fascists of Ukraine who have lost their lives fighting against neo-Nazi oppression.

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On the problem of the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin and about the program of the CPSU.

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This letter is the result of many years of work, the result of hard thoughts and doubts.

Before writing it, I tried to the best of my ability and ability to carefully study and analyze all the material available to me on a particular issue.

The material is extensive. And for me, when working on a letter, the greatest difficulty was precisely the process of selecting the most important and valuable, of course, from my point of view, that can be found in this material on the issues that interested me.

The whole letter is devoted, in fact, to one problem, one question - the problem of the so-called personality cult of I.V. Stalin, the question of why, a few years after Stalin's death, it was necessary to stir up the past and why, and why it was done in such a harsh and unsightly form.

It goes without saying that the answer to this question required an answer to another - is JV Stalin and his closest associates personally to blame for everything that is attributed to him?

It goes without saying that in my letter I have no right to refer to any documentary sources of a closed type in support of one or another of my statements.

I set myself the task of enabling those who will read this letter to check each of my references to a particular document directly against this document.

All quotes from V. I. Lenin, which I cited in the letter, have been checked against various editions of his works, except for the last, fifth edition, and are given according to the fourth edition. In those cases when I had the relevant materials at my disposal, all the statements of V. I. Lenin were checked against the first editions of his individual

works and speeches. All speeches by V. I. Lenin and other persons mentioned in this letter, made by them at party congresses, at the Plenums of the Central Committee, are quoted directly from the transcripts of these congresses or Plenums.

There are more than enough quotes in this letter.

But this is not Talmudism, not teaching. I do this consciously and deliberately. I am doing this in order to show that this or that statement of V. I. Lenin, this or that thought of his on this or that issue - was not accidental, was not subsequently forgotten or discarded by him.

For the same purpose, I decided to use in the letter only those works of V. I. Lenin, which were written by him in the last period of his life, in 1918-1924.

By the way, I will note in advance that those very few quotes by V.I. Lenin, which are used by the authors of current works on the history of the CPSU, were taken by them from V.I. Lenin, he himself described as follows:

“I must repent of one mistake that I happened to make at the Third Congress of the Comintern also because of excessive caution. At this congress I stood on the extreme right flank” (vol. 33, p. 181).

There are many quotes in my letter. But all of them, with the exception of one single one (K. Voroshilov), were taken from the speeches and works of only those leaders of our party and state who, by the XXII Congress of the CPSU, were not classified as persons responsible for the negative consequences of the so-called personality cult of I. V. Stalin.

I cannot but say that the very fact of writing this letter - from my point of view - is one of the concrete manifestations of the negative consequences of the so-called the struggle of the party with the so-called Stalin's personality cult, the result of what existed in me, as in the vast majority of our youth and people of the middle generation, BC; struggle against Stalin's personality cult, the unshakable faith in

the correctness of the party, in the authority of its leaders - are shaken, and shaken in the most decisive and most destructive way.

And it is precisely this circumstance that compels me to write this letter.

It is what keeps me from being silent. Silence when, in my opinion, perhaps erroneous, but nonetheless the deepest inner conviction, based on a thorough and comprehensive study of materials and documents on the history of the CPSU, this circumstance is quite deliberately caused for the masses and is one of the main sources of that clearly revisionist, clearly opportunistic turn in the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, which Khrushchev and his supporters introduced into them with the help and support of some leaders of the Western European communist and labor movement.

You can't be silent.

It is impossible to remain silent when it comes to discrediting the very IDEA of the proletarian dictatorship, the very IDEA of the socialist revolution.

It is impossible to remain silent when, according to V. I. Lenin, the idea is persistently introduced into the masses that "the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the concept of democracy exclude each other. Not understanding the theory of class struggle ... the bourgeois understands dictatorship as the abolition of all freedoms and guarantees democracy, any abuse of power by a dictator" (vol. 31, p. 318).

It is impossible to remain silent when, contrary to the repeated and categorical instructions of V. I. Lenin, they persistently try

"to reconcile two hostile classes and two hostile politicians by means of such a word (the word "in general") which "unites" the most diverse things" (vol. 21, p. 263).

It is impossible to remain silent when, under the guise of defending Marxism-Leninism from dogmatism and sectarianism, under the guise of Marxist dialectics, all the basic philosophical and strategic

foundations of Marxism-Leninism are being revised and adapted to a legal, social democratic existence.

It is impossible to remain silent when the words of V. I. Lenin that

"precisely because Marxism is not a dead dogma ... it cannot but reflect upon itself ... changes in social life. The reflection of the change was a deep disintegration, confusion, all kinds of vacillations, in a word - a most serious internal crisis of Marxism. A decisive rebuff to this disintegration, a resolute and stubborn struggle for the foundations of Marxism is again on the order of the day ... "Reassessment of all values" in various areas of social life has led to a revision of the most abstract and general philosophical foundations of Marxism" (vol. 17, pp. 23 - 24).

It is impossible to remain silent when the words of V. I. Lenin that

"only by overcoming the greatest crisis with revolutionary enthusiasm, with revolutionary energy, with revolutionary readiness for the heaviest sacrifices, can the proletariat defeat the exploiters and finally rid humanity of wars ... There is no other way out, because the reformist attitude towards capitalism gave rise yesterday (and will inevitably give rise tomorrow) imperialist slaughter of people and all sorts of crises without end" (vol. 30, p. 317).

Precisely because "the reformist attitude towards capitalism ... will inevitably give rise tomorrow to an imperialist slaughter of people," it is impossible, criminally, to remain silent when they try to convince us that war can be averted by an agreement with the governments of the imperialist states, by a certain agreement on the policy of the so-called "peaceful coexistence".

It is impossible to remain silent when, in such conditions, they shout about the unity of all "left" forces, ignoring the words of V. I. Lenin that

"The clever opportunists are most concerned with preserving the former "unity" of the old parties... They believe that it would be very

dangerous for the bourgeoisie if Social Democracy were to go even further to the right: "It must preserve the character of a workers' party with socialist ideals. For on the day it renounces this, a new party will arise which will take over the program that the former party renounced and give it an even more radical formulation"" (vol. 22, p. 102) (hereinafter in quotations there are minor inaccuracies - Ed.).

You can't be silent.

The personality cult of I. V. Stalin and the XXII Congress of the CPSU (1961)

The first question that confronted me when studying the problem of the so-called Stalin's personality cult, there was a question of how and why in 1956, i.e. three years after the death of I. V. Stalin, the need arose for the very formulation of this problem. Was there a need for this, and if it was, what objective reasons did it dictate?

Speaking at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, N. S. Khrushchev, speaking about the successes of the party in the period since Stalin's death, pointed out that

"It was of paramount importance to restore and strengthen in every possible way the Leninist principle of collective leadership. The Central Committee of the CPSU tried to set an example in this regard. It is obvious to everyone how much the role of the Central Committee as the collective leader of our party has risen in recent years. The Presidium of the Central Committee has become a regularly functioning collective body, in whose field of vision are all the most important questions of the life of the Party and the country.

Striving for the all-round development of the creative activity of communists and all working people, the Central Committee took steps to broadly explain the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of the individual in history. The Central Committee resolutely opposed the cult of personality, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, which turns this or that leader into a miracle-working hero and at the same time belittles the role of the party and the masses, leading to a

decrease in their creative activity. The spread of the personality cult belittled the collectivity of leadership in the Party and sometimes led to serious omissions in our work" (pp. 101-102).

All those who spoke at the 20th Congress of the CPSU spoke in the same spirit. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Brezhnev:

"Among the great measures taken recently, of particular importance is the fact that the Central Committee strengthened state socialist legality, which, as you know, was weakened and undermined in some links by the enemies of the party and the state" (p. 214).

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Suslov:

"The strengthening of the unity of the party and the increase in its activity, initiative, and combat readiness were greatly facilitated by the restoration of the norms of party life and the principles of party leadership, which were often violated before the 20th Party Congress, worked out by Lenin.

Alien to Marxism-Leninism, the theory and practice of the personality cult, which became widespread before the 20th Party Congress, caused significant damage to party work, both organizational and ideological. They belittled the role of the masses and the role of the Party, belittled the collective leadership, undermined internal Party democracy, suppressed the activity of Party members, their initiative and initiative, led to lack of control, irresponsibility and even arbitrariness in the work of individuals, hindered the development of criticism and self-criticism and gave rise to one-sided, and sometimes erroneous solutions to questions ...

There is no doubt that the cult of personality greatly contributed to the spread of dogmatism. The followers of the cult of personality attributed the development of Marxist theory only to individuals and relied entirely on them. All other mortals supposedly should only assimilate and

popularize what these individuals create. Thus, the role of the collective thought of our party and the role of the fraternal parties in the development of revolutionary theory, the role of the collective experience of the masses was ignored" (p. 284).

A. I. Mikoyan:

"The principle of collective leadership is elementary for a proletarian party, for a party of the Leninist type, but this old truth must be emphasized because for about 20 years it actually had no collective leadership, the cult of personality flourished, condemned by Marx, and then by Lenin, and this, of course, could not but have an extremely negative effect on the situation in the Party and on its activity" (p. 302).

G. M. Malenkov:

"... There is no doubt that the entire Party received with great satisfaction those important measures taken by the Central Committee during the reporting period, which were aimed at decisively eliminating serious abnormalities in party life and the methods of party leadership, at ensuring the exact implementation of the principles worked out by Lenin party leadership. Everyone understands the fundamental and vital importance of the firm course pursued by the Central Committee against the cult of personality, which is alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. The report rightly emphasizes that the cult of personality is a perversion of the Marxist-Leninist teaching. This perversion inevitably leads to the belittling role of the party and its leading center, to the suppression of the creative activity of the masses of the party and even more so the elimination of the methods of collective leadership, the perversion of the Marxist understanding of the role of the individual, the cult of the individual - all this led to peremptory individual decisions, arbitrariness, and in a certain period caused great damage to the leadership of the party and the country.

... The merit of the Central Committee is that, guided by Leninist principles, for the benefit of our common cause, it reveals mistakes, no matter who they are, resolutely, regardless of persons, justly corrects anyone who makes these mistakes" (p. 413 - 414).

V. M. Molotov:

"Both our serious successes in the affairs of the internal life of the country, and important successes in the field of foreign policy are due to the fact that after the 19th Congress the Central Committee implemented the Leninist principle of collective leadership.

Supported by the entire Party, the Central Committee came out firmly against the personality cult, alien to Marxism-Leninism, which played such a negative role in a certain period. We can express confidence that this congress will fully approve this principled policy" (p. 467).

L. M. Kaganovich:

"After the 19th Party Congress, the Central Committee boldly (I mean boldness in principle, ideological, theoretical) raised the question of the struggle against the cult of personality. This is not an easy question. The cult of personality is a harmful cult, it belittles the masses, the Party, and its leading cadres.

The exposure of the personality cult, a correct Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of the popular masses, the role of the Party and its leading cadres, the role of leaders, is of exceptionally great importance for strengthening the unity of the Party. The fight against the personality cult proved to be the most important factor in the formation and consolidation of the collective leadership of our party" (p. 532).

K. E. Voroshilov:

"During the reporting period, the Central Committee in its activities firmly and consistently followed the Leninist principle of collective leadership.

We must continue to strengthen this Leninist principle of collectivity in work, because only under these conditions can we warn ourselves against possible mistakes ... "(p. 533).

The XX Congress of the CPSU was held from February 14 to 25, 1956. The above quotes are literally everything that was said publicly by the delegates of the 20th Congress about Stalin's personality cult. True, a special meeting was held at the congress to consider the negative consequences of this cult, but, as you know, it was closed.

The materials of the XX Congress of the CPSU allow us to conclude that the fight against the so-called Stalin's personality cult was dictated, at first glance, by the need to restore and strengthen the principles and methods of collective leadership of the party and the country, the need for the full development of the creative activity and initiative of party members, the restoration and strengthening of socialist legality, which was "weakened, and in some links undermined by the enemies of the party and the state" (see L. Brezhnev's speech above).

The delegates of the XX Congress pointed to the gross violations of socialist legality that took place during the period of the so-called Stalin's personality cult.

But none of the congress delegates connected these violations directly with the name of Stalin or any of his associates in the Politburo or the Presidium of the Central Committee, not to mention Beria, of course.

This circumstance, and importance for the course of further consideration of the problem of the so-called Stalin's personality cult is very easy to prove by referring to the transcript of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

Here is what the congress delegates said about violations of socialist legality.

N. Khrushchev:

"The Central Committee of the Party paid and continues to pay great attention to strengthening socialist legality. Experience shows that the enemies of the Soviet state are trying to use the slightest weakening of socialist legality for their vile, subversive work. This is how the Beria gang, exposed by the party, who tried to bring the state security organs out of control of the party and Soviet power, put them above the party and the government, create an atmosphere of arbitrariness and lawlessness in these bodies. For hostile purposes, this gang fabricated false accusatory materials against honest leading workers and ordinary Soviet citizens.

The Central Committee checked the so-called "Leningrad case" and established that it was fabricated by Beria and his henchmen in order to weaken the Leningrad party organization and discredit its cadres. Having established the inconsistency of the "Leningrad case", the Central Committee checked a number of other dubious cases as well. The Central Committee took steps to restore justice. At the suggestion of the Central Committee, innocently convicted people were rehabilitated.

From all this the Central Committee drew serious conclusions. Proper control of the party and government over the work of state security agencies has been established. Significant work has been done to strengthen the state security agencies, the courts and the prosecutor's office with proven personnel" (p. 94).

F. R. Kozlov:

"The Leningrad party organization expresses its deep gratitude to the Central Committee for exposing the hardened enemy of the people, Beria, and his accomplices. These enemies, in order to weaken the Leningrad party organization and discredit its cadres, fabricated the so-called "Leningrad case," harmed our party. By exposing the criminal gang of Beria, the Central Committee has restored justice" (pp. 155 - 156).

V. P. Mzhavanadze, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia:

"The despicable band of Beria tried to break the unity and friendship of the peoples of our great Motherland. He tried to break our fraternal international ties with the countries of people's democracy; he tried, through terror and lawlessness, intimidation, to sow distrust among the peoples. He thought about more, but, fortunately, he failed to do so.

Comrades! It is difficult, and indeed impossible, to tell how much grief and misfortune the despicable band of Beria caused the Georgian people. Dozens, hundreds of honest and deeply devoted to the party and the people of the Soviet and party workers, cultural, scientific, and artistic figures fell victim to the insidious intrigues of this despicable gang ...

The Central Committee timely and decisively put a stop to the criminal activities of the conspirators and rendered us great assistance in eliminating the consequences of the enemy activities of this despicable gang" (p. 297).

G. M. Malenkov:

"It is well known that the imperialists placed great stakes on the worst enemy of our party and people, Beria. The exposure of Beria, that hardened agent of imperialism, and his accomplices was a great victory for the party and its collective leadership" (p. 414).

L. M. Kaganovich:

"The criminal activity of the fascist provocateur gang of Beria was boldly and decisively exposed and liquidated. Thus, the party and the Soviet state were strengthened" (p. 509).

That is all that we can find on this subject in the materials of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

On March 28, 1956, Pravda published a long editorial entitled "Why the cult of personality is alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism."

The main provisions of this article boiled down to the following (quoted in the newspaper):

“Why has our party launched a resolute struggle against the cult of personality and its consequences? Because the cult of personality means exorbitant exaltation of individual people, endowing them with supernatural traits and qualities, turning them into almost miracle workers and worshiping them.

There is no doubt that JV Stalin has great services to our party, the working class, and the international working-class movement. His role in the preparation and conduct of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, in the struggle to build socialism is well known. Occupying the important post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the party, JV Stalin rose to the ranks of the leading figures in the party and the Soviet state. He actively, especially in the first years after Lenin's death, together with other members of the Central Committee, fought for Leninism, against the enemies and perverts of Lenin's teachings. Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists, his works, his logic, his will have a great impact on the cadres, on the work of the party.

Guided by the teachings of the great Lenin, the party, headed by the Central Committee, launched a great deal of work on the industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, the implementation of the cultural revolution and achieved well-known historical victories. These victories were won in an irreconcilable ideological struggle against various political trends hostile to Marxism - Trotskyists, Zinovievists, right opportunists, bourgeois nationalists, all those who tried to lead the party astray from the only correct Leninist path. At that time, Stalin won popularity in the party, its sympathies and support gained fame among the people. However, those features and qualities gradually began to appear in the practice of Stalin's leadership, which then developed into a cult of personality. The cult of personality arose and developed against the backdrop of the greatest

historical achievements of Marxism-Leninism, the enormous successes of the Soviet people and the Communist Party in building socialism, the victorious conclusion of the Patriotic War, the further strengthening of our state and social system and the growth of its international prestige. Not receiving a sufficiently correct Marxist-Leninist interpretation, these gigantic successes in the construction of a new society ... were unjustifiably attributed to the merits of one person - Stalin and explained by some of his special merits as a leader. Lacking personal modesty, he not only did not stop those praises and glorifications that were addressed to him, but supported and encouraged them in every possible way. In the course of time, this cult of personality took on ever more ugly forms and caused serious damage to the cause, the victorious conclusion of the Patriotic War, the further strengthening of our state and social system and the growth of its international prestige. Not receiving a sufficiently correct Marxist-Leninist interpretation, these gigantic successes in the construction of a new society ... were unjustifiably attributed to the merits of one person - Stalin and explained by some of his special merits as a leader.

The cult of personality and the practice of leadership that developed under its influence in the last period of the life and work of I.V. Stalin caused great damage. Stalin's disregard for the norms of party life and the principle of the collectivity of the party leadership, and often his sole decision on issues, led to a distortion of party principles and party democracy, to a violation of revolutionary legality, and to unjustified repressions.

Only as a result of the cult of personality and related violations of the norms of party life could such a seasoned agent of imperialism as Beria and his accomplices get into leading positions in the party and the state.

... Paying tribute to the merits of I.V. Stalin, soberly assessing the major contribution that he made to the cause of the revolution, to the cause of building socialism, the party at the same time resolutely raised the question of eliminating the

Stalin personality cult in order to fully restore Leninist principles and norms of party and state work and thus create the best conditions for our great constructive activity in building communism" (Pravda, March 28, 1956, No. 88).

On July 30, 1956, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences" was published.

This resolution is a large and interesting document in content, a document in which the official point of view on the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin and its consequences, which the Central Committee of the CPSU developed during the XX Congress of the CPSU and sometime later, was reflected with the greatest completeness. Since now this is the most important decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the problem of the so-called Stalin's personality cult has been almost completely forgotten; it seems to me that I will not commit a special sin if I give the main provisions of this document. The ruling reads:

"How could it happen that under the conditions of the Soviet socialist system the personality cult of Stalin with all its negative consequences arose and spread?

When considering this issue, one must keep in mind both the objective, concrete historical conditions in which the construction of socialism in the USSR took place, as well as some subjective factors associated with Stalin's personal qualities. This was the first experience in history of building a socialist society, formed in the process of searching, testing in practice many truths that were previously known to socialists only in general terms, in theory. For more than a quarter of a century, the Soviet country was the only country paving the way for humanity to socialism. It was like a besieged fortress, surrounded by capitalism. The enemies of the Soviet country in the West and in the East after the failed intervention of 14 states in 1918-1920 continued to prepare new crusades against the USSR. Enemies in large numbers sent spies and saboteurs into the USSR, trying by all means to undermine the world's first socialist state. The threat of a new

imperialist aggression against the USSR grew especially strong after fascism came to power in Germany, proclaimed its goal the destruction of communism, the destruction of the Soviet Union ... Everyone remembers the formation of the so-called "anti-Comintern pact", the "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis", actively supported by the forces of all international reaction. In the face of the imminent threat of a new war, the refusal of the Western powers from the measures repeatedly proposed by the Soviet Union to curb fascism and organize collective security, the Soviet country was forced to strain all its forces to strengthen defense, to fight the intrigues of a hostile capitalist encirclement. The Party had to educate the entire people in the spirit of constant vigilance and mobilization readiness in the face of external enemies.

The intrigues of international reaction were all the more dangerous because a fierce class struggle was going on inside the country for a long time, the question "who wins?" was being decided. After Lenin's death, hostile currents became more active in the party - Trotskyists, right-wing opportunists, bourgeois nationalists, who stood on the positions of rejecting the Leninist theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, which in fact would lead to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. The Party launched a merciless struggle against these enemies of Leninism.

Fulfilling Lenin's precepts, the Communist Party set a course for the socialist industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture and the implementation of the cultural revolution. The Soviet people and the Communist Party had to overcome incredible difficulties and obstacles in the way of accomplishing these tremendous tasks of building a socialist society in one single country.

Our country had to, in the shortest historical period, without any economic help from outside, eliminate its centuries-old backwardness, rebuild the entire national economy on new, socialist principles.

This complex international and domestic situation demanded iron discipline, a relentless increase in vigilance, and the strictest centralization of leadership, which could not but have a negative effect on the development of certain democratic forms. In the course of a fierce struggle against the whole world of imperialism, our country had to go to some restrictions on democracy, justified by the logic of the struggle of our people in conditions of capitalist encirclement. But these restrictions were already considered by the Party and the people as temporary, to be eliminated as the Soviet state strengthened and the forces of democracy and socialism developed throughout the world ...

While serving for a long period as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, JV Stalin, together with other leading figures, actively fought for the implementation of Lenin's precepts. He was devoted to Marxism-Leninism, as a theoretician and a major organizer, he led the party's struggle against the Trotskyists, right-wing opportunists, bourgeois nationalists, and against the intrigues of the capitalist encirclement. In this political and ideological struggle, Stalin gained great prestige and popularity. However, all our great victories began to be incorrectly associated with his name. The successes achieved by the Communist Party and the Soviet country; the praise of Stalin turned his head. In this situation, the cult of Stalin's personality began to gradually take shape.

The development of the cult of personality was greatly facilitated by certain individual qualities of I.V. Stalin, the negative nature of which was pointed out by V.I. Lenin...

At the XIII Party Congress, which took place shortly after the death of V. I. Lenin, his letters were brought to the attention of the delegations. As a result of the discussion of these documents, it was considered expedient to leave Stalin in the post of general secretary, so that, however, he would take into account the criticism from V. I. Lenin ...

Remaining in the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin, for the first period after the death of Vladimir Ilyich, considered his critical remarks. Later, however, Stalin, having disproportionately overestimated his merits, believed in his own infallibility. Some restrictions on inner-party and Soviet democracy, inevitable in the conditions of a fierce struggle against the class enemy and his agents, and later in the conditions of the war against the Nazi invaders, Stalin began to establish a norm in inner-party and state life ... Plenums of the Central Committee and party congresses were held irregularly, and then did not convene at all for many years. Stalin actually turned out to be beyond criticism.

Great harm was done to the cause of socialist construction, to the development of democracy within the Party and the state, by Stalin's erroneous formula that, as the Soviet Union advances towards socialism, the class struggle will become more and more aggravated. This formula, true only for certain stages of the transitional period, when the question of "who won against whom?" was being decided, when a stubborn class struggle for building the foundations of socialism was going on, was brought to the fore in 1937, at a time when socialism had already triumphed in our country. .. In practice, this erroneous theoretical formula served as a justification for gross violations of socialist legality and mass repressions.

It was precisely in those conditions that a special position was created for the organs of state security, which were given great confidence, since they had undoubted services to the people and country in defending the gains of the revolution. For a long time, the state security organs justified this trust, and their special position did not cause any danger. Things changed after the control over them by the party and the government was gradually replaced by Stalin's personal control, and the usual administration of the norms of justice was often replaced by his individual decisions. The situation became even more complicated when the criminal gang of the agent of world imperialism, Beria, turned out to be at the

head of the state security organs. Serious violations of socialist legality and mass repressions were committed.

Immediately after Stalin's death, the Leninist core of the Central Committee took the path of a resolute struggle against the personality cult and its grave consequences.

The question may arise: why did these people not openly oppose Stalin and remove him from leadership? Under the circumstances, this could not be done. Undoubtedly, the facts show that Stalin is guilty of many lawlessness, which were committed especially in the last period of his life. At the same time, however, one must not forget that the Soviet people knew Stalin as a man who always defended the USSR against the intrigues of enemies and fought for the cause of socialism.

He used unworthy methods in this struggle, violating the Leninist norms and principles of party life. This was the tragedy of Stalin. But at the same time, all this made it difficult to fight against the lawlessness committed at that time, because the successes in building socialism, strengthening the USSR in an atmosphere of a cult of personality were attributed to Stalin.

Any action against him under these conditions would not be understood by the people, and the point here is not at all a lack of personal courage. It is clear that anyone who would have come out against Stalin in this situation would not have received the support of the people. Moreover, such a speech under those conditions would have been regarded as a speech against the cause of building socialism, as an extremely dangerous undermining of the unity of the party and the entire state in a situation of capitalist encirclement. In addition, the successes achieved by the working people of the Soviet Union under the leadership of their Communist Party instilled legitimate pride in the heart of every Soviet person and created such an atmosphere when individual mistakes and shortcomings seemed less significant against the background of enormous successes.

It should also be borne in mind that many facts and incorrect actions of Stalin, especially in the field of violation of Soviet legality, became known only recently, after Stalin's death, mainly in connection with the exposure of the Beria gang and the establishment of party control over state security agencies.

These are the main conditions and the main reasons that led to the emergence and spread of the personality cult of I. V. Stalin. Of course, everything that has been said explains, but by no means justifies the personality cult of I.V. Stalin and its consequences ... "(Brochure, Gospolitizdat, 1956).

Isn't it an interesting document?

Characteristic is also the reaction of some of the largest communist parties to the question of the so-called personality cult of I. V. Stalin, expressed by them at the XX Congress of the CPSU itself.

Here is what, for example, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee Mao Zedong wrote on behalf of the Communist Party of China in his greetings to the 20th Congress:

"The communist doctrine, the Leninist principle of collective leadership, close ties with millions of Soviet people, the continuous development of criticism and self-criticism, which the Central Committee of the CPSU strictly guides in its activities, as well as the decisive defeat of the treacherous Beria clique - all these are the main factors that ensure the invincibility of the policy of the CPSU and The stronger the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the more victories won by the Soviet Union in all fields, the more manifest is the invincibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created by Lenin and nurtured by Stalin together with his closest collaborators" (p. 280).

Speaking at the 20th Congress, General Secretary of the French Communist Party M. Thorez exclaimed:

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always been a model of firmness in principle, unbreakable loyalty to the great ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin" (p. 346).

On April 7, 1956, Pravda reprinted the entire editorial of the Renmin Ribao newspaper, an organ of the CPC Central Committee. In an article based on the results of the discussion of the issue of the so-called Stalin's personality cult at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, in particular, it was said:

"The question of the struggle against the cult of personality occupied an important place in the work of the XX Congress of the CPSU. The Congress with all its frankness revealed the fact of the spread of the cult of personality, the long existence of which in the conditions of Soviet society led to many errors in work, and caused undesirable consequences.

Communists must analyze the mistakes made in the communist movement. Some people think that I. V. Stalin is fully and completely wrong. This is a serious misconception. JV Stalin is a great Marxist-Leninist, but at the same time he made serious mistakes and did not realize them as a Marxist-Leninist. We must approach JV Stalin from a historical point of view, give a comprehensive and appropriate analysis of his positive and erroneous aspects, and thus draw a useful lesson.

Both its positive and negative aspects are one of the phenomena of the international communist movement and bear the characteristic features of the era.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, following the precepts of V. I. Lenin, has a businesslike attitude towards the mistakes made by Stalin in the leadership of socialist construction and the consequences they caused. In view of the seriousness of these consequences, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it necessary, simultaneously with the recognition of the great, enormous merits of JV Stalin, to reveal with all sharpness the essence of the mistakes

he made, calling on the party to resolutely eradicate the unhealthy consequences caused by these mistakes.

As we can see, the materials of the XX Congress of the CPSU, documents after the Congress period on the issue of combating the so-called Stalin's personality cult, the characteristics of his mistakes, the picture of the negative consequences of these mistakes, presented against the background of the *recognition of Stalin's great services to our people*, to the entire world communist movement, were drawn up in very, very moderate, I would even say, cautious tones.

A little over a year has passed. And so, at the June Plenum of the Central Committee in 1957 and after it, a broad and fierce struggle unfolded in the party against the so-called anti-party, factional grouping of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov and, as it was said then, Shepilov who joined them.

This struggle, both formally and in essence, is so closely intertwined with the problem of Stalin's personality cult that both of these issues cannot be considered in isolation from each other.

The problem of the personality cult, initially presented, as I said above, in a very restrained and moderate tone, turned at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU into a genuine, unbridled campaign to defame Stalin and his closest aides and associates.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that before the XXII Congress of the CPSU, in official materials, Stalin's closest associates - Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Malenkov, however, like Stalin himself - were not yet accused of such things that they were accused of at the XXII Congress.

Any objective person, having looked at the transcripts of the XXII Extraordinary Congress of the CPSU, the transcripts of the Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, held between the XX and XXII Congresses of the CPSU, will easily notice that before the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Stalin and his closest associates, back in 1957, fell into the anti-party, factional group, were not accused of careerism,

of deliberately destroying the best cadres of the party and the state, and of other serious crimes against the party and people.

Let us turn to the documents of the XXII Congress of the CPSU.

Speakers at the convention stated:

Shelepin -

Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich, close to him, used the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov as a pretext for organizing reprisals against people they did not like, with prominent figures of our state.

At that time, emergency criminal laws were adopted, which made it possible to exterminate and defame leaders honest and loyal to the party and people. During that period, a number of extrajudicial bodies appeared ...

In addition to what has already been said at the congress, I would like to tell the delegates about some facts. In November 1937, Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich sanctioned the trial of a large group of comrades from among prominent party, government, and military workers (their signatures on this document have been preserved). Most of them were shot. Among the innocently shot and posthumously rehabilitated are such prominent figures of our party and state as comrades Postyshev, Kosior, Eikhe, Rudzutak, Chubar, People's Commissar of Justice Krylenko, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee Unshlikht, People's Commissar of Education Bubnov and others.

A number of cynical resolutions by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov on the letters and statements of prisoners testify to the cruel attitude towards people, towards leading comrades who are under investigation. For example, at one time, Yakir, the former commander of the military district, turned to Stalin with a letter in which he assured him of complete innocence.

Here is what he wrote: "... I am a private and devoted to the party, state, people, a fighter, who I have been for many years. All my conscious life has passed in selfless honest work in front of the party and its leaders ... I am honest with every word I say, I will die with words of love for you, for the party and the country, with boundless faith in the victory of communism."

On this letter, Stalin inscribed: "A scoundrel and a prostitute," Voroshilov added: "An absolutely precise definition," Molotov signed this, and Kaganovich attributed: "Traitor, bastards and ... (followed by a hooligan, obscene word) one punishment - death execution."

On the eve of the execution, Yakir turned to Voroshilov with the following letter: "K. E. Voroshilov. In memory of my many years of honest work in the past in the Red Army, I ask you to instruct you to look after my family and help her, helpless and innocent. With such I addressed the same request to N. I. Yezhov. Yakir, June 9, 1937.

And in a letter from a man with whom he worked together for many years, he knew well that he had looked death in the eyes more than once, defending Soviet power, Voroshilov imposed a resolution: "I doubt the honesty of a dishonest person in general. K. Voroshilov. June 10, 1937 "

That's how, comrades, they inhumanly controlled the fate of innocent people... for many years..." (p. 404).

Not embarrassed in terms, prominent figures of the Central Committee Podgorny, Mazurov, Furtseva, Spiridonov, Ilyichev, Satyukov, Polyansky, Shvernik and some others, who spoke at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, vied with each other accused Stalin's former associates of careerism, sycophancy, deliberate destruction and beating of the best cadres of the party , state and Soviet workers - from the secretaries of the Central Committee and deputy chairmen of the Councils of People's Commissars to the heads of railways and chairmen of collective farms, in mockery of them, and even in sadism and assault.

In his closing speech at the congress, Khrushchev said:

“The beginning of mass repressions was laid after the murder of Kirov. We still have to make a lot of efforts to really find out who is to blame for his death. The deeper we study the materials related to the death of Kirov; the more questions arise. It is noteworthy that Kirov's killer had previously been detained twice by Chekists near Smolny and a weapon was found on him, but on someone's instructions he was released both times. It so happened that at the time of the murder, the head of Kirov's security guard was far behind S. M. Kirov, although, according to instructions, he did not have the right to lag behind the guarded by such a distance.

This fact is also very strange. When the chief of security Kirov was being taken for interrogation, and Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov were supposed to interrogate him, then on the way, as the driver of this car later said, an accident was deliberately made by those who were supposed to deliver the chief of security for interrogation. They announced that the chief of security had died in the accident, although in fact he was killed by those accompanying him.

In this way, a man who guarded Kirov was killed. Then they shot those who killed him. This, apparently, is not an accident, this is a deliberate crime. Who could do it? A thorough study of the circumstances of this complex case is now under way (pp. 250 - 252).

You heard the speech of comrade Shelepin. He told a lot at the congress, but, of course, he told far from everything that had now come to light. Many party, state and military figures perished.

Such prominent military leaders as Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman and others became victims of repression. These were honored people of our army, especially Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich. They were

prominent generals. And later Blucher and other prominent military leaders were repressed.

Somehow, a rather curious report flashed through the foreign press that Hitler, while preparing an attack on our country, planted a fabricated document stating that comrades Tukhachevsky, Yakir and others were agents of the German General Staff. This allegedly secret "document" came to the President of Czechoslovakia, Benes, who, in turn, apparently guided by good intentions, sent it to Stalin. Yakir, Tukhachevsky and other comrades were arrested, and after that they were destroyed.

Many remarkable commanders and political workers of the Red Army were destroyed. Among the delegates here are comrades... who spent many years in prison. They were "convinced", convinced in certain ways that they were either German, or English, or some other spies. And some of them "confessed". Even in those cases when it was announced to such people that the accusation of espionage was being dropped from them, they themselves insisted on their previous testimony, since they believed that it was better to stand on their false testimony so that the torture would end faster, so that they would quickly come to death. (pp. 253 - 254).

Let's remember Sergo Ordzhonikidze. I believed what was said then that he died suddenly, because we knew that he had a heart condition. Much later, after the war, I accidentally learned that he had committed suicide. Brother Sergo was arrested and shot.

Comrade Ordzhonikidze saw that he could no longer work with Stalin, although he used to be one of his closest friends. Ordzhonikidze held a high position in the party. Lenin knew and appreciated him, but the situation developed in such a way that Ordzhonikidze could no longer work normally and, in order not to clash with Stalin, not to share responsibility for his abuse of power, he decided to commit suicide.

The fate of Alyosha Svanidze, the brother of Stalin's first wife, was also tragic. It was an old Bolshevik, but Beria, through all sorts of machinations, presented the case as if Svanidze had been substituted for Stalin by German intelligence, although he was Stalin's closest friend. And Svanidze was shot ... After the death of Svanidze, Stalin said: "Look how proud he died, but did not ask for forgiveness." But he did not think that Svanidze was above all an honest man.

So many innocent people died.

This is what the cult of personality means" (pp. 254 - 256).

Truly, in their speeches at the 22nd Congress, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and some other members of its highest body painted a terrible picture of Soviet reality in the 1930s!

Considering the materials of the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU, the transcripts of numerous Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the period 1957-1961, one comes to the conclusion that, in contrast to the moderate and restrained tone in relation to the so-called Stalin's personality cult, a course in which the negative consequences of the so-called Stalin's personality cult was interpreted as the "tragedy of Stalin", a course in which, up to the moment of the opening of the XXII Congress, there was no mention of his closest living associates - in contrast to this course, the course of the XX Congress of the CPSU - at the XXII Congress Stalin and his comrades-in-arms appear before us as unprincipled, cruel and prudent careerists, concerned only with how to maintain their power and in the struggle for it mercilessly destroying hundreds of their imaginary and not imaginary rivals - the best,

Stalin and his comrades-in-arms, people who throughout the entire 30 years of Soviet power, right up to the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, constituted the main core of the Central Committee, in the presentation of the 22nd Congress, they themselves appear before us as rabid and notorious enemies of the people.

It turns out that for 30 years at the head of our Party, at the head of our state, their worst enemies managed to hold on by deceiving and intimidating the Party and the people? Yes, according to the logic of Khrushchev and others like him, it turns out so. And here no words of refutation will help.

These are the first, purely external conclusions you come to when examining the documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

I, very carefully, of course, using the materials that I had at my disposal, tried to analyze those definitely specific examples of the deliberate destruction of people that were cited in the speeches of Khrushchev, Shepilov and other delegates of the 22nd Congress.

But before dwelling on the analysis of these examples, let me dwell briefly on the very concept of "careerism".

Careerism is, first of all, the desire of a person to rise to a higher level of his official position or by any means to stay on the already reached level, contrary to the will and desires of most others, guided by his own selfish motives and goals.

It hardly needs any confirmation of the fact that the greatest possible degree of power under the conditions of our socialist system and a single ruling party has been and is wielded by people elected to the Presidium of the Central Committee (Politburo).

Therefore, it seems to me that if we are talking about careerism on the part of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee or the Politburo, then it should be recognized that, when applied to them, the concept of careerism can only be applied as a desire to retain power, eliminating, and destroying their rivals.

If we take this point of view for a moment, if we assume for a moment that Stalin and his closest associates deliberately, for careerist purposes, subjected to physical destruction (or, anyway, turned a blind eye to it) innocent prominent figures of our party and state, then voluntarily or involuntarily, whether we want it or not, we will have to come to the conclusion that the prominent leading figures of our party and state, among whom, by the way, were most of the current

members of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee are not the best cadres of our party and state, that these are people who survived only because they did not represent Stalin or Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Malenkov in the eyes, did not pose a danger to their careerist, anti-party, anti-people and anti-Soviet affairs.

If we stand for a moment on the point of view of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, then we should admit that during the period of the so-called Stalin's personality cult, when the fate of the party and the state was single-handedly and dictatorially controlled by Stalin and several other members of the Politburo, then it should, in turn, be recognized that during this period all any significant posts in the party and state, starting with secretaries of regional committees and chairman of regional executive committees, not to mention the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Union republics, the chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the Councils of Ministers of these republics, members of the Central Committee, etc. - Stalin and his collaborators nominated only such people who, in the eyes of Stalin and his entourage, did not have any significant political and business value, any significant authority in the party and the people.

These are the paradoxical logical conclusions you come to when studying the materials of the XXII Congress of the CPSU on the issue of the so-called Stalin's personality cult.

Let's return to the consideration of specific documents.

The main attention at the congress was given to three persons: S. M. Kirov, Tukhachevsky and Yakir.

About Tukhachevsky.

Above were the words of Khrushchev about Tukhachevsky and other prominent military leaders in their time.

In 1963, the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense published a book by the famous writer L. Nikulin "Tukhachevsky".

According to L. Nikulin,

"rudeness, capriciousness, uncontrollable lust for power, ambition, envy of the abilities of others - all these features of Stalin contributed to the fact that many prominent military leaders of the Red Army, those who could lead Soviet troops into battle from the very beginning, were physically destroyed ..."

The main motive for the physical destruction of Tukhachevsky, according to Nikulin, was the fact that even during the years of the civil war, major disagreements arose between Stalin, who was then a member of the RVS of the South-Western Front (front commander - Egorov), and Tukhachevsky, who then commanded the Western Front regarding the directive of the Commander-in-Chief to transfer the 1st Cavalry Army (Voroshilov, Budyonny) to Tukhachevsky.

Stalin, supported by the command of the 1st Cavalry, did not agree to transfer it to the Western Front, considering the immediate capture of Lvov to be the best help for him. When Yegorov nevertheless signed the order to transfer three armies under the command of Tukhachevsky, Stalin refused to sign it and informed the Commander-in-Chief about this.

"How can one explain Stalin's actions?" asks L. Nikulin and immediately answers himself. - It seems that he did not want all the laurels to go to someone else. He also sought to break the laurels of victory, at least by taking Lvov. According to him, the success of the Western Front was to be shared with the Southwestern Front" (p. 127).

Nikulin writes that on September 1, 1920, the Politburo released Stalin from his duties as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front.

"To a certain extent, Tukhachevsky, his insistence on transferring the 1st Cavalry Army and the 12th Army to the Western Front was the reason for Stalin's recall. In those years when the cult of personality was growing, people who at one time had the misfortune to provoke his discontent, time felt unkindness on his part" (p. 129).

In a word, L. Nikulin in his book in every possible way develops the idea that Stalin needed only an excuse to deal with Tukhachevsky, who was objectionable to him, objectionable because, due to "the strength of his vindictive and ambitious character," Stalin could not forget and forgive him, Tukhachevsky, his role in the above events.

Meanwhile, many participants in the civil war, including such prominent ones as the former commander of the Southwestern Front Yegorov, the former head of the Operations Department of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, back in the twenties, that is, in the years when Stalin's personality cult was out of the question, in their books they clearly pointed to the wrong, adventurous actions of Tukhachevsky in his desire to attack Warsaw at all costs. They, and not Stalin, reproached Tukhachevsky for the inept use of reserves, for the inconsistency in the actions of his troops.

I did not find that place in Khrushchev's speeches in which he accuses Stalin, and accuses him, precisely in connection with the events near Warsaw in 1920, of his dismissive assessment of V. I. Lenin's military abilities. But I remember well that Khrushchev, speaking of V. I. Lenin's reaction to the Lvov-Warsaw problem, quotes Lenin's words that, he, Lenin "does not understand how to help the Western Front by advancing on Lvov."

It seems to me that the repetition of such a thought by V.I. Lenin, even if he once expressed it, is inappropriate, but according to Khrushchev himself, that does not testify in favor of V.I. Lenin.

L. Nikulin, talking about the disagreements between Stalin and Tukhachevsky over the events near Warsaw in 1920, could not help but know that, in essence, it was not about disagreements between Stalin and Tukhachevsky, but about disagreements between Stalin and Trotsky, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.

In addition, L. Nikulin for some reason completely ignored the testimony of such an authoritative witness as V. I. Lenin himself.

Speaking at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) on March 8, 1921 (see the verbatim report of the congress), V. I. Lenin said:

"... During our offensive, advancing too quickly almost to Warsaw, a mistake was undoubtedly made. I will not figure out now whether this mistake was strategic or political, because this would lead me too far ... But in any case , the error is obvious, and this error is caused by the fact that the superiority of our forces was overestimated by us ... But the fact is obvious: In the war with Poland, we made a well-known mistake."

From this brief quotation from the speech of V. I. Lenin, by the way, it is clearly visible that V. I. Lenin himself assessed Tukhachevsky's offensive against Warsaw, both as a strategic (too fast advance) and as a political mistake - remember his telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council Western Front of August 9, 1920:

"Your reports are too laconic. Details are needed, and extremely hastily, about the mood of the farm laborers and Warsaw workers, as well as about political prospects in general. I beg you to answer as soon as possible" (Len[inskiy] collection, vol. 34, p. 342) .

It is known that the attack on Warsaw allowed Pilsudski to play on the national, patriotic feelings of a certain part of the Polish workers and peasants, on their primordial distrust of Russian great-power chauvinism, and, taking advantage of these feelings, to organize a rebuff to the offensive of the Red Army units on Warsaw.

Further in his book, L. Nikulin writes:

"In the first years after the death of Vladimir Ilyich, Stalin's desire for power was not so strongly felt. At the head of the Red Army, as before, was the faithful son of the party, Frunze.

In 1928, Tukhachevsky wrote a memorandum on the need to re-equip the Red Army. He calculated the number of new weapons and proposed building a number of factories to carry out this task, allocating large funds for the complete technical re-equipment of the army.

Stalin recognized Tukhachevsky's note as unrealistic. True, this note was written before the beginning of the 1st Five-Year Plan, when the country did not yet have a powerful industrial base.

Soon Tukhachevsky was forced to resign as chief of staff of the Red Army ...

He was appointed commander of the troops of the Leningrad district ...

As time went by, the first five-year plans were being implemented. In the international situation, the approach of a thunderstorm was felt ... Stalin was forced to reconsider his attitude to Tukhachevsky's memorandum, which he had previously called nonsense.

He was unfriendly to the author, but he understood that apart from him there was no person who could re-equip the army with modern weapons. Tukhachevsky was appointed deputy people's commissar of defense and head of armaments "(pp. 164 - 169).

"But", writes L. Nikulin,

"Tukhachevsky did not feel a solid support under him, because he knew Stalin too well to believe in his kind attitude towards himself. He knew how jealous Stalin was for someone else's glory or just fame" (p. 176). Tukhachevsky "for a long time did not feel the support of the one who stood above him. Together with all the people, he experienced the most difficult loss - Lenin died, who knew how to appreciate people, understand people, and knew who to trust" (p. 188).

Reading L. Nikulin, one simply wonders where he gets such illogical construction and inconsistency in thoughts! Stalin is a despot; he is vicious and vindictive; Tukhachevsky does not feel the support of Stalin, Lenin died; Frunze died...

But it was precisely from 1925, after the death of V. I. Lenin and M. V. Frunze, that the dizzying military-political career of Tukhachevsky began!

In fact, in November 1925 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Red Army.

In 1928 - 1931. - he is the commander of the Leningrad military district. Downgrade? Mistrust? In Nikulin's interpretation - yes, but in reality - not at all, given that historical moment (the struggle of the party against the Zinoviev opposition) and the historical fact that Zinoviev was the commander of the Leningrad Military District before Tukhachevsky was appointed to this post.

In 1931, Tukhachevsky was the head of armaments of the Red Army. Contrary to Nikulin's assertion that "time passed and the first five-year plans were carried out," it was during the "very first" five-year plan that Tukhachevsky was appointed to this post.

On November 7, 1938, "for exceptional personal services to the revolution in organizing the defense of the USSR on the external and internal fronts of the civil war and subsequent organizational measures to strengthen the power of the Red Army" (p. 176), Tukhachevsky was awarded the Order of Lenin and hosted a parade of troops on Krasnaya area.

In 1934, Tukhachevsky - 1st Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. At the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) he was elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

In 1935 - Tukhachevsky - among the first five marshals of the USSR. One must have the over-imagination and over-illogicality of L. Nikulin in order to see in this brilliant track record of Tukhachevsky the evil, vengeful and envious character of the one who held the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and without the knowledge, consent, and direct instruction of which not a single any significant appointment or movement in the party and state.

It seems to me that what has been said is quite enough to refute the idea developed by L. Nikulin that Stalin's personal hostility towards him, caused by envy, vindictiveness, lust for power, egoistic feelings etc., played a fatal role in the fate of Tukhachevsky.

Among other things, it is impossible not to notice, speaking of the so-called Stalin's personality cult, that Tukhachevsky himself made a considerable contribution to the glorification of I.V. Stalin. Let us recall, for example, his speech at the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b) in 1934, which he ended with the following words:

"... I have no doubt that under the pressure of our Party, under the pressure of the Central Committee, under the guiding and organizing pressure of Comrade Stalin, we will accomplish this most difficult task (re-equipment of the army. - V. M.)" (Stenotchet of the 17th Congress. Partizdat. 1934 .).

At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev mentioned in his closing speech that recently a report had flashed in the foreign press that Tukhachevsky and other prominent military men had been repressed as a result of a provocation by Hitler's intelligence.

In his book, L. Nikulin develops this idea of Khrushchev. He writes, quoting in the chapter "Russian Knot" of a foreign publication:

"The security service, i.e. Heydrich, Behrens and Nauhoks, in secret from the chief of German intelligence Canaris and the Gestapo ... began to prepare "evidence" of Tukhachevsky's betrayal. They fabricated a forged letter in which Tukhachevsky and his associates allegedly agreed on to get rid of the guardianship of civilians and seize power in their own hands.

In the letter, they tried to copy not only the handwriting, but also the characteristic style of Tukhachevsky. On the original letter there were authentic stamps "Abwehr", "Sov. Secret", "confidential" was Hitler's original resolution - an order to organize surveillance of the German Wehrmacht generals, who were allegedly connected with Tukhachevsky. The letter was the main document. The entire "dossier" had fifteen

sheets, and in addition to the letter, it contained various documents in German, signed by Wehrmacht generals (the signatures were fake, copied from bank accounts).

All that remained was to forward the dossier to Stalin. The "theft" of the dossier was simulated during a fire from the building of the Abwehr-intelligence. Then a photocopy of the "dossier" ended up in the hands of Beneš. He apparently believed in the authenticity of this document and let Stalin know about it, sincerely thinking that he was opening his eyes. It was in this spirit that Benes wrote a letter to his friend L. Blum, in which he claimed that there was a secret connection between the Red Army General Staff, its top commanders, and Nazi Germany.

No matter how carefully we treat various kinds of memoirs, confessions of living and dead Nazi agents, we still cannot cross out their testimony, just because in the documents left by Beneš (and in Churchill's memoirs), we find confirmation of the fact of the participation of G Hitler and his agents in a provocation directed against prominent Soviet military leaders.

The calculation was correct: Stalin did what Hitler and Heydrich hoped for, knowing his character, vindictiveness, and suspicion" (pp. 192 - 193).

The first, purely emotional feeling that arose in me after reading this piece from L. Nikulin's book was a feeling of some kind of embarrassment, mixed with indignation. L. Nikulin, a Soviet man, a writer who claims to be objective, you see, with great care regarding all sorts of memoirs and confessions of living and dead Hitler's agents, but nevertheless believing in the good intentions of Churchill and Benesh and pouring mud on the leader of his people, for some reason he allows himself to "forget" about such historical facts as the trials of 1937-1938.

I do not want to linger on these trials for the time being, and I will only allow myself to ask L. Nikulin the following question, digressing from everything else -was Stalin at one time aware of those memoirs

of living and dead Nazi agents that Nikulin writes about? Was Stalin aware of Churchill's memoirs or "documents left by Beneš"?

Let's stop at Yakira.

If in the case of Tukhachevsky, according to L. Nikulin and others like him, Stalin's ill will, his vindictiveness and suspicion played a fatal role, then Yakir, according to Khrushchev himself, was highly respected by Stalin. Consequently, in the Yakir case Stalin's vindictiveness and viciousness should not have taken place.

Why did Stalin destroy Yakir?

Let us repeat once again Yakir's letters, which Shelepin mentioned at the 22nd Congress.

In a letter to Stalin, Yakir wrote:

"... I am an honest and devoted fighter to the party, state, people, who I have been for many, many years..."

In a letter to Voroshilov he wrote:

"To K. E. Voroshilov. In memory of my many years of honest work in the past in the Red Army, I ask you to instruct me to look after my family and help her, helpless and innocent ..."

Both of these, cited by Shelepin, Yakir's letters cause me great doubts from the point of view of their evidence of Yakir's innocence and the cruelty of Stalin and other members of the Politburo. Rather, on the contrary.

Why? Firstly, because I cannot, for some reasons, which I will discuss below, treat with confidence documents in which ellipses appear as evidence, i.e. to individual phrases from the documents, and, secondly, because it seems to me that the cited letters of Yakir, if you pay attention to the places I have underlined in these letters, and especially to the general tone of the letters, clearly testify to their repentant character, to a quite definite recognition by Yakir himself of his guilt.

Of course, I am referring only to my own impressions of these letters.

Now about the murder of S. M. Kirov.

In the above speech at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev, in fact, revised the official version of the murder of Kirov that existed before the congress and, with his rather transparent hints, made it clear that he was in solidarity with the rumors about Stalin's involvement in the murder of S. M. Kirov, who was allegedly dangerous for Stalin by his popularity in the party and the people.

The old members of the party probably remember well that it was Kirov who sang of Stalin with inspiration and enthusiasm.

And, arguing formally, one could simply confine oneself to this kind of question - could a person who was rightfully called in the party "Stalin's singer" threaten the power and authority of Stalin?

Here is Kirov himself:

"Comrades, the party of which we are members has no equal in the world, our party is growing stronger every day. The leadership of our party is in the faithful hands of a staunch Leninist. The Central Committee of our party is headed by the best Leninist, who is the leader of the entire Communist International. Throughout the entire work on the five-year plan, we, comrades, have repeatedly become convinced of the exceptional historical role that Comrade Stalin plays in the cause of our socialist construction. Stalin: No one, like him, defended the purity of our Leninist ranks, Leninist commandments. I think that under this reliable, tested leadership, we, despite the many shortcomings in our work, we will accomplish just as victoriously, just as much in these coming years, as we did during the first five-year plan "(Kirov, report on the results of the January joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at a meeting of the party activists of the Leningrad organization. January 17, 1933).

"Comrade Stalin is an example of a Bolshevik in the full sense and purpose of the word. It is no coincidence that the enemies direct their arrows primarily at Comrade Stalin, who embodied the invincibility and greatness of the Bolshevik Party" (Speech at the joint plenum of the Leningrad regional and city committees of the CPSU (b) February 9, 1933).

"Comrades, speaking of the merits of our Party, of the successes of our Party, one cannot fail to mention the great organizer of those gigantic victories that we have. I am talking about Comrade Stalin.

I must tell you that this is a truly complete, truly all-round follower, a successor to what was left to us by the great founder of our party, whom we lost ten years ago.

It is difficult to imagine the figure of a giant like Stalin.

In recent years, since the moment when we have been working without Lenin, we have not known a single turn in our work, not a single major undertaking, slogan, direction in our policy, the author of which would not be Comrade Stalin, but someone else, or another. All the main work - the party must know this - is carried out according to the instructions, on the initiative and under the leadership of Stalin.

The powerful will, the colossal organizational talent of this man ensured the party timely implementation of major historical turns associated with the victorious construction of socialism "(Report on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the V Regional and II City Leningrad Party Conference. January 17, 1934).

And finally, I will quote one passage from SM. Kirov's speech at the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at the same congress at which he, Kirov, according to rumors spread among a certain part of the population, allegedly received the support of the majority of the congress delegates who recommended him for the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instead of Stalin:

"Comrades, ten years ago we buried the one who created our party, who created our proletarian state. But also ten years ago, through the mouth of the best continuer of Lenin's work, the best helmsman of our great socialist construction, our million-strong party, our million-strong working class, through the lips of this best, we took a sacred oath to fulfill the great behests of Lenin. We, comrades, can proudly say before the memory of Lenin: we fulfill this oath, we will continue to fulfill this oath, because this oath was taken by the great strategist for the liberation of the working people of our country and everything peace - Comrade Stalin" (Stenotchet of the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b.). Partizdat. 1934).

Reading these and other speeches by SM. Kirov, comparing them with the speeches and speeches of other prominent figures of our party of that period, you are convinced that Kirov, like no one else, really justified the name "Stalinist singer" given to him by the party.

And once again I ask myself and you - could the authority and power of Stalin be threatened by a person who glorified him so?

Let us recall the first official report on the murder of SM. Kirov. It stated in particular:

On December 1, Comrade Kirov was preparing for a report on the results of the November plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which he was supposed to make on the same day at a meeting of the party activists of the Leningrad organization.

Near the office of Comrade Kirov in Smolny, where visitors are usually received, Nikolaev, at the moment when Comrade Kirov was walking into his office, approaching from behind, fired a revolver into the back of the head of Comrade Kirov.

The killer was arrested immediately."

The killer arrested at the crime scene turned out to be L.V.

Nikolaev, a former employee of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, who was expelled from the party at the XV Congress of the RCP (b) for belonging to the Zinoviev opposition (see steno report of the XV Congress of the RCP (b). Gosizdat. 1928, p. 1319).

N. Khrushchev, in his speech at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, revolved for a long time around the murder of Kirov, around the questions of who the killer of Kirov was, why he was allowed to kill Kirov, although he was detained before with weapons in their hands, why an accident was simulated with a car carrying the chief of security Kirov for interrogation, etc. etc.

It is difficult to assume that Khrushchev forgot about the materials of the investigation into the murder of S. M. Kirov, conducted under the supervision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. It is difficult to assume that Khrushchev and others like him did not remember or did not know about the trials of the "Leningrad Terrorist Center" and the "Moscow Terrorist Center", which took place in 1934, in the month of December.

If we can question the trials of 1937-1938, referring to the adventuristic, hostile activities in the NKVD and OGPU bodies of Yezhov and Beria, then, it seems to me, we cannot allow such a reference to the trials of 1934 related to the assassination of Kirov.

The formal accusation in the case of the "Leningrad Center" stated that the center set itself the task of disorganizing the leadership of the Soviet government through terrorist acts directed "against the leaders of the Soviet government, and in this way changing the current policy in the spirit of the so-called Zinoviev-Trotskyist platform."

In his testimony, Nikolaev said that the leaders of the "Center" hoped that "the elimination of Kirov would weaken the existing leadership of the CPSU (b). They targeted Kirov in the CM because the former opposition had its own special accounts with Kirov in connection with the struggle that he organized against the Leningrad opposition."

This testimony can be trusted, for anyone who wants to follow the struggle of the party with the Trotskyist-Zinovievist, and later the Bukharin-Rykovian opposition can easily be convinced that if no one

sang Stalin with such rapture and inspiration as Kirov, then no one like Kirov, did not attack the oppositionists with such harshness and directness. Suffice it to recall the report of S. M. Kirov on November 28, 1927, on the work of the Leningrad Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) at the IX Party Conference of the Moscow-Narva region, where he directly accused Zinoviev and Kamenev of trying to "betray the revolution and betray Lenin." At the Fifteenth Congress, Kirov declared that "the working class is waiting for the oppositionists to be expelled from the party."

At the 16th Congress, Kirov said:

"Armed with this opportunist ideology, the right-wing opposition set itself the goal of becoming the head of the leadership of our party.

Who does not know and does not remember what kind of harassment on the part of the Rights arose against the policy of the Central Committee of our Party, what fierce attacks were subjected to the General Secretary of our Party, Comrade Stalin? We all have in our memory the plans that were ripening in the heads of the rightists ... "

In his reports at the joint plenum of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee and the Transcaucasian Regional Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the meeting of the Tiflis Aktiv together with the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of Georgia on December 19 and 20, 1930, Kirov warned the party that

"An absolutely unprecedented phenomenon is being created in the Party, which represents a danger in the given period of time.

This is double-dealing, this is a formal recognition of the general line of the Party, but in reality it is underground work against it, against the Party.

None other than Kirov proclaimed that

"Within our party there must be a completely merciless, completely uncompromising struggle against all kinds of opportunists, right and "left", covert, soft and hard - whatever you like."

None other than Kirov said:

"Now that the main questions of construction in town and countryside have been decided in favor of the party and its general line, embarking on the path of opposition leads directly and directly to the counter-revolutionary camp. It's not a matter of a faction within our party, but of the inevitable crossing over to the other side of the barricades towards a rabid counter-revolution".

"Leningrad Center" had two special groups. One of them was preparing a terrorist attack on Kirov, the other on Stalin. And is it really surprising that the first group in this respect achieved greater success in carrying out their criminal plans, for it was in Leningrad, the former fiefdom of Zinoviev, that the largest number of his loyal supporters remained.

The investigation into the case of the "Leningrad Center" established the presence of another, the so-called "Moscow Center", created by Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov and other leaders of the former opposition. In relation to the "Leningrad terrorist center" "Moskovsky" played a political role.

For reasons that I will discuss below, the leadership of the "Moscow Center" managed then, in 1934, to hide from the investigation its direct participation in the murder of S. M. Kirov. Then, in 1934, the leaders of the "Moscow Center" Zinoviev, Kamenev and others limited themselves to assuming moral and political responsibility for the assassination of Kirov and were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR to various, many to the most minimal, prison terms.

Only much later, at the trials of 1937-38, all the details of the murder of S. M. Kirov was revealed.

Let's take a closer look at these processes. And in the future, all the quotations I cite, can be checked against the following three documentary collections published in 1937 and 1938 by the Legal Publishing House under the headings: "The Trial of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev Bloc", "The Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist (so-called parallel) Center" and "The Trial of the Right-Trotsky Bloc".

First of all, I want to emphasize that all these three most complicated and intense trials were open, widely covered in the Soviet and foreign press. As I have already said, all the materials of the judicial investigation were published in separate editions in large circulations and presented in the most detailed way (of course, with the exception of closed sessions).

During interrogation on August 10, 1936, the defendant Evdokimov testified:

"... At the trial in the murder of Kirov, I - Evdokimov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakaev, Gertik and others deceived the authorities and the court, concealing that the murder of Kirov was prepared and carried out by us ..."

In the processes of 1937 - 1938. it was clearly proved that the assassination of Kirov was carried out on the direct directive of Trotsky and Zinoviev and on the corresponding decision of the united center of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev organization.

Stubbornly shutting himself away, Zinoviev was eventually forced to confess that back in 1932 a decision had been made to organize terrorist acts against Stalin in Moscow and Kirov in Leningrad.

"In the autumn of 1932," Zinoviev said, "at my dacha in Ilyinsk, in the presence of Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakaev and Karev, I instructed Bakaev to prepare a terrorist act against Stalin, and Karev to prepare a terrorist act against Kirov."

Kamenev stated in court on this occasion:

"I joined this decision, as I shared it entirely." "Motivating the need for a terrorist act against Kirov, Zinoviev said that Kirov

must be physically destroyed, as Stalin's closest assistant. He added at the same time that "it is not enough to cut down an oak, it is necessary to cut down all the young podbrubki (*sprouts Ed*) that grow near this oak tree." The need to kill Kirov Zinoviev was also motivated by the fact that Kirov is the head of the Leningrad organization and is personally responsible for the defeat of the opposition in Leningrad," the defendant Reingold said at the trial.

At the trial of the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" it was found out that one of the accomplices in the murder of S. M. Kirov was Yagoda, who was then deputy chairman of the OGPU.

Yagoda testified during the investigation and trial:

"The fact that the assassination of S. M. Kirov is being prepared by the decision of the center, I knew in advance from Yenukidze. Yenukidze offered me not to obstruct the organization of this act, and I agreed to this. For this purpose, I called Zaporozhets from Leningrad, to whom I gave instructions not to obstruct the impending terrorist act against SM Kirov.

Yagoda's testimony was confirmed at the trial by Yenukidze and Zaporozhets.

Bulanov, Yagoda's former personal secretary, gave detailed testimony about Yagoda's participation in this crime. In one of the conversations, Yagoda told Bulanov that

When members of the government arrived in Leningrad and summoned this Borisov to Smolny to interrogate him as a witness to the murder of Kirov, Zaporozhets, alarmed by this and fearing that Borisov would betray those behind Nikolaev, decided to kill Borisov. At the direction of Yagoda, Zaporozhets arranged for the car that was taking Borisov to Smolny for interrogation to crash. Borisov was killed in the accident, and in this way they got rid of a dangerous witness."

Khrushchev and others like him, pretending that they "forgot" about the political trials of 1934-1938, voluntarily or involuntarily subject these processes to a radical revision, cast doubt on the reliability and sincerity of the testimony of their participants - Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bukharin, Rykov, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and dozens of other defendants and witnesses, numerous experts, etc.

It is clear that, without having the original documents, it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge whether everything really happened the way the defendants say about it. Of course, it can be assumed that they were forced to give part of their testimony under torture and fear of death, etc. etc.

But I must repeat once again that all these trials were open, widely covered in the press, and anyone who wants to sort out the facts as objectively as possible can and should turn to a careful analysis of the materials on these trials.

Here is a book in front of me - "The Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center" of the Legal Publishing House of 1937 - "The Judicial Report on the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center, Considered by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on January 23-30, 1937, on charges of Pyatakov Yu. L., Radek K. B., G. Ya. "

I deliberately dwelled on this process because all these people were still at large when the trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev were over, and therefore they could not, having caught themselves, have any illusions about what awaited them.

I will not dwell on the course of the process, although, of course, there were many interesting things. But I cannot fail to dwell on the last words of the main defendants in this trial, former old revolutionaries who went through a great school of the revolutionary and opposition underground.

In their last words they said:

Pyatakov -

to draw for me personally any practical conclusions from it. But do not deprive me of the right to realize that, and only to realize that, even if it is too late, I still threw this dirt, this abomination out of myself.

After all, the most difficult thing, citizens of the judge, for me is not the just sentence that you will pass. This consciousness is primarily for myself, consciousness during the investigation, consciousness to you and consciousness to the whole country, that as a result of all the previous criminal underground struggle I found myself in the very thick, in the very center of the counter-revolution - the counter-revolution of the most disgusting, vile, fascist type, the Trotskyist counter-revolution.

It would be wrong to think that when my Trotskyist activities began, I knew where all this would lead.

It would be wrong to think - this does not in the least diminish my objective criminal deeds - but it would be wrong to think that I subjectively set myself counter-revolutionary tasks and realized what a swamp of abominations and crimes we would eventually come to.

Do not think, citizens of the judge, - although I am a criminal, but I am a man - that during these years, the years of the suffocating Trotskyist underground, I have not seen what is happening in the country. Do not think that I did not understand what is being done in the industry. I'll say it straight. Sometimes, leaving the Trotskyite underground and doing other practical work, I sometimes felt as if relieved and, of course, this duality was human not only in the sense of external behavior, but also duality inside.

... When already at the end of 1935, by 1936, we came close, or rather, incorrectly - we didn't come close, but found ourselves in the very thick of treason, betrayal, and the most undisguised fascist counter-revolution, when it was clear for us, that we are turning into agents of fascism, then not only I had the desire to get away from this. I did not find in myself

enough courage, nor enough firmness to take the only path that opened up, this

- the way of a voluntary story about my activities, the issuance of the organization and the issuance of everything that I did in the past, i.e. do before I did.

There was an arrest. The arrest has fulfilled its positive role in the sense of my giving exhaustive, complete testimony about the activities of Trotskyism. But he played his role only in the sense that if I had previously tried somehow to get out of this hole in the wrong way, then the arrest presented me with a dilemma: either continue to remain an enemy to the end, an unconscious, unrevealed, remaining Trotskyist until the last day, or take the path that I have taken.

I understand that this cannot serve as a motive for indulgence. I am only explaining to the court what finally prompted me to give that exhaustive testimony, which, I hope, helped at least a little to sort out this dirty tangle.

I will not say, citizens of the judge - it would be ridiculous to talk about this here - that, of course, no methods of repression or influence were used against me. Yes, these methods, for me personally at least, could not be an incentive to testify.

It is not fear that motivates them to tell about their crimes. What could be worse than the very consciousness and confession of all those crimes - the gravest and most harmful ones that had to be done?

Any punishment you endure will be lighter than the very fact of the confession. That is why I cannot reconcile myself with the assertion of the State Prosecution that even now, in the dock, I have always been and remain a Trotskyite...

I am too keenly aware of my crimes and I dare not ask you for mercy. I dare not even ask you for mercy.

In a few hours you will pass your judgment. And here I stand before you in the mud, crushed by my own crimes, deprived of everything through my own fault, having lost my party, having no friends, having lost my family, having lost myself.

Do not deprive me of one, citizens of the judge. Do not deprive me of the right to realize that in your eyes, even if too late, I found the strength to break with my criminal past" (pp. 222 - 224).

Radek -

"Citizens of the judge! After I pleaded guilty to treason, any possibility of a defensive speech is excluded.

There are no arguments by which an adult, not devoid of consciousness, could defend treason to the motherland. I can't claim extenuating circumstances either. A person who has spent 35 years in the labor movement cannot mitigate his guilt by any circumstances when he admits treason to his homeland ...

I went with the Trotskyist organization, not in the name of Trotsky's theory, whose rottenness I realized during my first exile, and not in the name of recognizing his authority as a leader, but because of another group on which I could rely on those political goals that I imagine set, it wasn't. I was associated with this group in the past and that's why I went with it.

I went not because I was drawn into this path of struggle, but on the basis of my own assessment of the situation, on the basis of a voluntarily chosen path ...

With this, I could end my last word, if I did not consider it necessary to object to the elucidation of the process, the elucidation of the partial, not in the main point given here, which I have to reject, not from my personal point of view, but from the political point of view. I admitted my guilt and gave full testimony about it, not based on a simple need to

repent - repentance can be an inner consciousness that you cannot share, not show to anyone - not out of love for the truth in general - this truth is very bitter, and I have already said that he would rather be shot three times than admit it - and I must admit guilt based on an assessment of the general benefit that this truth should bring. And if I heard that just bandits and spies are sitting in the dock, then I object to this.

And the point is this: this process has shown two major facts: the intertwining of counter-revolutionary organizations with all the counter-revolutionary organizations of the country. This is one fact.

There is a huge amount of objective evidence for this fact. The sabotage can be established by technical experts, the terrorist work consisted in the connection of so many people that the testimony of these people, apart from material evidence, gives an absolute picture. But the process is two-centric, it has another tremendous significance. He showed the forge of war, and he showed that the Trotskyist organization has become an agent of those forces which are preparing a new war.

What evidence is there for this fact? For this fact, there are testimonies of two people - my testimony, who received directives and letters from Trotsky (which, unfortunately, I burned), and the testimony of Pyatakov, who spoke with Trotsky. All other testimonies of the other defendants, they rest on our testimonies. If you are dealing with pure criminals, spies, then on what can you base your confidence that what we have said is the truth, the unshakable truth?

Clearly, the public prosecutor, the court, who know the whole history of Trotskyism, who know us, have no reason to suspect that we, bearing the burden of terror on our backs, appropriated treason to ourselves for pleasure. There is no need to convince you of this. It is necessary to convince, firstly, the dispersed, wandering Trotskyist elements in the country who have not yet laid down their arms, who are dangerous and must understand what we are saying here,

shocked to the core, and speak the truth and nothing but the truth. And we must also show the whole world that Lenin - I repeat this name with a shudder from this bench - in a letter, in directives to a delegation heading to The Hague, wrote about the secret of the war ... I cannot hide this secret and take it from myself to the grave for the reason that if, in view of what I confessed, I do not have the right to act as a repentant communist, then, nevertheless, 35 years of my participation in the working-class movement, with all the mistakes and crimes in which it ended, gives me the right to demand confidence in one thing - that all the same, these masses of people with whom I walked represent something for me. And if I hid this truth and left the stage with it, *as Kamenev did, as Zinoviev did, as Mrachkovsky did*, then when I thought over all these things, in my dying hour I would still hear the curse of those people who will be killed in a future war and to whom I could, by my testimony, give the means of fighting against the impending war.

Therefore, I dispute the assertion that criminals who have lost everything human are sitting in the dock. I am fighting not for my honor, I have lost it, I am fighting for the recognition of the truth of the testimony that I gave, the truth in the eyes of not this hall, not the public prosecutor and the court, who know us as flaky, but a much wider circle of people who knew me for 30 years and who cannot understand how I could slip. I need them to see convincingly from beginning to end why I gave this testimony.

... I was cowardly before the difficulties of socialism in 1931-1933. ...At this I stumbled and went back to the underground. And along the way, I immediately became the subject of deception. I say this not to lessen my guilt, but because I increased this deceit, multiplied it tenfold in relation to our rank and file, and so that you understand those personal motives that made it easier for me to understand the need for a turn.

When I was a member of the organization, Trotsky in his letter did not hint at the seizure of power. He felt that this idea

would seem too adventurous to me. He only picked up on my deep anxiety and that I might, in such a state, decide to join. And it'll all work out later. When, in a conversation with Pyatakov in December 1932, he told me: "what are you, what are you, it's a state conspiracy," that was the first crack at the very beginning.

In September 1983, Romm brought me a letter from Trotsky, which, as if by itself, spoke of sabotage. Again - and Romm in his testimony says that I was unheard of dumbfounded. Why? Because when I was negotiating, they didn't tell me a word about wrecking... And when Pyatakov again revealed these things to me, I, of course, knew that the doors had been slammed shut. It's ridiculous to start a dispute about this. But it was the second crack.

And, finally, after Trotsky's directive of 1934, sending him the reply from the center, I added on my own behalf that I agreed to the sounding of the soil - do not get involved yourself, the situation may change. I suggested: let Putna, who has connections in leading Japanese and German military circles, conduct the negotiations. And Trotsky answered me: "We will not get in touch without you, we will not make any decisions." The year was silent. A year later, he confronted us with the facts of his conspiracy ...

And what is the picture before me? First stage. Kirov was killed. Years of terrorist preparation, dozens of vagrant terrorist groups going at random to sack one of the leaders of the party, and the results of terror for me personally were the loss of human life without any political consequences for us.

The second is defeat.

... Whoever used to disguise before himself that he was a defeatist by necessity, in order to save what can be saved, he had to say to himself: I am a traitor who helps to conquer a country that is strong, growing, moving forward. For what purpose? In order for Hitler to restore capitalism in Russia.

Did I know before the arrest that the matter would end precisely with the arrest? How could I not know about this if Tivel, the head of the organizational part of my bureau, was arrested, if Friedland was arrested ... I will not name other names ... I could not then for one minute have any doubt that the matter would end in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. And then I have to answer the question - why didn't I turn to the party, why didn't I turn to the authorities, and if I didn't do it before my arrest, then why didn't I do it at the time of my arrest?

The answer to this question is very simple. The answer is as follows. I was one of the leaders of the organization. I knew that Soviet justice is not a meat grinder, that there are people of varying degrees of guilt among us, that we, the leaders, must answer with our heads for what we did. But there is a significant stratum of people that we have brought to this path of struggle, who did not know the basic, I would say, organization guidelines, who trudged forward blindly.

When I raised the question of a conference, I wanted a disengagement so that those who wanted to go to the end would separate - those who could be handed over to even those who were bound - and give those others the opportunity to leave and thus give the opportunity to declare their guilt to the government .

When I found myself in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the head of the investigation immediately understood why I did not speak. He told me: "You are not a small child. Here are fifteen testimonies against you, you cannot get out and, as a reasonable person, you cannot set this goal for yourself; if you do not want to show it, then only because you want to gain time and take a closer look. Please take a closer look." For two and a half months I tormented the investigators, forcing them to do unnecessary work. For two and a half months, I forced the investigator to interrogate me, opposing the testimony of other accused, to reveal the whole picture to me, so that I could see who confessed, who did not confess, who revealed what.

This went on for two and a half months. And one day the head of the investigation came to me and said: "You are already the last one." And I said, "Yes, I'll start testifying tomorrow." And the testimony that I gave, from the first to the last, does not contain any corrections. I revealed the whole picture as I knew it, and the investigation could correct one or another of my personal mistakes in terms of the connection of one person with another, but I affirm that nothing that I said during the investigation was refuted and nothing was added.

I admit to myself one more fault: having already admitted my guilt and disclosing the organization, I stubbornly refused to testify about Bukharin. I knew that Bukharin's position was as hopeless as mine because our guilt, if not practically, then essentially, was the same. But we are close friends, and intellectual friendship is stronger than other friendships. I knew that Bukharin was in the same state of shock as I was, and I was convinced that he would give honest evidence to the Soviet authorities. Therefore, I did not want to bring him bound to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Just as with the rest of our cadres, I wanted him to be able to lay down his arms. This explains why only towards the end, when I saw that the trial was on the nose, I realized that I could not appear in court, hiding the existence of another terrorist organization ...

We, including myself, cannot demand any indulgence, we have no right to it, and I'm not saying - there is no pride here, what kind of pride can there be ... I will say that we do not need this indulgence . Life in the coming years, five to ten years, when the fate of the world will be decided, makes sense in one case, when people can take part at least in the most menial work of life. What was, excludes it. And then condescension would be only unnecessary torment. We are quite a sung company among ourselves, and when Nikolai Ivanovich Muralov, Trotsky's closest person, about whom I was convinced that he would rather die in prison and not say a single word, when he gave his testimony and motivated them by the fact that he did not want to die in the

consciousness that his name can be a banner for any counter-revolutionary bastard,

We fully realized what tools of historical forces we were. It is very bad that, with our literacy, we realized this so late, but let this consciousness of ours serve someone."

Muralov -

"I gave up the defender, I gave up the defense, because I'm used to defending with a good weapon and attacking. I don't have a good weapon to defend myself.

Yesterday the public prosecutor doubted our sincerity, the sincerity of our testimony. I also took it to my address, because, of course, it is quite legitimate to doubt in relation to criminals. But I assure the court that neither during the investigation, nor here, at the trial, I concealed anything in my testimony, I gave exhaustive information about my criminal activities and gave an appropriate assessment. I have already mentioned how I came to this conclusion. I struggled with myself for a long time... I did not want to remain a fool, I did not want to remain a criminal, because if I locked myself up, I would be a banner for the counter-revolutionary elements, which, unfortunately, still exist on the territory of the Soviet Republic. I did not want to be a root from which poisonous offspring would grow.

For over ten years I have been a loyal soldier of Trotsky, that villain of the labor movement, that despicable agent of fascism, enemy of the working class and the Soviet Union. But for more than twenty years I have been a loyal soldier of the Bolshevik Party. All these circumstances forced me to honestly say everything and tell it at the investigation and trial. These are not my empty words, because I am accustomed to being faithful in the old days, at the best time of my life, a loyal soldier of the revolution, a friend of the working class. And I ask you to take into account these sincere testimonies of mine when passing this or that sentence on me.

Norkin -

"During the investigation, I told everything about my crimes without concealment. I completely repented. All my testimony is completely sincere and accurate. This is enough for the court to be able, having sorted out all the details and circumstances, to make the necessary decision. circumstances sufficient to soften the assessment and spare my life, I declare that I will accumulate strength with the greatest greed in the hope of giving my strength in the fight against fascism. an act of my life - I want to use it to convey my bubbling contempt and hatred for Trotsky. There is a lot of it so that Trotsky can generously share it with his partners and the real masters of the fascist intelligence services and general staff "(p. 241).

Shestov -

"Citizens of the judge. For 18 years I was a member of a counter-revolutionary, subversive, and fascist organization. For the last five years I have been actively preparing, trying to kill the leaders of the working people, the leaders of the working class ... For the last five years, I have been actively conducting destructive, subversive work in the mines, mines of Kuzbass. The last four - five years I was a traitor, an agent of the most reactionary detachment of the world bourgeoisie, an agent of German fascism... I knew what I was getting into. I knew where I was going, I knew what awaited me if the organization I led failed. I do not ask for mercy. I do not need indulgence. The proletarian court should not and cannot spare my life. Here, in front of you, in the face of all the working people, in the face of all countries oppressed by capitalism, I, by virtue of my abilities, shot down the ideology, in the captivity of which was thirteen. And now I want one: with the same calmness, stand at the place of execution and wash off the stain of the traitor with your own blood.

Here are the last words of the main defendants in the process of the so-called "parallel Trotskyist center". I was not too lazy to bring them almost completely.

Many times, in the most attentive way, I re-read these words and, honestly, I could not get rid of the impression that they spoke sincerely, definitely not counting on the fact that their sincerity could mitigate their fate.

Many times I analyzed in the most attentive manner the entire course of the trials of 1937-1938. And even if we admit the idea that without exception all the persons who went through these trials gave their testimony under direct physical pressure or, as some of today's intellectuals say, moral threats, etc., in order to force them to give false ones, necessary accusatory materials for someone, then I am certainly convinced that no tortures and threats are able to force such last words in an open trial.

In a word, I have no objective or subjective grounds to question, let alone refute, the trials of 1937-1938.

Khrushchev and others like him, pretending that they do not know anything about the trials of 1937-1938, and once again raising the issue of the murder of S. M. Kirov, the issues of rehabilitation of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other convicts in these trials, thereby, as it were, revising these trials, questioning the legitimacy of these trials and, whether they want it or not, - they also take under their protection such people as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Pyatakov, Radek, Reingold, Putna, Muralov, Rakovsky, Krestinsky, Shestov, and the like.

Here it is necessary to return to Tukhachevsky again.

The trial of a group of former senior commanders of the Red Army, in contrast to the trials of civilians, for obvious reasons, took place behind closed doors. But some rather significant facts about the conspiratorial activities of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and other military men leaked into the testimony of the accused in other trials.

At the trial of the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyists", which took place in March 1938, the defendant Krestinsky, a former deputy. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, testified, for example, that back in 1933, during his meeting with Trotsky in the city of Meran, Trotsky suggested that he establish contact with Tukhachevsky, in whom he

saw "an adventurous person who claims to take the first place in the army, and who is likely to go to great lengths."

From the testimonies of the defendants at this trial, it is clear that Tukhachevsky hatched the plan of a military coup.

Krestinsky said that when the defeat of underground organizations began in 1936, Tukhachevsky began to force the coup in every possible way.

"At the end of November 1936, at the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, Tukhachevsky had an exciting, serious conversation with me. He said: failures have begun, and there is no reason to think that the arrests that have been made will stop ... He drew conclusions: you don't have to wait for intervention, you have to act on your own ... Tukhachevsky spoke not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of the counter-revolutionary organization of the military, "Krestinsky testified at the trial.

In March 1937, a conference was held at the apartment of a member of the center of the "Right-Trotskyist Center", Defendant Rozengolts, in which Tukhachevsky and Krestinsky took part. At the meeting, the deadline for the speech was set - the second half of May (after Tukhachevsky returned from a trip to London).

Speaking about the possible options for a military coup, Rosengoltz stated in his testimony:

"... Tukhachevsky had a number of options. One of the options on which he most strongly counted was the opportunity for a group of military men, his supporters, to gather in his apartment under some pretext, penetrate the Kremlin, seize the Kremlin telephone exchange and kill the leaders of the party and government."

The same Rozengolts testified that another participant in the conspiracy, Gamarnik, "reported to him his assumption, apparently agreed with Tukhachevsky, about the possibility of capturing the building of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs during a military coup. Moreover, Gamarnik assumed that this attack would

be carried out by some kind of military party, directly under his leadership, believing that he sufficiently enjoys party political authority in the military units. He expected that some of the commanders would help him in this matter. I remember that he called Gorbachev's name. "

Grinko spoke about the preparation of terrorist acts by Gamarnik and Yakir in his testimony:

"... A fact that is known to me and which refers to the same period is the preparation by Bergavinov from the Glavsevmorputi of a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin. I also knew about this from Gamarnik. Antipov and Yakovlev knew about this, I knew about this from Bergavinov himself, who told me that he accepted the task of Gamarnik and is trying to carry it out.

In general, trying to the best of my ability to objectively understand the events of 1934-1938, I imagined the following picture of the concrete historical situation of those years.

Having lost all hope of the emergence in the course of socialist construction of difficulties insurmountable for the party and government, which could lead to the compromise and overthrow of the government and, thus, ensure the coming to power of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, the latter begin in 1931 to agree on the organizational merger of both opposition groups. The center of the underground Trotskyist organization then consisted of Mrachkovsky, N. I. Smirnov and Ter-Vaganyan. The Zinovievites had their own center, which included Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov and Bakaev. The united center was made up of the persons mentioned, in which Zinoviev and Smirnov played a leading role.

In case of failure, the Trotskyists created their own parallel purely Trotskyist center, which included Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov and Sokolnikov. The parallel center was engaged in the restoration of old connections and the creation of its branches on the periphery. A Ukrainian Trotskyist center was created (Loginov, Golubenko, Kotsyubinsky,

Livshits). There is a Trotskyist cell in the Urals, in Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kyiv and ... (omission in the text. - Ed.). Even earlier, in 1928, on Trotsky's directive, an underground Trotskyist center was formed in Western Siberia (Muralov, Boguslavsky, Beloborodov, and others). A Trotskyist center also took shape in Georgia (Mdivani, Okudzhava, Kavtaradze, and others).

At the beginning of 1933, the disagreements between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievites were finally smoothed out, and right-wing and bourgeois nationalists joined them. This unity of views was expressed in 1933 [in the creation] of the so-called "Contact Center", which included representatives of all anti-Soviet underground organizations. The "contact center" was a stage in the creation of a conspiratorial organization of the "highest type", known as the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites." The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks also joined the bloc.

In February 1935, Tukhachevsky's group joined Blok.

The leading center of the bloc included Bukharin, Rudzutak and Yagoda from the right, Tukhachevsky from the military group, Pyatakov from the Trotskyites.

Wreckership as a means of creating additional artificial difficulties in the national economy and thereby causing dissatisfaction and embitterment with the policy of the party and government, the spread of all sorts of anti-Soviet, anti-party and anti-government rumors under various sauces and for various reasons, individual political terror and, finally, sophisticated double-dealing, demonstration of complete devotion and loyalty to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and its leading core, as the main method of conspiracy, have become widespread in all these organizations as the main means of struggle for the implementation of the goals set for this underground to seize the leadership of the party and the country.

I do not want to dwell now on the description of the wrecking work of various anti-Soviet organizations.

But one cannot fail to say a few words about their terrorist activities.

In my opinion, enough has been said about the murder of S. M. Kirov.

The commission of terrorist acts has been entrusted to a number of terrorist groups and individuals created for this purpose. One of these individual terrorists was Zinoviev's former secretary Bogdan, who was instructed by Zinoviev to shoot Stalin in the secretariat of the Central Committee. After Bogdan did not complete this task in 1933, he committed suicide.

"I know from Mrachkovsky and Dreitzer," defendant Reingold testified, "that in the summer of 1933 a Trotskyist group of military men was organized under the leadership of Dreitzer, which included: Schmidt, commander of one of the Red Army brigades, Kuzminov, chief of staff of one of the military formations, and a number of other persons whose names I do not know. I know from Dreitzer that the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act against Voroshilov were Schmidt and Kuzminov, who agreed to carry out this act. It was assumed that they would use one of Voroshilov's methods for this, or use Voroshilov's visit to their military units.

Dreitzer himself and others gave similar testimony.

During the trials, it was irrefutably proved that in addition to "their" terrorists, anti-Soviet organizations used the services of hired terrorists - agents of foreign intelligence services, transported to the USSR by Trotsky and his henchmen. So, for example, the terrorists Olberg, Borman-Yurin, Fritz David, M. and I. Lurie, and dozens of others were transported to the USSR.

Many of them went through the trials of 1934-1938. and gave detailed testimonies about their spy-terrorist work.

The testimonies of such "leaders" as Pyatakov, Radek, Rykov, Bukharin are interesting.

According to Radek, Trotsky in his directives demanded

"organize a narrow team of people to carry out assassination attempts on the leaders of the CPSU (b), primarily against Stalin."

Pyatakov, in his testimony, said that in a conversation with him in 1935, Trotsky said:

"Understand that without a whole series of terrorist acts, which must be carried out as soon as possible, it is impossible to topple the Stalinist leadership."

At the trial of the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" Rykov testified that

"Back in 1934, I already gave the task of monitoring the cars of the leaders of the party and government to the Artemenko group I created."

Bukharin confessed that in 1932 he enlisted the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorists, "who had extensive experience in such matters," to organize and carry out the assassination attempts on Stalin and Kaganovich.

At the direction of the center of the Trotskyist underground, A. M. Gorky, V. V. Kuibyshev, and the chairman of the OGPU Menzhinsky were killed.

"The United Center ... for a long time tried to indoctrinate Gorky and tear him away from closeness to Stalin. For this purpose, Kamenev, Tomsy, and a number of others were assigned to Gorky. But this did not give real results ... When the question of overthrowing Stalin's leadership and the seizure of power was seriously raised , the center could not

but take into account the exceptional influence of Gorky in the country, his authority abroad ... "(From the testimony of Yagoda).

The Trotskyist part of the bloc especially insisted on the murder of Gorky, which was a consequence of Trotsky's categorical directive. According to Bessonov, this directive was given to him by Trotsky in 1934:

"M. Gorky is very close to Stalin. He plays an exceptionally large role in winning sympathy for the USSR in public and world democratic opinion, and especially in Western Europe ... Yesterday's our supporters from the intelligentsia to a large extent under the influence of Gorky, are moving away from us. At the same time I conclude that Gorky must be removed. Pass on this order of mine to Pyatakov in the most categorical form: "Gorky must be physically destroyed at all costs."

In the destruction of Gorky, according to Rykov, the fact that "Trotsky was well aware that Gorky considered him a rogue and an adventurer" also played a role.

In connection with what has been said about the terrorist activities of the Trotskyists, one cannot fail to recall the following passage from the speech of N. M. Shvernik at the 22nd Congress:

"... Here is an example of Molotov's extreme cynicism. When he traveled to Prokopyevsk in 1934, the car he was in drove off with its right wheels into a roadside ditch. None of the passengers received any injuries. This episode subsequently served as the basis for the version of "attempt" on the life of Molotov, and a group of innocent people were convicted for this. Who, if not Molotov, knew that in fact there was no attempt, but he did not say a word in defense of innocent people "(Stenotchet of the XXII Congress, Gospolitizdat, 1961, p. 216)?

Let's try to take a closer look at what has been said.

First, as is known, Kirov had not yet been assassinated in November 1934, the existence of a wide network of underground Trotskyist organizations had not been revealed; secondly, could Molotov himself, without resorting to the help of the relevant authorities, establish whether the incident with his car was an accident or a deliberate act; and, finally, thirdly, would it not be better to turn to the facts, as they are presented in the book *The Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center*?

Who was directly accused of preparing the assassination attempt and of the assassination attempt on Molotov itself? Muralov, Boguslavsky, Shestov, Arnold and some others were accused of this, and Arnold alone was accused of the attempt on Molotov, as the only criminal act. Muralov, Boguslavsky, Shestov and others were charged with treason, espionage, and sabotage activities. Such was the group of "innocent people" who were accused of preparing an assassination attempt and an attempt on the life of Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

During interrogation in an open session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the defendant Boguslavsky said:

"In 1934, it became known to me that in addition to those terrorist groups that I spoke about, the Khodorose and Shestov groups, Muralov instructed the director of one of the state farms - Kudryashev - to carry out a terrorist act against the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov, whose arrival was expected in Siberia, and in particular to this state farm. Muralov told me about this."

Vyshinsky: Who prepared this terrorist act?

Boguslavsky: Kudryashev, on behalf of Muralov.

VYSHINSKY (to Muralov): Accused Muralov, was there such a case?

Muralov: The order was given not to Kudryashov, but to Khodoroza and Shestov.

VYSHINSKY (to Shestov): Do you confirm Muralov's testimony that he ordered you to organize an assassination attempt on Comrade Molotov?

Shestov: Yes, I confirm.

VYSHINSKY (to Boguslavsky): Accused Boguslavsky, explain.

Boguslavsky: The preparation of terrorist acts was carried out in such a way that they were not concentrated in one place. Shestov was instructed to organize a terrorist act against Molotov if he came to Kuzbass, which was done by the accused Arnold. But in parallel, the same was entrusted to Kudryashev. I affirm this, Kudryashev himself told me about it. Shestov organized terrorist groups in such a way that they could carry out a terrorist act anywhere in Kuzbass, not excluding the preparation of this act at the state farm ...

VYSHINSKY: From whom did Kudryashev receive such a task?

Boguslavsky: From Muralov" (p. 87).

And here is the testimony of the accused Muralov and Shestov.

"Muralov: ... In Prokopyevsk, in 1934, we tried to commit a terrorist act against Molotov, but the act was unsuccessful. So, in fact, no terrorist acts were committed in Western Siberia.

VYSHINSKY: Failed?

Muralov: Yes, failed.

VYSHINSKY: Did you prepare?

Muralov: We were preparing.

VYSHINSKY: Did you fail because you refused, or did it not depend on you?

Muralov: No, it just didn't work out then.

VYSHINSKY: Please tell us in more detail how the attempt on Molotov's life was organized, to whom did you give such an order, who organized it?

Muralov: I entrusted this to Shestov. He told me that he had already prepared a group headed, I think, by Cherepukhin, and that a driver had been prepared who was ready to sacrifice his life to take the life of Molotov. But at the last moment the driver faltered, did not risk sacrificing his life, and thus Molotov's life was saved.

VYSHINSKY: How was the assassination attempt expressed?

Muralov: The car was supposed to turn at full speed into a ditch. Under this condition, the car turns over by inertia upside down, the car breaks down, people ...

VYSHINSKY: Allow me to ask Shestov. Defendant Shestov, do you confirm Muralov's testimony in this part?

Shestov: Yes. I also recall that at the beginning of June 1933 I told Muralov that Ordzhonikidze was expected to arrive in Kuzbass, and received from Muralov an instruction to commit a terrorist act against Ordzhonikidze.

VYSHINSKY: Having received a direct order from Muralov to prepare terrorist acts, what did you actually do?

Shestov: When I found out about Molotov's arrival, I ordered Cherepukhin to immediately leave for Prokopyevsk to personally supervise the terrorist act against Molotov. He did just that. As he later told me, he instructed Arnold to carry out this terrorist act. The preparatory plan provided for the commission of a terrorist act by means of a car accident, and two convenient places were chosen. Who knows, this is

Prokopyevsk, near mine No. 5, towards the mine administration, and the second place is between the work camp and mine No. 3. There is not a groove, as Muralov said, but a ravine of fifteen meters.

Vyshinsky: "Ditch" of fifteen meters! Who chose this place?

Shestov: I am personally with Cherepukhin.

VYSHINSKY: Who told the performers about these places?

Shestov: Cherepukhin spoke to the performers. He told me that he managed to put Arnold behind the wheel of the car.

VYSHINSKY: Who was Arnold then?

Shestov: Arnold was the head. garage. He is an experienced driver. Moreover, as Cherepukhin told me, he even provided for additional reinsurance. It consisted in the fact that if, for some reason, Arnold drifted, the second car, a truck going towards him, should hit the passenger car in the side so that both cars had to fly into a ravine.

Indeed, Arnold was driving Molotov, turned the steering wheel and thereby disorientated the heavy car, which slipped in the hope that Arnold had fallen into a ravine. In fact, although he turned the steering wheel into the ravine, he did not turn decisively enough, and the guards driving behind him managed to pick up this car literally in their arms. Molotov and others seated, including Arnold, climbed out of the already overturned car. Here is what Cherepukhin reported to me at the time about this. Analyzing this situation together with Cherepukhin, we came to the conclusion that Arnold did not give enough gas and did not make a sharp enough turn.

VYSHINSKY: Let me ask Arnold. Accused Arnold, did you hear Shestov's testimony? Did he show correctly?

Arnold: The technical design is not well outlined...

VYSHINSKY: But was it actually a fact?

Arnold: Yes, there was" (p. 95 - 96).

During interrogation in court, Arnold said:

"Cherepukhin comes to my office in the morning and says: "Molotov will be here today. Look, don't miss it again." I replied that I would do it. I gave the car to the expedition. I knew the place where I was supposed to make an accident, it was near the rise from mine No. 8. There is a rounding, on this rounding there is not a ditch, as Shestov called it, but what we call a slope - the edge of the road, which has a depth of 8 - 10 meters, a drop of about 90 degrees. When I brought the car to the entrance, Molotov, the secretary of the district committee of the party, Kurganov, and the chairman of the regional executive committee, Gryadinsky, got into the car.. They told me to go to the workers' settlement along Komsomolskaya street. I went. When I just started to leave the country road for the highway, suddenly a car flew towards me. I then realized that Cherepukhin did not believe me, which means he sent a second car. I didn't have time to think. But I got scared. I managed to turn to the side, into the ditch, but at that moment Gryadinsky grabbed me and said: "What are you doing?"

VYSHINSKY: What stopped you here?

Arnold: I was stopped by cowardice..." (p. 128).

Here is an almost complete account of the official version that existed before the XXII Congress of the CPSU regarding the accident with Molotov's car in 1934.

What concrete opposition was made at the 22nd Congress to these materials? Nothing but a few unsubstantiated phrases.

I am convinced that any objective person, speaking of the so-called period of Stalin's personality cult, cannot bypass the political processes of 1937-1938. We can and should treat them critically, but

we have no right to forget about them at all if we want to truly understand such a complex issue as the question of Stalin's personality cult.

And I ask myself again - on what basis should we question and refute the materials of the trials of 1937-1938, materials based on the testimony, on the unanimous testimony of dozens of people with rather strong characters and definite political and moral attitudes?

I remember how at one time the bourgeois press reacted to these trials, asserting that the unanimity of the accused in these trials, their detailed and frank testimony was obtained by the NKVD with the help of some super-sophisticated tortures, machines, etc. invented in it.

Can a sensible person agree with such assertions, which, by the way, have been strengthened to no small degree by the 22nd Congress?

No he Cannot.

Does all of the above mean that I completely reject the very possibility of the existence in the period under review of facts of arbitrariness, condemnation of innocent people, etc.?

No, it doesn't. Not only was I not going to and am not going to reject this possibility, but I fully agree that the facts of arbitrariness, careerism, condemnation of innocent people, etc. things were widespread in the period under review.

But I ask myself - if the counter-revolutionary organizations in one of the first places put forward a plan to cause discontent and anger among the population of the USSR with the policy of the party and government, then couldn't they also put their hand in the activities of our investigative, judicial and all other similar institutions - state and public? They could, and they certainly did.

I ask myself - if we talk about the mass character of arbitrariness and unjustified repressions of the period 1937-1938. - Do we have the right to forget about our state, Soviet, economic, and even party apparatus of that time?

Are we entitled to assume that all this million-strong apparatus, including here the NKVD and justice bodies, was completely free from specific bearers of the heritage of the past - squabblers, careerists, etc.?

Stalin was right or wrong when, speaking on January 7, 1933, at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he said:

“As a result of the implementation of the five-year plan in the field of industry, agriculture, and trade, we have approved the principle of socialism in all spheres of the national economy, driving out the capitalist elements from there.

What was it supposed to lead to in relation to the capitalist elements, and what did it actually lead to?

This led to the fact that the last remnants of the dying classes were thrown out of the rut: industrialists and their servants, merchants and their henchmen, former nobles and priests, kulaks and kulakists, former white officers and sergeants, former policemen and gendarmes, all kinds of bourgeois intellectuals of the chauvinistic sense and all other anti-Soviet elements.

Being knocked out of the rut and scattered throughout the territory of the USSR, these former people spread to our plants and factories, to our institutions and trade organizations, to railway and water transport enterprises, and mainly to collective farms and state farms. They crawled and hid there, throwing on the mask of "workers" and "peasants", and some of them even crawled into the party.

What did they go with? Of course, with a feeling of hatred for Soviet power ...

These gentlemen are no longer capable of launching a direct attack against Soviet power. They and their classes had already led such attacks several times, but were defeated and

scattered. Therefore, the only thing left for them to do is to harm and harm the workers, collective farmers, Soviet power, the party" (Problems of Leninism, 11th ed., p. 392).

I think that one cannot but agree with these words of Stalin.

It is clear that Stalin's statement did not mean at all and does not mean that all (or that the bulk) of these former people were wholly and completely set up purely hostile to Soviet power.

But is it really a big mistake if we assume that it was this mass of former people who settled in our Soviet, economic, and party bodies, in industrial and agricultural enterprises, in transport, etc., that it was he who played a certain - sharply negative - role in the facts of arbitrariness, violation of socialist legality, careerism, etc., that phenomena took place?

The great realist V. I. Lenin said:

"There is no doubt that we live in a sea of lawlessness and that local influence is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, opponents of the establishment of legality and culture-checking commissions, the settlement of local and personal accounts..." (vol. 33, p. 328).

None other than Lenin, speaking of the new Soviet apparatus, of an apparatus "really deserving of the name Soviet, socialist", stated that

"... such an apparatus and even elements of it are ridiculously few in our country, and we must remember that in order to its creation ... it is necessary to spend many, many, many years" (vol. 33, p. 446; sub-V.M.).

V. I. Lenin said this in 1923.

It is difficult to deny, if one does not say loud phrases, that these words of V. I. Lenin equally applies to the apparatus of 1934-1938 and even to our current apparatus.

And the question is, how can Stalin and his closest collaborators be accused of creating conditions in the country for rampant

arbitrariness and lawlessness, completely ignoring the actions of our Soviet and party apparatus?

How can a communist-Leninist present things in such a way, as if in such a gigantic country like the USSR, with its 21 million square km of territory, with its 170 million population, some dozens of people could for many years create arbitrariness and lawlessness, deliberately destroying the best sons and daughters of the people?

Is this propaganda of the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the role of the masses and the individual in history? No, this is its rebuttal.

The question is, where was the party of millions of communists, where were tens of millions of Soviet, real Soviet people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia?

Did they really not notice all this, or were they crushed by fear that they could not even utter a word?

The question is, do we really not notice that, representing the period of the so-called Stalin's personality cult in the light in which they tried to present him at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU and in the period that followed Khrushchev and others like him - did we thereby represent our party and our people to the whole world as a party and people of cowards of sycophants?

It is impossible to agree with such a view.

Based on numerous historical documents of the period 1934-1938. I take the liberty of asserting that the party, at any rate a broad party active, knew, understood, and justified the necessity of strengthening the rigidity and firmness of the dictatorship of the proletariat in this period.

At the same time, I proceed from the circumstance, which is undoubted for me, that the processes of 1936-1938 were processes not inspired by someone for careerist purposes and, moreover, in order to destroy prominent Soviet and party workers, but revealed a real picture of the mass distribution among the former opposition groups

of various anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary, sabotage and espionage underground organizations.

And there is nothing surprising or inexplicable in the fact of their existence. Anyone who more or less objectively wants to understand this, based on the materials of the history of our party, can easily trace the path along which, literally from the day the RSDLP was founded, all these former opposition groups and small groups rolled into the swamp of counter-revolution, political terror, sabotage, and treason .

Whomever we take from the members disclosed in 1934 - 1938. underground counter-revolutionary organizations - and what has been said applies not only to the leaders of these organizations - we will definitely find that this particular person was at one time severely (ideologically, and often also practically) punished by Lenin, the party for certain political mistakes.

By the way, they talk about the cruelty and suspicion of Stalin.

They say, but for some reason forget to add, that until 1936, many old members of the party, members of the Central Committee and the Politburo reproached the same Stalin for excessive softness towards people who showed hesitation and indecision in carrying out the general line of the party, who allowed big and serious mistakes. They forget that even such people as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Smirnov and others were expelled 2-3 times and reinstated in the party not without the knowledge and direct instructions of its general secretary; that even such people as Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Rakovsky and others, whose political views were recognized by the party as early as 1930, at the 16th Congress of the CPSU(b), as incompatible with Leninism, right up to the very trials of 1936-1938 remained in the party, and some even in the Central Committee,

I don't want to give evidence in support of what has been said, because, I repeat, everyone can easily find them in materials on the history of the CPSU (b) - in the transcripts of congresses and plenums, in which, by the way, unlike the current transcripts, they were set out in the most detailed way the point of view on this or that issue under consideration of all their participants - both supporters and

opponents of this or that event of the party and government, this or that solution of not only practical, but also political and theoretical issues.

Once again I consider it necessary to emphasize that I do not deny the presence in the campaign, in the political campaign of 1936-1938, of errors, distortions and excesses, facts of unfounded decisions, condemnation of innocent people, and so on.

But it is absolutely wrong and essentially anti-Party to attribute all these intentional and unintentional, "conscious and unconscious" phenomena to Stalin, to members of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Committee, abstracting from the concrete historical situation of those years, from the influence and direct actions of our then party, Soviet and the economic, central and, especially, the local apparatus, which is by no means free from careerist, sycophant-fraudulent and directly hostile, subversive elements who took advantage of the situation of lawful, natural intensification of the struggle against the numerous underground counter-revolutionary organizations discovered during this period for their own purposes. And the Party knew about this, took into account that such moments could and did take place, tried to prevent, and correct the mistakes and excesses made.

Even at the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1930, that is, long before the so-called period of repression, speaking with a political report of the Central Committee, I. V. Stalin said:

"Some comrades think that the main thing in the offensive of socialism is repression, and if repression does not increase, then there is no offensive. Is this true? Of course, it is not true."

We accused Stalin and Molotov of theoretical substantiation of the repressions of 1937-1938, i.e. during the period of exposure and disclosure of the broad anti-Soviet Trotskyist underground.

But we forgot that even before the murder of SM. Kirov, at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1934 - the Congress of the Winners - many delegates to the congress, including such now rehabilitated comrades as Postyshev, Kosior,

Rudzutak, who occupied the highest posts in the party and the state, said:

"The class struggle during this period assumed the sharpest forms, which was also reflected in the Party ... The struggle, comrades, was exceptionally sharp, and it could not be otherwise, because during this period one of the main, most difficult tasks of October, the task of socialist reorganization of the countryside ... It is obvious that a defeated and scattered enemy, deprived of a material base, does not cease to be an enemy, he remains one, but even more malicious, even more hating our socialist construction. At the same time, we must remember that the enemy is warmed up, inspired by capitalist forces surrounding our country, by the forces of our present capitalist encirclement" (From Kosior's speech, pp. 197 - 201).

The speech of N. Khrushchev, Secretary of the MK and MGK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at this congress is also interesting:

"The concrete leadership of our Leninist Central Committee, and above all of Comrade Stalin, was felt by our entire Party. We, the workers of the Moscow organization, felt this leadership of the Leninist Central Committee and Comrade Stalin personally especially directly, day after day, on all the issues on which we had to work .

In their time, Right deviators settled in the Moscow organization. The Right, led by Uglanov, and the leaders of the Right Opposition - Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky - tried to use the organization in the capital in the struggle against the general line of the Party, against the Leninist Central Committee of the Party.

Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the Rights are defeated in our Party and in the Moscow organization.

We carried out a purge in the Moscow Organization, which further strengthened the combat capability of our ranks. But we must not be arrogant, we must not weaken our Bolshevik vigilance. We must fight misunderstandings on some of the issues of creating a classless society. Some understand this question in such a way that, they say, one can rejoice - soon there will be no classes and there is no need to wage a class struggle. The class struggle does not stop, and we must mobilize the forces of the party, the forces of the working class, strengthen the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the final destruction of all class enemies, all remnants of the right and "left" and all other opportunists ... "(Stenotchet of the 16th Congress. Partizdat. 1934 g., pp. 145 - 147. Emphasized by me - V. M.).

The question is, is this a sincere, correct statement, or just a toadying or double-dealing declaration?

The question is posed, perhaps somewhat sharply, but in fact, in fact, it can only be posed in this way: either - or; either it was a conscious statement by a communist, one of the leaders of the Moscow party organization, or an insincere statement, i.e. double-dealing.

At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, N. Khrushchev and some other leading figures of the party and state tried to present the matter in such a way that they supposedly knew nothing and could do nothing to correct and suppress the mistakes and excesses committed through the fault of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov fight against the enemies of the people.

I contend that this is a trick designed for simpletons.

Members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, including Khrushchev and Mikoyan, could not be unaware of every facet of party and judicial persecution of people who held one or another major party or government post. They might not have known, and probably did not know, all the materials and files of people brought to justice for political reasons throughout the entire Soviet Union. It would be foolish to present the matter in such a way that several dozen people, members of the Central Committee,

were personally engaged in analyzing the cases of several thousand people. But I affirm that the cases of all persons who held prominent party or state positions were known to them, and that these persons were brought to trial by the decision of the majority of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Let's take this fact. It is known that from May 22 to May 28, 1937, the IV Moscow City Conference was held, and after it - from June 5 to June 10 - the V Moscow Regional Party Conference, at which a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the first secretary of the Moscow Committee and MGK Khrushchev.

Speaking at the Fifth Regional Party Conference and condemning the excesses in the struggle against the Trotskyist elements, Khrushchev said:

"Some comrades simply dealt with people and threw out good people who were loyal to us from the Party. We must now correct the mistakes we made" (XIV collection "To Help Students of the History of the CPSU," 1962, p. 81).

Doesn't this one little quotation from Khrushchev's numerous speeches during that period testify to the fact that he was perfectly aware of the state of affairs both in the Moscow party organization and in the party as a whole? I think it testifies. And it is interesting to note that this was said in June 1937 - at the very height of the unfolding campaign against the enemies of the people. What is it - Khrushchev's personal courage or an expression of an objective assessment of the state of affairs? What is it - Khrushchev's personal opinion or the opinion of the party and its Central Committee? I think it will not be difficult to answer these questions.

It is known that in the period 1936 - 1937. secretaries of the MK and MGK of the CPSU (b) A. I. Ugarov, B. A. Bratanovsky, I. V. Margolin, E. S. Kogan, N. I. Dedikov, the chairman of the regional executive committee N. A. Filatov, the secretary of the regional committee of Komsomol Aleksandrov, a number of secretaries of district party committees, chairman of district executive committees, etc. Now all the comrades listed above by name have been rehabilitated.

The question is - could Khrushchev, being the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, not know about the repressions against his closest assistants and employees? And does this mean that the repressions against these persons, his deputies, and subordinates, were primarily beneficial and needed by Khrushchev himself for careerist or even directly hostile purposes?

Following the logic of Khrushchev, we would inevitably have to adopt a similar point of view. But Khrushchev's logic is not the logic of a Marxist-Leninist, but the logic of an ordinary embittered tradesman, and it does not suit us.

The Party and the people knew that in the fight against real enemies and their accomplices, mistakes and excesses are made, as a result of which honest Soviet citizens can and do suffer.

Speaking at the same Fifth Moscow Regional Party Conference, the same Khrushchev, as a positive example in the work of the Moscow party organization he headed, cited the fact that the Moscow Committee and the Moscow City Committee during 1937 reinstated 3810 people in the party ranks who were incorrectly expelled from the party on slanderous denunciations and on the grounds of "passivity".

Hence? Consequently, the Party was not only aware of the mistakes that were being made, but also tried to correct these mistakes.

The delegates of the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in 1939, that is, immediately after 1937 - 1938, in their speeches did not even think to hide the fact that during these years there were numerous, sometimes blatant facts of arbitrariness, lawlessness, unjustified exclusion from the party, condemnation of innocent people, etc.

The secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a member of the Politburo, A. A. Zhdanov, was the main speaker on this issue at the 16th Congress of the CPSU (b). Here is what he said in his big speech:

“At the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 and the January Plenum of the Central Committee of

1938, the party condemned the practice of a formal and callous attitude to the question of the fate of party members. expulsions from the Party, as well as by disguised enemies within the Party, who sought, through the widespread use of measures of repression, to kill honest members of the Party and sow excessive suspicion in the ranks of the Party. vigilance to kill as many honest communists as possible, meant to sow mutual distrust and disorganize our ranks.

Slandering honest communists under the banner of "vigilance" is at present the most widespread method of covering up and disguising hostile activity. Look for undiscovered hornets' nests of enemies first of all among slanderers.

Further, A. A. Zhdanov gave numerous and vivid examples of this enemy (including careerist) activity, covered up by the flag of the struggle for "vigilance."

A. A. Zhdanov spoke about the secretary of the Issinsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Tambov Region, Kalaikin, who out of the total number of members of the party organization of 175 people expelled fifty-eight people from the party. Priluchny acted in the Arkhangelsk region, writing 142 statements against the communists to the NKVD, none of which was confirmed. In Leningrad, for a long time, a whole group was operating, which fabricated compromising materials on honest communists and sent these materials to the NKVD. Gladkikh, secretary of the Rovdensky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Arkhangelsk Region, gave each communist the task of "finding an enemy of the people" and warned in advance that "there would be no excesses from this"; in Klyuchevskoy district of Aktobe region, the enemy of the people of Peskovskaya organized the expulsion of 156 communists from the party, or 64% of the entire district party organization.

Needless to say, this list given in A. Zhdanov's report could be significantly expanded and extended?

A. A. Zhdanov said:

"The enemies directed their main efforts to killing honest Bolshevik cadres. The enemy of the people Kudryavtsev, who before his exposure was in a leading position in one of the Ukrainian party organizations, in his testimony said the following:

"We tried to expel as many people as possible from the party. We also excluded those for whom had nothing to expel. There was only one calculation - to increase the number of embittered people and thereby increase the number of our allies."

The defeat of the party apparatus was also part of the plan for the subversive activities of the enemies of the people. Here is what another enemy of the people showed, who tricked his way into one of the regional party committees in Ukraine:

"Within 5 - 6 days, I broke up the apparatus of the regional committee, removed almost all the heads of departments of the regional committee, dispersed 12 - 15 instructors and even replaced the technical apparatus of the regional committee. ... After "clearing" the apparatus of the regional committee under the same flag, I proceeded to disperse the city committees. In a short time, I fired fifteen secretaries and a number of workers ... I created the appearance of fighting enemies, embittered a number of Communists against the Party ... In addition, I fired a number of members of our counter-revolutionary organization, transferring them to a smaller job and saving them from failure."

Expulsion from the Party on the grounds of "connection" with enemies took on especially large proportions in its time, and still takes place today.

On this basis, a considerable number of honest workers were indiscriminately expelled from the party, whose entire fault was that, under the conditions of work, they had to meet and see enemies of the people - "to pass along the same street."

This popular formula - "connection with the enemies of the people" - was widely used by anti-Party elements to beat up honest communists. It, this formula, was used in such a broad and widespread interpretation that the most ordinary things were summed up under it - both the usual acquaintance, and the joint duty of work with enemies, and the real connection with enemies - without any gradations, everything was drowned in general formula.

On this basis, a large number of mistakes were made, and are still being made."

This was said by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Maybe he, A. A. Zhdanov, should be included in the number of sycophants and double-dealers? Maybe all this was recognized and said, so to speak, after the fact, as a distraction?

Perhaps N. Khrushchev, who, already being the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, exclaimed from the rostrum of the XVIII Congress:

"Comrades! At our congress we heard the report of the struggle for communism, the struggle of the workers, peasants, intelligentsia, all the working people of our country under the leadership of our party and its Central Committee, under the leadership of our brilliant leader, leader, our great Stalin.

... These successes did not come for nothing, by themselves. They were won in a fierce struggle against the enemies of the working class, against the enemies of the peasantry, against the enemies of our entire people, against the agents of the fascist intelligence agencies—the Trotskyists, the Bukharinites, the bourgeois nationalists.

In spite of all the efforts of the capitalist intelligence agencies, in spite of all the efforts of the enemies of the working people, we are advancing victoriously towards communism. The

working class, all working people, under the leadership of the great Bolshevik Party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, broke the enemy resistance, crushed the enemies, defeated, and destroyed them.

The Ukrainian people hate the bourgeois nationalists, all those dastardly Lyubchenko spies, scumbags, Zatonsky and other evil spirits. These monsters, the dregs of humanity, are cursed by the working people of the Soviet Ukraine. Polish, German fascists staked on them. With the help of these enemies of the Ukrainian people, the Nazis wanted to enslave the flourishing Soviet Ukraine. It didn't and never will!

Anyone who encroaches on the land of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people will face the fate of vile bourgeois nationalists, the curse of the people and destruction like mad dogs!

The vigilance of Ukrainian workers and collective farmers has increased.

We will enhance these qualities in every possible way and poison, like cockroaches, any vile creature that is sent to Ukrainian soil by foreign intelligence services.

The party was informed about everything. Its leading circles took a sober look at the reality around us, did not idealize either themselves or the objective situation in the country. The Party knew about the mistakes made and made in the difficult task of recognizing the enemies of the Party and the people and their henchmen and accomplices, who for many years hid behind the mask of loyalty and political double-dealing.

The Party and our people fully approved and understood the words of I. V. Stalin at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937, when he said:

"... It has been proved like two times two is four that the bourgeois states send spies, wreckers, saboteurs, and sometimes murderers to each other's rear, give them tasks to infiltrate the institutions and enterprises of these countries, create their own network there and," if necessary "Blow up their rear to weaken them and undermine their strength. This is the case in the present. This has been the case in the past.

... Would it not be more correct, from the point of view of Marxism, to assume that the bourgeois states would send two and three times more wreckers, spies, and saboteurs into the rear of the Soviet Union than into the rear of any bourgeois state?

The Party and the people fully understood, shared, and approved of Stalin's words when he said that if in order to build a bridge, large funds, and the efforts of several hundred workers are needed, then in order to destroy it, only one saboteur is needed, which in order to successfully conduct a battle, several corps of Red Army soldiers are needed, and in order to fail it, one spy somewhere in the headquarters of the division.

Now, speaking of the period of 1937 - 1938, as a gloomy period of mass unjustified repressions, we frankly mock the saying "they cut down the forest - the chips fly", adding that we are not talking about chips, but about living people. Such a statement seems to us very humane, very humane.

But for some reason, we forget at the same time that we are talking not just about some kind of peaceful period in ordinary life, i.e. bourgeois state, but about the immediate pre-war years in the history of the first and only socialist state in the world.

It is possible and, in other conditions, should scoff at the saying "they cut down the forest - the chips fly" in relation to people.

But it seems to me that before indignant at the application of this proverb to the period 1937-1938 one should think about the specific historical situation that developed in those years, both inside and outside our country.

At the very beginning of this section, I cited the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Overcoming the Consequences of the Personality Cult", which followed the 20th Congress. It quite accurately outlined the concrete historical situation in the world of those years. Let me remind you again.

"Anti-Comintern Pact" - Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis - Hitler-Mussolini-Hirohite. Mannerheim Finland. Pilsudska Poland. Hungary Horthy and Romania Antonescu. Chamberlain's England and Daladier's France. British Foreign Secretary Simon, on his return from Berlin to London in 1935, reports to the government:

"Hitler emphatically declared that Germany did not wish to participate in a pact which would obligate her to mutual assistance. Germany in particular is not disposed to participate in a mutual assistance pact with Russia." (XIV collection "To help students of the history of the CPSU", 1962, p. 10.)

With the tacit consent of the governments of the United States, Britain and France, Japan occupied Manchuria, Italy seized Abyssinia, Germany - Austria. Together, Hitler and Mussolini cracked down on Republican Spain. The military expenditures of the capitalist states jumped sharply upwards in comparison with 1933. Germany's military spending increased twenty-two times. In all its glory, the "fifth columns" developed their activities. In all its glory, various Trotskyist legal and illegal organizations in Western European countries, especially in Spain, showed their counter-revolutionary, anti-people and anti-Soviet orientation.

The German official poet Jost wailed:

"The people must demand priest-leaders who shed blood, blood, blood, who stab and cut!"

At the Congress of the Nazi National Socialist Party in Nuremberg in September 1937, the Führer openly proclaimed:

"The organization of human society is threatened...

In recent years, we are witnessing further attempts to spread communist unrest in the East and West...

National Socialism expelled the Bolshevik danger from Germany... It secured the immunity of the people and the empire from the Bolshevik threat.

That we are good soldiers is something the world has certainly not forgotten.

That we have now become even better soldiers - in this let them believe us. That the National Socialist state will rise up and fight for its existence with a different fanaticism than the burgher empire once did, let no one doubt this."

Goebbels echoed Hitler:

"For the first time in history, we are experiencing such a moral, cultural, intellectual, political infection aimed at the destruction of most of the earth. It is carried out in a widely used and subtly carried out campaign of international Bolshevism against a good world.

...We call on Europe to reason, knowledge, and action.

Not too late.

The forces of resistance are set in motion...

Germany rose up against the world enemy. And we believe, hope, and know that she will be able to crush him someday.

The Fuhrer appeared before us as a savior." (All quotes are from archival materials.)

Here is the face of the enemy who was preparing, feverishly preparing for war with us, not hiding his goal - the destruction of the world's first state of workers and peasants.

The governments of the capitalist states - Munich showed this - tried at all costs to drag the USSR into a war with Hitler and Hirohito. And I ask - how in such an external historical situation, in such an internal situation, when the existence in our country of a widely branched anti-Soviet, treacherous spy underground was revealed, how in such a concrete historical situation it was possible to forget the instructions of V. I. Lenin that

" what our job is to put the question straight. Which is better? To catch or imprison, sometimes even shoot hundreds of traitors ... who spoke (some with weapons, some with a conspiracy, some with agitation, etc.) against Soviet power ...? Or take matters to the point of allowing ... to kill, shoot, flog to death tens of thousands of workers and peasants? The choice is not difficult.

The question is this and that.

Whoever has not yet understood this, who is capable of whimpering about the "injustice" of such a decision, should give up on him, he should be betrayed to public disgrace and ridicule ... "(Volume 29, p. 417).

V. I. Lenin said:

"I argue soberly and categorically: what is better - to imprison a few dozen or hundreds of instigators, guilty or innocent, conscious or unconscious, or to lose thousands of Red Army soldiers and workers? - The first is better. And let me be accused of any mortal sins and violations of freedom "I plead guilty, and the interests of the workers will win" (vol. 29, p. 274).

And I ask, is it really impossible to fully attribute to these words of V. I. Lenin, which contains great meaning, the sober thinking of a fighter-revolutionary, the saying "they cut down the forest - the chips fly"?

We now laugh at this proverb. We, instead of following the advice of V. I. Lenin, betray to public ridicule and disgrace people whining about the mistakes and excesses that took place in the fiercest struggle

against the class, internal and external enemy, caused in fact by this same enemy and imperfection of our own state apparatus, the low level of socialist consciousness of the majority of its cadres - we instead subjected to public disgrace the old leaders of the party and state, proven by the 40-year history of the Communist Party and Soviet power. We attributed to these people, these few specific individuals, the blame for all the mistakes and excesses that took place during the period of intensification of the struggle against the class enemy.

It must be said that supporters of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU began to portray V. I. Lenin, based on a legitimate and accurate characterization of him as the most humane person on earth, as a sort of soft-bodied intellectual type, for whom "universal" feelings of justice, humanism, love, and friendship for comrades were above all else.

In my opinion, this is a false, incorrect interpretation of the personality of V.I. Lenin - the leader of the revolution, the communist revolutionary.

We rightly call V. I. Lenin the most humane person on earth, but this is not at all because he was infinitely philanthropic and gentle in dealing with people - it is well known that with a rare talent he ridiculed everyone who argued with him on one or another important political issue, and how no one easily broke the closest friendship with people who, according to him, Lenin, were wrong, - but only because his philanthropy concerned, applied to the vast majority of humanity -to the working and exploited masses, to the workers and peasants of all countries. Lenin's philanthropy, his humanism was concretely embodied in his Marxist teaching on the socialist revolution, on the dictatorship of the proletariat, on communism, in which, and only in it alone, V. I. Lenin saw the only real means of liberating mankind from moral and material oppression and exploitation, from violence and wars, from everything that makes a person suffer.

Only by approaching the assessment of the personality of V.I. Lenin, it is possible and should appreciate all the deepest humanism of his following statements:

"Comrade Hungarian workers! Be firm. If there are vacillations among the socialists who joined you yesterday, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or among the petty bourgeoisie, suppress the vacillations mercilessly. Execution is the legitimate fate of a coward in war" (vol. 29, p. 360 - 361).

"We must say that either those who wanted to destroy us and about whom we believe that he must die must perish - and then our Soviet Republic will remain alive - or, on the contrary, the capitalists will remain alive and the republic will perish ... Sentimentality there is no lesser evil than selfishness in war ...

You are here talking about how to teach. You must come to the conclusion that we have no place for the undereducated. Then, when there will be communism, then the teaching will be softer - now I say that the teaching cannot but be harsh - on pain of death" (vol. 33, pp. 48-50).

"At least half of our Communists do not know how to fight, not to mention those who interfere with the fight ...

... There is hope that we will remove one hundred thousand from our party. Some say that there are 200 thousand - and I like these last ones more" (vol. 33, pp. 50 - 52).

"Until we apply terror - execution on the spot - to speculators, nothing will come of it. In addition, we must also act decisively with robbers - shoot on the spot.

The prosperous part of the population is to be imprisoned for three days without bread..." (vol. 26, p. 457).

"To all reproaches and accusations of terror, dictatorship... although we are still far from real terror... - to all accusations we say: yes, we openly proclaimed what no government could proclaim" (Vol 26, p. 419).

"A White Guard uprising is clearly being prepared in Nizhny Novgorod. It is necessary ... to form a trio of dictators ... to immediately impose mass terror, shoot and take out

hundreds of prostitutes, drunken soldiers, former officers, etc. Not a minute of delay ... We must act with all our might: mass searches... Mass expulsion of Mensheviks and unreliable..." ("Bolshevik", No. 2, 1938, p. 69 - 70).

"... I received your telegram... It is necessary to carry out mass merciless terror against the kulaks, priests, and White Guards. Doubtful lock up in a concentration camp outside the city" ("Leninsky collection", vol. 18, p. 202).

"... I advise you temporarily to appoint your superiors and shoot conspirators and waverers, without asking anyone and without allowing idiotic red tape ... (ibid., p.

"Catch the bastards named here by all means ... This bastard must be dealt with so that everyone will remember for years" (ibid., p. 65).

The entire history of the existence of our state in conditions of capitalist encirclement is a battle, it is the most bitter war between the exploiting classes and the exploited classes, a war between the state of workers and peasants and bourgeois states, a war between socialism and capitalism both on the internal and on the external arena. As in every war, in this war there are periods of temporary calm. But that does not stop the war from being a war.

I say this because now, when you cite this or that statement of V. I. Lenin, similar to the ones stated, you often hear that, this is, of course, true, but only for the period of civil war, for the period of war communism, etc. etc. They refer to dialectics, concrete historical conditions, and so on. But for some reason they forget that for Lenin the dialectician, for Lenin the Marxist, the socialist revolution did not end with the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie in one country, did not end with the destruction of the exploiting classes in this country, did not cease to be "a life-and-death war between two classes, two worlds" with the victory of socialism in one country.

V. I. Lenin did not tire of emphasizing that

"We continue to be a besieged fortress... and in this besieged fortress we must act with military ruthlessness, with military determination, with military discipline and self-sacrifice..." (vol. 80, p. 466).

Following Lenin's precepts, our party acted in the terrible years of the rapidly approaching new world war, new intervention against our socialist state, waging a merciless and difficult struggle to destroy the agents of capitalism, the agents of war in our own country.

We cut wood and chips flew...

Were there any mistakes? Once again I repeat that there were. And the most important of the mistakes of Stalin and the entire Politburo of that time, I consider the indisputable fact for me that they overestimated to some extent the quality of our state and party apparatus, overestimated our own revolutionary consciousness and conscience. They relied on us, and we, in no small number, were infected with elements of careerism, settling personal scores and, often, the most ordinary political myopia.

In the above statements by V. I. Lenin, I ask, by the way, to pay special attention to the fact that in them Lenin speaks not only and not so much about direct enemies of the revolution and Soviet power, counter-revolutionaries, spies, traitors, etc. types, how much about people who are hesitant, doubting and "doubtful." It is precisely in relation to these people - hesitating, doubting and "doubtful" - V. I. Lenin, the most humane person on earth, recommended "ruthlessly suppressing hesitation", "taking them to concentration camps" and even shooting them, "without asking anyone and avoiding idiotic red tape."

And remember that already in 1921, V. I. Lenin spoke about the Mensheviks -

"In my opinion, of the Mensheviks who joined the Party after 1918, approximately one hundredth part should be left in the Party, and even then after checking each one three or four times. Why? Because the Mensheviks, as a trend, proved during the period of 1918 - 1921 had two of its properties: to

skillfully adapt, to cling to the current prevailing among the workers; the second is to serve the White Guards faithfully and truthfully, to serve it in deed, renouncing it in words ... The Mensheviks, like opportunists, adapt, so to speak, "out of principle" ... they are repainted in a protective color ... This feature of the Mensheviks must be known and must be taken into account. And to take it into account means to purge the party of ninety-nine hundredths of the total number of Mensheviks who joined the RCP after 1918, i.e. then, when the victory of the Bolsheviks began to become at first probable, then indubitable" (vol. 83, pp. 19-20).

None other than Lenin, in 1922, in a letter to the People's Commissar of Justice D. I. Kursky, wrote about the notorious article 58 - 10 of the Criminal Code:

"... The court should not eliminate terror; to promise this would be self-deception or deceit, but to substantiate and legitimize it in principle, clearly, without falsehood and embellishment. It is necessary to formulate as broadly as possible, because only revolutionary legal consciousness and revolutionary conscience will lay down the conditions for practical application, more or less wide" (Emphasized by me. - G. M., vol. 32, p. 76).

None other than Lenin taught that

"A bad revolutionary is one who stops short of the necessity of the law at a moment of acute struggle. Laws in transitional times have a temporary significance. And if the law hinders the development of the revolution, it is canceled or corrected" (vol. 27, p. 478).

"Do not hesitate before the necessity of the law", "to formulate as broadly as possible" - is it possible to accuse V. I. Lenin of dissemination, propaganda of lawlessness and arbitrariness for these provisions?

And, finally, I would like to cite a short fragment from the memoirs of A. M. Gorky about Lenin (A. M. Gorky. Soch., vol. 17, pp. 5 - 17).

"I often had to talk with Lenin about the cruelty of revolutionary tactics and way of life.

What do you want? he asked in surprise and anger. - Is humanity possible in such an unprecedentedly ferocious fight? Where is the place for kindness and generosity? We are blocked by Europe, we are deprived of the expected help of the European proletariat, the counter-revolution is attacking us from all sides like a bear, and what about us? Shouldn't we fight, resist? Well, sorry, we're not stupid. We know that what we want, no one can do, but us. Do you suppose that if I were convinced otherwise, I would be sitting here?

- By what measure do you measure the number of necessary and unnecessary blows in a fight? he asked me one day after a heated conversation. To this simple question I could only answer lyrically. I don't think there is any other answer."

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU found a different answer to this question.

In the interpretation of the XXII Congress, the struggle of the party, its leading core represented by members of the Politburo in the pre-war period of 1937-1938 against direct and indirect, conscious, and unconscious, voluntary, or involuntary opponents of the Communist Party and Soviet power was presented to us as a struggle for the throne, as a settling of personal scores, as a conscious destruction on the part of the members of the Politburo, whose example was followed by smaller "bipods" (*supporters Ed*), of their political competitors for selfish career purposes.

In the interpretation of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, and this is the most important thing, the struggle of the party, its leading circles with the Trotskyist-Zinoviev-Bukharin underground was presented to us as a struggle for power between equally right-wing groups in the communist movement, because at the XXII Congress not a word was said about the Trotskyist-Zinoviev-Bukharin anti-Soviet, espionage and provocateur organizations, not a word was said about the legitimacy of the trials of these organizations, not a word was said about the fact that, along with the mistakes and excesses that took

place in the fight against counter-revolution, it was exposed and a considerable number of genuine spies, saboteurs, terrorists and traitors have also been punished.

I believe that by questioning the legitimacy of the trials of 1937-1938, by pushing the masses to look at the allegedly falsified nature of these trials, by retrospectively justifying many of the main accused, by clearly refuting the version of the murder of S. M. Kirov that existed before the congress and officially confirmed by these trials - The 22nd Congress, both logically and in fact, takes under its protection such people as Zinoviev and Kamenev, like Bukharin and Rykov, like Pyatakov and Radek, and the like.

Breaking away from the specific historical situation of those years, fixing our attention exclusively on the repressions, on the mistakes and excesses that took place in their application, but without saying a word about the fact that these mistakes and excesses took place as a result of the imperfection, insufficient level of consciousness of our own party and state cadres, as a result of subversive actions and direct enemies of Soviet power, and interpreting them as the deliberate destruction of the BEST cadres of the party and state, the XXII Congress subjected our entire party as a whole to withering criticism, declaring those who remained after the so-called period of Stalin's personality cult, all the more or less prominent members of the party, the army, the state and economic apparatus are alive as the worst cadres, who survived precisely because they are the worst.

I believe that the direction that was given by the XXII Congress of the CPSU to the question of the so-called personality cult of I. V. Stalin, was a direction directly aimed at undermining the authority of the party among the working people of our country and the whole world, at discrediting the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a party represented by the 22nd Congress as a blind and obedient executor of the will of a tyrant - its general secretary; party, represented by the XXII Congress as a hotbed of squabbles and "court" squabbling for power, for proximity "to the throne."

I believe that in the form that the 22nd Congress of the CPSU gave to the question of the struggle against the personality cult of I.V. Stalin and destruction. This struggle, both logically and actually, turned out

to be aimed at revising the Marxist-Leninist foundations for building the proletarian party, at its disorganization, at its undermining and destruction.

One of the best proofs of this, along with a number of Khrushchev's other theoretical and practical measures, is the division, the disunity of the party along the lines of production.

The cult of personality and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the proletarian party

At the XX and subsequent congresses of the CPSU, at the Plenums of the Central Committee, the question of the so-called "Stalin's cult of personality" was closely intertwined with the question of the collective leadership, with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the role of the individual and the masses in history.

It seems to me that if we try to combine all these questions into one whole, then we should come to the conclusion that at the XX and subsequent congresses of the CPSU, under the guise of fighting against the so-called personality cult of Stalin, there was a discussion about the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the proletarian party, about its organizational foundations, about the relationship between the leaders of the party and the party, about the problem of the so-called internal party democracy.

So, the leading figures who spoke at the XX Congress of the CPSU said - Khrushchev:

"It was of paramount importance to restore and strengthen in every possible way the Leninist principle of collective leadership...

Striving for the all-round development of the creative activity of communists and all working people, the Central Committee took steps to broadly explain the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of the individual in history. The Central Committee resolutely opposed the cult of personality, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, which turns this or that leader into a miracle-working hero and at the same time

belittles the role of the party and the masses, leading to a decrease in their creative activity. The spread of the personality cult belittled the role of the collective leadership in the party and sometimes led to serious omissions in our work" (Stenotchet of the 20th Congress, Gospolitizdat. 1956, vol. 1, pp. 101-102).

Mikoyan:

"The main feature that characterizes the work of the Central Committee and its Presidium over the past three years is that after a long break a collective leadership has been created in our Party.

The principle of collective leadership is elementary for a proletarian party, for a party of the Leninist type, but we have to emphasize this old truth because for about 20 years we actually had no collective leadership, the cult of personality flourished, condemned by Marx, and then by Lenin, and this, of course, could not but have an extremely negative effect on the situation in the Party and on its activity" (ibid., p. 302).

Suslov:

"The strengthening of the unity of the party and the increase in its activity, initiative, and combat readiness to a large extent was facilitated by the restoration of the norms of party life worked out by Lenin and the principles of party leadership, which had often been violated before the 20th Party Congress" (ibid., p. 277).

What is a cult of personality?

In the words of Khrushchev himself, the ideologist and initiator of the fight against Stalin's personality cult, this is "attributing to this or that figure the role of a miracle worker hero", "associating with the name of this or that figure all the victories of the party and the people" (see the report of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, page 91).

In the light of everything said in the previous section, such a formulation of the question, of course, cannot but seem somewhat strange, because, on the one hand, it attributes all negative phenomena in the life of the party to one or another of its leading figures, and on the other hand, he attributes everything positive only to the account of the party as a whole.

But it's not that.

Let us turn to the 21st Extraordinary Congress of the CPSU, convened in 1959, that is, three years after the 20th Congress.

Let's look at the position of the delegates of the XXI Congress -

"The Soviet people are well aware that these successes are the result of the wise leadership of the Leninist Central Committee of our Party, the Presidium of the Central Committee of our Party, headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (Stenotchet of the XXI Congress of the CPSU, Gospolitizdat, 1959, vol. 1, p. 128 - from the speech of N.V. Podgorny).

"At numerous meetings, the working people unanimously approved the plans for the future outlined by the party, and expressed their heartfelt gratitude to the Central Committee of the party and the First Secretary of the Central Committee, the head of the Soviet government, comrade N. S. Khrushchev, for his tireless activity in implementing the Leninist general line of the party ..." (*ibid.*, p. 235 -Kapitonov).

"In the resolution adopted at the Leningrad Regional Party Conference, the delegates noted with a sense of gratitude the outstanding role of the current composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee and especially the First Secretary of the Party, Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, in the struggle for the unity of the party ranks, for the restoration of the Leninist norms of party life and the principles of party leadership, in all measures of exceptionally progressive significance in raising the national economy, culture, science

and the well-being of the working people" (ibid., p. 250 - Spiridonov).

"The successes of our Party and people are truly enormous. Justice demands that we note the outstanding activity, Lenin's firmness, adherence to principles and initiative in raising and developing the most important questions of the theory and practical activities of our Party and the Soviet government, the tremendous organizational work of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union USSR Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (ibid., p. 465 - Kirichenko).

"And it must be said frankly, comrades, that in the great political, organizational and creative work that our Leninist Central Committee has carried out in all areas, from the solution of the most complex and acute problems of international life ... from the solution of the most important problems of the development of agriculture and the collective farm building, restructuring the management of industry and construction, to questions of literature, science and art, questions of strengthening the connection between school and life - an outstanding role belongs to the initiative, rich political experience, tireless energy of Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev "(p. 586 - Pospelov).

"... N. S. Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, showed an example of the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory and its skillful application to the specifics of a specific situation. Now, in a report at the 21st Party Congress, Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev enriched our theory with many bright thoughts and new rules...

I think that if the Central Committee draws up a draft of a new program on the basis of the main provisions of Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev at this congress, then this will make a good program of the party "(ibid., vol. II, pp. 161 - 162 - Kuusinen).

"... The fact that a further rise in cotton growing in the country is ensured, we attribute mainly to the tireless activity of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally" (ibid., p. 165 - Uldzhabaev).

"Facilities for the study of thermonuclear reactions are large and complex structures ... Their rapid creation was possible only thanks to the attention and great help from the Presidium of the Central Committee and personally Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (ibid., p. 181 - Kurchatov).

"We owe our successes in creating and launching artificial earth satellites and space rockets primarily to the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party and personally to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (ibid., p. 279 - Ustinov).

I would not like to turn to quotations from the materials of the next 22nd Congress of the CPSU - it should be clear to everyone anyway that in these materials there will be a much larger number of such quotations than at the 21st Congress, and of a much higher "quality".

Still, I cannot resist the temptation to cite at least some of them. (All quotations are from the Stanley Report of the XXII Congress, 1962)

"All the activities of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, his inexhaustible seething energy, the truly revolutionary Leninist approach to solving complex problems of theory and practice, his inextricable connection with the people, humanity and simplicity, the ability to constantly learn from the masses and teach the masses - an inspiring example for all party, for every communist.

The Communists of Ukraine, the entire Ukrainian people warmly approve and actively support the political line and practical activities of the Leninist Central Committee of our Party, headed by the outstanding party and statesman Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (pp. 268-269).

From the bottom of their hearts, the Ukrainian people say thanks to their native Communist Party, its Leninist Central

Committee, thank you, Nikita Sergeevich! Thank you for your daily attention, for your constant concern for the welfare and happiness of the working people of Ukraine, for the welfare and happiness of the working people, of all Soviet people" (p. 279 - Podgorny).

"... The peoples of Uzbekistan wholeheartedly, from the bottom of their hearts, call Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev their closest friend, their dear and beloved teacher" (p. 306 - Rashidov).

"Speaking about the successes of our Motherland, about the activities of our Party and its Central Committee, it must be emphasized that in recent years the most important events in the life of the country, in the life of the Party ... are inextricably linked with the name of a faithful Leninist, an outstanding political figure of our time - with the name Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. A man of great soul and inexhaustible energy, who knows life well and draws new strength in communication with the people, Nikita Sergeevich won deep respect and great love from the broad masses of the people!

The Soviet people, all progressive mankind associate his name not only with the achievements of our Motherland, but also with the strengthening of the positions of the world socialist camp, with the active struggle of the peoples for world peace.

And if now in the international arena the voice of the Soviet Union sounds like the voice of the most powerful power, then this is the enormous merit of the Central Committee of the Party, this is the enormous merit of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev personally! .

"How can one not say a heartfelt thank you to those who worked on the creation of this Program! .. And above all, how not to say such thanks to the main creator of the Program - our Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (vol. II, p. 182 - Sholokhov) .

"... With great energy and passion, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and the head of the Soviet government, our dear Nikita Sergeevich, defends peace and fights for it! He speaks on behalf of the multimillion-strong Communist Party and the entire Soviet people, on behalf of our brothers in all countries. There is no such corner on earth now where people would not know Comrade Khrushchev as a great fighter for peace and friendship between the peoples of all countries "(Vol. II, p. 221 - Shvernik).

"... The Party knows where Comrade Khrushchev is, there is truth and progress, life, and happiness" (Vol. III, p. 131 - Rodionov).

It seems to me that the above quotes are more than enough.

The question is - what is it, if not the most obvious propaganda of the cult of personality?

For example, I felt a great sense of embarrassment for all the quoted comrades who sang Khrushchev so frankly and selflessly - after all, one wonders, have they really forgotten about the zeal and bitterness with which they themselves, in their own speeches, on the same 22nd Congress attacked Stalin's personality cult, the personality cult in general, as a negative phenomenon, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism?

How to evaluate such "forgetfulness"?

Maybe it is connected with the relapse of the cult of personality? Maybe this is nothing more than simple servility and sycophancy?

If one takes the position of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, then this is the only way one can and should regard such a rare forgetfulness.

But I contend that this is not so. I affirm that the "singing" and "praising" of individual comrades from among the leading party and state leaders is by no means alien to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the role of the individual and the masses in history, the doctrine of the

proletarian party and its leaders, but, on the contrary, is part of the organic, an integral part of this doctrine.

As early as March 28, 1956, Pravda published an editorial article, which I have already mentioned, under the heading "Why is the cult of personality alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism?"

The main conclusion of this article is the conclusion that the cult of personality, glorifying and praising this or that figure, attributing to him all the successes in the victories of the party and people, is incompatible with the Leninist principle of collective leadership, undermines and belittles the role of the party, its leading core, the role masses of the people in history, leads to glossing over shortcomings, to eyewash, sycophancy, and servility.

The article does not disclose at all, as, indeed, in all materials on the cult of personality, why exactly the cult of personality leads to such results. But it's not that.

Pravda wrote:

"Marxism does not deny the role of outstanding people in history, the role of the leaders of the working people in leading the revolutionary liberation movement, in building a new society. V. I. Lenin emphasized with all his might the role of revolutionary leaders as organizers of the masses. The materialist understanding of history developed by the classics of Marxism-Leninism recognizes that the working masses, the people are the creators of a new society, makes it possible to correctly understand and evaluate the role of leaders, organizers, initiators, heroes who are created and put forward by the people themselves. Outstanding personalities, thanks to their characteristics, which make them most capable of serving the public interests, can play a serious role in society as organizers, leaders of the masses, who understand events deeper and see further than others.

Exposing the petty-bourgeois, anarchistic radical intellectuals who opposed the organizing role and authority of the party, Lenin said:

"The working class, which is waging a difficult and stubborn struggle all over the world for complete liberation, needs authorities - but, of course, only in the sense that young workers need the experience of old fighters against oppression and exploitation, fighters who have gone through many strikes and participated in a series of revolutions wised up by revolutionary traditions and a broad political outlook. The proletarians of every country need the authority of the world struggle of the proletariat... The collectiveness of the advanced class-conscious workers will always be the greatest authority in all such questions."

Pravda then wrote:

"The founder and leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, V. I. Lenin always attached particular importance to the role of the party in leading the Soviet state and the entire course of socialist construction. Pointing to the high responsibility of the Communist Party as the ruling party in the country, Lenin himself strictly adhered to and demanded from all communists to adhere to the party life norms and principles of leadership worked out by the party through extensive experience. The most important of these principles is the collective leadership, which follows from the very nature of the party, built on the basis of democratic centralism, combining the activity, initiation, and initiative of party members with iron discipline. Lenin said that the revolution will bring forth "collective organizational talent, without which the armies of millions of proletarians cannot achieve their victory"" (soch., vol. 29, p. 75).

With these two statements by V. I. Lenin, cited in the newspaper Pravda as early as 1956 in substantiation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the organizational foundations of the proletarian party, allows me to begin consideration of this issue.

Let's see how both of these quotes from Lenin look in full context. Quote one -

"In conclusion, a few words about 'authorities'. Marxists cannot take the usual point of view of a radical intellectual with his supposedly revolutionary abstractness: 'no authorities'. No."

And then V. I. Lenin writes as quoted in Pravda, right up to the ellipsis, after which Pravda interrupts the course of Lenin's thought. In fact, Lenin wrote:

We need the authority of the theoreticians of world social democracy in order to clarify the program and tactics. But this authority, of course, has nothing in common with the official authority of bourgeois science and police policy.

This authority is the authority of a more versatile struggle within the same ranks of the world socialist army. It is so important for broadening the horizons of the fighters, so impermissible would it be for a workers' party to presume to decide from outside, to publish practical and concrete questions of immediate policy. The collectivity of the advanced class-conscious workers will always have the greatest authority in all such questions."

Quote two -

In that ebullient struggle, which is a revolution, in that special post in which every revolutionary stands, if the work of even a small collegium turns into reasoning, great importance is gained in the course of the struggle, indisputable moral authority, an authority that draws its strength not, of course, in abstract morality, but in the morality of the revolutionary fighter, in the morality of the ranks and ranks of the revolutionary masses.

If for more than a year we have managed to endure the exorbitant burdens that fell on a narrow circle of selfless revolutionaries, if the leading groups were able to solve the most difficult questions so firmly, so quickly, so unanimously, it is only because an outstanding place among them was occupied by such an exceptional, talented

organizer, like Yakov Mikhailovich. Only he managed to develop in himself a remarkable instinct for practice, a remarkable talent as an organizer, that unquestionably unquestioned authority, thanks to which the largest branches of the work of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which only a group of people could do, were entirely and exclusively in the charge of Yakov Mikhailovich. Only he managed to win such a position that in a huge number of the most important and major organizational and practical issues, it was enough for his one word to indisputably, without any conferences, without any formal votes, the issue was resolved once and for all, and everyone had full confidence that the question has been decided on the basis of such practical knowledge and such an organizational instinct that not only hundreds and thousands of advanced workers, but also the masses, will consider this decision as final.

History has long shown that great revolutions, in the course of their struggle, bring forth great people and develop talents that previously seemed impossible...

None of those who knew closely, who observed the constant work of Yakov Mikhailovich, can doubt that in this sense Yakov Mikhailovich is irreplaceable. The work that he did alone ... - this work will now be within our power only if each of the major industries that Comrade was in charge of alone. Sverdlov, you will put forward entire groups of people who, following in his footsteps, would be able to get closer to what one person did.

From that moment on, Pravda began its "quote" from V. I. Lenin's speech, that Lenin said that "the revolution will put forward a collective organizational talent, without which millions of proletarian armies cannot achieve their victory."

And V. I. Lenin further said this:

"But the proletarian revolution is strong precisely because of the depth of its sources. We know that in the place of people who selflessly gave their lives ... it will put forward the ranks

of other people ... **And in this sense, we are deeply sure that the proletarian revolution will put forward groups, and groups of people around the world, put forward numerous layers of proletarians, from the working peasants who will give that practical knowledge, the one, if not sole, then collective organizational talent,, without which the million army of proletarians cannot come to their victory ”**(vol. 22, p. 73 - 75. Highlighted and underlined by me. - G. M.).

Isn't it true - both of these quotes in the context look a little different than in the form in which they were given by the newspaper?

And, as a matter of fact, V.I. Lenin's view on the role of the leaders of the proletarian revolution, on the role of the leaders of the party, on the problem of unity of command and collective leadership in it is so clearly expressed in them that even these two statements of V.I. Lenin could be limited to addressing all these issues.

But, and this was mentioned above, the focus of the fight against the so-called personality cult has actually focused on such complex and important issues that, by and large, constitute one of the main provisions of Marxism-Leninism, the basis of the foundations of the Marxist-Leninist party - the organizational principles of its construction and functioning.

And two quotes from the works of V.I. Lenin will not be enough here.

It was not for the first time, at the 20th or 22nd Congresses, that our Party went through periods of sharp, tense struggle against groups and groups attacking the organizational principles of building the Party under one sauce or another. This is not the first time she (*Party Ed.*) has come across accusations of "dictatorship", "cruelty", "repressions", etc., against the leaders of the party - Lenin and Stalin.

The entire history of our party, up to the 16th Congress of the CPSU(b), is the history of the struggle of the party, its Central Committee, its leaders attempts to violate and revise the Leninist organizational principles of building a proletarian party under the guise of a struggle for the collective leadership of the party, a struggle

for the development of internal party democracy, against dictatorship, etc. etc.

So let's turn to history.

Party discipline, Discussion, group policy

XI CONGRESS OF THE RKP(b). 1922 (Stenotchet, publishing department of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). Moscow, 1922).

Here is the main point from the speech of V. I. Lenin at the XI Congress, against which some of the delegates of the Congress "revolted" -

"If people start panicking, even if they are well-intentioned, at such a moment ... when the whole point is to maintain good order, at this moment it is necessary to punish the slightest violation of discipline severely, cruelly, mercilessly ...

... When the Mensheviks say: you are now retreating (about NEP. - G. M.), and we have always been for retreat, we agree with you, let's retreat together - and we say to them: "For the public manifestations of Menshevism our revolutionary courts must pass the death sentence, otherwise they are not our courts, but God knows what" (p. 35).

And here is what some of the "rebels" said -

"All the comrades who have to criticize ... who, as part of their party service, have to criticize the policies of the Central Committee, find themselves in a difficult situation. Our Central Committee is a very special institution. They say that the English parliament can do everything; it only cannot turn a man into a woman. Our Central Committee is much stronger: it has already turned more than one very revolutionary man into a woman, and the number of such women is incredibly multiplied.

... The Central Committee violated and did not put into practice when it could be done, during the whole of this year,

all the principles of intra-Party democracy. As long as the Party and all its members do not take part in the collective discussion of all the measures that are being taken in its name, as long as these measures fall like snow on the heads of the Party members, until then we will create what Lenin called a panic mood" (pp. 69 - 70 - Ryazanov).

"... I will say: exaggerated discipline, one that enables our centers to act too arbitrarily and does not allow Party members to independently raise those questions that really need to be resolved in time. Retreat by retreat, this is a very good example, but speaking seriously , we need this.

We must move from military discipline to strict, but really Party discipline, because we now need to spiritually mobilize the Party.

...Let's be honest: do you think that our party, its members, have enough initiative? Why is it not?

As a result of the theory of discipline and its concept, which Comrade Lenin expounded... In order for self-activity among the masses to develop, we must first of all be self-active. To do this, you need to be a public figure with initiative, and this is achieved through a series of measures that smooth out the wreckage of the movement and emancipation of the members of the Party ... It is necessary to destroy the wreckage of the old military system, that system of party passports, that coercion to certain points that has been created in our country. In our country, very many people notice a completely opposite trend. And Comrade Lenin took the wrong tone, just the opposite, he said that you need to beat, shoot, pull, etc. If we turn our attention in this direction now, we will make a mistake, and even if Comrade Lenin laughed now, we'll see what he has to say at the Twelfth Party Congress" (pp. 76-79 - Osinsky).

"Yesterday, Comrade Lenin said very, very serious things... He said things that cannot be said to a mere mortal at every

meeting without being accused of decadence, panic, that he is corrupting the Party.

... We have created some kind of privilege under which Comrade Lenin can say at non-party congresses what he did not say in front of responsible party workers ...

Other comrades must also be given the right to say what they see, what they notice. We must give them the opportunity to speak freely within the Party, not to threaten these people with some kind of curse because they dare to say what Comrade Lenin told us yesterday" (pp. 89 - 90 - Stukov).

"I affirm that the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Central Committee was not put into practice: the system of management of our party has remained the same bureaucratic, the same orderly and, to a certain extent, military, as it was during the war ...

In the course of this year, not only have we not developed a great connection and a great merger within the Party organization, a great connection with the revolutionary masses, but, on the contrary, the working masses are moving away from the Party. Many workers leave the party. How can this be explained? This, dear comrades, is explained by the ironclad regime which has nothing in common with real Party discipline and which we are cultivating. Our Party as a whole loads firewood, sweeps the streets, and only votes, and does not decide any questions... Petty-bourgeois sentiments are growing in our Party. To these petty-bourgeois sentiments we can only oppose communist initiative within the party. But for this it is necessary that workers' democracy be put into practice..." (pp. 112 - 114 - Kosior).

XII Congress of the RCP(b) (Stenotchet. Krasnaya Nov Publishing House, 1923).

"The main question, in my opinion, is that the leading group of the Central Committee in its organizational policy is to a large extent pursuing a group policy, a policy which, in my

opinion, very often does not coincide with the interests of the Party. This policy, comrades, manifests itself primarily in the organizational form in which we carry out the selection and use of responsible workers for Soviet and Party work. Dozens of our comrades stand outside Soviet and Party work. These comrades stand outside this work, not because they are bad Communists, but solely because at different times and on different occasions they participated in this or that grouping, that they took part in discussions against the official line that was pursued by the Central Committee.

Comrades, this organizational line, in my opinion, gives rise to completely unnecessary discontent within the Party; it creates an atmosphere and ground for well-known groupings, for petty group struggles, which are not in the interests of our Party. This, to a certain extent, group policy, in my opinion, is also carried out in our country when selecting the leading bodies of the Party. I must state that for those comrades who for some reason took part in one or another grouping, the road to these leading bodies is almost closed: sometimes, as if through the eye of a needle, one or another of the opposition slips through, but in general, our leading bodies they are selected in such a way that comrades who are connected in the past and present with the leading group of the Central Committee get there.

... This is the first congress when there is no recognized and respected leader Comrade Lenin among us. How long or how short, but Comrade Lenin will be absent, and, in any case, the Party is faced with the task of working out in itself those inner forces that should compensate us to a certain extent for the brilliant mind and brilliant experience of Comrade Lenin. I wholly subscribe to the opinion that this can be done only through the collective experience of the Party. But is it possible under the present conditions to work out the collective experience of the Party, are there suitable conditions for this? I affirm that there are not.

...Comrades, how is collective opinion possible in the Party? Collective opinion in the Party cannot be worked out

individually. Collective opinion should be developed in organizational forms. We have neither clubs nor other organizations where members of the Party could exchange opinions, where they could work out this collective experience.

If this resolution (Kosior is referring to the resolution of the 10th Congress, which banned the formation of factions and groupings in the party. - G.M.) is interpreted in such a way that any collective opinion of 3-6 members of the party is elevated to a faction and subject to this very law, it is quite understandable that we will not be able to develop any activity, any collective experience ... There is no need to elevate this resolution into a system of administration in which all social life in the Party, if it does not fit into the framework of the official organs of the Party, within the framework of cells, district and city committees essentially becomes impossible..." (p. 92 - 95 - Kosior).

"... If all kinds of anonymous theses appear, if anonymous people have to publish some platforms, then this is only because in our RCP (b) there is no way to express their views, point of view on certain issues in a normal way. This proves that if you try to criticize in the RCP..., then you will immediately be enlisted as a Menshevik, a Social Revolutionary, anyone you like. We heard this from the report... I wrote down a phrase from him (from Zinoviev. - G.M.): "Under the present conditions, any criticism, even from the left, will inevitably have to turn into Menshevik."

... It turns out that not the whole party, but only the Politburo is an infallible pope: everything that I do, I do right, do not dare to object, and no one has the right to direct any criticism ... And if this continues , it goes without saying, as if the logical conclusion of all this, as a result there will be all kinds of groupings ... The method of saving the party of Comrade Zinoviev, who, speaking on behalf of the Central Committee, undoubtedly expressed the opinion of the Central Committee as a whole, is no good.

Here Comrade Zinoviev is completely wrong when he says that we will not allow, we will not tolerate, and so on. This method must be recognized as completely useless" (pp. 104 - 106 - Lutovinov).

"... Comrades, let me tell you that you have forgotten a trifle, that it is impossible to leave it in the old way. Because it is impossible that the most important element of this old one - Vladimir Ilyich - to our common misfortune, has gone out of work for quite a considerable period.

When they tell us: let's leave everything as it was, I say that you can't leave it as it is, because the most important focus, which concentrated all the experience of our party and before which everyone was ready to bow down and leave him the right to decide questions peremptorily, comrade Lenin was out of action for a long time" (p. 118 - Krasin).

"You, comrades, should know that we have approximately 30% of all the secretaries of our provincial committees who are secretaries, as it is customary to say, "recommended" by the Central Committee...

... I think the right of the Central Committee to transfer, to strengthen some organizations, to dismantle those in the most important areas ... lose their efficiency, no doubt, but to introduce into the system that which is an exception, which must be the result of extreme necessity and that it is politically dangerous for the party, in no case should it be" (p. 133 - Preobrazhensky).

ON PARTY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

XI II Congress of the RCP (b) (Stenotchet, published by Krasnaya Nov, Moscow, 1924).

The main struggle in the party after the XII Congress of the RCP flared up according to the so-called "Platform 46" and on a series of articles by Trotsky, collectively known as "The New Course", in which Trotsky called on the party to change the

old course to a new one - "democratic" and "non-bureaucratic".

The "New Course" was a concentrated expression of the revision of Lenin's organizational principles for building a proletarian party under the flag of struggle for their expansion and strengthening.

Therefore, it seems to me that without at least a cursory acquaintance with the articles of Trotsky and his supporters, with the course of the discussion in 1923, it is impossible to imagine the objective significance of the struggle against the so-called personality cult.

In 1927, the State Publishing House in the "Series of manuals for party self-education" published a collection of materials and documents entitled "Discussion of 1923". The following materials are cited from this book.

Trotsky's letter "To Party Meetings" dated 11/KhP 1923

"Dear comrades!

The resolution of the Politburo on party building is of exceptional importance. It marks that the party has come to a serious turning point in its historical path.

... The new course consists in the fact that the center of gravity, incorrectly shifted under the old course towards the party apparatus, now, under the new course, must be shifted towards activity, critical initiative, self-government of the party as the organized vanguard of the proletariat ... In short, you can formulate as follows: the party must subordinate its apparatus to itself, without ceasing for a moment to be a centralized organization.

In recent debates and articles it has been pointed out very often that "pure", "extended", "ideal" democracy is unrealizable and that democracy is not an end in itself for us.

This is absolutely indisputable, but with the same right and justification it can be said that pure or absolute centralism is unrealizable and incompatible with the nature of a mass party.

The task is to balance these two sides... For the last period, there was no such balance. The center of gravity was incorrectly moved to the machine. Party self-activity was reduced to a minimum. This created skills and methods of management that were fundamentally contrary to the spirit of the revolutionary party of the proletariat. The excessive strengthening of apparatus centralism at the expense of party initiative gave rise in the party to a feeling of malaise ... a feeling that party bureaucracy threatened to lead the party into a dead end ...

By killing self-activity, bureaucracy thereby prevents the general level of the Party from rising. And this is his main fault. Inasmuch as more experienced and distinguished comrades inevitably enter the Party apparatus, the bureaucracy of the apparatus responds most severely to the ideological and political growth of the younger generations of the Party. This is precisely what explains the fact that the youth, the party's barometer, reacts most sharply to party bureaucracy.

... Only the constant interaction of the older generation with the younger one within the framework of party democracy can preserve the old guard as a revolutionary factor. Otherwise, old people can become ossified and imperceptibly become the most complete expression of apparatus bureaucracy.

The rebirth of the "old guard" has been observed in history more than once ...

There is no other remedy for this undoubted danger than a serious, profound, radical change of course towards party democracy, with more and more proletarians from the machine tool being drawn into the party.

...First of all, it is necessary to change the spirit that prevails in organizations. It is necessary that the Party, in the person of all its cells and associations, regain the collective initiative, the right of free, comradely criticism, without fear and without looking back, the right of organizational self-determination. It is necessary to renew and refresh the Party apparatus, to make it feel that it is the executive mechanism of the great collective.

... The renewal of the Party apparatus - of course, within the clear framework of the Rules - must be carried out with the aim of replacing those who have turned out to be bureaucratic and bureaucratic with fresh elements ... And above all, those elements must be eliminated from Party posts, which, at the first voice of criticism, objection, protest tend to demand a party card for repression. The new course must begin with everyone in the apparatus feeling, from top to bottom, that no one dares to terrorize the Party.

It is absolutely not enough for the youth to repeat our formulas. It is necessary that young people take up revolutionary formulas with a fight, turn them into flesh and blood, work out their own opinion, their own face, and be able to fight for their own opinion with that courage that comes from sincere conviction and independence of character. Passive obedience, mechanical alignment with superiors, impersonality, subservience, careerism - get out of the party! A Bolshevik is not only a man of discipline - no, he is a man who, by drilling deeply, develops in himself a firm opinion in each given case, courageously and independently defends it not only in battle against enemies, but also within his own organization. Today he will be in the minority in his organization. He obeys because it is his party. But this, of course, does not always mean that he is wrong. He, perhaps, saw or understood a new task or the need for a turn only earlier than others. He persistently raises the issue a second time, and a third, and a tenth. In this way he renders a service to the party, helping it to meet a new task fully armed or to make the necessary turn without organizational upheavals and factional convulsions.

But the party can successfully cope with the dangers of factionalism only by developing, consolidating, and consolidating the course towards workers' democracy. It is the apparatus bureaucracy that is one of the most important sources of factionalism. It suppresses criticism and drives dissatisfaction deep. He tends to label every individual or collective voice of criticism or warning as a faction.

Mechanical centralism is inevitably complemented by factionalism..." (pp. 16-20).

Trotsky's article "The Question of Party Generations"

"The current turning point has grown ... out of all previous development. Unnoticeable at a superficial glance, molecular processes in the life and consciousness of the Party prepared the turning point much earlier. The sales crisis gave a big impetus to the critical work of thought. It was especially sharply revealed to what extent the party lives on two floors: in the upper one they decide, in the lower one they only learn about the decisions. A critical review of the inner-party situation was, however, delayed by the tense expectation of the imminent denouement of German events. When it became clear that this denouement was the course of things pushed aside, the Party put the question of a new course on the order of the day.

... Bureaucracy is not an accidental feature of individual provincial organizations, but a general phenomenon. It does not go from the county, through the province, to the center, but rather, on the contrary, from the center, through the provinces, to the county. It is by no means a "survival" of the war period, but is the result of the transfer to the Party of the methods and techniques of administration accumulated precisely in recent years. The bureaucracy of the war period ... seems infantile in comparison with the current bureaucracy that took shape in the conditions of the peace period, when the party apparatus, despite the ideological growth of the party, continued to think hard and decide for it.

...The Party is ready to enter a new phase of development.

The main danger of the old course, as it has developed as a result of both great historical causes and our mistakes, is that it shows a tendency to more and more oppose the several thousand comrades who make up the leading cadres to the rest of the mass of Party members as an object of influence. If this regime had persisted stubbornly, it would undoubtedly have threatened in the end to cause the degeneration of the party - moreover, simultaneously on both of its poles, i.e. both in the party youth and in the leading cadres. With regard to the proletarian basis of the party, the factory cells, students and others, the nature of the danger is quite clear. Not feeling themselves active participants in social work and not receiving a proper and timely response to their party requests, significant circles of the party would begin to look for a surrogate for party initiative in the form of all sorts of groupings and factional formations.

Trotsky's article "Public Composition of the Party"

"The first task of the class that seized power was the creation of a state apparatus, including the army, economic management bodies, etc. But the working of the state, cooperative, etc. apparatus meant, in its essence, the weakening and dilution of the main factory cells of the party and an extraordinary growth in parties of administrative elements. Therein lies the contradiction of the situation.

An absolutely exceptional place is and will continue to be occupied by necessity in the Party for the education of young people. By educating the new Soviet intelligentsia with a high percentage of communists through the workers' faculties, party universities, and higher specialized educational institutions, we are thereby tearing away the young proletarian elements from the machine not only for the period of study, but, as a general rule, for the rest of their lives: working youth, who has gone through higher education will, in due time, obviously be absorbed by the industrial, state, or the same party apparatus. Such is the second factor in the

disruption of the equilibrium in the Party, to the disadvantage of the basic, factory units.

We have, consequently, a situation where a very significant and best-trained part of the party has been absorbed by various apparatuses of leadership and management, economic management, and command, while the other significant part is studying; a third is scattered in the villages, working on the arable land, and only a fourth (at present less than one-sixth in number) consists of proletarians working at the machine tool. It is quite natural that the growth of the Party apparatus and the features of bureaucracy accompanying this growth are not generated by factory cells... The source of bureaucracy in the Party is the increasing shift of attention and forces towards government apparatuses and institutions, with insufficient growth in industry. In view of these fundamental facts and tendencies, we must be all the more clearly aware of the dangers of the degeneration of the old Party cadres in an apparatus... It is perfectly obvious that the heterogeneity of the social composition of the Party, engendered by the whole situation, does not weaken, but, on the contrary, extremely sharpens all the negative aspects of the apparatus policy. There is and cannot be any other means of overcoming the corporative and departmental spirit of the individual component parts of the Party than their active rapprochement in the regime of Party democracy..." (pp. 124-127).

Trotsky's article "Groups and factional formations"

"The question of groupings and factions has occupied a central place in the discussion. On this point, it is necessary to speak out with all clarity since the question is very acute and responsible. And it is often posed falsely.

We are the only party in the country, and in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat it cannot be otherwise. The various needs of the working class, the peasantry, the state apparatus, and its personnel put pressure on our Party, trying to find political expression through it. The difficulties and

contradictions of development, the temporary inconsistency between the various parts of the proletariat or the proletariat as a whole and the peasantry—all this presses on the Party through its workers' and peasants' cells, through the state apparatus, through the student youth. Even episodic temporal disagreements and shades of opinion can express to some extent, in some particular instance, the pressure of certain social interests. Episodic disagreements and groupings of opinions can, under certain conditions, turn into stable groupings; these latter can, in turn, sooner or later deploy into organized factions; Finally, the established faction, by opposing itself to the other sections of the Party, is thus more susceptible to pressure coming from outside the Party. Such is the dialectic of intra-Party groupings in an era when the Communist Party necessarily monopolizes the leadership of political life in its hands. What is the conclusion? If you don't want factions, you don't need permanent groupings; if you don't want permanent groupings, avoid temporary groupings; Finally, in order to protect the Party from temporary groupings, it is necessary that there should be no disagreements in the Party at all, for where there are two opinions, there people always group together. But how, on the other hand, is it possible to avoid disagreements in the half-million-strong party that leads the life of the country in exceptionally difficult and complex conditions? This is the main contradiction

Party public opinion is inevitably developed in contradictions and disagreements. To localize this process only in the apparatus, by presenting ready-made fruits to the Party in the form of slogans, orders, etc., means to weaken the Party ideologically and politically. To make the entire Party a participant in the formation of decisions means to meet halfway between temporary ideological groupings, with the danger of their transformation into long-term groupings and even factions. How to be?

Is there really no way out? Is there really no place for a party line between the regime of party "calm" and the regime of factional splitting of the party? No, there is such a line... To

prevent this, it is required that the leading Party bodies listen to the voice of the broad masses of the Party, do not consider any criticism as a manifestation of factionalism, and do not thereby push conscientious and disciplined Party members onto the path of isolation and factionalism..." (p. 130 - 137).

Here are all four articles and letters of Trotsky, known as the "New Course", which caused in the party, in the period of preparation for the 13th Congress of the RCP, a broad discussion on issues of inner-party democracy, the attitude of the party towards its own party apparatus, towards leaders, etc.

And although they are written in a diplomatic and skillful manner, it seems to me that every more or less attentive reader can discern Trotsky's main idea behind the abundance of generally very smooth phrases, the main direction of his blow is that the old party cadres are being reborn, bureaucratized, mired in the apparatus affairs, have lost their militant proletarian, revolutionary spirit, and therefore the party must renew its apparatus, get rid of the bureaucratized old cadres, the old leaders who oppose, resist the introduction of the "new course" in the party - the course towards the democratization of the party - and place a stake on the youth.

Other participants in the 1928 discussion spoke more clearly and more frankly than their ideological inspirer. Here, for example, one of them - Preobrazhensky - wrote in Pravda dated 28 / XI-1923:

"... In my opinion, for the last two years the Party has been pursuing a fundamentally wrong line in its inner-Party policy.

...In order to correctly orientate ourselves in an extremely confusing situation... - for this it is necessary to create a different life within our organizations than it was during the front-line struggle.

It was necessary to liquidate militaristic methods within the party, to restore party life partly according to the pattern of 1917-1918, developing the activity and initiative of the

organization and its individual members in posing and discussing the main questions of party life ...

In practice, this did not happen ... Instead of a course towards the collective initiative of organizations ... a course was taken towards a good apparatus and a good party official. We improved the apparatus, which is indisputable, but we achieved this at the price of a more voluminous minus, the price of the extinction of inner-Party life and the separation of a small active part of the organization from the Party-passive or semi-passive majority.

... The most harmful anti-Party currents sometimes capture good rank-and-file communist workers only because the cells do not help them, through free collective discussion, to dispel their doubts among people, among comrades. Many of these wavering or embittered would never have dared to conspire against the Party if they had been given the opportunity to openly defend their opinions at Party meetings ...

The course towards the appointed secretary, the course towards the cadre of the party apparatus leads to the fact that this apparatus acts, thinks (because it thinks) and bears responsibility for the entire party ... This inevitably leads to the fact that due to the growth of influence and power of this layer in the role and importance in the organizations of the working section of the party is diminishing, both those who drowned in Soviet and economic work, and those who work at the machine tool" (pp. 62 - 66).

Characteristically, the speech of the supporter of the "new course" Stukov at a meeting of the Moscow party activists on December 11, 1923:

"Those comrades who have been sitting in the apparatus up to now have run the party, obviously they are such human material that, organically, to a large part, cannot correctly carry out the completely correct line of the Central Committee.

So the question is...

We had a certain system of party management, a system that had taken shape over the years. This system is a system of bureaucratic centralism. Any mode can be carried out, of course, only on the condition that it is embodied in a certain frame of people. The regime was brought up in the practice of a system of bureaucratic management: a certain type of party worker took shape and grew up, who, by virtue of such a formulation of the question of managing the party, at every step in everyday life, got used to opposing himself to the rest of the party mass, was accustomed to considering himself as a guardian, leader, and the party mass, which he is called to lead, must obey him. This party type, which grew up on the soil of a system of bureaucratic centralism, is now showing itself in the sense that it is beginning to show resistance.

Otherwise, he cannot. This particular type of comrade that has developed can hardly reconstruct itself, can hardly reorganize...

... I have declared and continue to declare that historically this cadre, which grew up on the leadership of the party, on a management built on the type of bureaucratic centralism, this cadre has done its job. And he should be replaced by new people who are easier to learn new tasks that are in line ...

...What is our main practical task? In order to ensure the implementation of the new course, it is central and paramount to raise the question of refreshing the apparatus ... " (pp. 89 - 90).

At the Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(b) the struggle between the majority of the delegates and the opposition was fought basically on the same questions as in the pre-Congress discussion. But the forces of the opposition were already so undermined by the position of the overwhelming majority of party members that at the congress many of the oppositionists (including Trotsky himself) largely softened their attacks on the Central Committee.

But for the inner-party struggle of 1923, it was very significant that in it, for the first time in the history of the party, a single block of all the forces that remained from those oppositions that had been condemned and defeated by V. I. Lenin came out against the Central Committee. This bloc included all the leaders of the notorious "democratic centralism" group, the leaders of the "workers' opposition", Trotsky's supporters in the discussion about trade unions, and so on.

The united opposition at the Thirteenth Congress did not receive a single vote in its support, despite the fact that the Thirteenth Congress was the largest congress of all the previous twelve congresses of the party.

XIV Congress of the RCP(b). (Stenotchet. Gosizdat, 1926)

"Finally, comrades, the third and most difficult question for me is the question of the Party and the collective leadership of the Party.

I would propose to confirm the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of our Party. It said: "The Congress instructs the Central Committee to conduct all work in the direction that the vast majority of the members of the Party in the near future will consist of workers directly employed in production."

Here is the decision adopted at the 13th Party Congress. (Voices: "That's right!") If it's right, then the question is: why the fuss about Axelrodovism?... Why do they react so passionately... to the proposal that more workers are needed in the party? Why this fear of the working class?

Now I would like to say a few words about our leadership.

Already from what I have given you, from a whole series of hesitations on a major question of principle, you can clearly see that in a number of cases there was no firm policy ... I think that, of course, there were mistakes, and this must be said quite openly . Of course, we have the best Central

Committee that we only know, no one, of course, can argue against the fact that this is a selection of the entire party, but this does not mean that we should engage in self-praise, and this does not mean that we will accept firm gestures for a firm policy..." (pp. 97 - 127 - Zinoviev).

"Comrade Bukharin here spoke with great pathos about what the congress decides, that's right. Every Bolshevik considers the decisions of the congress binding for him ... For us Marxists, the truth is that which corresponds to reality. Vladimir Ilyich said: teaching Marx is invincible because it is true. And our congress must take care to seek and find the correct line. That is its task. We must not console ourselves with the fact that the majority is always right. There have been congresses in the history of our party where the majority was wrong. Let us recall the historic Stockholm Congress

(Noise. Voices: "This is a subtle allusion to thick circumstances.") The majority should not revel in the fact that it is the majority, but impartially seek the right solution. If it is true ... (Voice: "Lev Davidovich, you have new allies"), it will direct our party on the right path" (Krupskaya).

"... Allow me to dwell on the collective leadership of the Party. I, comrades, already spoke in October and I repeat here now - during this time life and reality have not convinced me that I am wrong. (Voice from the seat: "It's a pity.")

It seems to me that insofar as I observe the work both in the Central Committee and in the Politburo, insofar as I was privy to inner work, I know that there was no real collective leadership...

... Instead of a collective leadership, we had a number of political, or something, so to speak, combinations ...

Comrades, if you need more printed confirmation of how Comrade Uglanov understands democracy, then I can read you this. In his concluding remarks at the Moscow Conference, he said: "Our further task must be to continue the

centralization of our organization from top to bottom, the centralization of leadership. Collective leadership must be brought under this centralization. This is the basis of the foundations and the true expression in practice of intra-Party democracy." (Stormy applause.)

It also says: "Applause." (Laughter, voices from the seats: "That's right!" Applause.)

... We cannot imagine the leadership of the party without Zinoviev and Kamenev. The leadership will be as the majority decides. But, comrades, it is inconceivable that in our Party, in the Central Committee and in the Politburo there must necessarily be unanimity on all questions. Of course, shades of opinion are inevitable here, and these shades, which are represented by a number of comrades, these shades must be taken into account. Don't be suppressed. Not that... Here's the thing...

Yes, I know it's nice to be in such an overwhelming majority, but you have to be able to be in the minority and go against the grain and tell the truth. (Voices from the seats: "Against the party, not against the current!") We will submit to the majority. This is not the question, and do not reduce it to this plane. What do we want? We want real collective leadership - not in words, but in deeds. In practice, this means that on all controversial issues that exist and which undoubtedly will exist, it cannot but exist, that on all these controversial issues the minority should be given the opportunity to express their point of view, to defend it ... We want the minority not to be silenced. (Voice from the floor: "Freedom of groupings") ... We want an honest inner-party policy" (pp. 180 - 186 - Lashevich. Emphasized by me. - G. M.)

"November 9 or 10 Comrade Cherny told me the following:

In the Central Committee of the RCP(b) there are disagreements between TT. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya, on the one hand, etc. Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Rykov, Tomsy and Bukharin, on the other hand, on the following main

questions: ... on the individual or collective leadership of the party ...

T. Black said:

... On the question of leading the party and all its work, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya, and the entire Leningrad organization are in favor of collective leadership of the Party in resolving all the most important questions of work and job transfers, while Comrade Stalin, with the support of these persons, in every possible way wipes, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other Comrades from the leadership of the Party " (from a letter to the Central Control Commission, p. 197).

"I must now approach the question that was touched upon here and by other comrades ... namely, the question of the organization of the leadership in our Party, and I think that this question stands in the closest connection with the questions of our economic policy.

... We are faced with the task of achieving the greatest firmness in economic management. This firm economic leadership has been shattered in recent months by the fact that we do not have a sufficiently firm and coordinated Party leadership. That's the way it is. (Noise, voices: "And the chest just opened. Now I understand.") ... I repeat that I cannot imagine the Leninist party without Kamenev and Zinoviev. (Noise) Yes, I can't imagine Lenin's Politburo of the Central Committee without Kamenev and Zinoviev. When I said this at a large meeting of members of the Central Committee, the accusation, which was repeated here today, was thrown at me, that I was putting forward for Kamenev and Zinoviev some kind of monopoly on the representation of Leninism. (Voices from the seats: "So it is!") ...

We absolutely must ensure the unity of leadership; it is absolutely necessary. If you think that Kamenev and Zinoviev are not fit for this, their participation is unthinkable - say so. If you think... (Noise and shouting: "And Stalin? Should Stalin be in the Politburo?") Comrades, let me say a

few words about Comrade Stalin. (Voices from the floor: "Ah, well, well. We'll see, we'll see.") Comrades, let me tell you that for a number of years I worked hand in hand with Comrade Stalin, and I have nothing but the best comradely relations with him! (Noise, screams.) I want to say: I have absolutely no feelings of hostility, personal and political, towards Comrade Stalin, absolutely none. I have to say this because they say that all our relations are dictated, as it were, by personal hostility and so on. This is not the case; I do not have the slightest doubt that the entire Party is of the greatest benefit (as in the text. - Ed.) from the work that Comrade Stalin is doing ... I cannot agree that if in the Politburo, or in the Central Committee, or at the congress the question arises as to how the Secretariat should be organized, we must regard this circumstance as an attempt at an intra-Party coup. I do not agree with this. Comrades, I am personally convinced of the following: I think that the influence and authority of Comrade Stalin, even if he were not the general secretary of the party ... (Noise, shouting.) ... I ask: why, to what extent can be shaken the authority of Comrade Stalin if he works as a member of the Politburo? Does this in any way diminish the guiding significance of every word spoken by Comrade Stalin? It doesn't decrease. (Noise, screams.) ...

Comrades, since the general secretary of the party is, on the one hand, a member of the Politburo, and on the other hand, the head of the secretariat, then, quite independently of Stalin's personality, a situation is created where any divergence of views in the Politburo that arises on any political issue receives its reflection in organizational work, because, in reality, one of the members of the Politburo, being the general secretary ... finds himself in such a position that any disagreement ... can immediately receive one or another expression through organizational measures. (Noise) ... I would consider it correct to organize the Secretariat in such a way that the Secretariat would actually be the executive organ of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. What would we gain if we really organized the Secretariat this way?

What we would gain is that a completely free exchange of opinions would indeed be possible within the Politburo: today there may be one majority on one issue, tomorrow another majority on another issue. (Noise. Laughter. Voices: "Combinations? Democracy? Fashion leadership?" The call of the chairman.) No, comrades, it's not a matter of combinations;

Politburo freedom of opinion and the formation of firmly united groups in the Politburo and the Central Committee was excluded ... "(pp. 332 - 336 - Sokolnikov).

"Comrades, if in the headquarters of the Leninists, in this difficult situation, any disagreements are immediately accompanied by organizational measures, if after each opinion expressed, forces are gathered not to challenge it, but in order to undermine the authority and discredit the comrades who expressed this opinion, if the comrades in the party who try to raise their voice in defense of this opinion ... do it with trepidation, expecting organizational punishment for it, then we cannot get rid of the fact that ideological differences do not develop into an organizational fight.

If such a regime continues in the Party, I see an enormous danger that these ideological differences will not really be able to get along in the bowels of a single Central Committee. ... This will be a catastrophic event. I urge you not to choose this path, but to choose another path ... This can only be achieved if the minority ... is given the opportunity to defend their views in the party, of course, with all the responsibility that is entrusted to us by the party and the dictatorship.

... And, finally, we are against creating a theory of "leader", against making a "leader". We are against the fact that the Secretariat actually unites both politics and organization, standing above a political body. We are for our leaders to be organized inside in such a way that there is a really full-fledged Politburo, uniting all the politicians of our party, and at the same time that there is a Secretariat subordinate to it and technically implementing its decisions. (Noise.)

.. I have to finish speaking. Precisely because I repeatedly said this to Comrade Stalin in person, precisely because I repeatedly said this to a group of Leninist comrades, and I repeat this at the congress: I have come to the conclusion that Comrade Stalin cannot fulfill the role of a unifier of the Bolshevik headquarters. (Voices from the seats: "Wrong!", "Nonsense!", "Here's the thing!", "The cards have been revealed!" Noise, shouts: "We will not give you commanding heights!", "Stalin! Stalin!" The delegates stand up and greet Comrade Stalin. Thunderous applause. Shouts of "That's where the Party has united!")

Chairman (Rykov): Comrades, please calm down. Comrade Kamenev will now finish his speech.

Kamenev: "I began this part of my speech with the words: we are against the theory of one-man operation, against creating a leader!" With these words I end my speech" (pp. 244 - 2575 - Kamenev).

XV Congress of the RCP(b). (Stenotchet. Gosizdat. 1928)

At the Fifteenth Congress, the struggle of the party against the opposition continued, this time joining the Zinoviev-Kamenev group as the main striking force. The party resolutely rebuffed the political views of the opposition, their understanding of the collective leadership and internal party democracy. The opposition, under pressure from the 15th Congress, tried to retreat to reserve positions.

"Comrades, I am coming to this rostrum with the sole purpose of finding a way to reconcile the opposition with the Party. (Voices: "Lie, it's too late!")

The opposition represents a minority in the party. Of course, it cannot put any conditions on her part to the parties. It can only tell the congress the conclusion it draws for itself from the history of two years of struggle, and answer the questions put to it.

... The struggle in the Party during these two years has reached such a degree of intensification that it confronts all of us with the question of choosing one of the two paths. One of these paths is the second line. This path under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat is disastrous for the revolution. This is the path of political and class degeneration.

This path is ordered for us, forbidden, excluded by our whole system of views, by all Lenin's teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We cannot and do not want to lead our like-minded people along this path. (Voices: "But you led, led. You're lying!")

It remains, therefore, the second way. This path... is to submit to the party fully and completely. We choose this path because we are deeply convinced that the correct Leninist policy can triumph only in our Party and only through it, and not outside the Party, not in spite of it. To embark on this path means for us to submit to all the decisions of the Congress, no matter how difficult they may be for us (a voice: "Formal!") and to fulfill them. (Voice: "No one will believe.")

If we were to add to this the renunciation of views, this, in our opinion, would be un-Bolshevik. This demand, comrades, for the renunciation of views has never been put forward in our Party. If we were to renounce the views that we defended a week or two ago, that would be hypocrisy... I am talking, of course, about those views that are our true views (Voroshilov: "We demand Menshevik views!") ...

... You have created a commission to disarm the opposition. You demand from us a guarantee of this disarmament. It is natural. No one in the party is obliged to take a word for it. (Voroshilov: "In Geneva, the League of Nations is also talking about disarmament." Voices: "And whoever believes your word is completely bad!")

If you do not believe, then you have only one way - the way of your own verification of our activities. (Voices: "We've

been checking for two years already!") Otherwise, you can't get any guarantees. What is the guarantee? You won't believe my word of honor, will you? (Laughter. Voices: "We won't believe your word of honor, no!")... Comrades, the Party has the only way to test the sincerity and decisiveness of our statements - to give us the opportunity to prove it in practice. There is no other way. (Voice: "Tell me frankly about the underground work, then we'll believe it." Voice: "Put your underground organization on the Party table.")

I don't carry an illegal organization in my pocket and I can't put it on the table... (Laughter. Voice: "That's the point, they left it at home in reserve.")

... Our like-minded people openly signed a number of documents sent by us to the Central Committee of the Party. (Voice: "Not even reading it.") There are about 3,000 signatures under the statement of the 1983s. This statement is in your hands (M.I. Ulyanova: "Half was removed")" (pp. 251 - 256 - Kamenev).

The very statement of the opposition to the congress is very interesting. It says:

"Comrades!

The unity of the Communist Party is the highest principle in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat: without the unity of the Party on the basis of Leninism, it is impossible to maintain the dictatorship, to advance the building of socialism and to promote the development of the world revolution.

Meanwhile, the recent development of the inner-Party struggle has clearly endangered the unity of our Party. If the further development of our struggle should lead to a split in the Party and then result in a struggle between two parties, this would signify the greatest threat to the cause of Lenin.

We in no way wish to deny the share of responsibility that lies with us for the aggravation of the inner-Party situation: in the struggle for our views we embarked on the path of

factionalism, which sometimes took extremely sharp forms, in a number of cases we resorted to means that ran counter to the Party's discipline. It was only our deep conviction that our views were right and Leninist, our desire to bring these views to the attention of the masses of Party members, the obstacles that we met along the way, the accusations that Bolsheviks could not bear to which we were subjected, that pushed us to this path.

We have no program differences with the party.

Pointing to the growth and existence of Thermidorian dangers in the country and to the insufficient rebuff to them, we have never considered and do not consider that our Party or its Central Committee have become Thermidorian or that our state has ceased to be a workers' state, which was also categorically stated in our platform. We do not allow any doubts or hesitations on the question of the defense of the USSR... We did not intend and do not intend to make non-party judges of our disputes...

Meanwhile, the intra-Party struggle has reached a degree of intensification which poses a clear threat to the unity of the Party, and consequently to the fundamental interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This cannot and should not continue. Struggle in these forms must be eliminated. In the face of the international bourgeoisie, which is profiting from a split in the Party and is even more persistently preparing for war against the USSR, in the face of the international proletariat... - we consider it our duty to do everything necessary to strengthen the fighting unity of our Party.

We cannot renounce the views, the correctness of which we are confident and which are set forth in our platform and in our theses, but for the sake of preserving the unity of the Party, ensuring its full combat capability as the leader of the state and the world revolutionary movement, we declare to the congress that we are ceasing all factional work. We are disbanding all factional organizations and calling on our like-minded people in the CPSU(b) and in the Comintern to do the

same. We consider submission to the congress to be the unconditional duty of a member of the Party, and we will put this submission into practice...

This statement expresses our firm determination.

We are sure that we express the opinion of all our like-minded people who were expelled from the Party, and that the Party, as a first step to restore normal Party life, will consider it necessary, on the basis of this statement, to return those expelled to the Party, release those arrested for opposition activities and give all of us the opportunity to work in party to prove the firmness of this decision of ours..." (pp. 1333 - 1336).

Among the signatories of this statement, we also see those names that we often met and will still meet when studying the struggle of the party with various anti-party and anti-Soviet elements - Beloborodov, Babakhan, Belenky, Bakaev, Budzinskaya, Boguslavsky, Vardin, Gertik, Ginzburg, Drobkis, Evdokimov , Zinoviev, Zalutsky, Kamenev, Kavtaradze, Kuklin, Kagalynov, Lashevich, Levkin, Lizdin, Muralov, Nikolaev (killer of S. M. Kirov), Natason, Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, Peterson, Reingold, Radek, Rakovsky, Rafail, Rem, Safarov , Smilga, Serebryakov, Safronov, Sarkis, Smirnov, Trotsky and dozens of others.

The 15th Congress did not accept the opposition's statement as a document worthy of the Party's confidence.

Pay attention to the lines underlined by me in the statement of the opposition - "we cannot abandon the views we are sure are correct". Precisely these lines were quite rightly regarded by the party as a desire to continue the struggle, if the opportunity arose, as political double-dealing.

XVI Congress of the CPSU (b) (Stenotchet. Giz. 1930).

In the period between the 15th and 16th Congresses of the CPSU(b), the party again had to wage a serious struggle with yet another opposition, this time from Bukharin-Rykov.

And, as always with the opposition, one of the favorite, if not the most favorite, argument this time of the Bukharin-Rykov group was the assertion that

"neither democracy nor self-criticism can be used to a sufficient extent because democracy itself and self-criticism itself are used to decisively and immediately overcome any shade of opinion. In accordance with this (that is, overcoming any and every shade), the entire cadre of workers in the party apparatus is determined. All this inevitably greatly complicates the businesslike discussion of issues." (p. 89).

"We are opposed to single-handedly deciding questions of the party leadership. We are opposed to control by the collective being replaced by control by a person, even an authoritative one" (p. 203).

If we try to briefly sum up the struggle of the Party against the opposition on questions of the organizational structure of our Party, we will see that all the attacks of the opposition elements and groups boiled down to the fact that there is no collective leadership in the Party, replaced by one-man, dictatorship, that it is dominated by military a discipline in which all independent activity and creative initiative of party members who have one or another point of view different from the official one, which belongs to the "dictator", is suppressed. All opposition elements opposed the "theory of the leader", the "cult of the leader", the "cult of personality". All opposition elements, as a panacea for all ills in the party, brought to the fore the collective leadership, inner-party democracy, interpreting them in such a way that it turned out that without freedom of speech in the party for all and all opposition groups, without the right guaranteed by the party to what people who put forward, propagate and defend views different from the views of the majority of the party - there could be no question of collective leadership and inner-party democracy.

The history of the party teaches us that the party never (before the 22nd Congress) was led by opposition demagogues who tried to bribe the party with beautiful words about democracy, freedom of opinion, and so on.

The party remembered the repeated categorical instructions of V. I. Lenin that

"The will of tens and hundreds of thousands can be expressed in one person. This complex will be worked out in the Soviet way.

We need more discipline, more unity, and more dictatorship. Without this, one cannot even dream of a great victory..." (vol. 30, pp. 472, 480).

"... I leave aside the question whether the Prosecutor General enjoys sole power or shares this power with the Supreme Tribunal and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Justice, because this question is completely secondary and can be decided one way or another depending on whether the party trusts one person with a huge power or distributes this power between the indicated three instances "(Subch. - GM, vol. 33, pp. 328 -329).

"Military victories are easier than economic victories. Defeating Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin was much easier than defeating the old petty-bourgeois habits, attitudes, skills, economic conditions, defended and reproduced by millions and millions of small owners next to the workers, together with them, among them .

To win here, you need more endurance, more perseverance, more perseverance, more systematic work, more organizational and administrative skills on a larger scale" (vol. 30, p. 330).

"The state is an area of coercion. It would be crazy to renounce coercion, especially in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat. "Administration" and an administrative approach to business are obligatory here. The party is the direct ruling vanguard of the proletariat, it is the leader. Exclusion from the party, not coercion , here is a specific means of influence, a means of purification and tempering of the avant-garde" (vol. 32, p. 76).

"We have people who say about military discipline: 'Here's another! Why is this?'" Such people do not understand the position of Russia and do not understand that on the bloody front our struggle ends, and on the bloodless front it begins, and here no less tension, strength and sacrifice are needed, and the stakes here are no less and the resistance is no less but much more ... Do not make yourself any illusions. To win, you need the greatest struggle, you need iron military discipline. Whoever does not understand this, he has not understood anything in the conditions of the preservation of workers' power and, by his considerations, brings great harm to these very worker-peasant authorities" (vol. 30, p. 405).

V. I. Lenin expended a lot of energy in the fight against those who believed that where there is collegiality, there is democracy, and where there is unity of command, "dictatorship" - there is no democracy, there one cannot talk about the Soviet, socialist principle of management - on the principle of democratic centralism.

"Collegiality is necessary for solving the affairs of the state of workers and peasants. But any exaggeration of collegiality, any distortion of it, leading to red tape, to irresponsibility, any transformation of collegiate institutions into talking shops is the greatest evil, and this evil must be put an end to at all costs, as soon as possible, without stopping at anything.

Collegiality should not go beyond the absolutely necessary minimum, neither in regard to the number of members of the collegium, nor in regard to the businesslike conduct of work, the prohibition of "speeches", the greatest speed of the exchange of opinions, reducing it to information and to accurate practical proposals.

Whenever there is even the slightest opportunity for this, collegiality should be reduced to zero, to the briefest discussion of only the most important questions in the smallest collegium, and the practical management of an institution, enterprise, business, task should be entrusted to one comrade, known for his firmness, decisiveness, courage,

the ability to conduct practical work, which enjoys the greatest confidence ... "(vol. 29, p. 403).

V. I. Lenin wrote:

"Recently ... The question arose of how the sole administrative power (power that could be called dictatorial power) is compatible with democratic organizations in general, with a collegial principle in management - in particular, and - with the Soviet socialist principle of organization - in particular. "Undoubtedly, the opinion is very widespread that the sole dictatorial power is incompatible neither with democracy, nor with the Soviet type of state, nor with collegial management. There is nothing more erroneous than this opinion. (I emphasized. - G.M.)

... The question arose of really enormous importance: firstly, the fundamental question is whether the appointment of individuals, vested with unlimited powers of dictators, is compatible with the fundamental principles of Soviet power; secondly, what is the relation of this case - this precedent, if you like - to the main tasks of power at this particular moment.

That the dictatorship of individuals in the history of revolutionary movements has very often been the spokesman, bearer, and conductor of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes is evidenced by the indisputable experience of history. With the bourgeois democracy undoubtedly combined the dictatorship of individuals. But on this point the bourgeois detractors of Soviet power and their echoes always show sleight of hand... and say: personal dictatorship is absolutely incompatible with your Bolshevik (that is, not bourgeois, but socialist) Soviet democracy.

The reasoning is bad. If we are not anarchists, we must recognize the necessity of the state, that is, coercion for the transition from capitalism to socialism, the form of coercion is determined by the degree of development of a given revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for

example, the legacy of a long and reactionary war, then by the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie.. Therefore, there is absolutely no fundamental contradiction between Soviet (that is, socialist) democracy and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals. The difference between the proletarian dictatorship and the bourgeois dictatorship is that the former directs its blows ... in the interests of ... the majority, and then that the former is carried out - and through individuals - not only by the masses of the working and exploited, but also by organizations built so that it is precisely such masses to wake up.

... Any large-scale machine industry - that is, precisely ... the source and foundation of socialism - requires an unconditional and strict unity of will that directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people. Technically, economically, and historically, this necessity is obvious; everyone who thought about socialism has always recognized it as its condition. But how can the strictest unity of will be ensured? - Submission of the will of thousands to the will of one.

This submission can, with the ideal consciousness and discipline of the participants in the common work, resemble more the soft leadership of the conductor. It can take sharp forms of dictatorship if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness ... This transition from one political task to another, which in appearance is completely different from it, is the whole originality of the moment experienced. The revolution has just shattered the oldest, strongest, heaviest fetters to which the masses obeyed under duress. It was yesterday. And today the same revolution, and precisely in the interests of its development and strengthening, precisely in the interests of socialism, demands the unquestioning obedience of the masses to the unified will of the leaders... It is clear that such a transition is unthinkable all at once. It is clear that it is feasible only at the cost of the greatest shocks, upheavals, and returns to the old.

There are comrades who sing an old song and say that such statements by V. I. Lenin applied to them only for the period of war communism, only for the period of NEP, and so on.

V. I. Lenin himself taught:

"Collegiality is the school of government. You can't sit in the preparatory class of the school all the time" (vol. 30, p. 428).

"Collegiality at best results in an enormous waste of energy and does not satisfy the speed and clarity of work..." (vol. 30, pp. 285-286).

"At the moment we are living through, when Soviet power and dictatorship have sufficiently strengthened, when the preparation of the masses by the functioning of Soviet institutions for independent participation in all public life has been sufficiently carried out, the task of strictest separation of discussions and meetings from the unquestioning fulfillment of all the instructions of the leader is put forward. This means separating the necessary, useful preparation of the masses for the implementation of a certain measure and for monitoring its implementation - to separate it from this implementation itself" (vol. 27, p. 430).

There are people who object and say that V. I. Lenin, advocating unity of command, for "dictatorship", for the unquestioning subordination of the will of tens of thousands to the will of one person, meant only production relations, only relations between leaders and subordinates in the labor process at manufacturing enterprises, only in economic matters.

Is it so? Did the leader of our party really have in mind only relations of production, or did he also have in mind the party as "the direct ruling vanguard of the proletariat," as the leader of all, including the economic activities of the proletarian state?

Let's try to find the answer to this very important and interesting question from Vladimir Ilyich himself, -

"In the theses of comrades Osinsky, Maksimovsky and Sapronov ... everything is a complete theoretical distortion. They write that collegiality in one form or another constitutes the necessary basis of democracy. I affirm that in the 15 years of pre-revolutionary social democracy you will not find anything similar. Democratic centralism only means that representatives from the localities gather and choose a responsible body that should govern. But how?

It depends on how many good people there are, on how many good "administrators" there are. Democratic centralism lies in the fact that the congress checks the Central Committee, dismisses it, and elects a new one" (vol. 30, p. 430).

According to the direct meaning of V. I. Lenin's words, to link the issue of collegiality, collectivity with the principle of democratic centralism - the basic principle of the organizational structure of the proletarian party - is "a complete theoretical distortion", "a monstrous fundamental absurdity."

In a letter to E. M. Alexandrova, V. I. Lenin said:

"You are striving, if I am not mistaken, for autocracy (*single center of power*) and a 'firm hand'. It is a good thing, and you are a thousand times right, right that this is exactly what we need" (vol. 34, p. 131).

V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that

"the will of a CLASS is sometimes carried out by a dictator who alone sometimes does more and is often more necessary" (vol. 30, p. 444). (Emphasis mine. - GM).

It turns out that V. I. Lenin also extended the individual personality to party work. In my opinion, this is really so, and it cannot be otherwise, in real life conditions.

The party elects a congress - a meeting of delegates from the field. The congress, guided by considerations of a political and business nature, elects a Central Committee consisting of several dozen of the most

authoritative and respected members of the party - the highest executive and administrative body of the party in the inter-congress period. The Central Committee, according to the Rules, meets at least once every six months for its plenary sessions - plenums of the Central Committee.

"The Central Committee elects: to manage the work of the Central Committee between its Plenums - the Presidium (Politburo); to manage the current work, mainly in the selection of personnel and organization of verification of performance - the Secretariat" (Charter of the CPSU).

All the executive and administrative bodies of the party - the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Politburo (Presidium) - are entirely and fully accountable to the Party Congress, responsible to it.

The Charter of the CPSU fully implements the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, the Leninist indication of the maximum efficiency of leadership, the indication of "reducing to a minimum" collegiality, "necessary for a business discussion of work, prohibition of" speeches ", the most rapid exchange of opinions, reducing it to information and to accurate practical suggestions.

From a congress of many thousands to a Central Committee with several dozen members, from the Central Committee to a Presidium, that is, to 10 to 12 members of the Central Committee—such is the Leninist scheme for governing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Is it by chance, V.I. Lenin, speaking of the general secretary of our party, pointed to him as a person who "concentrated immense power in his hands"?

No, not by chance. This statement by V. I. Lenin, in my opinion, only once again confirms his idea, based on real life, that "we need autocracy and a "firm hand", that "the will of a class must sometimes be carried out by a dictator who will do more and is more needed."

V. I. Lenin did not have any illusions about the fact that the General Secretary of our Party must necessarily be and will be an ideal communist and an ideal person, that he will be completely insured against certain mistakes and mistakes in his work, that he will be absolutely free from feelings of personal hostility, distrust of one or another workmate, etc. etc.

The leader and founder of our party unshakably believed in the strength and revolutionary spirit of the working people, the proletariat, in the mind, honor and conscience of our era - in the proletarian communist party.

The great Marxist, even for a moment, could not imagine such a situation in the proletarian party, when one or several tens, or even thousands of people, could turn the party around like a toy for their own personal and selfish purposes, could carry out a policy in their leading and administrative work, going against the aspirations of a million-strong party.

It is hard to believe, and, from the point of view of the truth of life, it is impossible to believe that for two decades a million-strong revolutionary party was led and ruled by tyrants and despots who, by some miracle, managed to fool the party around their finger like a blind kitten. It is difficult, impossible to believe that in the million-strong Party of Communists there was not a single honest Communist-Leninist (if one does not include members of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev-Bukharin terrorist groups) who did not find the courage to remove such a person from our path.

I have said and consider it necessary to repeat once again that the line of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU leads us into such jungles of philistine from which there is no way out.

The line of the 22nd Congress not only does not confirm the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the Party and its leaders, about the role of the individual and the masses of the people in history, but, on the contrary, completely rejects this teaching.

V. I. Lenin taught:

"... The masses decide, who, if a small number of people do not approach them, ... do not treat this small number too politely" (vol. 31, p. 257).

Party led by its leader V. I. Lenin understood this very well and, precisely proceeding from the principles of democratic centralism, from the Marxist doctrine of the party and its leaders, party was not afraid of one-man and "dictatorship", knowing that it could always, at the next party congress or the Plenum of the Central Committee, give a proper assessment actions of this or that person, draw appropriate conclusions from this assessment and approve or stop the activity of this person if he makes major mistakes or embarks on the path of abuse of his power.

To take a different point of view means to admit that the majority of the members of the leading organs of the party - the Central Committee, the Commission of Party Control, the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee, its Secretariat, as well as the majority of leaders of local authorities, consisted of people who either were frightened to the point of insensitivity, or put up with the anti-party, anti-Leninist regime that existed in the party (according to the 22nd Congress), or from those to whom this bloody and sticky (according to the 22nd Congress) regime was at hand and who only for this reason provided for more than two decades "trust" and support to Stalin and the almost permanent composition of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee.

Is this a defense of the Leninist Party and the organizational principles of its construction, about which there was so much and so "colorful" discussion at the 22nd Congress?

No, this is their refutation, this is Trotsky's rotten theory about the apparatus and "apparatchiks" revived with renewed vigor.

Our Party has always vigilantly guarded the Marxist-Leninist principles of its organizational structure, and has never set leaders against the Party, the Party against the class.

It seems to me that it would not be out of place to recall what such ardent rejectors of the "leader's theory" and the "leader's cult" as Zinoviev and Kamenev used to say in their time.

Here is what they said, for example, at the 13th Party Congress:

"... Without Lenin, without a lamp, without the most brilliant head on earth, we have to solve those tremendously important questions on which the fate of our party depends, and not only of it alone.

Until now, we have been able to act directly and literally according to Lenin..." (Memorandum of the Congress, p. 37).

"... The Party trusts its Central Committee, and the Central Committee is proud of this. However, we do not have such a situation that the Party approves everything with its eyes closed. Yes, this did not happen before. But before we had such a colossal political and moral authority of one leader, who covered everything..." (ibid., p. 248 - Zinoviev).

And at the XII Congress (in 1923), -

"Comrades, our congress met with some delay... We all firmly counted on the fact that today none other than Vladimir Ilyich would take this rostrum, and we would listen to his speech, which, as always, would determine the path ... for years. There is no point in reminding us of the importance that Vladimir Ilyich's introductory political speech always had at our congresses. When we went to these congresses, we primarily had in mind to listen to this particular speech, since we knew in advance what we would receive in it, not only a refined experience of the past, but we will receive firm indications for the future. Do you understand with what thirst we have always listened to this speech - a thirst that resembles the thirst of a person who, on a hot summer day, falls to a deep, clear spring to get drunk? With a powerful searchlight Vladimir Ilyich illuminated the path before the Party, with all its convolutions, with all its difficulties at the

forthcoming stage" (Stenotchet of the XII Congress, ed. Krasnaya Nov 1923, p. 6 - Zinoviev).

"Comrades, two dangers threaten us, especially now, when, perhaps, for a number of months we will be forced to work without Vladimir Ilyich. The first danger is if we do not have clarity in decisions. Half of the trouble was earlier when decisions were passed that were not formulated quite clearly. When doubt arose, there was a person who could interpret them on behalf of the entire party. And we knew that this interpretation was really the interpretation of the entire party" (ibid., p. 46).

This congress is taking place without the one who taught us Marxism, who taught us the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat, who, with his personality and ideas, rallied the working class and the peasantry together, who spent 25 years rigorously studying party discipline.

Vladimir Ilyich was not able to attend this congress, but everything that the congress has already done shows that although physically Vladimir Ilyich is not in this hall, he is ideologically and actually leading this congress. We fulfill his precepts by making our decisions. His teachings were checked every time we were confronted with this or that problem, this or that difficult question. Mentally, each of us asked himself: how would Vladimir Ilyich answer this? ... "(p. 479 - Kamenev).

Let us recall how the same Zinoviev, Kamenev and company spoke about inner-party democracy, about the inner-party regime at the XII and XIII Congresses of the RCP (b), responding to the attacks of the opposition supporters of Trotsky:

"... Comrade Lutovinov did not criticize the policy of the party in a word. What did he say? The party drives criticism underground. This is what Comrade Lutovinov's reproaches boil down to, if we do not dwell on some of the principles that he put forward on freedom of criticism..." (Memorandum of the Congress, p. 122 - Radek).

"We know that we have been accused of the fact that for the sake of all sorts of goals ... the policy of the Party is directed by us not in the name of certain ideas, but by this or that group combinations ...

It was pointed out that disagreements were being blown up, that it would be better if we didn't talk about it... This point of view is absolutely wrong.

We live in a country in which not only the dictatorship of the proletariat exists, but in which we are compelled to keep the development of our own intra-Party democracy within certain limits. And we know why this should be done, and we are convinced that only completely irresponsible demagogues (under - GM) can dispute the need for this in a country where the proletariat and the communist party hold a dictatorship in their hands, surrounded not only by the international bourgeoisie, but also petty-bourgeois and NEP elements within their own country. Under these conditions, every line, every shade of thought must be carefully analyzed. Only by this can one judge the processes and moods that are ripening in the depths of our Party, and if we do not take them into account, we will fall into a trap in one or two months." (pp. 139-140 - Kamenev).

"All complaints about the too dictatorial nature of the behavior of the Central Committee boiled down in Kosior to the fact that the Central Committee does not make it possible to reveal the collective opinion, and in Comrade Lutovinov to the fact that some groups ... were driven underground.

Comrades from the field, how do we discuss any economic issue? Don't we chew it in our party committees, at meetings of organizers and agitators, in the presidiums of executive committees, in trade unions, etc.? What other forms can be devised to reveal collective creativity? These complaints are empty complaints, and they are caused, in my opinion, not by the fact that there is no way to clarify the collective thought, but by those who do not offend it will be said that the complaining comrades have thoughts that are not inculcated

in the Party. But the party has nothing to do with it, inner-party democracy has nothing to do with it either" (p. 147 - Evdokimov).

"Comrade Kosior stopped at the fact that the Central Committee is not pursuing a common line, but is pursuing a group policy. What is this? If the Central Committee has a certain leading group of comrades, then we know that this is not terrible. This is normal... We know not only the relationship between the party and the working class, but also the relationship that must exist between the party and its leaders. A party cannot exist without leaders. A party that does not have good leaders falls apart. A party that discredits its leaders is inevitably weakened and disorganized. ...

What is collective experience?... We can in no way achieve the collective experience that exists in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, where there are as many tactical lines as there are Socialist-Revolutionaries...

We do not need such a collective experience. In this regard, experience has taught us how to fight and defeat our enemies. Further, it seems that Comrade Lutovinov spoke about the barracks regime. This, comrades, is either demagoguery or sheer lack of principle. What does barracks mean? You need to reveal the brackets. This is what our enemies call the iron discipline that has existed, exists, and will continue to exist in our Party...

Ultimately, in my opinion, everything depends on organizational issues. Some comrades are inclined to stress the word "democratic", while others emphasize the word "centralism". The Mensheviks and those petty-bourgeois groups with whom we came into contact were always inclined to talk a lot about democracy. We have always subordinated the principles of democracy to revolutionary expediency. This we will continue to do in the future" (p. 155 - 156 - Ryutin).

"... Comrade Kosior, again, clearly not on his own, demanded one thing, as he put it: to abolish the exceptional law, which consists in the fact that organized factions and groups are prohibited in our country ... This is not an exceptional law, it is an instrument of self-defense of the proletarian party, which is surrounded on all sides by corrupting and petty-bourgeois influences. There is enough freedom in our party to discuss any opinion. Only he who wants to corrupt the party will not receive freedom ...

We argued about major organizational issues. These are, of course, very difficult questions... But it is clear to Osinsky why all this is happening: they supposedly do not want to release power. He even undertakes to name the main instigator, who is afraid for power.

Tov. Osinsky! Drop it! Can't you believe that each of us, like you, is above all concerned about the good of the Party and nothing else? We have power, if it comes to that, everyone has more than enough, and no one feels longing for power "(from the conclusion, the words of Zinoviev).

Bukharin also spoke well -

"Comrade Kosior's main argument is directed against the decision of one of the previous congresses, namely the decision concerning the prohibition of groups. This is a question, comrades, who I personally consider quite important, if we consider and discuss it, then, it seems to me, we need to decide Comrades like Kosior want to turn our centralized party into a federation of various groupings that can block alliances with each other when necessary, that will enter into a certain kind of relationship with each other, but which, on the whole, will be decisively anything, but not the Bolshevik Party...

Look at how Comrade Lutovinov argued ... Comrade. Lutovinov says: "If all sorts of anonymous theses appear, if some platforms have to be published anonymously, it is only because in our RCP it is not possible to express one's views,

opinions on certain issues in a normal way." Considerations of strife... If we allowed for a moment that in our Party such considerations as those of Comrade Lutovinov were expressed "in the normal way", we would be the ultimate fools... We must preserve all our old revolutionary virtues. We were different from all the other groups who said: "Why lace up the thought, you are violating the principle of freedom!" Sorry. To this Comrade. Lenin replied: "We are a union of people who have organized a voluntary association on the basis of a certain platform, and if you wish to express thoughts in a normal way that go against this, deign to become outside of our organization." And this is an abnormal demand that completely anti-Bolshevik thoughts be expressed in a "normal" way" (pp. 170 - 173 - Bukharin).

Let us turn to the 13th Congress.

What exact, firm, and true words did Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and others then find in connection with the above-cited articles and letters of Trotsky under the general title "New Course"! It would be a sin not to remember these words.

"For the first time in the history of our revolution, at least after October, we had a situation where between congresses, in the middle of the year, an attempt was made either to change the policy of the Central Committee in a fundamental way, or even to change the very composition of the Central Committee, to harness the horses on the move ...

We need a solidity a thousand times greater than hitherto... We need an even more iron-clad solidarity than has been hitherto, and we cannot afford to go so far as to allow freedom of factions and even freedom of groupings... "Democracy", "secretary bureaucracy"! You remember the cries of the opposition. The answer is Lenin's call!

... The smartest and most worthy Bolshevik thing that the opposition could do is what a Bolshevik does when he happens to make this or that mistake - to go to the podium of the Party Congress to the Party and say: I was wrong, but the

Party was right "(Stenotchet XIII Congress, pp. 37 - 116 - Zinoviev).

In his concluding speech at the congress, Zinoviev bluntly said,

"that in Trotsky's New Course there is not a grain of Bolshevism."

Very indicative is the section of Zinoviev's concluding remarks in which he dwells on the question of factions and groupings, on the problem of inner-Party democracy.

"... Whatever the groupings stand for is well known. Don't you remember how Comrade Krylenko, our first assistant to the supreme prosecutor of the republic, demanded in the press that there be a legal formulation of what a faction is and what a grouping is (laughter), because without this there is nothing at all to talk about democracy ... We do not need legal formulations. It is not a matter of verbal disputes. We, who went through the school of joint struggle with the Mensheviks, who sat for many years with them in the Central Committee, know what a faction is and grouping, without legal definitions. When we sat in the Menshevik Central Committee, then we resorted to this method: "What is a faction? Don't we have the right to act as a group of like-minded people?" etc.

Yes, comrades, it was quite acceptable and appropriate when, by the will of fate, in a certain historical situation, we were forced for the time being to sit with the Mensheviks in the same Central Committee, to use every opportunity to push back the petty bourgeoisie and crystallize the proletarian party.

But excuse me, when some comrades are now resorting to the same measures in relation to our Bolshevik Central Committee, then, comrades, let them not allow this ...

It seems to me that it is not good for us to play hide and seek. Comrade Stalin correctly said that we all value joint work

with Comrade Trotsky ... we are all ready to do everything possible to ensure that joint and friendly work goes on, but not the kind that allows Stanislav Ivanovich (Kosior. - GM) to write: "Do you have unity in the Politburo?"

... We guarantee that if they attack the party, as they attacked before, or even a hundred times weaker than they attacked, then they will once again be recognized with our "non-vegetarian" properties. They must know that if they believe that they have the right to speak of the policy of the Central Committee as disastrous for the country, then we have every right, as revolutionaries placed in the leadership of the greatest of the workers' parties, to prove before the working class and the country that they do not know what they are doing, or do not understand what they are saying. And we will do this with all the passion of the revolutionaries, and not guided by "love of one's neighbor" ... When they want to stir up the party against the Central Committee at the most difficult moment, let them give back three times.

... Comrade Trotsky said: there will still be difficulties ... If they come, tell me, then where will you be, on whose side? ..

We demand guarantees that these future difficulties, which may recur, will not be used, against raising a new storm against the Party" (p. 248 et seq.).

"The dispute began from the moment when comrade Trotsky, not satisfied with the unanimously adopted resolution, appealed to the party apart from the Central Committee ... Trotsky preferred to make a revolution in the party instead of reforms ... This he presented to the party in his letter - in a letter, in which he stated the danger of the degeneration of the top, stigmatized the top as a complete expression of apparatus bureaucracy, in which he called on the party to "subjugate its apparatus", in which he reproached the apparatus for preparing to bureaucratically nullify the resolution of the Central Committee, and in which, finally, he pointed out those reserve forces that must carry out the "treatment" against the decaying elite and the bureaucracy of

the apparatus ... - in the person of young people, who have received the name "barometer". These are, in general, elements that testify to the fact that instead of the path of party reform on the basis of the resolution of December 5, we had before us an attempt to carry out an intra-party revolutionary reshuffling of forces.

... If Comrade Trotsky said that he fulfilled his duty when he defended his idea before the Party, he was right ... But there is also a Party duty: the duty is to correct anyone who makes a mistake ... "(p. 211 - Kamenev) .

The question is, what happened to Zinoviev, Kamenev and others like them after the Thirteenth Congress, at which they defended the Leninist organizational principles with such resoluteness - - what happened to them that at the XIV and XV Congresses they suddenly turned 180 degrees and, with even greater bitterness than before, Trotsky and his associates began to attack these principles themselves, putting forward against them, under the guise of their defense, the same the same arguments as Trotsky, and adding new ones to them?

In general, one very important circumstance should be noted, which follows from the study of the history of the CPSU, namely, the fact that the emergence of one or another oppositional trend in the party always arose, always turned out to be associated with some major turning point in the course of the historical development of the revolution.

In particular, Trotsky's opposition was connected with the illness of V. I. Lenin and the significant difficulties that arose at that time in carrying out the link between town and country; the opposition of Zinoviev-Kamenev - with the death of V. I. Lenin and with the aggravation of the economic difficulties of building socialism, which led them to the "theory" about the impossibility of building socialism in one country; opposition Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky - with new economic difficulties, in particular in agriculture, their, so to speak, "fright" in the face of the party's proclaimed policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

A study of the history of our Party clearly shows that a common and indispensable feature of all oppositions, that is, minorities in the Party, was the development of political differences into organizational differences.

All "oppositions" and opposition groups, as soon as they found themselves in the minority in the party on the POLITICAL issues put forward by them, immediately and inevitably began to accuse the majority of "silencing", repressions, violations of inner-party democracy, etc., immediately and inevitably they began to oppose the party to its apparatus, to tear the party away from its apparatus, from its acknowledged leaders; immediately and inevitably all these opposition groups and little groups raised the cry of collective leadership in the party, of democratic centralism, accusing the leaders of the party of dictatorship, of individualism and arbitrariness.

And the most interesting thing is that for all that they "forgot" what they themselves said and proved in the past - when they went with the majority.

This common, indispensable, characteristic feature of all opposition groupings is to castigate opponents of the Leninist principles of leadership and management of the proletarian party, being in the majority, being part of its leading elite, and shouting "watch!", Feeling the precariousness of their positions and finding themselves, at the will of the party, in the minority, - this trait can be clearly traced already between the position of Zinoviev and Kamenev at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses, when they, together with the Party, beat off Trotsky's attacks, and between their position at the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, when they found themselves in opposition on the political questions raised before the Party.

Let's take the Bukharin-Rykov Kaya, so-called "right opposition".

This is what the leaders of this opposition said at the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, that is, when they did not yet have "oppositional" disagreements with the Party and spoke together with the Party against Zinoviev, Kamenev, and company.

"As for democracy, let me tell you. I received a note from you, and Comrade Naumov raised this question: how, pardon, they removed something from us - is it democracy? We did something - is it democracy? We distributed folders and so on, we were punished - is this democracy?

At first glance, everything seems very convincing. So, comrades, let me... (Coughs, voice from the spot: "Choked!") I may have choked at first, but in the end I will - ideologically, of course - swallow you up (Laughter). So, comrades, this is really suitable for small children, as they raise the question of democracy. Just imagine, if people appeared in our party who would openly preach Menshevik views, what would you do? (Voice from the floor: "They would have been expelled from the Party.") They would have been expelled from the Party. Would that be democratic or not? What, you don't have enough words to answer?

Do you not know? Have you thought about it?.. So, comrades, I will explain to you.

This would be highly undemocratic in terms of democracy, which includes these individuals.

Let me put a question on the merits. What, in your opinion, does our Party discipline presuppose that any comrade can put his feet on any table and do whatever his darling pleases? Nothing like this. Does your democracy assume that the decisions of the party congress are put up and then spit on them? Since when has this been? At least, I have never heard such things being introduced into the basis of Leninism, into the basis of the principle of democratic centralism. Until now, the basis of our democracy has been that we are discussing, but when the issue is resolved, this decision is carried out ...

I must tell you that up to now we have always considered that our party - this is one of the constituent parts of Leninism - is a single, monolithic, organizational fortress, working out a perfect unity of will, etc. We proved this in our polemic with the Trotskyists to the point of hoarseness in our voices. What

did you do? You do not notice how you are already lying at the very bottom. You proposed a bloc to all the factions and groupings against which Lenin fought.. Zinoviev came out and shouted at the congress: I'm drowning, drowning! Shlyapnikov, comrade Safronov, comrade Drobnis, save and help! That's what happened here at the convention. You put forward the slogan of groups, you put forward the slogan of factions, the slogan of "freedom" of discussion, you put forward the slogan of turning our steel party into a federation of small groups - that's what you put forward. I affirm that we will not take this path of destroying the Party."

"Now they come to us here and start talking about democracy, about oppression, and so on... A little bit of democracy always adorns a dignitary in opposition. This is the logic of any opposition. See, comrades, how boring this is repeated. Is it not so long ago that we heard from Zinoviev and Kamenev the wisest, most Bolshevik and Leninist speeches about the danger of factional struggle in the ruling party? Have you heard about the danger of "shades", "groupings", about the danger of permanent discussion? Have we heard all this? Have you heard ...? And what do they say now ?.. Well, thank you. If you want there to be no doubts, we declare that we remain in the old position in this matter.

...Leninism will be an emasculated doctrine without that part of it which speaks of the class and the party, of the role of party instances. And you forgot it. I am very sorry that neither Zinoviev, nor Kamenev, nor Comrade Krupskaya told us about the Leninist interpretation of what a party in power is, what its tasks are, what are the dangers of the position of a party in power under a capitalist encirclement.

... The party is not something abstract, formless, where different opinions, currents, etc. fight. No. You came to the congress, elected the Central Committee, discussed the line, gave it, and after that you had to listen to the Central Committee. It seems so. So, this is what is called democratic centralism, Leninist democratic centralism. And here an attempt is made to replace it with something else.

We are told: now we need freedom of opinion. It won't work. This is the secret of the fact that a majority formed around Stalin. This is the secret. And you thought - in something else? Please tell me what social, economic, political, and other conditions created such a situation that a majority of the members of the Central Committee formed around the secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin, and among the comrades. Kamenev and Zinoviev ... turned out to be a minority and emptiness. Around them were TT. Sokolnikov, Krupskaya and also the Leningrad organization at this congress. How did it happen?

... It is ridiculous to say what some comrades said and what they tried to portray here - as if someone had concentrated power in his hands, and the rest of the majority of the Central Committee supported him.

Why? What can you say, suggest on the issue of leadership? What can you suggest about democracy? I'm asking you. Tell me what do you suggest? Money for a barrel!

Nothing but the old, well-known slogans: freedom of opinion, freedom of discussion, freedom of shades - you will not offer. And we call this the disintegration of the Leninist party..." (Ibid., pp. 275 - 292 - Tomsky).

Compare these words and thoughts of Bukharin and Tomsky with their own words and thoughts at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (see page ... [Omission in the text. - Ed.]).

Isn't it also clearly traced here, noted by us (and by Tomsky himself - in relation to the Trotskyite-Zinoviev opposition), the same indispensable characteristic feature of all opposition groups - finding themselves in a minority, they attack the Leninist principles of the organizational structure of the party, under the guise of their protection from encroachment by the majority, led by dictators?

Here I cannot help dwelling on some of the speeches of the Fifteenth Congress, speeches which, in my opinion, are very indicative of the

spirit that prevailed at the Fifteenth Congress, and which cannot be ignored in an analysis of the problems under consideration. But here, as before, I will present the speeches of only those people who were either rehabilitated at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU as victims of the personality cult, or were not directly suspected of their sins.

“Comrades, this is the third congress we have to hold without Vladimir Ilyich, and the third congress in a row must deal with the opposition.

Comrades, at the Thirteenth Party Congress Trotsky appeared before the congress with his head...

Comrades, Trotskyism's liver was only beaten off at that time, but it hoped to still live, to rage in our Party, hoped that this liver would grow and Trotskyism would continue to be active, as before, to oppose the Party.

At the Fourteenth Congress he was silent. He was silent, waiting: maybe someone will come to him, because if you go on your own, then too much will be asked of him, but he did not want to make concessions - he was not used to making concessions. His, so to speak, premonitions, aspirations, desires were justified to a certain extent: a new opposition came to Trotsky, and Trotsky did not make any concessions, and concessions were made by the new opposition precisely to Trotsky, and Trotsky sat on this opposition, which, like a thief from around the corner, wanted to plunge a knife into the back of the party. Trotsky sat down on this opposition, saddled it and, like a horse breaking out of a stable, began to run around the Bolshevik herd, kick, and bite. And behind him and his brood. Here, comrades, we had to drive the people back, we had to try to drive them back to the stable.

But by the Fifteenth Party Congress we already see the main trotters of the opposition outside the herd of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik clubs drove the main trotters out of their herd, and some were herded into special stalls, for endurance, however, not with beaten livers, but with well-rounded sides.

... It is necessary to deal with the opposition within the party, with the opposition that hinders the work of the party, which is trying to disintegrate the ranks of the working class, to put an end to it in the most decisive, most firm way "(Stenotchet of the XV Congress of the RCP (b.). Giz. 1928, p. 168 - 172 - Postyshev).

...that you are inviting a new danger of intervention. You have created this danger, more than anyone else ... You have created the ground abroad for the public opinion that now the Soviet Union is so weakened that a new military attack is not so dangerous that there is hope of defeating the Soviet Union. Didn't all this lead to the fact that foreign gossip in the newspapers, the preparation of a military attack on us, are not fed to a large extent by the information and slander that the opposition raises against the party and the country? .

"... Enough, comrades! Enough of the soft regime... Enough! Those complaints that come from the bottom of the party about the soft regime that the Central Committee is implementing in relation to the opposition, they are to some extent justified, but the basic policy of the Central Committee was correct, because it gave the Oppositionists the opportunity until the last moment to correct themselves and return to the Party. But now that's enough! This soft policy, these compromises, can be disastrous for the Party if we continue them, and therefore no concessions, no compromises. A final decision of the Fifteenth Congress is necessary about the complete exclusion of the opposition from the party..." (Ibid., pp. 200 - 208 - Andreev)

After this, in my opinion, necessary digression, let us return to what has been characterized as an indispensable and common feature of all opposition currents in our party.

Using the example of all the oppositions in the history of our party, we can also easily see that in their attacks on the organizational principles of building our party, the oppositionists paid the most attention to the person who, by the will of the party, was placed in the most important and authoritative place in the party.

And, of course, not by chance. It is not accidental, firstly, that it was V. I. Lenin, and after him I. V. Stalin, who occupied this place in the party; secondly, it is no coincidence that they were the ones who were subjected to the main blows of the opposition forces.

Why? Because the oppositionists, as well as the entire party, did not have any illusions about the fact that, in the final analysis, the main line of the party's policy was determined and directed precisely by this particular person.

And, as I tried to prove, in my opinion, this situation that existed and still exists in the Party, reflecting life as it is, does not in the least contradict Marxism-Leninism.

The Leninist scheme of democratic centralism, a scheme that takes into account objective life phenomena and therefore reduces leadership and management in the party, in the period between congresses and plenary sessions of the Central Committee, to a narrow collegium - the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee and the Secretariat - itself suggests that in this narrow of the ten most respected and influential members of the Central Committee, there must be and cannot but be one person whose voice, even in this "elected" collegium, is listened to with special attention and interest.

In the article "Why the cult of personality is alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism," which I have repeatedly mentioned, there are, oddly enough - and this is strange because this statement contradicts the spirit of the article - there are such completely fair words:

"Marxism does not deny the role of outstanding people in history, the role of the leaders of the working people in leading the revolutionary liberation movement, in building a new society.

V. I. Lenin stressed with all his might the role of revolutionary leaders... Outstanding personalities, thanks to their characteristics that make them most capable of serving the public interest, can play a serious role in society as organizers,

leaders of the masses, who understand events deeper and see further others."

Very interesting in this respect is one passage from the speech of K. E. Voroshilov at the XIV Congress of the RCP(b) (Stenotchet of the Congress, Guise, 1926, p. 391).

Comrade Stalin is - I affirm this - the main member of the Politburo, but he never claims to be the leader, he takes the most active part in resolving issues, and his proposals pass more often than anyone else (laughter, applause), and these proposals are accepted unanimously. I affirm that on fundamental questions, even on the question of whether it is possible to build socialism in one country, which was discussed in my presence in the Politburo, even on this question, after Comrades Stalin and Bukharin - there was a unanimous decision: you can build. (Laughter, applause.)

V. I. Lenin taught that "without a dozen talented (and talents are not born in hundreds), tested, professionally trained and long-term school trained leaders, who perfectly mellowed with each other, a steadfast struggle of not a single class is possible in modern society" (vol. 5, p. 430).

It goes without saying that leaders are not born, that the authority and influence of leaders on the masses are not acquired and manifested immediately - they are developed over a long period of time, developed as a result of people's gradual inner conviction that this particular person "understands events deeper and sees them further than others" that it is pursuing a policy that is in their common interest.

The faith of the masses in the leader acquired over the years, their trust in the leader, is an important and, it seems to me, a necessary element in the historical development of society. Without the trust of the masses in their leaders - and this trust is not a constant value acquired once and for all - there can be neither the "leader" as such, nor the firm policy of the party as a mass public organization, in the Marxist-Leninist sense of these concepts.

And I take the liberty of asserting that I.V. Stalin had enormous, indisputable authority and unconditional trust among the Soviet people, not at all because we were brought up to this by the official propaganda of the "cult of personality", not attributing to Stalin all the successes in the construction of socialism - no, not because (*of this*).

Until the end of his days, J. V. Stalin enjoyed great authority and trust of the people only because this authority and this trust were based on the only possible, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, solid foundation - on the basis of real, tangible successes of the party policy by every Soviet person in raising the living and cultural level of our socialist society.

Of course, it is difficult to deny the fact that our propaganda apparatus, the propaganda apparatus of the party, which, by the way, was headed by such people as A. A. Zhdanov, P. N. Pospelov and M. A. Suslov, did not abuse, especially in the post-war period, (*while*) shouting "Hurrah!" towards Stalin.

But, nevertheless, it could not be otherwise, our people never opposed Stalin to the Politburo, the Politburo to the Central Committee, and so on. etc. Paying tribute to Stalin, stormily welcoming him, we met with the same sincere feeling all other prominent figures of the party and state - Molotov, Voroshilov, Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Kalinin, and others. .

The Party has always well understood that the education of the leaders of the revolution, the leaders of the working class, is a matter of many years and hard work.

The Party has always understood that the authority of our leaders among the people acquired over the years is the same authority of the Party among the people.

The respect acquired over the years for the deeds and names of the leaders, their influence on the masses, is at the same time the influence of the party on the masses. One from the other - the party and its leaders - are inseparable. According to Mayakovsky, -

"The Party and Lenin are twin brothers, - // who is more valuable than mother history? // We say - Lenin, we mean - the party, // we say - the party, we mean - Lenin."

What is it? What is the meaning of these lines? It is unlikely that anyone would argue that they are propaganda of the cult of personality.

The Party has always understood that by discrediting its leaders, it is discrediting itself.

Listen, for example, to how such a well-known member of the Central Committee as A. I. Mikoyan spoke about this, speaking at the Fourteenth Congress:

"... Before the opening of the congress, we, the majority of the members of the Central Committee, turned to Zinoviev and others and said: if you do not agree with us on anything, let's choose a method in order to quickly get rid of differences within us as soon as possible. We did not want our leaders quarreling before the eyes of our enemies. Let at least Uglanov and Yevdokimov quarrel with Evdokimov. That has a different meaning. But it will be much worse if Zinoviev quarrels with Bukharin and others. After all, the struggle between the leaders at the congress begins. This is written on the pages of the press; this will be news everywhere.

Here, comrades, reports were delivered by Zinoviev and Bukharin.

What was the result of their performance? This is, in essence, mutual undressing of the leaders, mutual exposure... I must say, comrades, that the congress does not need to be reminded of who our leaders are, what they are, what shortcomings each has. Ilyich wrote about this so strongly that it will not leave our memory. Needless to remind us of this. But to undress each other in front of the whole country, in front of the whole world - why is this, in whose favor? "

(Stenotchet of the Congress, pp. 186 - 188).

Isn't it a curious speech by A.I. Mikoyan?

Curious, but essentially correct. Because, if you follow the expressions of Mikoyan, - "mutual undressing, mutual exposure in front of the whole country, in front of the whole world - why is this, in whose favor?"

The Party has always perfectly understood that an attack on the leaders invested with its confidence is an attack on the Party itself.

The Party has always understood that attacks by opposition elements on the leaders of the majority are attacks on the majority as a whole, that these attacks are directed not personally at this or that politician, but are directed at the policy pursued by this figure in the interests and with the consent of the majority.

The 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held at the beginning of 1934, is interesting in this respect.

Let's hear what the repentant "center forwards" of the former opposition teams had to say about this -

"Furthermore, it is clear that the struggle against the Party regime was connected with and inevitably flawed from another, anti-Party political line, just like the struggle against Comrade Stalin, as the best spokesman and inspirer of the Party line, Stalin, who won a deep victory in the internal political struggle, principles of Leninist policy, and it was on this basis that he received the ardent support ... of the overwhelming mass of the party and the working class ...

Finally, it is clear that it is the duty of every member of the Party to fight against all anti-Party groupings, to fight actively and ruthlessly, regardless of any previous personal ties and relationships, to rally around the Central Committee and rally around Comrade Stalin as the personal embodiment of the mind and will of the Party. its leader, its theoretical and practical leader." (Stenotchet of the 17th Congress, Partizdat, 1934, pp. 124 - 129 - Bukharin)

"In my struggle, when we stood up ... on Leninist positions, when I fought for ... the Leninist line against Trotsky and all other oppositions, I knew very well and made many good speeches about the unity of the party and party discipline. But when we stood up on the opposition platform, the boundaries of the party, the boundaries of party discipline, as for any opposition, became narrow for us. We sought to expand, expand these boundaries - and hence, like all oppositions, attacks on the regime and on the one who personified the unity of the party, who gave strength to the majority of the Party, who led the leadership of the Central Committee and the entire Party—the majority of our attacks were directed at Comrade Stalin. I am obliged to declare before the Party that only because Comrade Stalin was the most consistent, the most brilliant of Lenin's disciples, only because Comrade Stalin was the most vigilant, saw most far, most steadily led the party along the correct Leninist path, because he beat us with the heaviest hand, because he was more theoretically and practically versed in the struggle against the opposition - this explains the attacks on Comrade Stalin. , pp. 249 - 251 - Tomskey).

"Comrades, how many personal attacks were made by me and other former oppositionists on the leadership of the party and in particular on Comrade Stalin. And now we know everything that in the struggle that was waged by Comrade Stalin at an exceptionally high level of principle, at an exceptionally high theoretical level, that there was not the slightest taste of any personal moments in this struggle. And precisely ... when I understood my mistakes more deeply and when I became convinced that the members of the Politburo, and first of all Comrade Stalin, seeing that a person began to understand his mistakes more deeply , helped me return to the party - it is after this that one becomes especially ashamed of the attacks that were on our part.

This congress is the triumph of the party, the triumph of the working class. Lenin taught that the leadership of the proletarian movement was of tremendous importance. He never spoke false phrases to the effect that the role of leaders

is very small in the proletarian movement. We look at the role of the individual in history through the eyes of Marx-Lenin... But at the same time, we all know what gigantic significance leadership really has in the history of the proletarian struggle, which cannot but be an iron, centralized leadership. That is why it is absolutely clear that the triumph of the party is the triumph of the leadership, the triumph above all of the one who led this leadership in a decisive and difficult period, such an important period as was the period of the October Revolution. That is why it is especially hard and painful for those who tried to shake the authority of this leadership,

“In addition to the common class basis, these three groups (meaning Trotsky-Bukharin-Ryutin. - GM) had one more common feature. And we must admit with shame that we supported this feature. This is the sharpening of the struggle against the force that cemented, collected, led into battle the army of the proletariat - against the Central Committee and, of course, against Comrade Stalin, as its leader. This was an invariable feature of any counter-revolutionary group, no matter what it was called. However, it does not take much intelligence to understand that it is not a matter of personality here, that Comrade Stalin is fighting the enemies of socialism as a banner, as an exponent of the will of millions, a blow against which means a blow against the whole party, against socialism, against the entire world proletariat ... (My detente. - GM).

One of the most important elements...of the undoubted future victory of the proletarian state over all its enemies is absolute trust in the commander. This absolute trust in the commander, against whom we fought, who overcame us - overcame correctly and fairly - is testified by the whole country. It is manifested in this triumph of the congress, it is the property, the property of the entire world proletarian movement.

I know that again there will be comrades who will say that these quotations are not an example, that they were said by repentant people, insincerely, hypocritically, and so on.

Let me remind them of the statement of such an impeccable person, from the point of view of the 22nd CPSU Congress, as Kosior, who said:

"Comrades, you have to be a really lost person, to have nothing else in your soul to come here and say:" But Stalin is to blame ... "The point here is not Stalin: speaking of Stalin, they are hitting the whole party. It would be funny if it weren't so vile, so disgusting. For this, the opposition needs to be hit once again, so that next time it would be disrespectful. (Voice: "It needs to be caught, not hit.") (Stenotchet of the XV Congress, pp. 363-363)

It is also impossible to ignore the statement made at the 16th Party Congress by M. Thorez, one of the most prominent figures in the world communist movement, in which, in particular, he said:

"The renegades thrown out of the communist parties have firmly seized on the arguments of the Right deviators, and in particular they have seized on the accusation of Comrade Stalin of 'Asiatic rudeness', but we Communists, like all the revolutionary workers of France, declare here with all resoluteness ... that we clearly understand the historical role of this iron leader in the CPSU(b) and the Communist International." (Stenotchet of the XVI Congress. Giz. 1930, p. 443).

I would like to finish this section with one more statement by V.I. Lenin, which, it seems to me, is the best way to characterize what happened at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU;

"It is nonsense, confusion, ridiculous absurdity, and stupidity to come to an agreement ... to oppose the dictatorship of the masses in general to the dictatorship of leaders..

The rejection of party membership and party discipline - that's what the opposition did. And this is tantamount to the complete disarmament of the proletariat in favor of the bourgeoisie" (vol. 31, p. 26).

Someone may object to me: how is it possible - defending the party, defending Stalin, you yourself are slipping into the positions of the XXII Congress of the CPSU in the person of Khrushchev and some others, throwing such an accusation against the entire party; if what you say is at least to some extent true, then where was the party, where did it look? If you yourself assert that one person or a group of people cannot direct a party of a million members to where these millions do not want to go, then how did Khrushchev and those who were with him at that moment manage to do this? Are you not slipping into those positions that you just so self-confidently criticized?

I must confess that this is a very serious objection. Indeed, if Khrushchev succeeded in leading the 22nd Congress, and behind him the whole party, along the path he needed, then, one wonders, why was Stalin unable to do the same?

And to be honest, I had to sweat no less over the answer to this objection than over all the other materials. I think I should answer like this:

The June Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957 was the first plenum in the history of our party, at which seven of its eleven members - Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin - were immediately removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee.

There have been many such periods in the history of our Party when a sharp struggle took place in it on various questions that confronted it.

But I affirm, and it is easy to see from the factual material that is given in this letter, that always in such cases, up to the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), the party, all its active members, through official party sources and channels, were aware of the nature of the disagreements, about the course of the struggle, about the arguments that one side or the other put forward in support of its position. Always, up to and including the 18th Congress, members of the Party were officially informed about this or that political disagreement in the Party, in its leading core, before the Party took this or that final decision.

At the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Party Congresses, that is, at all those congresses in the history of our Party at which questions of the internal political struggle were raised, at all these congresses the Party, through its delegates, had a full opportunity to listen to both sides of the argument.

Anyone who is interested in the truth, if the materials I have cited are not enough for him, I refer to the transcripts of the relevant congresses.

At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, at the first congress after the 16th Congress, on the agenda of which the issues of political differences in the leading core of the Central Committee were again included, for the first time in the history of our Party, one of the parties was deprived of the right to defense, because the main accused was dead, and the rest were tried in absentia.

Therefore, the highest party court - the congress - did not have the opportunity to listen to both sides and form its own point of view. He did not have the opportunity to evaluate the arguments of both sides, listening to only one side - the side accusing. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the accusers, citing only certain general provisions that aroused the objections of the accused, completely passed over in silence both these objections themselves and the specific reasons that aroused them. And the reasons, apparently (let's not get ahead of the course of events), were quite serious, if we take into account the fact that among the accused there was a qualified majority of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

The main, most convincing, most "impressive" argument of those who acted as prosecutors were these words:

"... They sought to restore the vicious methods that dominated the cult of personality. They wanted a return to those difficult times for our party and country when no one was immune from arbitrariness and repression. Yes, Molotov and others wanted just that" (Khrushchev. Steno report of the XXII Congress, p. 350).

A small "lyrical" digression. Khrushchev, apparently, forgot two insignificant circumstances: firstly, the words of Comrade Serdyuk, Deputy Chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU, who spoke to him that

"... I recall (!) that Molotov was even (!) appointed chairman of the commission to investigate past violations of socialist legality."

and, secondly, he forgot his own words, spoken by him at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU and repeated at one of the Plenums of the Central Committee, that Molotov himself (Khrushchev also mentioned Mikoyan) in the last years of the period of the cult of personality "was under the threat of physical destruction;

"... Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov resisted the party line of condemning the cult of personality, unleashing inner-party democracy, condemning and correcting all abuses of power" (Podgorny, Ibid., pp. 279 - 280).

"... A similar burden put pressure on Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and united their desire to seize the leadership of the party and the country in order to fight to preserve the order that existed during the period of the personality cult." (Spiridonov. Ibid., p. 284).

"... Their atrocities cost the people dearly, therefore, speaking of the dire consequences of the cult of the personality of Stalin, one cannot bypass those who wrote their ominous resolutions and thereby decided the fate of honest, most devoted communists.

... And I can say as a participant in the congress, and I think I will express your general opinion: what happiness for our entire Party, what great happiness for our Soviet people, that at that moment the Central Committee of the Party, headed by our dear Nikita Sergeevich, turned out to be at the height of his position ... "(Furtseva. Ibid., p. 397).

"... When Kaganovich was charged with mass repressions ... Voroshilov defended Kaganovich; he jumped up and, waving his fists, shouted:" You are still young, and we will straighten your brains " (Polyansky. Ibid., t II, pp. 43 - 44).

"... What goals did the anti-party group set? To decapitate the leadership of the party, change the composition of the Presidium behind the back of the Central Committee, seize leadership of the party, turn it off the Leninist path, restore the order that existed under the cult of personality. In this vile deed, Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Voroshilov was driven not only by a thirst for power, but also by the fear of responsibility for the reprisals and lawlessness they committed, from which many party members and non-party people innocently suffered.

... They were experienced intriguers and double-dealers..." (Ignatov. Ibid., vol. II, p. 107).

"... It turned out that during the period of the cult of personality they were the initiators of creating an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. Occupying leading positions ... they grossly violated the Leninist norms of party life and revolutionary legality" (Shvernink. Ibid., vol. II, p. 214).

The essence of these accusations, after all that has already been said on this subject, is no longer worth dwelling on. But, it seems to me, one cannot ignore such a circumstance as the fact that all these accusations were brought only by prosecutors of the highest, so to speak, instance - members and candidates for membership of the new Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, not counting the two prosecutors of the "lower" rank - secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus and Georgia vols, Mazurov and Mzhavanadze, who delivered similar speeches.

Of course, and this is evident from the documents I have cited, that these arguments and accusations were furnished with a colorful description of all the horrors of the so-called period of the cult of personality, to which the accused bloodsuckers wanted to turn the party and our people.

And take A. I. Mikoyan's speech at the XXII Congress, where he said:

"The victory ... of the anti-Party group would lead to reprisals against all active supporters of the 20th Party Congress, by methods that the Party can never forget..." (Stenotchet, vol. 1, pp. 446-449).

What is it? What do all these speeches mean?

In my opinion, this is nothing but an attempt to intimidate the congress delegates.

And I affirm that this attempt was successful to some extent, since, indeed, during the so-called Stalin's personality cult, there were facts of arbitrariness and lawlessness, caused both by shortcomings and errors in the work of our entire party and state apparatus, especially our punitive organs, and by direct hostile activity.

An important role in how Khrushchev and his supporters managed to lead the 22nd Congress was also played by such a circumstance as the composition of the congress delegates.

I have in mind, of course, not the social composition of the congress delegates, but their composition according to their party seniority, which, it seems to me, if it does not determine, then nevertheless matters for determining the qualitative state of the delegates to the 22nd Congress.

Let's turn to the numbers.

Let us take the data of the credentials committees of the three congresses - XIX, XXI and XXII (according to the transcripts of these congresses - XIX - p. 68; XXI - p. 261 and XXII - p. 429). Let us dwell on such an indicator as the number of delegates with military and post-war party experience.

At the XIX Congress of such delegates there were 20% of the total number of delegates to the congress, at the XXI - already 48%, and at the XXII - 68%, and, as you know, two and a half times more delegates

were present at the XXII Congress of the CPSU than at any other congress in the history of our party (4800).

Other figures cited in the materials of these congresses are also interesting.

During the period from the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the 19th Congress of the CPSU inclusive (1939-1952), the membership of the party increased from 2.5 million members to 6.9 million members, i.e. almost 4.5 million people; at the same time, it must be taken into account that on the fronts of the Patriotic War, about 9 million new members were accepted into the ranks of the party; that by the end of 1945, when the total number of party members was 5.5 million, there were 3 million 325 thousand communists in the army and navy, or about 60% of the entire membership of the party (see "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", 1961, p. 593); and, finally, that during the period from the 19th to the 20th congress, 333,360 people were admitted to the party, while during the period from the 20th to the 22nd congress, over 2.5 million.

What do all these numbers say?

I don't want to utter loud phrases to the effect that these figures testify to the growth of the Party's prestige among the working people of our country, to the increase in their activity and consciousness, and similar phrases in relation to the period between the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU. It's just that during this period, more than ever, the doors of the party were opened for peacetime, and many honest people who had previously shunned the military discipline that reigned in the party and were attracted by the proclaimed new "New Deal" entered these doors.

And it should be clear to every unprejudiced person that I am not citing these figures in order to cast doubt on the honesty and devotion to communism and Soviet power of the overwhelming majority of delegates to the 22nd Congress, even in the slightest degree.

Composition of the Central Committee and renewal ratio

But at the same time, in my opinion, one cannot close one's eyes and completely be distracted from the obvious fact that after all, almost 70% of the congress delegates were people with military and post-war party experience, that is, people without a sufficient Marxist-Leninist theoretical school and without any practical school of struggle against various kinds of anti-party, opposition elements and directions.

Without detracting in the least from the subjective honesty and other human virtues of the delegates to the 22nd Congress, I must say that this circumstance - the party youth of more than two-thirds of the Congress delegates, their political inexperience and immaturity - also played an important role in the fact that Khrushchev and his supporters succeeded in leading the XXII Congress of the CPSU.

In addition, we should not forget, if we want to be consistent in our reasoning, that a fairly significant part of the delegates to the 22nd Congress, especially among delegates with pre-war experience, were made up of people who in one way or another experienced certain negative consequences of the period of the so-called personality cult.

Pondering over the reasons why Khrushchev and his like-minded people were able to subdue the 22nd Congress, starting from the 11th Congress, according to the transcripts of the congresses, I compiled the following, very curious table (the table is not reproduced. - Ed.)

To an attentive reader, this small table can tell a lot and demonstrate a lot.

According to this table, the history of our party can be divided into the following four periods:

- 1) From 1923 to 1934, when over a period of 13 years and six congresses, the composition of the Central Committee was renewed by 80%;
- 2) From 1934 to 1939, when over a period of 5 years and one congress, the composition of the Central Committee was renewed by 73%;
- 3) From 1939 to 1952, when over a period of 13 years and one congress, the composition of the Central Committee was renewed by 69% and

4) From 1952 to 1961, when over a period of 10 years and two congresses, the composition of the Central Committee was renewed by 94%.

What happened in the party within the party in each of these periods?

In the first period, as is well known, it was a fierce ideological struggle between the party and the Trotskyist-Zinoviev-Bukharinist political opposition groups.

The second period was characterized by the development of the political, ideological struggle between the opposition and the party into an underground, conspiratorial struggle, into an anti-Soviet and terrorist struggle.

The third period is the period of the Great Patriotic War and the first post-war period, when many members of the old Central Committee, elected back in 1939, simply left the political arena and when a huge increase in the size of the party, more than doubling compared to 1939 caused a corresponding increase in the number of members of the Central Committee.

And, finally, the fourth period - the period of N. Khrushchev's tenure as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Whether this was actually the case, I do not know, but it seems to me that the vast majority of delegates to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU by the beginning of the Congress had the impression that, with the exception of a few people, members of the so-called anti-party group, the vast majority of members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, elected by the previous, XX Congress, fully or mainly share the point of view propagated by Khrushchev.

Based on the data in the table, I contend that this was not the case.

It clearly shows that during the period between the 19th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU, the composition of the Central Committee was renewed by no less than 94%.

In compiling the table, I did not take into account the simple arithmetical expansion of the membership of the Central Committee

from congress to congress, did not take it into account because I think that such an expansion was dictated not only by necessity - in connection with an increase in the total number of the party - but also by such a circumstance as the desire of Stalin and Khrushchev to increase the number of his supporters in the Central Committee.

But even if we take this indicator into account, we get that already at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, 26% of the members of the old Central Committee did not get into the number of the new Central Committee, and at the 22nd Congress this figure reached 55%. Consequently, the Central Committee of the CPSU, elected at the 22nd Congress, included only 19% of those comrades who at the 19th and 20th Congresses of the CPSU were members or candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU.

I think this number says something.

In the speeches of some delegates to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, no less interesting figures flashed by.

Here, for example, is what the 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Comrade Kazanets, and the 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Comrade Rodionov, the leaders of the two largest (excluding the RSFSR) our party organizations, said:

"... In the last elections, the composition of our regional committees, city committees and district committees of the party was updated by more than 40%" (Kazanets. Stenotchet of the XXII Congress, vol. III, p. 50).

"... The composition of city committees and district committees of the republic has been updated by 46%, and the composition of regional committees - by 50%" (Rodionov. Ibid., p. 133).

Apparently, a similar event took place in all other republics and was carried out on the basis of a relevant directive.

Every person who is more or less familiar with the life of our party organizations, in my opinion, knows that never before the 22nd Congress of the CPSU there was such a situation in the party when at regional, city or district party conferences, newly elected regional committees, city committees or the district committees of the Party turned out to be 50% of the comrades who made up these leading local bodies of the Party before these elections.

I do not dispute the expediency of such a practice, the expediency of introducing a systematic renewal of party bodies, in all likelihood, conceived as a kind of guarantee against bureaucracy, although I am more than sure that, if put into practice, this practice will not so much give such a guarantee as reduce the authority of the secretaries party organizations, will deprive them of confidence in the future, limit their opportunities to gain sufficient experience in party work.

It is important to note something else - that such a widespread "shaking up" of party organs was introduced into party life even before the 22nd Congress adopted the new CPSU Rules with its 25th clause, which provides for the systematic renewal of party organs. And from this fact it follows that the pre-Congress preparations in the local party organizations took place under the sign of an EXTRAORDINARY position.

And it is difficult to get rid of the impression that this extra-statutory event was a kind of officially carried out, but not announced, purge of the party, a purge of local party bodies, that is, those bodies from which the delegations to party congresses are mainly formed.

From the delegates of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the fact of the existence of serious disagreements that arose back in 1957 between the two main forces of the world communist movement - between the CPSU and the Communist Party of the PRC was carefully concealed.

Speaking at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev assured the delegates of the congress:

"The Yugoslav revisionists have now concentrated their main fire against the People's Republic of China and are spreading all kinds of conjectures about alleged differences between the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. As the Russian proverb says, "a hungry godfather has bread in his mind." The revisionists are looking for disagreements between the communist parties, But their illusory hopes are doomed to failure. We fully agree with the fraternal Communist Party of China in everything, although its methods of building socialism are in many ways different from ours.

Why don't we have disagreements with the Chinese Communist Party? Because we have the same class approach and class understanding. The Communist Party of China stands firmly on class, Marxist-Leninist positions. It is waging a struggle against the imperialists and exploiters, a struggle for the reorganization of life on socialist lines, it observes the principles of international proletarian solidarity and is guided by Marxist-Leninist theory.

One can say to the Yugoslav revisionists: do not look for cracks where there are none. Apparently, you want to cheer yourself up and mislead the Yugoslav people with fabrications that there are differences not only between you and me, but allegedly also between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Will not work. You can't see this like your own ears ... "(Stenotchet of the XXI Congress, vol. 1, pp. 109 - 110).

A. I. Mikoyan made a similar statement, -

"Many questions were asked in the United States related to the relationship between the Soviet Union and China. It must be assumed that such questions arose on the basis of revisionist, anti-Chinese propaganda in the Yugoslav press, which lately, passing off wishful thinking, came out with insinuations that , they say, some disagreements began between the Soviet Union and China ...

I answered that, apparently, the gentlemen who ask these questions are having sweet dreams for themselves, that by some magic, disagreements will appear in the socialist camp,

between the Soviet Union and China. But I said that this was only a dream of these gentlemen, only a pipe dream. Soviet-Chinese friendship is built on the unshakable foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the common goals of communism, on the fraternal mutual support of the peoples of our countries, on the joint struggle against imperialism, for peace and socialism.

...We will cherish this friendship as the apple of our eye. Our friendship is a holy cause, and let those who would like to denigrate it not stretch their unclean hands towards it" (ibid., p. 545).

Among the reasons that allowed Khrushchev and his supporters to lead the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, such two circumstances as, firstly, the trust in the Central Committee and its Presidium developed over many years, absolute trust in every word, which, by the way, the 22nd Congress itself, whether it wanted it or not, attributed it to one of the negative consequences of the personality cult, and, secondly, such a circumstance as a certain demobilization mood among many members of the Party, a certain and, perhaps, a quite natural desire to relax somewhat after many years of military discipline in the party.

So, in my opinion, the following factors, each individually and all in combination, contributed to the fact that for the first time in the history of our party, the minority of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU managed to lead the XXII Congress of the CPSU:

- 1) Lack of awareness of the congress delegates about the essence of disagreements between members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU;
- 2) The impossibility for members of the so-called an anti-party group to address the party and the congress with an explanation of its position;
- 3) Insufficient level of theoretical Marxist-Leninist training and the lack of practical training in the fight against various opposition

currents among the majority of delegates to the XXII Congress of the CPSU;

- 4) Deep and early selection of delegations for the congress;
- 5) Concealment of the truth about the differences in the communist movement on many issues of theory and practice that were on the agenda of the congress;
- 6) The presence of a certain demobilization mood among many congress delegates and
- 7) The habit of unconditional confidence in the Party's words and deeds of its leaders.

This is how Khrushchev and his supporters managed to turn the congress, and after it the party, for some, quite a long time, by 180 degrees.

Many comrades with whom I had to talk in one form or another during this time considered and continue to consider the policy of Khrushchev and his supporters on the problem of the so-called Stalin's personality cult was a short-sighted mistake, the result of a struggle for power between them and members of the Leninist-Stalinist Politburo.

Of course, there is some truth in this opinion, but only, in my opinion, a very, very small portion. And it seems to me that if we want to remain on Marxist-Leninist positions, we must not forget Engels' wise words that "the future of a political party is sad if its entire political inventory consists in knowing only the factor that such and such a citizen is not trustworthy" (F. Engels, "Revolution and counter-revolution in Germany").

Based on the foregoing, I am convinced that the fight against the so-called personality cult of I. V. Stalin, in the form in which it was deployed after the XX Congress of the CPSU, pursued only one, quite definite goal - to compromise the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who disagree with certain theoretical or practical guidelines and provisions of Khrushchev, to remove them

in this way from leading the party and the country to a sharp change in the general course of our party far away from Leninism.

I fully and completely agree with the opinion of V. Lenin, when he, speaking of the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, wrote:

"All disputes are explained by 'personal scores', 'struggle for power in the party', and at hand a rumor is spread ... that some 'masters from the revolution' are to blame for everything, they are afraid of losing their influence.

To litter the heads with gossip, phrases, personalities and thus escape from the need to explain one's position - these are the author's goals. But if it was just gossip - half the trouble. This is the gossip of an angry renegade - that's the point" (V. I. Lenin, soch., ed. 4, volume 19, p. 57).

A vivid expression of this is the new Program of the CPSU adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

To the best of my abilities and possibilities, I will try to concretely demonstrate, using the example of certain provisions of the Program of the CPSU, what confusion the new Program of our Party has introduced into the extremely clear and precise provisions of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, both under the guise of combating dogmatism, under the flag of Marxist dialectics. Program of The CPSU revises and adapts the martial doctrine of Marx-Lenin to the demands and needs of contemporary opportunists in the world communist movement.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the program of the CPSU on the state ("People's" state and "party of the whole people")

In his speech at the 21st Congress of the CPSU in 1959, Khrushchev said:

"Along with the problems of economic development, there also arise questions of the political organization of society,

state structure and administration in the period of the extensive building of communism.

The main direction in the development of socialist statehood is the all-round development of democracy, the involvement of the broadest sections of the population in the management of all the affairs of the country, the involvement of all citizens in the management of economic and cultural construction" (Stand report of the XXI Congress, p. 102).

That's all that was said by Khrushchev on this subject at the 21st Congress of the CPSU.

But two years later, at the 22nd Congress, speaking on the draft Program of the CPSU, Khrushchev proclaimed:

"There are also other kinds of proposals that have been made, I would say, from the standpoint of a dogmatic, rather than a creative approach to the phenomena taking place in life. Thus, for example, in the opinion of some individual comrades, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be preserved until the complete victory of communism. Such comrades do not at all take into account the objective conditions that have developed in our country, but only operate with arbitrarily snatched quotations, losing sight of the essence of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin about the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a state in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism - the first phase of communism. They do not take into account that in our socialist society there are now only working masses who are engaged in socialist production and are united in socio-political and ideological terms. After the complete and final victory of socialism in our country, there is no ground for the dictatorship of one class. Indeed, in relation to what class can we have a dictatorship? We do not have such classes.

The comrades also refer to the fact that the organizational-economic and cultural-educational functions inherent in the dictatorship of the proletariat are preserved even during the period of transition to communism. But these functions will

remain under communism. To be consistent, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be preserved, according to the logic of these comrades, even under communism. The incorrectness of such reasoning is obvious to everyone ... "(Stenotchet of the XXII Congress, pp. 215 - 216).

Mikoyan echoed Khrushchev:

"Among the most important theoretical questions, and at the same time of the most vital practical importance, developed and resolved by the new Program, is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The conclusion of the Program is a new word for the Party, a serious contribution to the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

As you know, the dictatorship of the proletariat is called upon to crush the resistance of the exploiting classes, to lead to their disappearance, to transfer the peasantry from the rails of small-scale production to the rails of collective production, to ensure the building of socialism, its complete and final victory, to remake and re-educate the peasants, artisans, employees, and workers in the spirit of socialism. intelligentsia, to create the socialist unity of the people, so that the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia become bearers of socialist relations of production and spokesmen for communist spiritual aspirations.

The dictatorship of the proletariat solved all these tasks that confronted it. It was necessary until these tasks were solved. It has ceased to be necessary as a form of state since these tasks have been solved in our country. The new conditions of development have transformed the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a state of the whole people.

It may be said that the defense of the socialist gains against encroachments from without remains. Yes, indeed, the task of defending the country remains and will remain in the future. It will remain under communism as long as imperialism exists. It would be frivolous to assert that since the function

of the defense of the country remains, the dictatorship of the proletariat must also be preserved.

The task of defending the country, as a function inherent in the state in general, will be successfully carried out by the state of the whole people ...

The Leninists always linked the development of the socialist state with the real needs of the new society. The development of the new state occurs dialectically. From bourgeois democracy, "forward development," wrote Lenin, "does not proceed simply, directly, and smoothly, 'toward more and greater democracy,' as liberal professors and petty-bourgeois opportunists represent the matter" (Soch., vol. 25, p. 433). The development forward from bourgeois democracy goes through the dictatorship of the proletariat, which brings an enormous expansion of democracy for the working people, but immediately makes a number of exemptions from freedom in relation to the exploiters. Only after the destruction of the exploiting classes is broad democracy realized ... "communism alone is able to give truly complete democracy, and the fuller it is, the sooner it will become unnecessary, will wither away by itself" (Soch., vol. 25, pp. 434-435).

The Program of the CPSU says that the dictatorship of the working class ceases to be necessary before the state withers away.

Dogmatists may say that by characterizing our state as a state of the whole people, we thereby allegedly contradict our teachers, who criticized the Lassalleans for the slogan "state of the people." This would be a completely correct criticism, for what kind of people's state could one speak of under capitalism, when society is split into hostile classes? But it would be sheer dogmatism to transfer those conditions to our society, where the socialist unity of the people has been created and where the state cannot but act as the spokesman for the will of the entire people" (ibid., pp. 456-457).

Without going into the essence of the issue for the time being, I would like to show, using the example of A. I. Mikoyan's speech, how one or two inserted or, conversely, "omitted" words can at once turn the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat into something else.

Let us turn to V. I. Lenin's work "The State and the Revolution", from which Mikoyan so conveniently took a quotation for his speech at the 22nd Congress. V. I. Lenin writes:

"Only in a communist society, when the resistance of the capitalists has finally been broken, when the capitalists have disappeared, when there are no classes, only then 'the state disappears and it is possible to speak of freedom,' only then is truly complete, real democracy without any exceptions possible and will be realized" (T 25, p. 434).

The replacement of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the state of the entire transitional period from capitalism to a society without classes - communism, is done very easily and simply - instead of Lenin's absolutely clear and categorical indication that the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary until the complete victory of communism, according to the "new Program of the CPSU" and its theoreticians, the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat disappears already under socialism, with the destruction of the exploiting classes, and not classes in general.

It is this substitution - not the destruction of classes in general, but the destruction of only the exploiting classes - that lies as one of the main theoretical provisions at the basis of Khrushchev's "doctrine" about the state.

The program of the CPSU proclaims:

"The working class is the only class in history that does not aim at perpetuating its dominance. Having ensured the complete and final victory of socialism, the first phase of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historical mission and, from the point of view of the tasks

of internal development, has ceased to be necessary in the USSR which arose as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, turned into a state of the whole people, into an organ for expressing the will and interests of the entire people.

Some comrades argue as follows: whether we call our state the dictatorship of the working class, or whether we continue to call it a state of the whole people, the essence of the matter will not change from this.

It seems to me that the comrades who argue in this way are profoundly mistaken. They are mistaken because Marxist-Leninists cannot and should not forget the words of V. I. Lenin that the very term "people's" state expresses both "misunderstanding of the socialist criticism of any state in general, for every state is NOT free and NOT people", and Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state in general and of the state of the proletarian dictatorship in particular. They are mistaken because the Marxist-Leninist theory of scientific communism is such an integral and interconnected doctrine that one has only to break at least one link in this whole, the whole chain collapses.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that

"... The essence of Marx's teachings was assimilated only by those who understood that the dictatorship of one class is necessary not only for class society in general, but also for the whole historical period separating capitalism from a "classless society" from communism" ("State and Revolution").

"... Classes cannot be abolished all at once. And classes have remained and will remain during the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship will not be needed when classes disappear. They will not disappear without the dictatorship of the proletariat" (vol. 30, p. 94).

"... The Communist Party must be clearly aware that in the period of transition from capitalism to communism, that is, during the dictatorship of the proletariat..." (vol. 31, p. 131).

Many more similar statements by V. I. Lenin could be cited. But, in my opinion, even the cited ones are enough to tell with complete certainty that according to V. I. Lenin, the dictatorship of the proletariat disappears only when classes and class distinctions disappear.

M. A. Suslov, in his report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 14 / P 1964, justified the need for a transition from the dictatorship of the proletariat to a "nationwide" state with reference to the following quote from K. Marx's letter to Brakka ("Criticism of the Gotha Program") -

"Between capitalist and communist society there lies a period of revolutionary transformation of the former into the latter. This period also corresponds to a political transitional period, and the state of this period cannot be anything other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the program does not deal with either this last or the future statehood of communist society" (K. Marx and F. Engels, soch., vol. 19, p. 27, ed. II).

Suslov said:

"Indeed, the Chinese theoreticians, allegedly based on the ideas of Marx, say: 'The withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat is also the withering away of the state.' Meanwhile, Marx speaks of the 'statehood of communist society', which is no longer the dictatorship of the proletariat..."

... It seems to me that there is no longer any consistency, no logic, and all the more, clarity of the Marxist scheme for the development of a socialist society.

By acting in the way the supporters of the thesis of the Program of the CPSU about a "state of the whole people" act, that is, by breaking up, dividing Marx's continuity and sequence of development into some completely arbitrary stages, one can, of course, reach the "evidence" that our state is now in the first quarter of the first subphase of the II phase of incomplete communism ...

Supporters of the thesis of a "state of the whole people" forget that V. I. Lenin himself has a proper explanation regarding the letter to Brakka, which, in my opinion, does not need comments.

Speaking of the fact that a comparison of the views of Marx and Engels, upon a superficial examination of the letter, allegedly shows [that] there is a divergence of views on the state between Marx and Engels, for Engels declares that the Commune was no longer a state in the full sense of the word, and Marx in his letter speaks not only of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitional state, but also of the "future statehood of communist society," V. I. Lenin wrote:

"...Such a view would be fundamentally wrong. Closer examination shows that the views of Marx and Engels on the state and its withering away completely coincide, and Marx's expression quoted refers precisely to this dying statehood." ("State and Revolution").

Further in the same work, V. I. Lenin points out that

"... Engels speaks of the "destruction" of the bourgeois state by the proletarian revolution, while the words about withering away refer to the remnants of the proletarian state after the socialist revolution."

You can, of course, interpret and reinterpret the words of Marx, Engels, Lenin in any way, but the meaning of these words is only one - the withering away of the state is precisely the withering away of the dictatorship of the working class.

Indeed, there is no wall between the state of socialist society and the future, residual, dying statehood of communist society. Socialism gradually develops into communism. But the state of socialist society,

the first phase of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, according to Marx and Lenin, does not at all grow into some new type of state, into a "state of the whole people." The dictatorship of the proletariat consciously and inevitably leads to the abolition of all classes and class distinctions; it, and it is precisely this, is in the hands of the working class the indispensable tool with which it, as the only completely revolutionary class, achieves the complete abolition of classes and class distinctions. after which the dictatorship of the proletariat goes to its gradual "falling asleep", "withering away". V. I. Lenin wrote:

"The expression 'the state is dying' is chosen very well, for it indicates both the gradualness of the process and its spontaneity" (ibid).

At the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), fighting Trotsky and his like-minded people, V. I. Lenin said:

"... Marx and Engels fought mercilessly against people who forgot about the difference between classes, talked about producers, about the people or about working people in general. Anyone who knows the works of Marx and Engels in any way cannot forget that through all these works passes ridicule of those who talk about the producers, about the people, about the working people in general...

There will be a dictatorship of the proletariat. Then there will be a classless society... Thoughts, speech, assumptions that classes will disappear before communism, Marx and Engels ridiculed mercilessly and said that only communism is the abolition of classes" (vol. 30, p. 226 et seq.).

Yes, there is no wall between socialism and communism. And in this Khrushchev is right. But putting forward at the present stage of development of our state the theory of the so-called "people's" state, Khrushchev completely ignores Lenin's remark that

"A society in which the class difference between the worker and the peasant has remained is neither a socialist nor a communist society. Of course, when interpreting the word

socialism in a certain sense, one can call it socialist, but this will be casuistry, a dispute about words. Socialism is the first stage of communism - but it's not worth arguing about words" (vol. 24, p. 330).

So let's follow the advice of V. I. Lenin.

Marx, Engels, Lenin argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary and historically inevitable for the entire transition period from capitalism to communism, not because they wanted it so much, but based on strictly scientific conclusions from the experience of the real life of society.

When considering the position of the theoreticians and supporters of the CPSU Program on the question of the state structure of socialist society, what strikes one first of all is their persistent striving to bring to the fore only one side of the dictatorship of the proletariat - its violent side, the side of suppressing the overthrown exploiting classes, bypassing completely precise and firm

V. I. Lenin's instructions that the dictatorship of the working class is mainly an organizing, educating and moral force. V. I. Lenin did not tire of emphasizing that

"... the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitable, necessary, and absolutely obligatory for the exit from capitalism. Dictatorship means not only violence ... it also means a higher organization of labor than the earlier organization ... This new organization of production is born with the greatest difficulty, because to overcome one's disorganizing, petty-bourgeois licentiousness is the most difficult thing, it is a million times more difficult than to defeat the landowners or capitalists..." (vol. 23, pp. 343-345).

The experience of the revolution confirms that changing forms of government is not a difficult task, that the elimination of the ruling class of landowners and capitalists is a thing possible in a short time.. but a change in the fundamental conditions of economic life, a struggle against those habits that have been absorbed into everyone for

centuries and millennia ... this is a matter which, subject to the complete overthrow of the exploiting classes, requires long years of persistent organizational work" (vol. 29, p. 484).

Or, more importantly,

"The dictatorship of the proletariat ... is not only violence against the exploiters, and not even mainly violence. The economic basis of this revolutionary violence, the guarantee of its vitality and success, is that which represents and implements a higher type of social organization of labor than capitalism. This is the essence; this is the source of strength and the guarantee of the inevitable complete victory of communism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat ... means this: only a certain class, namely the industrial workers, is in a position to lead the entire mass of working and exploited people in the struggle to overthrow the yoke of capital, in the course of the overthrow itself, in the struggle to maintain and strengthen victory, in the matter of creating a new one, socialist social system, in the entire struggle for the complete abolition of classes (we note in brackets: the scientific difference between socialism and communism is only that the first word means the first stage of the new society growing out of capitalism, the second word, its higher, further stage).

It is clear that for the complete abolition of classes it is necessary not only to overthrow the exploiters ... not only to abolish the property, it is also necessary to abolish all private ownership of the means of production, it is necessary to abolish both the difference between town and country, and the difference between people of physical and mental labor. This is a very long work. In order to make it, an enormous step forward in the development of the productive forces is needed, it is necessary to overcome the resistance (often passive, which is especially stubborn and especially difficult to overcome) of the numerous remnants of small-scale production, it is necessary to overcome the enormous force of habit and inertia associated with these remnants.

To assume that all "working people" are equally capable of this work would be an empty phrase or an illustration of antediluvian, pre-Marxist socialism. For this ability is not given by itself, but grows historically and grows only out of the material conditions of large-scale production. This ability is possessed ... only by the proletariat" (vol. 29, pp. 388-389).

V. I. Lenin said:

"The class that took political domination into its own hands took it, knowing that it was taking it alone.

This is contained in the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept only makes sense when one class knows that it alone takes political power into its own hands and does not deceive either itself or others by talking about "nationwide", "general election", power consecrated by all the people" (vol. 32, p. .250).

Putting forward as a "new word" in Marxism the concept of a "nationwide" state, declaring the view of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a state of the entire transitional period from capitalism to full communism as dogmatism, the supporters, and theorists of the Program of the CPSU are subjecting to a radical revision one of the most important provisions of the Marxist-Leninist theories of scientific communism - the doctrine of the state as an instrument of class domination.

Marx, Engels, Lenin taught that every state is an instrument of class domination, is an organ of power that the proletariat needs insofar as it, with the help of the state, has not destroyed all classes and class differences. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine is inconceivable without the doctrine of the class struggle. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and the class struggle is unthinkable without recognizing the correctness of its position on the class nature and class character of any state. It was on the basis of this position that Lenin asserted that "every state is NOT free and NOT people."

The following statement by V.I.

"In ordinary discussions about the state, that mistake is constantly made, which ... Engels warns against ... namely: they constantly forget that the destruction of the state is also the destruction of democracy, that the withering away of the state is the withering away of democracy ...

...Perhaps, someone even fears that we do not expect the advent of such a social order when the principle of subordination of the minority to the majority will not be respected, because democracy is, after all, the recognition of this principle?

No. Democracy is not identical with the subordination of the minority to the majority. Democracy is a state that recognizes the subordination of the minority to the majority, that is, the organization for the systematic violence of one class over another, one part of the population over another.

We set as our ultimate goal the destruction of the state, that is, of all organized and systematic violence, of all violence against people in general" (vol. 25, p. 428).

In fact, even without being Marxists, thinking about the very concept of "democracy", we will come to the conclusion that democracy is the power of the people, the power of the majority, POWER. But, the question is, over whom and over what? If we follow the logic of the theoreticians of the 22nd Congress, if we agree with their assertion that the development of socialist society into communist society occurs as democracy develops more and more fully, as the dictatorship of the proletariat grows into a "nationwide" state, and this "state" into communist self-government - then, one asks, are we not thereby asserting that the development of society into a communist society occurs as it strengthens, as power grows?

It pleases us to call this power of the people, that is, the power of the whole people. But over whom and over what is this power exercised? Where is the subject (so in the text - Ed.) of this power? Separate "anti-people" elements? And where is the Marxist-Leninist theory about the class nature of the state? There is none.

Following the logic of the theoreticians of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, we will inevitably come to a dead end in questions of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, we will inevitably come to the recognition of the non-class or supra-class nature of state power, we will inevitably slide into a denial of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state as an organ of the ruling class.

The program of the CPSU is consistently moving along this path.

Both on the question of a "nationwide" state, and on many other questions on which we will dwell later, the Program of the CPSU is moving away from the Marxist-Leninist class, proletarian positions to a conciliatory Social-Democratic point of view.

Let us take the thesis of the Program of the CPSU on the entry of our society into a period of extensive building of communism.

I don't want to say that, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, we entered this period as early as October 1917. But suppose we entered it in 1961.

We deny the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat in connection with the transition to this period. Let it be. But nevertheless, we are broadcasting everywhere that "the Party proceeds from the Leninist proposition that the construction of communism should be based on the principle of material interest. Pay according to work will remain the main source of satisfying the material and cultural needs of the working people over the next twenty years" (Program of the CPSU) .

Is it possible to combine two, in my opinion, mutually exclusive provisions of the Program of the CPSU - one about the uselessness of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e. a socialist state, and another about the need to strengthen and expand in every possible way the socialist principle of distribution according to work?

V. I. Lenin saw in the consistent and daily implementation of this basic principle of socialism the most important condition for the "correct functioning of the first phase of communist society" (emphasized by me. - GM. T. 25, p. 444).

Labor free from exploitation of the citizens of socialist society, labor for oneself and for the good of society is the only possible and the only source of social wealth and well-being of the working people in a socialist society. Therefore, the work of each member of socialist society is not only his personal affair, but acquires the most important state significance. Because of this, socialist society declares work to be the first OBLIGATION of every able-bodied member of society, on the basis of the principle "he who does not work shall not eat."

The dictatorship of the working class is an organ created by the socialist revolution not only to suppress the resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes, not only to destroy them, but mainly for the speedy and unswerving implementation of the basic principle of socialism "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work", for the education masses in the spirit of a conscious attitude to work as the first and most necessary duty, in order to compel those who are trying to evade the conscientious fulfillment of this sacred duty to society.

Rejecting the dictatorship of the working class on the grounds that, with the liquidation of the exploiting classes, there are no more classes in our society in respect of which dictatorship is necessary, and, as already mentioned, emphasizing its violent side, the theorists and defenders of the Program of the CPSU for some reason forget about inevitable bourgeois character of the state of the transitional period from capitalism to communism, that the basic principle of socialist distribution "to each according to his work" necessarily needs to be put into practice in bourgeois law as a regulator of the distribution of products and the distribution of labor.

V. I. Lenin in his work "The State and Revolution" explains these circumstances as follows:

"... In the first phase of communist society ... "bourgeois law" is not completely abolished, but only partially, only to the extent of the economic revolution already achieved, i.e. in relation to the means of production. "Bourgeois law" recognizes them as private property individuals. Socialism makes them common property TO THE EXTENT - and only to that extent - "bourgeois law" disappears.

But it still remains in its other part, remains as a regulator (determinant), of the distribution of products and the distribution of labor among the members of society. "He who does not work shall not eat", this socialist principle has already been realized;

"for an equal amount of labor, an equal amount of products" - and this principle has already been implemented. However, this is not yet communism, and this does not eliminate "bourgeois law," which gives unequal people for an unequal (factually unequal) amount of labor an equal amount of product" (vol. 25, p. 439).

Further, Lenin writes:

"Bourgeois law in relation to the distribution of consumer products inevitably presupposes, of course, the bourgeois state, for law is nothing without an apparatus capable of forcing observance of the norms of law. It follows that under (*first phase of*) communism not only does bourgeois law remain for a certain time, but even the bourgeois state without the bourgeoisie!

What a striking difference is the position of V. I. Lenin, who in the first phase of communism inevitably assumes a bourgeois state in the sense of coercion to comply with bourgeois norms of law, contained in the socialist principle of "distribution according to work", from the position of supporters of a "nationwide" state, who do not notice the forced dictatorial character proletarian state!

Incidentally, the Program of the CPSU itself is of great help in the correct solution of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

From the rostrum of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev addressed us with the question, "Why, in fact, is the state itself preserved, although the main thing that gave rise to it, class antagonism, has disappeared? This is explained by the fact that the tasks that society can solve only with the help of the state have not yet been exhausted."

What are these tasks that society can solve only with the help of the state, the “nationwide” state?

The answer to this question is provided by the Program of the CPSU. According to the Program, such tasks not yet solved by our state are -

- 1) the creation of the material and technical base of communism in industry and agriculture;
- 2) further strengthening of the indestructible alliance between the working class and the peasantry;
- 3) the gradual erasure of contrasts between town and country, between physical and mental labor, between highly paid and low-paid labor;
- 4) the all-round development and improvement of socialist democracy, the enlistment of all citizens in active participation in the administration of the state, in the direction of economic and cultural development;
- 5) strengthening the defense of the USSR, the power of the Soviet Armed Forces, as the most important function of the socialist state;
- 6) education of the entire population in the spirit of scientific communism;
- 7) the development of a communist attitude to work among all members of society;
- 8) approval of communist morality;
- 9) tireless education of Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and Soviet patriotism;
- 10) overcoming the remnants of capitalism in the minds of people;
- 11) exposure of bourgeois ideology;

12) improvement and strengthening of the principle of material interest and payment according to work, etc. etc.

Here, it turns out, what a great many responsible and difficult tasks our state faces at this stage of its development, at the stage of the so-called full-scale construction of communism!

It seems to me that a deep Marxist analysis is not required in order to draw an indisputable conclusion from a mere cursory examination of this list of tasks that our state has to solve (or complete) that our society is still far from the end of the first phase of communism, and, moreover, not at the beginning of its second phase, the conclusion that almost any of these tasks, not to mention their totality, can be solved only by the state of the working class, only by the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To deny the necessity of the dictatorship of the working class for the successful solution of these tasks means, from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist ideology, to deny the class nature of these tasks.

The position of the Program of the CPSU on the leading role of the working class, as the most advanced, most conscious class of our society, in the system of the state of the whole people, next to the provision on the uselessness of the dictatorship of the proletariat, does not save the situation, because it, this position, in my opinion, is devoid of any specific political content.

V. I. Lenin not only developed the teachings of Marx-Engels on the hegemony of the proletariat in the socialist revolution, not only developed their teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat as a proletarian state in a transitional period, but also filled these concepts with concrete content.

Speaking about the Soviets, about this "Russian form of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (vol. 28, p. 236), about the trade unions, about the Komsomol, about the Party as separate links in the general mechanism of the dictatorship of the working class, V. I. Lenin wrote:

"... it turns out, in general and as a whole, a formally non-communist, flexible, and relatively broad, very powerful,

proletarian apparatus, through which the party is closely connected with the class and the masses and through which, under the leadership of the party, the dictatorship of the class is carried out" (vol. 25 , p. 192).

V. I. Lenin did not engage in a game of concepts and buzzwords and did not try to oppose the leading role of the working class in the socialist revolution to its revolutionary dictatorship, to tear them apart from each other.

For V. I. Lenin, the leading role of the working class in the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the working class in the revolution are equivalent and inseparable concepts!*

Marx, Engels, Lenin gave a precise and clear distinction between two phases of a single and inseparable process - the transition of society from capitalism to communism.

In "State and Revolution" V. I. Lenin wrote:

Marx, without embarking on utopias, defined in more detail what can now be determined with regard to this future, namely: the difference between the lower and the higher phase (stage, stage) of communist society.

... Marx gives a sober account of exactly how the socialist society will be forced to manage. Marx comes to a concrete analysis of the conditions of life in a society in which there will be no capitalism, and at the same time says:

We are dealing here not with a communist society that has developed on its own basis, but with one that is just emerging from capitalist society and which therefore in all respects, economically, morally, and mentally, still bears the imprint of the old society from the depths of which it emerged.

This communist society, which has just emerged from the bowels of capitalism, which bears in all respects the imprint of the old society, Marx calls the "first" or lower phase of communist society.

The means of production have already moved out of the private property of individuals. The means of production belong to the whole society. Each member of the society, performing a certain share of socially necessary work, receives a certificate from the society that he has completed such and such amount of work. According to this certificate, he receives from the public warehouses of consumer goods an appropriate amount of products, minus the amount of labor that goes into the public fund, each worker, therefore, receives from society as much as he gave him.

As if "equality" reigns.

But when Lassalle says, referring to such social orders (usually called socialism, and in Marx called the first phase of communism), that this is a "just distribution", that it is "the equal right of everyone to an equal product of labor", then Lassalle is mistaken, and Marx explains his mistake.

"Equal law," says Marx, "we really have here, but it is still 'bourgeois law,' which, like any law, presupposes inequality. Every law is the application of the same scale to different people who are in fact not the same, not equal to each other, and therefore equal right is a violation of equality and injustice. Indeed, each receives, having worked out an equal share of social labor with another, an equal share of social production (after the indicated deductions).

Meanwhile, individual people are not equal: one is stronger, the other is weaker; one is married, the other is single, one has more children, another has fewer, etc."

... Breaking down Lassalle's petty-bourgeois vague phrase about "equality" and "justice" in general, Marx shows the course of development of communist society, which is forced at first to destroy only that "injustice", that the means of production are seized by individuals, and which is not in a position to immediately destroy and further injustice, which consists in the distribution of commodities "according to work" (and not according to need).

Marx not only takes into account the inevitable inequality of people in the most precise way, he also takes into account the fact that one more transfer of the means of production into common ownership does not eliminate the shortcomings of distribution and the inequality of "bourgeois law," which continues to prevail, since products are divided according to work" (vol. 25, p. pp. 436 - 438).

Here is a detailed Marxist-Leninist definition of what is socialism, or the lower, first phase of communism.

The same clear and definite explanation belongs to Marx and Lenin in relation to the second, highest phase of communism.

V. I. Lenin writes further:

"Marx continues: "...In the highest phase of communist society, after the division of labor that enslaves man has disappeared; when the opposition of mental and physical labor disappears along with it; when labor ceases to be only a means of life, but becomes the first need of life; when, along with the all-round development of individuals, the productive forces also grow and all sources of social wealth flow in full flow, only then will it be possible to completely overcome the narrow horizon of bourgeois law, and society will be able to write on its banner: each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. 25, p. 439).

V. I. Lenin gives us the opportunity to establish what socialism (in the commonly used sense of the word) and communism are from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism.

Socialism is -

- 1) The abolition of private ownership of the means of production, its replacement by public property;
- 2) The elimination of the exploiting classes, and then of all classes and class distinctions;

- 3) Elimination of the "economic, mental and moral" remnants of capitalism;
- 4) Elimination of free trade and money circulation;
- 5) Creation of labor productivity, higher in comparison with capitalism;
- 6) Strengthening the socialist principle of distribution - "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

The list of tasks facing our state, given in "the Program of the CPSU" (see p. ... of this section), indisputably indicates that our society, if we do not want to enter into a dispute with Marx and Lenin, has not yet entered into, not completed the construction of a socialist society, that our state has not yet fully completed any of the main tasks by which a society can deserve the name socialist.

According to Marx and Lenin, the first phase of communism, socialism, differs from the second phase, complete communism, in the main and defining features, in the following:

- 1) Such a high level of development of the productive forces of society, on the basis of which it will be possible to "overcome the narrow horizon of bourgeois law" and write on the banner "to each according to his ability, to each according to his need."
- 2) The transformation of labor from a vital necessity into a vital need.

The practice of socialist construction made some amendments to the theoretical outlines of Marx and Lenin, in particular, on the issue of commodity-money circulation under socialism, dictated the need for two forms of ownership of the means of production - public and group, collective-farm-cooperative.

But as soon as we declare that we have begun the full-scale construction of (*1st phase*) communism, we must inevitably carry on the work of building (*1st phase*) communism.

1) to the gradual replacement of collective-farm-cooperative property with public property, while not forgetting the very important and profound instructions of V. I. Lenin that

"...Land is considered by us as common property.

Well, what if I take a piece of this common property for myself, cultivate on it twice as much grain as I need, and speculate on the surplus grain... am I acting like a communist? No, as an exploiter, as an owner..." (vol. 31, p. 268).

"As long as there remains private ownership of the means of production (for example, agricultural implements and livestock, even if private ownership of land is abolished) and free trade, the economic basis of capitalism remains" (ibid., p. 367).

2) to such an increase in labor productivity that it is possible to create an abundance of consumer goods, while not forgetting Lenin's indication that

"Labor productivity is, in the last analysis, the most important thing, the most important thing for the victory of the new social system... Capitalism can be defeated and will be finally defeated by the fact that socialism will create a new, much higher productivity of labor" (vol. 25, p. 398).

3) to the gradual replacement of commodity-money circulation by a system of direct product exchange between industry and agriculture, while not forgetting Lenin's instructions that

"not appropriation, not a tax, but the exchange of products of large-scale ("socialized") industry for peasant products, such as is the economic essence of socialism, its basis" (vol. 32, p. 300).

"Money is a clot of social wealth, a clot of social labor, money is evidence of the receipt of tribute from all workers, money is the remnant of yesterday's exploitation. That's what money is! Is it possible to immediately destroy money? No ... It takes a lot of technical and, which is much more difficult and much

more important than organizational conquests in order to destroy money, and until then one has to remain with "equality" in words, in the constitution, and in the position where everyone who has money has an actual right to exploit" (vol. 29, p. 328 - 329).

4) to the gradual transformation of labor into the first necessity of life, while not forgetting Lenin's indication that he assumes

"gratuitous work for the public good, not taking into account individual differences, erasing any memory of everyday prejudices, erasing inertia, habits, the difference between individual branches of work, the difference in the amount of remuneration for work, etc." (vol. 30, p. 164).

This is how, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, the transition to the task of the direct practical construction of a (*1st phase of*) communist society should be presented, if, following the Program of the CPSU, we tear it off, compare or oppose to the construction of socialism.

And what does the "Program of the CPSU" say about the transition to the full-scale construction of (*1st phase of*) communism? According to the CPSU Program, the solution of this problem consists, as already mentioned, in the following:

1) In the creation of the material and technical base of (*1st phase of*) communism in industry and agriculture, and the creation of such a base in agriculture is conceived "as the all-round strengthening of the collective farm system."

2) The need to "fully use such tools for the development of the economy as money, price, profit, trade, finance", etc. bourgeois instruments.

3) In "reliance on the principle of material interest", on the principle of payment according to work.

Isn't it an interesting transition to the direct, full-scale construction of communism?

Instead of a gradual transition from two forms of ownership, inherent only in socialism, to a single public ownership of the means of production, which determines communism, there is an "every possible strengthening" of these two forms. Even more - the transfer of the main means of production from the hands of the state into the hands of individual production teams - the sale of basic agricultural equipment to collective farms.

Instead of the gradual replacement of commodity-money, market relations, which are inherent not only in socialism, but also in capitalism, by a system of direct product exchange, which determines communism, there is an all-out expansion and strengthening of commodity-money relations. Even more - cardinal measures are planned to introduce, strengthen, and expand such commodity-money categories as profit, as some kind of "socialist competitiveness." Instead of gradually diminishing the role of personal material interest, i.e. instead of the gradual preparation of society for the transition from the socialist principle "to each according to his work" to the communist one - "to each according to his needs", - (*there is*) reliance on the principle of material interest, on the principle of payment according to work.

There is something to be a little confused about...

Why is there such confusion and confusion in this matter? What does that testify to?

I am sure that all this testifies to only one thing - that the theoretical position of the Program of the CPSU about the entry of our country into the period of the full-scale construction of (*1st phase of*) communism, into the period presented by the Program as a certain higher stage than socialism - turned out to be untenable, turned out to be in conflict with life, in contradiction with the theory of scientific communism of Marx-Lenin.

It is easy to see that the tasks that the Program of the CPSU has set for our society, every one of them, are aimed at one goal - towards the further construction of socialism, towards the completion of socialism.

This fact is undeniable. And therefore, all the theoretical provisions of the Program of the CPSU on the transition of our country to the task of directly building the highest phase of communist society, on the already accomplished development of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as a state of the period of socialism, into a state of the whole people, etc., are crumbling. etc.

We have considered only one, the inner side of the issue of the so-called public state. But this issue has another side, no less, if not more, important than the internal one, the external side of this issue, its international side.

Does the "Program of the CPSU" recognize the existence of the international side of the problem of the so-called "public state"? Recognizes, because it is to this side that the following piece of the Program is devoted:

"For the complete withering away of the state, it is necessary to create both internal conditions - the building of a developed communist society, and external conditions - the final resolution of the dispute between capitalism and communism in the international arena in favor of communism."

That is all that is said in the "Program of the CPSU" on this occasion. And we will not find anything else and anywhere about this side of the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state of the whole people, neither in the Program of the CPSU, nor in other materials devoted to the so-called public state.

It seems to me that such a position is not accidental, because even the closest superficial acquaintance with this side of the "thesis of the Program of the CPSU" about the uselessness of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its development into a "people's" state shows that this thesis is even more contrary to Marxism than when considering its internal side - Leninism, that from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, he, as they say, does not climb into any gates.

V. I. Lenin very sharply and very definitely stated:

"If the power of the Soviets is exercised, if the bourgeoisie is overthrown in one country, the second task is to fight on an international scale, fight on a different plane, the struggle of the proletarian state among the capitalist states" (vol. 29, p. 40).

"Dictatorship is a big, cruel, bloody word, expressing a merciless struggle for life and death between two classes, two worlds, two world-historical epochs" (vol. 30, p. 330).

"The dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean the cessation of the class struggle, but its continuation in a new form and new means. AS long as the classes remain, as long as the bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, intensifies its attacks on socialism on an international scale, until then a dictatorship is necessary" (Abstracts of the report on the tactics of the RCP (b) at the Third Congress of the Comintern).

One last statement of V. I. Lenin is worth whole volumes!

It shatters to smithereens all the arguments of the theoreticians and supporters of the Program of the CPSU in their attempts to prove that the liquidation of antagonistic classes within one country means the end of the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country.

Supporters and defenders of the "people's" state have forgotten about the existence of antagonistic, hostile classes and their states OUTSIDE of our state, they have forgotten that the socialist revolution, according to Marx and Lenin, both in letter and in spirit of their, above all, revolutionary teaching, DOES NOT END with the liquidation of the exploiting classes in one or more countries.

And the result of this regular forgetfulness of the theoreticians and defenders of the Program of the CPSU was the position of the Program about the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR. The program of the CPSU proclaims:

"Having ensured the complete and final victory of socialism - the first phase of communism - and the transition of society

to the full-scale construction of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historical mission..."

Speaking at the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1964, M. A. Suslov exclaimed:

"Peking theorists in every possible way hush up the position that Lenin emphasized and said that dictatorship is needed "in order to finally create and strengthen socialism" (vol. 29, p. 259), that the disappearance of the danger of restoring capitalist relations "means the end of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (vol. 33, p. 75)."

Is M. A. Suslov right in saying this?

He is wrong, because he mixes together two different sides of this issue - internal and international.

What does the approval of the Program of the CPSU on the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR mean?

It means, firstly, that no internal factors are any longer able to lead to the restoration of capitalism in our country, and, secondly, but most importantly, it means that our country is already guaranteed against the restoration of capitalism and through intervention from the world imperialism, including through military intervention.

Let us turn to V. I. Lenin. He pointed out countless times:

"We are not in a position to bring about a socialist revolution in the West at will - this is the only absolute guarantee against restoration in Russia" ("The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution").

"We will come to final victory only when we manage to finally and totally break international imperialism... We will come to victory only together with all the workers of other countries..." (Speech in the Moscow Soviet, 1918).

"You can finally win only on a global scale ..." (Report on foreign policy at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Council).

According to V. I. Lenin, it follows that only a series of victorious socialist revolutions in other countries can give us the right to speak of the final victory of socialism in our country as the first socialist country.

Some comrades, defending the position of the "Program of the CPSU" on the final victory of socialism in the USSR, are trying to prove that V. I. Lenin, speaking of a number of victorious socialist revolutions in other countries as the only absolute guarantee of the victory of socialism, precisely meant by these revolutions a number of post-war socialist revolutions in the people's democracies.

Such a statement is another attempt with unsuitable means.

These comrades admit a small but very significant inaccuracy, a reticence that distorts the very meaning of Lenin's words. V. I. Lenin taught:

It is impossible to win finally, completely on a world scale in Russia alone, but it is possible only when the proletariat wins in all, at least the advanced countries, or at least in a few of the largest advanced countries.

Only then will we be able to say with complete certainty that the cause of the proletariat has triumphed, that our first goal - the overthrow of capitalism - has been achieved" (vol. 29, p. 40).

And Lenin particularly stressed this idea more than once.

Thus, for V. I. Lenin, it was not at all indifferent where and in what countries the socialist revolution would take place.

One does not have to be a Marxist to understand why Lenin saw revolutions as the only guarantee of the final victory of socialism in at least a) several of the b) advanced and c) largest countries.

V. I. Lenin was a sober politician, and he well understood that a full guarantee of the final victory of socialism, full confidence that in any case, including in the case of armed intervention, we will definitely come out victorious, if only we can have a corresponding superiority in all the forces of socialism - economic, military, political - over the forces of imperialism. V. I. Lenin was well aware that without bringing "at least a few of the largest advanced countries" to the side of socialism, such superiority cannot be achieved, and especially when we have to catch up with capitalism in terms of economic development.

The question is whether it is possible to bring under the Lenin rubric several of the largest advanced countries of the people's democracy of the West or the East?

I don't think so. NOT possible YET.

I think that it would be superfluous to give any figures to justify this statement of mine. It seems to me that the very fact that we still have to catch up with capitalism in terms of economic development speaks for itself. And it is enough to refer to the words of the compilers of the Program, who said:

"Even if we agree with the President of the United States, who just recently declared that we have a balance of power, even then it would be unreasonable to threaten war" (Khrushchev, 22nd Congress of the CPSU).

"If in 1950 the share of socialist countries in world industrial production was about 1/5, now it exceeds one third" (Suslov. Report at the Plenum of the Central Committee 14/11-64).

The only serious proof of the correctness of the thesis of the Program of the CPSU about the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR could be given only by showing that V. I. Lenin, speaking of a number of victorious socialist revolutions in other countries as the only real guarantee of this final victory, had in mind was not socialism, not the First phase of communist society, but communism proper, its second phase. This is quite possible, since in his speeches

and works V. I. Lenin very often did not make any distinction between the use of the words socialism and communism.

Is there any such proof? I very carefully studied all the collected works of Lenin available to me, but did not find anything similar in it. Vice versa. Listen -

"... It goes without saying that only the proletariat of all the advanced countries of the world can finally win, and we Russians are starting the work that will consolidate the English, French or German proletariat, but we see that they will not win without the help of the working masses of all oppressed colonial peoples, and above all the peoples of the East.

We must realize that the vanguard alone cannot bring about the transition to communism" (Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East).

No matter how you interpret these Leninist words - whether in the form of a transition from capitalism to socialism or in the form of a transition from socialism to communism - they have only one essence: the final victory of the new system is impossible without the victory of a number of revolutions in several of the largest advanced (in economic, military, and political respect) countries of the world.

This Leninist thought does not allow any other interpretation for communists, for it takes the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a whole, as the main and inevitable, most necessary element of the socialist revolution as a whole, that is, conceivable on a global scale, and not from the positions of narrow nationalities, limited by the boundaries of one country, as does the Program of the CPSU and its theorists and supporters.

The assertions of the Program of the CPSU about the final victory of socialism in the USSR, about the uselessness of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its development into a state of the whole people, are a denial of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the socialist revolution, which continues up to the complete and final victory of socialism on earth.

I said above that Marxism-Leninism is such an integral and interconnected doctrine that it is impossible in one way or another to deviate from one part of it, so as not to violate the other, so as not to break its overall harmony and integrity.

The program of the CPSU, following the assertion of the final victory of socialism in our country, proclaims that

"The Party regards the building of communism in the USSR as the great international task of the Soviet people..."

V. I. Lenin taught that

"Proletarian internationalism requires, firstly, the subordination of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of this struggle on a world scale; secondly, it requires the ability and readiness on the part of the nation, which is carrying out victory over the bourgeoisie, to make the greatest national sacrifices for the sake of overthrowing international capital" (Report at the Second Congress of the Comintern).

V. I. Lenin taught that

"internationalism in fact is one and only one: selfless work on the development of the revolutionary movement and revolutionary struggle in one's own country, support (by propaganda, sympathy, materially) for the same struggle, the same line, and only this one in all countries without exception.. ." (Letters on tactics).

V. I. Lenin taught that the tactics of the communists, counting on a world revolution are,

"obligatory for a Marxist, for every proletarian and internationalist", "as the only internationalist one, for it does the maximum possible in one country for the development, support, awakening of the revolution in all countries" (The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky).

Let us compare these statements of V. I. Lenin with his repeated and categorical statements that without the victory of the socialist revolution in several of the largest advanced countries, the final victory of socialism is impossible.

What does this comparison say? That Lenin's teaching on proletarian internationalism is based not only and not so much on class, proletarian hatred of the exploitation of man by man, not only and not so much on the passionate revolutionary desire to help all working people in their struggle against all forms and types of oppression and oppressors, but, first of all, the most sober Marxist account of the fact that only the complete superiority of the forces of socialism over the forces of capitalism is capable of providing the working people with an equally complete guarantee of their victory. Lenin's teaching of proletarian internationalism is based on a real consideration of the fact that it is possible, even inevitable in the future, enthusiasm on the part of the state or states for their narrowly national tasks in the construction of a new social system.

Precisely because V. I. Lenin saw the guarantee of the final victory of socialism in a series of victorious revolutions in several of the largest advanced countries, precisely for this reason he did not get tired of repeating that the only internationalist policy is the policy of pursuing the maximum feasible in one country for the development, support, the awakening of the revolution in all other countries.

Proletarian internationalism demands that national tasks be subordinated to international ones. Proletarian internationalism requires mutual support, mutual assistance to each other from all sections of the international proletariat. But proletarian internationalism requires help and support, first of all, from the country "carrying out victories over the bourgeoisie", because - according to V. I. Lenin - without return help and support, all the efforts of this country to independently solve the problem of final victory over the bourgeoisie are doomed to failure.

In itself, the thesis of the Program of the CPSU that "the Party regards communist construction in the USSR as a great international task for the Soviet people" is indisputable, since it is based on Lenin's

instruction about the revolutionary influence of our economic successes. True, it is still too early for us to talk about the concrete revolutionary influence of our economic successes, especially in the light of Khrushchev's classic comparison of a "trouserless" Soviet worker with a fully equipped worker in capitalist states.

But it's not the case. Taken by itself, the thesis of the Program of the CPSU about the "great international task of the Soviet people", as I have already said, is indisputable. But when next to this "thesis in the Program of the CPSU" there is an assertion about the final victory of socialism in the USSR, it seems to me that then the very thesis about our great international task acquires a somewhat different meaning.

Indeed, what does the statement about the final victory of socialism in the USSR mean, the statement that serves as a premise for the thesis about the great international task of the Soviet people? It means that we consider ourselves henceforth fully guaranteed against all attempts by the world bourgeoisie to restore capitalist relations in our country; it signifies our indirect and rather subtle recognition of the fact that in connection with the final victory of socialism in the USSR, we have the opportunity, to put it mildly, to digress somewhat from the fulfillment of our "ordinary" international obligations for the sake of our great international task; it means that we are able to refrain "from the greatest national sacrifices for the overthrow of international capital"; it means, finally, that for us it is no longer necessary, although desirable, the tactics of the Communists, counting on a world revolution.

This is the striking result we arrive at as soon as we try to destroy the integrity and consistency of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the socialist revolution.

Why do we need different victims, tactics, and other Marxist-Leninist "tricks" there now? - after all, we have already won finally and irrevocably. Let us calmly build communism for ourselves - we have everything necessary for this; build it, then the people will look and say: this is life! We are for communism, and long live the world revolution!

Inextricably linked with the problem of the so-called "people's" state is the question raised by the Program of the CPSU about the transformation of the party of the working class in our country into the party of the whole people.

The program of the CPSU substantiates the thesis of the transformation of the party of the working class into a party of the whole people as follows:

- 1) Changes in the class structure of our society;
- 2) the fundamental community of interests of all sections of the working people of the USSR with the interests of the working class;
- 3) The established ideological unity of our entire society. It seems to me that much of what could be said here in relation to the provision of the Program on the transformation of the party of the working class into a party of the whole people, has already been said in the previous lines. It only remains to add the following:

The liquidation of the exploiting classes in the USSR did not lead to the liquidation of classes in general in our country. And, fortunately, no one disputes this. But, unfortunately, few people think what follows from this.

And from this it follows, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, that while and since there are classes in our society, no matter what, antagonistic or friendly, as long as and to the extent that class contradictions and class struggle exist and will continue to exist.

Another thing is the pattern of resolving antagonistic or non-antagonistic contradictions. While the former are overcome through social revolution, the latter are overcome without revolutionary upheavals. But both of them are overcome in the struggle. And those who try to pass off socialist society as a society without class contradictions and class struggle make a serious mistake; which passes off the features of resolving non-antagonistic contradictions in socialist society as reconciling them.

While and insofar as our society implements the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work", which reflects and consolidates the actual inequality of people, while and insofar as two forms of property exist, are legally fixed and are further strengthened in society - public and cooperative, so far and since in it there is an opposition between physical and mental labor, between town and country, so long as and insofar as (and in view of the above) our society needs a state, i.e. in the army, police, courts, prisons, etc. organs of coercion and violence - so far and to the extent that all arguments about the social, moral and ideological unity of class society are anti-scientific verbal assurances that have no Marxist-Leninist basis.

Only the complete victory of communism, its highest phase, means the complete destruction of all and all classes and class differences, and with them all and all class contradictions and class struggle, and only this destruction leads to the complete moral, political and ideological unity of society.

When we spoke about the "nationwide" state, there was a part of the Program of the CPSU devoted to the tasks facing our society at the present stage of its development (see p. ...).

Let us try to analyze these tasks in relation to the approval of the "Program of the CPSU" on the moral and ideological unity of our society.

The question is, if in our society such a strong moral, political and ideological unity of society has already developed that it is already possible to write in the Program of the CPSU about the transition from the party of the working class to the party of the whole people, then why is the same Program of the CPSU and countless party and state directives literally on every step they call on us to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to observe discipline in all areas of life, to enhance the role of control and accounting in every way, to strengthen and expand the principle of material interest, to devote all our efforts to educating the population, especially young people, in the spirit of communist morality, to

overcome the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people, in the development of a conscious attitude to work (so in the text. - Ed.), etc.?

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government have made and are making great efforts to carry out these tasks in practice. The question is, if all these phenomena, for example, such as the remnants of capitalism in the minds of people, an irresponsible attitude to work, the manifestation of parochialism and departmentalism, etc., are exceptions to the rule, then why then elevate them to the rank of the most important party and state tasks? Is it really necessary in the conditions of complete moral-political and ideological unity of society to have a "special machine, a special apparatus of suppression" to combat "possible excesses of individuals"?

The answer to these questions suggests itself - all these "remnants" and "manifestations" so far, unfortunately, are not "excesses of individuals", but widespread, mass phenomena. And there is nothing anti-Marxist or anti-Soviet in recognizing this fact. V. I. Lenin recognized "the possibility and necessity of excesses of individuals" even in the conditions of a communist society. What is surprising in the fact that in the conditions of a socialist society, in the conditions of the existence of classes both within society and outside it, such excesses are not limited to individuals, but still remain a mass phenomenon?

No wonder. Another thing is surprising - how can one pursue quite definite and clear goals in practical affairs, while at the same time in theory trying not to notice them and bypass them?

Only with the complete victory of communism will it be possible to talk about the moral-political and, moreover, about the ideological unity of society. To declare this now means, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "jumping not to the lower, not to the middle, but to the higher phase of communism."

Such a jump cannot be supported by any reference to Marxism-Leninism. So theorists and defenders of the thesis "from the party of the working class to the party of the whole people" have to confine themselves to verbal tightrope walking, like the following:

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has not ceased to be the party of the working class, for it has been and remains the spokesman of its communist ideals. But the Communist Party in our country has become not only the party of the working class, but of the whole people, because the whole people have adopted the Marxist-Leninist worldview of the working class, his ideals" (collection "From the party of the working class to the party of the whole people", 1964).

Speaking on February 14, 1964, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M. A. Suslov said:

The party of the working class, without which the dictatorship of the class is impossible, retains both formally and in essence its proletarian class character until the complete victory of socialism.

This is the undeniable truth. But it is also indisputable that the party, as a political organization, reflects the changes taking place in the class structure of society. The CPSU emphasized in its Program that the working class would remain the leading force in Soviet society until the complete victory of communism. Even during the period of extensive building of communism, the party remains the spokesman for communist ideals, the aims of the working class and its fundamental interests. At the same time, it becomes the party of the whole people. This is not happening according to someone's subjective wishes, but because the goals and ideals of the working class have become the goals and ideals of all classes and strata of the people who built socialism" (I emphasized. - GM).

Much of this statement is surprising and incomprehensible.

It is not clear in what sense of the word the first paragraph of this quotation speaks of socialism - about socialism in the "common sense of the word", i.e. about communism, or about socialism as the first phase of communism?

It is not clear what kind of changes in the class structure of society are we talking about - is it the liquidation of the exploiting classes, or is it a qualitative change in the character of the classes?

It is surprising and incomprehensible why the working class, having previously and remaining to this day the leading force of Soviet society, the working class, "whose goals and ideals have become the goals and ideals of all classes and strata of the people," why it should, precisely for this reason, renounce the leading role in the party ?

Why?

If, speaking of the complete victory of socialism, M. A. Suslov has in mind the complete victory of communism, then this means that the party of the working class both formally and in essence retains its class proletarian character until the construction of a complete classless society. If so, then we are formally and essentially Marxist-Leninists.

If, speaking of the complete victory of socialism, M. A. Suslov has in mind the present period of development of our society, then this means that both formally and in essence the party of the working class is losing its class proletarian character somewhere halfway from capitalism to communism. If this is so, then we formally and essentially break with Marxism-Leninism.

As soon as we recognize that our society is a class society, even if with significantly erased class boundaries, just as soon we are obliged to admit, if we are Communist-Leninists, that a non-class or general class party, as well as a state of the whole people, is in our society cannot be , or, as Lenin liked to say; either we admit that "party membership is the highest principle of class", and then we are Marxist-Leninists, or we are for the "party of the whole people", and then there is nothing in common between us and the Marxist-Leninists.

Defenders of the CPSU Program argue:

"How is the class spirit of a Marxist-Leninist party expressed in a socialist society, where there are no antagonistic classes,

where the exploiters have been destroyed and the exploitation of man by man has been abolished forever, where the socio-political unity of society has been strengthened? The communists answer this question as follows: the class character of the Marxist-Leninist party in such a society consists in its loyalty to communism - the highest class principle of the international proletariat, in the implementation of communism - this ultimate goal of the international working class" (collection "From the party of the working class to the party of the whole people", 1964).

Such an attempt to salvage the situation and to give the so-called all-people's party a class Marxist character is yet another attempt with unsuitable means.

The question is, how is the class spirit of a Marxist-Leninist party expressed in a capitalist society?

Following the logic of reasoning of the theorists and defenders of the CPSU Program, one should answer this question in the same way as they themselves answer it - the class character of the Marxist-Leninist party in a capitalist society consists in its loyalty to communism (socialism), in the implementation of communism (socialism).

Following the logic of the arguments of the supporters of the "Program of the CPSU", we will inevitably have to come to the conclusion that any party that sets as its ultimate goal the establishment of socialism and communism, regardless of whose class interests it expresses and what specific paths it intends to follow or is heading towards this goals - is the essence of the class Marxist-Leninist party.

Following this logic, we will be forced to rank among the Marxist-Leninist parties such parties as the English Labor Party, the Italian, French or Japanese Socialist Parties, and so on, parties that proclaimed that their ultimate goal was "socialism".

We will be all the more compelled to admit this, since from now on we have proclaimed that ideological, that is, theoretical, differences cannot serve as an obstacle in the struggle for a common goal.

The program of the CPSU emphasizes that

"The period of extensive construction of communism is characterized by a further increase in the role and importance of the Communist Party as the leading and guiding force in Soviet society."

The program of the CPSU explains what caused this increase in the role and importance of the Communist Party:

"The increased role of the party in the life of Soviet society at a new stage in its development is due to:

- the growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks of communist construction, requiring a higher level of political and organizational leadership;
- the rise of the creative activity of the masses, the involvement of new millions of working people in the management of state affairs and production;
- the further development of socialist democracy, the enhancement of the role of public organizations, the expansion of the rights of the union republics and local organizations;
- the growing importance of the theory of scientific communism, its creative development and application, the need to strengthen the communist education of the working people and the struggle to overcome the remnants of the past in the minds of people.

And as a result of the "growth of the role and importance of the Communist Party" - the Program of the CPSU proclaims the transition from the party of the working class to the "nationwide" party.

You involuntarily ask questions - if THIS is the creative development and application of the theory of scientific communism, then where is Marxism-Leninism in it ?! Marxism-Leninism, which is based on the doctrine that ONLY the working class, in alliance with other friendly

classes and strata of society, ONLY he (*working class Ed*) alone, ONLY HIS PARTY, is able to eliminate all and any class contradictions and differences and ensure the complete and final victory of communism on the ground?!

Such a "creative development and application of the theory of scientific communism" leaves nothing in this theory similar to scientific communism because it nullifies the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the revolutionary role of the working class in history, limiting this history to the first phase of communist construction in ONE country.

The program of the CPSU acts consistently and logically - rejecting the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, declaring its development into a "people's" state, it does not stop halfway and goes further, from the party of the working class to the "people's" party, replacing the dictatorship of the class with the hegemony of the class, mixing it into a heap principles of communism with the aims of the working class.

Well, how can one not recall the words of V. I. Lenin that

"Basic propositions and goals are two different things: after all, even anarchists will agree with us on goals, because they too stand for the abolition of exploitation and class differences. Principles are not a goal, not a program, not tactics and not theory. Tactics and theory are not principles ... The principles of communism consist in the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and in the application of state coercion in the transitional period. These are the principles of communism, but this is not its goal "(vol. 32, p. 445).

So, according to V. I. Lenin, and not according to the Program of the CPSU, it is impossible, fundamentally mistaken, since it is devoid of any real meaning, to assert that communism is the highest class principle, and through such a substitution to express the class character of the party.

Communism is the ultimate goal of the working class. And this goal means nothing more than the destruction of all classes and class distinctions. And only the working class is capable of destroying classes and class differences, as the only class that is not interested in perpetuating its rule, for only the working class is not the owner of the means of production and does not have the opportunity to exploit the labor of others. And the only tool with which the working class can achieve its ultimate goal, communism, is its state, the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is what Lenin teaches.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND PEACEFUL ECONOMIC COMPETITION OF STATES WITH OPPOSITE SOCIAL ORDERS AND WAR

I shall begin my consideration of this extremely important and complex question directly from the relevant provision of the Program of the CPSU. It says:

"Peaceful coexistence implies: the rejection of war as a means of resolving disputes between states, their resolution through negotiations; equality, mutual understanding and trust between states; consideration of each other's interests; non-interference in internal affairs, recognition of the right of each people to independently resolve all issues of their country strict observance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit "Peaceful coexistence" is the basis of peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on a world scale and is a specific form of class struggle between them... Peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist states - an objective necessity for the development of human society ...Peaceful competition or a catastrophic war - this is the only way history has posed the question" (Programma KPSS. Gospolitizdat. 1961, pp. 60-61).

Analyzing this program provision, we must bear in mind the guiding explanation of Khrushchev, who "taught" in his speech at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU:

"Peace and peaceful coexistence are not exactly the same thing. Peaceful coexistence is not just the absence of war, not a temporary unstable truce between wars, it is the existence of two opposite systems based on the mutual rejection of the use of war as a means of resolving disputed interstate issues."

And, forestalling the quite logical question of how long this peaceful coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is conceivable, Khrushchev added:

"In modern conditions, the prospect of achieving peaceful coexistence has opened up for the entire period during which the social and political problems that now divide the world must find their solution ..."

It is clear from what has been said that the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems presupposes, as its support base, the foundation of the very possibility of its implementation, the renunciation of war, a mutual agreement between states on the renunciation of war as a means of resolving disputed interstate issues. The program of the CPSU assures us that such an agreement is quite possible and admissible, that it is an objective necessity, because the governments of all states are aware of the fact that the problem of peaceful coexistence is put before them only in this way - either peaceful coexistence or a catastrophic thermonuclear war.

It goes without saying that, speaking of the policy of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states, the Program of the CPSU consistently follows its own course and extends this policy not only to relations between states with opposite social systems, but also to relations between capitalist states, solemnly declaring that

"The CPSU and the entire Soviet people will continue to oppose ... wars between capitalist states..." (p. 62).

After these preliminary remarks, let me pass on to a direct consideration of the question of so-called peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition between socialist and capitalist states.

And I don't think I'm making a big mistake if I break this very big, wide-ranging, very complex issue into a few separate parts.

IS WARS INEVITABLE WHILE IMPERIALISM EXISTS?

V. I. Lenin in his works repeatedly addressed this, the most exciting issue of the 20th century. And this is the answer he gave:

"Wars are rooted in the very essence of capitalism; they will stop only when the capitalist system ceases to exist" (Militant Militarism, 1918).

"Under capitalism, especially in its imperialist stage, wars are inevitable" (Pacifism and the slogan of peace).

"War is not an accident ... but an inevitable stage of capitalism" (The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International).

"Intensification of militarism, intensification and acceleration of preparations for new imperialist wars, an increase in the number of wars throughout the world ..." (Theses on the international situation. 1920).

"War ... is a continuation of the policy of peacetime" (From a letter from I. Armand).

Based on a strictly scientific, economic analysis of imperialism as the highest and last stage of capitalism, V. I. Lenin clearly showed and proved that "imperialist wars are inevitable on the basis of private property" (vol. 50, p. 398).

And it was from this analysis of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism that V. I. Lenin drew his brilliant conclusion about the possibility of the victory of socialism, first in one, separately taken country, as the first stage of the world socialist revolution.

VI Lenin spoke about the fatal inevitability of wars under imperialism.

The program of the CPSU asserts that "even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, if capitalism is preserved in part of the world..." (p. 58), war can be prevented.

Theorists and supporters of the Program of the CPSU declare that V. I. Lenin, speaking of the inevitability of wars under imperialism, had in mind wars only between imperialist states.

Invalid statement. Speaking at the Third Congress of the Comintern with a report on the tactics of the RCP (b), V. I. Lenin pointed out:

"Now a certain balance of power has set in, a balance between bourgeois society, the international bourgeoisie as a whole, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia, on the other ... Of course, it must be emphasized that we are talking only about relative equilibrium, about a very unstable equilibrium ... Until there is a common end result, the state of terrible war will continue ... "

With even greater certainty, Lenin spoke of this in his letter to the Eighth Congress of the RCP(b) in 1919:

"We live not only in a state, but also in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic alongside the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either one or the other will win. Until that end comes, a series of clashes between Soviets and bourgeois states is inevitable."

Of course, V. I. Lenin in 1918 - 1924 (and later I.V. Stalin) did everything in their power in their foreign policy in order to delay as long as possible, to maintain this state of "unstable balance", a state of unstable peaceful respite.

Lenin's general line of foreign policy proceeded from a sober, objectively accurate analysis of the correlation of class forces in the world.

"Until an international socialist revolution engulfing several countries breaks out," said V.I. Lenin, "so strong that it could defeat international imperialism, until then the direct duty of

the communists who have won in one (especially backward) country is not to accept battle with the giants of imperialism, to try to evade combat, to wait until the clash between the imperialists among themselves will further weaken them, bring the revolution in other countries even closer" (vol. 27, p. 294).

"The foreign policy of the Soviet government must not be changed in any way. Our military training has not yet been completed, and therefore the general slogan remains as before: maneuver, retreat, wait, continuing this training with all our might" (vol. 27, p. 325) .

Indeed, V. I. Lenin spoke, and this statement of his serves as the main trump card in the hands of supporters. Programs of the CPSU, their main argument in defense of the idea of peaceful coexistence, which

"we have found ourselves in such a position that, without having gained an international victory, the only and lasting victory for us, we have won for ourselves the conditions under which we can exist side by side with the capitalist powers, which are now forced to enter into trade relations with us ..." (vol. 31, p. 384).

True, at the same time, supporters of the CPSU Program forget to finish this quote, the end of which looks like this:

"Now we have to talk not only about one respite, but about serious chances for new construction for a longer time" (Sub. - GM).

In addition, theorists, and supporters of the Program of the CPSU could leaf through the same thirty-one volumes of V. I. Lenin's works and read Lenin's own remark on the quoted words on page 426:

"I said ... that we have now passed from war to peace. But we have not forgotten that war will return again. As long as capitalism and socialism remain, they cannot live peacefully: either one or the other will win in the end; either according to the Soviet authorities will sing memorial services, or - for

world capitalism. This is a delay in the war "(vol. 31, p. 426) (emphasized by me. - GM).

V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out:

"We have finished one period of wars, we must prepare for the second; but when it comes, we do not know, and we need to make sure that when it comes, we could be on top" (vol. 31, p. 470) .

"...Now our international position has given us a much longer and more lasting respite than the one we had at the beginning of the revolution. But we must remember that this is nothing more than a respite" (vol. 30, p. 453).

"Although an extremely unstable, extremely fragile, but still such an equilibrium has turned out that a socialist republic can exist - of course for a short time - in a capitalist environment" (vol. 32, p. 429).

The great leader of the proletariat never had any illusions about the fact that the so-called peaceful existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the capitalist powers can continue indefinitely, or, as Khrushchev says, until the moment when "history itself" decides the dispute between socialism and capitalism.

V. I. Lenin, being a great Marxist and a most sober politician, could not even allow the thought of the possibility of some long (in the historical sense) period of peaceful coexistence of states with opposite social systems.

Why? Because he, and precisely because he was a sober Marxist politician, could not even allow the thought of the possibility of reconciling the irreconcilable.

The Program of the CPSU says:

"The main contradiction of the modern world is the contradiction between socialism and capitalism."

At the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1964, M. A. Suslov quite convincingly argued that

"The struggle of world socialism and world imperialism is the main content of our era, the core of the class struggle on a world scale. ... The central point of world politics, of all social development, is the struggle of the world socialist system against imperialism." (And, of course, vice versa, that is, world imperialism against socialism. - GM).

Consequently, we recognize that there are certain class contradictions between socialism and imperialism at the present stage of the development of human society. And we not only recognize, but emphasize in every possible way that these class contradictions are the central point of world politics, the core of the class struggle of socialism against imperialism. This is a Marxist-Leninist position.

But the question arises whether the class contradictions between socialism and imperialism irreconcilable are.

For a Marxist-Leninist, the answer to this question can only be positive - yes, the contradictions, the class contradictions between the socialist system and the capitalist system, cannot be anything other than irreconcilable contradictions. If this is so, and from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, I repeat this once more, then this is so, and it cannot be otherwise, do we thereby recognize that the contradictions between the socialist states and the capitalist states, between the governments of these states - are also class and antagonistic contradictions?

We have to put this naive question, from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist ideology, because following the absolutely correct statement that "the main contradiction of the modern world is the contradiction between socialism and imperialism", that "the struggle of world socialism against imperialism is the pivot class struggle on a world scale," the CPSU program and its supporters solemnly proclaim the possibility of peaceful coexistence of states with opposite social systems, the possibility of mutual agreement between the governments of these states on the renunciation of wars, the possibility of taking into account each other's interests, etc. etc.

The proclamation by the Program of the CPSU of the possibility of peaceful coexistence for an indefinitely long period of states with different social systems, the proclamation of this peaceful coexistence as an objective necessity, in essence, means nothing more than a denial of the irreconcilability of the class contradictions between socialism and capitalism.

In my opinion, the proclamation of the policy of peaceful coexistence, in the form in which it is taught by the Program of the CPSU and its defenders, ultimately leads to the rejection or at least to the obscurity of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, to the policy of reconciliation of the class struggle. at the present stage of the development of human society, to "the oblivion of socialism for the sake of anti-militarism" (see V. I. Lenin, *soch.*, vol. 13, p. 76).

By declaring the policy of peaceful coexistence "not a temporary truce between wars" but "the existence of two opposite social systems based on the renunciation of war," the Program of the CPSU reduces this opposition to some kind of ephemeral concept, emasculates the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary content from it.

Announcing the possibility of mutual understanding and trust, the possibility of the imperialist states taking into account the interests of the socialist states, and vice versa, we propagate the idea of a shallow contradiction between socialism and capitalism with even greater force.

Khrushchev stated:

"We are for peaceful coexistence between states with different socio-political systems, but we are against peaceful coexistence between hostile classes. We are for class struggle. There can be no peace between those who exploit and those who are exploited" (Speech at a reception in honor of participants of the World Youth Forum, 19/IX-1965).

Beautifully said, but this statement does not fit in with Marxism-Leninism.

It is impossible to be, if one remains on the positions of Marxism-Leninism, at the same time against peaceful coexistence between hostile classes and for such between hostile states.

It is unthinkable to assert, without abandoning the Marxist-Leninist position, that there can be no peace between the exploiters and the exploited, while at the same time declaring the possibility of peace between the exploiting states and the socialist states.

Such assertions are possible only when we cross out the entire teaching of Marx-Lenin on classes and the class struggle in general, when we cross out Marx-Lenin's teaching on the class nature of the state in particular.

V. I. Lenin taught us that

"It is impossible to blame individuals for starting the war - it was created by capital. Capitalism has reached a dead end. This dead end is nothing but imperialism" (vol. 28, pp. 62-63).

"If militarism is a child of capitalism, then wars cannot be destroyed by the intrigues of rulers and diplomats, and the task of socialists is not to awaken illusions on this score, but, on the contrary, to constantly expose the hypocrisy and impotence of diplomatic "peaceful" steps" (Militant Militarism).

"If imperialism were the fault or crime of individuals, then socialism could remain socialism. Imperialism is the last step in the development of capitalism" (Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets).

"War is not engendered by the evil will of predatory imperialists... War is engendered by the entire development of world capital, by its billions of threads and connections" (The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution).

Lenin taught this. And the Program of the CPSU teaches us that war can be prevented by concluding an agreement with the governments of the imperialist states.

It teaches us that "the policy of peaceful coexistence meets the vital interests of all mankind, with the exception of the bigwigs of the big monopolies and the military" (p. 61. Emphasized by me. - GM).

Khrushchev taught that

"The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems can only be preserved and ensured by the selfless struggle of all peoples against the aggressive aspirations of the imperialists" (Stenotchet of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU).

"No one demands from the ruling circles of the USA that they fall in love with socialism, just as they cannot demand that we fall in love with capitalism. The main thing is that they refuse to resolve controversial issues by means of war" (ibid.).

Many party and state documents interpret this question in a completely similar way -

"We believe that the working class, the working people of all countries can force the imperialist governments to agree to disarmament, to end the war" (Open Letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU).

"To fight for peace today means to keep a vigilant eye on the intrigues and machinations of warmongers, to raise sacred anger against those who are heading for war" (Statement of the Soviet Government dated 14/UP-63).

In a report at the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1964, Suslov said the same thing:

"We are convinced that the revolutionary struggle of the workers, the general democratic upsurge, the growing might of socialism, the decisive actions of all peace-loving peoples can and must force the imperialists, against their will, to reckon with the demand for disarmament."

It is easy to see that between the positions of V. I. Lenin and the positions of the theoreticians and defenders of the CPSU Program there is a huge distance.

For V. I. Lenin, war is an inevitable companion of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism, one of its main defining features. For V. I. Lenin, it is indisputable that wars are "inevitable on the basis of private property" and that therefore they cannot be abolished or prevented by an agreement between governments, cannot be abolished by "struggle against warmongers," "big monopolies," etc. representatives of the class of private owners.

For the theoreticians and compilers of the CPSU Program, war is just politics, just a product of the evil will of the "big monopolies", the "military", "a narrow handful of monopolists," and so on.

And there is nothing surprising in the fact that, following the logic of its compilers and theoreticians, the Program of the CPSU replaces the struggle against the imperialist class as a whole, the struggle for the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, as an objective source of wars, by the struggle against individuals or groups of "tycoons".

At the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev said:

"When, under the pressure of the masses, supporters of a more or less moderate policy gain the upper hand, international tension is relaxed, the clouds of war part somewhat. When the pressure of the masses weakens and those groupings of the bourgeoisie who enrich themselves in the arms race and see in the war an opportunity for additional profit win, - international tension is escalating."

He was echoed by such a major theoretician of the new course as O. V. Kuusinen:

"We are far from considering the entire modern bourgeoisie as something whole and homogeneous. A process of differentiation is also going on in its ranks. It does not and cannot have a single line, especially in such a decisive issue

as the question of war and peace. Hence - two tendencies in the foreign policy of the imperialist states... One is militantly aggressive... The other is moderately sober... In practice, bourgeois governments most often compromise between the demands of the two extreme flanks of the bourgeois camp as a course to maintain international tension, if only the pressure from the masses of the people is not strong enough to force the ruling circles to agree to detente" (Stand report of the XXII Congress, vol. 1, pp. 386 - 387).

It turns out great according to the CPSU Program and the compilers! Well, how can we not remember again V. I. Lenin, who wrote:

"Here is an example of philistine credulity and forgetfulness of the class struggle. The government appears to be something like a supra-class or supra-partisan government, only it is 'pressed' too hard from the right, it needs to be pressed harder from the left" (vol. 25, p. 233).

Indeed, according to the Program of the CPSU, it turns out that the governments of the imperialist states are some kind of supra-class or extra-class bodies, independent of "big monopolies", "military", "a narrow handful of monopolists"; organs expressing the interests and pursuing the policy NOT of these "bigwigs", but expressing the interests and pursuing a policy of "compromises", a policy capable of taking into account the class interests of the socialist states.

The struggle against the most reactionary and rabid representatives of the bourgeois class or its accomplices is necessary because both for the cause of the working class and for the cause of peace, as V.I. Lenin said, the difference "between the Lloyd Georges and the Hendersons, between the Hendersons and the Churchills" is not indifferent.

But one cannot be a Marxist and reduce the class struggle to a struggle against individual representatives of a hostile class. One cannot be a Marxist by reducing the struggle to prevent war to a struggle against individual members of the imperialist class. One cannot be a Marxist by reducing the struggle against war to a struggle against individual "big monopolies". One cannot be a Marxist and fight against imperialism without touching the economic foundations of imperialism.

Let's remember Lenin, who wrote -

"The questions of whether a reformist change in the foundations of imperialism is possible, whether to go forward, towards a further sharpening and deepening of the contradictions generated by it, or backward, towards blunting them, are the fundamental questions of criticism of imperialism" (Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism).

It turns out, as Lenin said, that

"... we are tearing the policy of imperialism from its economy... It turns out that monopolies in the economy are compatible with a non-monopoly, non-violent, non-grabbing mode of action in politics. It turns out that the territorial division of the earth, completed just in the era of finance capital and forming the basis of the originality of the present forms of competition between the major capitalist states, are compatible with non-imperialist politics. The result is obscuration, blunting the most fundamental contradictions ... instead of revealing their depth, what is obtained is bourgeois reformism instead of Marxism" (ibid.).

Extremely interesting in this regard is that part of V. I. Lenin's speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in which he speaks of the "Appeal for all countries" of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, where it was said in particular:

"The time has come to begin a decisive struggle against the grasping aspirations of the governments of all countries. The time has come for the peoples to take the solution of the question of war and peace into their own hands."

It was about these words that Vladimir Ilyich remarked:

"Government, whatever form of government it may be, expresses the interests of certain classes, which is why to oppose the government and among the people... there is the greatest theoretical confusion, there is the greatest political helplessness, there is a condemnation of themselves and their

entire policy to the most precarious and unstable position" (vol. 25, pp. 16 - 18).

Nothing else can be added to these words of V. I. Lenin.

The policy of so-called peaceful coexistence, based on an agreement between the governments of states with opposite social systems, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, essentially boils down to a good intention to make imperialism not be imperialism, it is "the condemnation of themselves and their entire policy to the very precarious and unstable position.

The next question that arose in my mind when considering the problem of the peaceful coexistence of states with opposite social systems can be formulated as follows: do the contradictions between socialism and imperialism weaken with the course of history?

It seems to me that the clarification of this question is also important for establishing the very possibility of the peaceful coexistence of socialism with capitalism.

The program of the CPSU reads:

"...Today, world capitalism has entered a new ... stage of crisis. More and more countries are falling away from capitalism; the position of imperialism in economic competition with socialism is weakening; the colonial system of imperialism is disintegrating ... - this is the expression of the general crisis of capitalism.

The liquidation of the capitalist system in a large group of countries, the development and strengthening of the world socialist system, the collapse of the colonial system and the collapse of the old empires, the beginning of the breakdown of the colonial structure of the economy newly-free countries, the expansion of economic ties between these countries and the world of socialism - all this exacerbates the crisis of the world capitalist economy.

We quite rightly note that

"The countries of imperialism have lost their former monopoly on supplying the world non-socialist market with the means of production, as well as in the field of credit, loans and technical services" (Khrushchev. Report of the Central Committee to the XXII Congress of the CPSU).

V. I. Lenin proved that the growth of state-monopoly capital, the territorial division of all land between individual imperialist powers, the struggle for spheres of influence, for spheres of investment of capital, for sales markets, their redistribution, their narrowing - lead and cannot but lead " to a gigantic aggravation of all capitalist contradictions, both within the capitalist countries and between them. V. I. Lenin proved that all these factors, all these contradictions of imperialism lead and cannot but lead to imperialist wars, which are economically inevitable.

And what do the words of the Program of the CPSU mean about "aggravating the crisis of the world capitalist economy", "eliminating the monopoly of the capitalist states on the supply of equipment and credits", etc.? They mean not only the intensification and aggravation of the internal and external contradictions of imperialism; they also mean the aggravation and intensification of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism.

I have already referred to VI Lenin's letter to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in which he pointed out that "a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable." Now I must add that the peaceful existence of socialist states with imperialist states is "unthinkable for a long time" not only because, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, the peaceful coexistence of two class-hostile, antagonistic camps is unthinkable, but also because peaceful coexistence of two opposing economic competitors "a long time is unthinkable".

From the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, the narrowing of the imperialist sales market, the narrowing of the spheres of investment of capital, and, consequently, the spheres of political influence, as a result of the active entry into the world market of such a powerful ECONOMIC MONOPOLY as the united socialist camp, lead and

cannot but lead to further aggravation of the economic contradictions between socialism and imperialism. In my opinion, as the economic power and economic competitiveness of the socialist countries grow, acting on the world market as a single political and economic monopoly, the economic, and hence the political and military interests of socialism and capitalism will inevitably have to come into ever greater clash, the economic, political, and military antagonisms between the socialist and capitalist states will inevitably sharpen and heat up.

Let us recall Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, where he said:

“Competition is widely developed in the capitalist world. When two competitors fight among themselves for a buyer and the buyer eventually goes to one of them, to the one who offers the goods cheaper and of better quality, then after all, the other competitor does not die, he is not deprived of his life ", he is not physically destroyed. We appeal to capitalist countries: let's act in this way, accessible to your understanding. You do not want to call relations between countries a peaceful competition. You prefer the word competition. Please, we agree" II, p. 402).

Khrushchev said "please", but he forgot to add that, although in the competitive struggle the vanquished is not physically destroyed, he is ruined, left poor and completely submissive to the will of the winner. Khrushchev forgot to add that the laws of capitalist competitive struggle, which do not disdain any means to strangle their economic opponents, long ago, without Khrushchev's call for it, are the laws not only of the internal but also of the foreign policy of the capitalist states.

Here we come close to the question of the peaceful economic competition between socialism and capitalism, of the revolutionary influence of example.

In a report at the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 14, 1964, M. A. Suslov said:

"Marxist-Leninists ... see the revolutionary significance of the victories of socialism in economic competition in that they stimulate the class struggle of the working people, making them conscious fighters for socialism. Peaceful economic competition not only does not doom the masses to passive expectation, but, on the contrary, stimulates their revolutionary activity."

And further, -

"The question of peaceful economic competition is by no means only economic in its essence. It has a deep political meaning: to defeat capitalism economically means to seriously facilitate all revolutionary forces in their struggle against imperialism."

M. A. Suslov is right. Taken by itself, the question of the revolutionary influence of example fully and completely corresponds to Lenin's instruction that socialism should exert its main influence on the course of the world revolutionary movement through its economic successes. But what does this Leninist instruction mean?

It seems to me that, in essence, it means that socialism must clearly demonstrate to the working masses of the capitalist countries that only the socialist system provides the vast majority of the population with a higher standard of living than the capitalist system, because, in this sense, Suslov is also right, " in our time, the merits of socialism are judged not only by theoretical works, but above all by deeds, by how communists practically solve the problems of building a new society."

It is clear that only by defeating (already defeating!) capitalism economically can we speak concretely about the revolutionary influence of example.

This most important task of ours - to defeat capitalism economically - we have not yet solved. And I think that this statement of mine does not need proof. Well, if there are doubters, let them listen to Khrushchev, who at the 20th Congress said:

"Only incorrigible braggarts can turn a blind eye to the fact that economically we have not yet surpassed the most developed capitalist countries, that our level of production is still insufficient to ensure a prosperous life for all members of society" (Stenotchet of the 20th Congress, p. 196).

And in 1964, Khrushchev repeated this idea even more colorfully and more definitely:

"If we do not show in practice the advantages of our socialist system, the advantages in the rapid growth of the country's economy, in the steady growth of material and spiritual wealth, if the Soviet people do not live better than they lived before the revolution, then many will say: listen, they say that Communists are building socialism, but why do we need it? Here Russians, they say, live under socialism, but go without pants, so do you want to follow their example? And even under capitalism we wear not only pants, but pants, and even a jacket to boot (Speech at a meeting of Soviet-German friendship on June 12, 1964).

I will allow myself to linger a little on this quotation, because it is another characteristic example of what, after the October 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is customary to call Khrushchev's theoretical "carelessness".

What does the future tense mean in this quote?

In the direct meaning of Khrushchev's words, it means that up to the present time, we, that is, the socialist system, have not yet shown the advantages of our system and, moreover, that we, the Soviet people, are not yet living better than we lived before the revolution.

Wow "theoretical carelessness"! It seems to me that this is precisely the kind of carelessness about which V. I. Lenin said:

"I am asking if it is permissible to speak in such a tone in the Communist Party? This is counter-revolutionary" (vol. 31, p. 223).

Forgive me this lyrical digression ...

But the fact remains that it is too early for us to talk about the revolutionary influence of our example as a stimulator of the class revolutionary struggle of the working masses against capitalism. In the words of Khrushchev, for this we should at least put on pants.

We recognized as real and correct the proposition that "in our time the merits of socialism are judged ... primarily by deeds, by how communists practically solve the problems of building a new society." If we compare this position with the thesis of the Program of the CPSU on peaceful economic competition and with our numerous statements that we are still quite far from the standard of living in the advanced capitalist countries, then the question is, does not such a comparison mean a very transparent and unambiguous appeal to the working masses of the developed capitalist countries with an appeal not to hasten with revolutions, to refrain from decisive action until the moment when it becomes clear to them, these working masses, that the socialist "seller" offers them only cheaper and better quality than the "seller".

It seems to me that we can shout "long live the socialist revolution!" as much as we like, but [if] along with this we teach, namely, teach that as long as this very revolution did not give the working masses, in the material sense, greater benefits than the capitalist system, such science and similar agitation for a socialist revolution contains nothing but hypocritical phrases and objectively pursues completely opposite goals.

This is one side of the question of peaceful economic competition between socialist and capitalist states.

But there is also another side. M. A. Suslov is right when he declares that "the question of peaceful economic competition is in its essence far from being only economic," that "it contains a deep political meaning." But, raising the question of the peaceful economic competition of socialism with capitalism, of the revolutionary influence of example, Suslov directs our attention to only one side of this political question, bypassing the very thesis about the possibility of a PEACEFUL competition of socialism with capitalism.

Socialism needs peace. Under the conditions of peace, all the advantages of the socialist mode of production over the capitalist are revealed to the fullest extent. Peaceful economic competition brings with it, in the final analysis, victory, both economic and political, over capitalism. All this is clear. All this is undeniable. ONLY PEACE IS NEEDED.

And here again the main problem of war and peace emerges in full growth.

And in general, one cannot but say that the theoreticians and compilers of the Program of the CPSU suffer from a strange forgetfulness. This forgetfulness is also clearly manifested in the existing, according to the Program, separation of foreign policy from domestic policy, in the desire to separate them from each other, to present them as independent of each other.

In the section on the general crisis of imperialism, the program of the CPSU names among the facts in which this crisis finds its expression the following:

"An unprecedented intensification of political reaction along all lines, the renunciation of bourgeois freedoms and the establishment of fascist regimes in a number of countries; the sharpening of the contradictions of imperialism with the growth of state-monopoly capitalism and the growth of militarism."

Many materials on the CPSU Program give a broader and more impressive picture of the full-scale offensive of reaction along the entire front of social and political life within the capitalist countries. And if we are Marxist-Leninists, it is unlikely for us to forget V. I. Lenin's instruction that

"to single out "foreign policy" from politics in general, or even more so to counterpose foreign policy to domestic policy, is fundamentally wrong, not a Marxist, not a scientific idea" ("On the Caricature of Marxism and on "Imperialist Economism").

If this is so, if this instruction of V. I. Lenin does not apply to dogma and is valid in our time, then does this not mean that all attempts by theorists and supporters of the CPSU Program to combine statements about a full-scale offensive of reaction within the capitalist states with assertions about the possibility of these states pursuing a non-reactionary foreign policy, a policy of peaceful coexistence – doesn't this mean that they look like a caricature of Marxism?

Of course, and this is not disputed, a world war, especially a thermonuclear one, would be a terrible disaster for humanity.

And communists must exert every effort and means to prevent a new world war, which, from the point of view of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, IT IS INEVITABLE AS LONG AS IMPERIALISM EXISTS ON THE EARTH IN THE PERSON OF THE LARGEST AND ECONOMICALLY ADVANCED STATES.

As the main stronghold, the idea of the peaceful coexistence of states with opposite social systems presupposes the rejection of war as a means of resolving disputed interstate issues. The program of the CPSU proclaims that

"The CPSU and the entire Soviet people will continue to oppose any and all predatory wars, including wars between imperialist states, local wars aimed at strangling the liberation movements of the people, and consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples, their just liberation war against imperialism" (p. 62).

This provision of the Program of the CPSU, despite its outward beauty, in my opinion, also contradicts Marxism-Leninism.

Speaking about the contradictions between the capitalist states, V. I. Lenin pointed out:

"Can we remain indifferent and only say, as communists; 'we will propagate communism within these countries.' That's right, but that's not all. The practical task of communist politics is the task of exploiting this enmity, pitting them against each other... Are we committing crimes against

communism? No, because we are doing this as a socialist state, conducting communist propaganda and compelled to use every hour given by circumstances in order to grow stronger as quickly as possible" (vol. 31, p. 415).

V. I. Lenin constantly returned to this idea. He said:

"We cannot wage war... Politically, we must use the differences between opponents, and only deep differences explained by the deepest economic reasons" (vol. 31, p. 419).

On the basis of Marxist analysis, V. I. Lenin revealed the irreconcilable contradictions that existed in his time between the imperialist countries. Lenin pointed to the contradictions between Japan and America, between the Entente and Germany, between America and the rest of the capitalist world.

As you know, Lenin's analysis was brilliantly justified. And precisely because the party in its foreign policy steadfastly followed Lenin's instructions, the world's first socialist state succeeded in stretching out the peace it had won for 20 years.

Without any embellishment, openly and loudly, not afraid of accusations of "cannibalism" and "anti-humanism", in the most difficult and tense years of the existence of Soviet power, the great realist declared:

"The circumstances would save us even more if the imperialist states were at war. If we are forced to endure such scoundrels as capitalist thieves, each of whom sharpens a knife against us, it is our direct duty to turn these knives against each other" (vol. 31 , p. 419).

I admit that the words of the Program of the CPSU about the "struggle" of the CPSU and the Soviet people against the wars between the imperialist states are said for red flags. But let's go further.

What does the rejection of wars in general, of all and all wars, mean? It seems to me that this question can be answered correctly only by

returning again to the work of V. I. Lenin, in which he wrote that "if we are forced to endure such scoundrels as capitalist thieves ..."

The words of V. I. Lenin, which I have underlined, has a great meaning, they contain a fundamental, radical opposition to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of wars from the point of view on this issue of the Program of the CPSU.

In the same speech, a few words above, just as openly and loudly, to the whole world, as he proclaimed that a war between the imperialist states would greatly help us, V. I. Lenin declared:

"As soon as we are strong enough to defeat all of capitalism, we immediately grab it by the collar" (vol. 31, p. 413).

The program of the CPSU, its theoreticians and supporters solemnly proclaimed that today it is not imperialism, but socialism that determines the fate of the world, that in our country socialism has finally and irrevocably triumphed, i.e., that now we are not afraid of any military or other encroachments of imperialism.

V. I. Lenin taught (I have already referred to these quotes):

"The foreign policy of the Soviet government must not be changed in any way. Our military training has not yet been completed ...".

"Our point of view is this: as long as great concessions and the greatest caution..." "As long as capitalism and socialism remain, they cannot live peacefully..." "Only after we overthrow, finally defeat and expropriate the bourgeoisie throughout the world, and not just in one country, wars will become impossible." "The final victory in one country is impossible."

If we compare all these statements of V. I. Lenin with one another, then we will clearly see how they are all inextricably linked into one whole. The question of the final victory of socialism in our country, the question of proletarian internationalism, the question of world revolution—all these questions will prove to be inseparable from the question of revolutionary wars.

According to V. I. Lenin, socialism can finally win only if socialist revolutions are victorious in a number of major, advanced capitalist countries. Socialism and capitalism cannot live peacefully. War between them is inevitable. Wars between imperialist states are inevitable. Wars bring innumerable disasters to humanity.

And, hence - as soon as we become stronger than imperialism - "we will immediately grab him by the collar."

The clear, consistent, Marxist thinking of V. I. Lenin gave him the right to declare with good reason:

"We are not pacifists. We are opposed to imperialist wars over the division of spoils among the capitalists, but we have always declared it absurd if the revolutionary proletariat were to renounce revolutionary wars that might be necessary in the interests of socialism" (Vol. 23, p. 361).

"To tell us that we must wage only a defensive war, when a knife is still raised above us, when, despite our hundreds of proposals and in the face of unheard-of concessions to which we are making ... - to tell us this means to repeat ... the phrases of the petty-bourgeois. If, in front of such constantly actively hostile forces, we should take a vow, as we are offered, that we will never embark on certain actions that may turn out to be offensive in military-strategic terms, then we would not only be fools but also be criminals. That is where these pacifist phrases and resolutions lead us. They lead to the fact that they want to tie the Soviet government, surrounded by enemies, hand and foot and hand over to be torn to pieces by world capitalist predators" (vol. 31, p. 488).

The program of the CPSU proclaimed that

"The CPSU and the entire Soviet people ... consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples, their just wars of liberation against imperialism."

We will support... And how, how? Morally, financially?

We accuse the imperialists of "a one-sided, class approach to the idea of cooperation between socialist and capitalist states" (see, for example, the book *Some Problems in the Theory and Practice of Building Communism*, 1961). Curiously, what other approach would we like to see from the imperialists? Extra-class? "Public"?

The imperialists are pouring blood over the land of socialist Vietnam, and we - we get off with loud phrases ...

While proclaiming support for the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples, the Program of the CPSU, meanwhile, completely ignores Lenin's instruction that when

"we are talking about defending our alliance with the oppressed class, with the oppressed peoples," we must "remain faithful to this alliance ... This task is not easy. This task does not let us forget that under certain conditions we cannot do without a revolutionary war. the revolutionary class cannot renounce revolutionary war, because otherwise it will force itself into ridiculous pacifism... It is impossible to renounce this war."

This is exactly what the Program of the CPSU did, proclaiming the renunciation of wars in general as the fundamental principle of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The main argument of theorists and defenders of the policy of peaceful coexistence is that they believe -

"... although the nature of imperialism, its predatory essence remain unchanged, the balance of forces on the world stage has changed, the place and role of imperialism in the world economy and world politics have changed, the possibility of its influence on the course of events is decreasing. All this is forcing the imperialists to go to peaceful coexistence" (Suslov, report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 14/11 - 64, Emphasized - GM).

The balance of forces in the world arena is forcing the imperialists to go for peaceful coexistence - this is the main argument of the theoreticians and compilers of the CPSU Program in defense of the thesis that the peaceful coexistence of socialist and imperialist states is possible.

What can be said about this? It is indisputable that today is not 1924, but the year 1964. It is indisputable that the balance of forces in the world has changed, and has changed in favor of socialism. But, when speaking about the change in the balance of forces in the world, do we really have the right to forget, not to take into account the fact that in this case we are not talking about the superiority of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism, that for the time being we cannot talk about the simple equality of the economic power of socialism and capitalism? Or do we want to be in the place of those "incorrigible braggarts" about whom Khrushchev spoke at the 20th Congress of the CPSU?

According to the most recent official data (see *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1965, p. 51), in 1963 all the socialist countries accounted for about 38 percent of world industrial output. As for the military might of the camp of socialism and the camp of imperialism, in my opinion, here too, if we want to base our policy on a real base, we have no right to forget that, despite the falling away from the imperialist camp of a number of European and Asian countries, with the advent of nuclear weapons and modern means of delivering these weapons to the target, the purely military capabilities of imperialism have not diminished.

It seems clear to me that as soon as we recognize that the nature of imperialism, its predatory essence, has not changed, just as soon we must recognize that we cannot force imperialism, which is not inferior to us in strength, to cease to be imperialism.

Moreover, From the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, even the complete superiority - economic and military - of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism does not at all mean that in this case a war between them can be prevented without first overthrowing the power of capital in the main imperialist states.

This is not fatalism, not Hegelianism. War is not an eternal and necessary element in the development of human society. According to the Program of the CPSU, -

"With the destruction of imperialism, there will be no source of wars on earth."

V. I. Lenin never harbored illusions that the superior forces of socialism would by themselves compel or could compel the imperialist states to calmly watch their system crumbling. I have repeatedly quoted Lenin's words that

"we live not only in a state, but also in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic next to the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable."

In the words of V.I. Lenin there is not even a hint that the military superiority of the forces of socialism over the forces of capitalism (which Lenin, being a great Marxist dialectician, undoubtedly had in mind when considering the period of "the existence of the Soviet Republic next to the imperialist states") is capable of forcing capitalism to surrender its class positions.

Fear of the power of nuclear weapons, consciousness of the superiority of the forces of socialism, "consciousness of one's responsibility for the fate of mankind," etc. - cannot force the capitalist class and its governments, "against their wishes", to follow the principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence, as long as and insofar as the nature of imperialism remains imperialist in the Marxist-Leninist sense of the word.

Speaking about the complete and final victory of socialism in our country, V. I. Lenin directly and categorically taught that

"We have known all along and will not forget that our cause is an international cause, and until a coup is carried out in all states, including the most advanced, rich, and civilized, until then our victory is only half a victory or perhaps less ... We know that they will have negligible chances, we also know that our military forces will be stronger and more powerful

than any other power, but with all this, the danger has not disappeared, it exists and will exist until the world revolution wins" (vol. 31, p. 371. Emphasized by me - GM).

Unfortunately, I don't remember exactly, but it seems to me that at the 22nd Congress, speaking to the delegates of the Congress with the substantiation of the thesis about the objective necessity for the imperialists to follow the principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev drew socialism in the form of an elephant, and imperialism - a tiger, and said, something like, since the elephant is stronger than the tiger, the latter, despite the fact that he is a strong and bloodthirsty predator, never risks attacking the elephant, "realizing" that the elephant is stronger.

Let's try and follow this allegory. Does a tiger really never attack an elephant, or do such cases happen? There are, and people know them. And they happen when a hungry tiger does not find a victim to satisfy the feeling of hunger. In addition, every person knows very well how every living being fights for life to the very last strength, how madly it resists any attempts to deprive him of life or the usual conditions of existence.

If the goal of the "socialist elephant" is to "peacefully" devour the "imperialist tiger" and the elephant does not hide this intention, and the tiger understands its seriousness, would it not be more logical to assume that the tiger will protect its life from such "peaceful" aspirations of the elephant?

Of course, you can compose such a fairy tale. It already happened, children, that on a planet called Earth, a pretty peaceful and herbivorous elephant and a predatory bloodthirsty tiger were forced to live side by side. True, children, when this elephant was still small, boasted that when he grew up big and strong, he would destroy the tiger that ate the poor goats and antelopes. But this is a saying, a fairy tale is ahead.

And then the day came when the peace-loving elephant called the bloodthirsty tiger to him and announced to him: "Listen to the tiger, you are too bloodthirsty. There are many forests and meadows on the earth, and there is enough plant food for all of us." The tiger growled:

"What are you talking about, elephant! I am a tiger, not a cow. I will die of hunger if I don't eat meat! But then you yourself said that soon all the goats and antelopes will gather their strength and trample me. What do you want me to do - sit and wait for this moment? No, I won't.

The elephant got angry, trumpeted: "Oh, you are so-and-so! Don't listen to me, the elephant?! But do you know that if there is a war, then I, the elephant tail between legs), for sure I will defeat you?! You know? So I'll tell you this: I'm not some bloodthirsty beast, and I won't go to war with you, although I'm stronger than you. I offer you peaceful coexistence. It's profitable for both of us - you will eat meat for some time, and I will raise those goats and antelopes who, when they grow up and gain strength, will pull out only your claws and teeth, but will not physically destroy you.

The tiger thought: "What to do? Go to the elephant with the war? It's scary and dangerous." And the tiger answered: "Okay, elephant, I agree to peaceful coexistence - let your baby elephants, goats and antelopes grow, I will not touch them. I will only eat from my herd."

The elephant was delighted that he outwitted the stupid bloodthirsty tiger. And the elephants, goats and antelopes grew up, attacked the tiger, and trampled him to death. And a nice peace-loving elephant stood aside and rejoiced.

This is how, children, communism was established on planet Earth.

Only and everything. As V. I. Lenin said,

"All kinds of transformations are possible, even a fool into a smart one, but such a transformation is rarely real.

Does all of the above about the problem of the so-called peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, mean that Marxism-Leninism cannot imagine the course of the historical development of human society without such social phenomena as war?

No, it doesn't. War can not only be prevented, but completely destroyed. And it is precisely in this that there is a complete unity of views between V. I. Lenin and the Program of the CPSU.

The program of the CPSU, following Lenin, repeats that

"With the destruction of imperialism, there will be no source of wars on earth."

Only. Further, there are no points of contact between V. I. Lenin and the Program of the CPSU.

The theoreticians and drafters of the Program of the CPSU assert that war can be prevented by forcing the "ruling circles" of the imperialist states to agree to renounce war, to take into account the class interests of socialism, and to renounce imperialist policy in general. The theoreticians and compilers of the Program of the CPSU believe that the superiority of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism is forcing the governments of the imperialist countries, contrary to their wishes, to agree to this class capitulation out of a sense of fear of imminent defeat in a possible war, out of a sense of awareness of their responsibility for the fate of all mankind, finally, under pressure from the progressive public of their countries, not interested in the war, etc. etc.

The program of the CPSU builds its provisions on the assumption that, having succeeded in achieving the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence, having succeeded in concluding an agreement with imperialism on the renunciation of war, on disarmament, we will devote all our forces and means to the speedy solution of our great international task - building a communist society, this undeniable and irresistible for all revolutionary example.

And then, when we achieve this, when we provide the Soviet people with a standard of living unattainable for capitalism, then, according to the theoreticians of the CPSU Program, in all capitalist countries, including the most advanced and developed, socialist revolutions, imperialism will break out, will be destroyed and the very source of wars on earth will be destroyed.

The program of the CPSU builds a theory of the destruction of capitalism on earth as the very source of wars, counting on the "prudence" of the imperialists, completely ignoring Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which teaches that the concept of "prudence" is a class concept and that what is prudent for us is not at all must necessarily be reasonable for the capitalists. This oblivion of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, this "theoretical carelessness" leads to the fact that the calculations of the Program of the CPSU turn out to be built on sand; it turns out that in the end they assume not the prudence of the imperialists, but their stupidity.

The prudence of the imperialists, their class prudence, tells them that it is not in their interest to allow socialism to develop and expand freely, for socialism is their gravedigger. And the imperialists have done, are doing and will do everything in their power to become the gravediggers of their own gravedigger, not neglecting any, the most extreme means to achieve this goal.

And the events in the world of recent years (Congo, Panama, the Dominican Republic, North Vietnam, Cuba, etc.) only confirm that the imperialists are prudent in their own way and have no illusions about the idea of peaceful coexistence. And if one takes a Marxist-Leninist, class point of view, in my opinion, it would be simply stupid to reproach the imperialists for the fact that, despite our appeals and peace-loving proposals, they nevertheless pursue a prudent, from their class point of view, imperialist policy, not any other policy.

The Marxist-Leninist posing of the question of combating war, of preventing war has nothing in common with the posing of this question by the Program of the CPSU.

Here are the Leninist, concrete ways and means of achieving this most noble goal - the deliverance of mankind from wars:

"All efforts should be directed towards using the mood of the masses in favor of peace. But how to use it?

Recognizing the slogan of peace and repeating it ... would be deceiving the people with the illusion that the present governments, the present commanding classes are capable,

without "teaching" (or, more correctly, eliminating) them, a series of revolutions for a world that in any way satisfies democracy and the working class. class ... There is nothing more harmful than this deception. There is nothing more clouding the eyes of the workers, suggesting to them the deceptive idea of the superficial contradiction between capitalism and socialism, nothing more embellishing capitalist slavery. No, we must use the mood of the masses in favor of peace to explain to the masses that the blessings they expect from the world are impossible without a series of revolutions. The end of wars, peace among peoples...-precisely our ideal, but only bourgeois sophists can deceive the masses by tearing this ideal away from the immediate, direct preaching of the revolution.

"One of the forms of fooling the working class is pacifism and the abstract preaching of peace. Under capitalism, and especially in its imperialist stage, wars are inevitable. Peace propaganda at the present time, not accompanied by a call for revolutionary action by the masses, can only sow illusions, corrupt the proletariat by instilling confidence in the humanity of the bourgeoisie" ("Pacifism and the slogan of peace").

"Unrelated to the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat, the struggle for peace is only a pacifist phrase... We cannot and must not assume the pose of "statesmen" and draw up "concrete" peace programs. On the contrary, we must explain to the masses the deceitfulness of any hopes for a democratic a world without the development of revolutionary class struggle... The masses must not be lulled by the hope of peace without the overthrow of capitalism" ("To the International Socialist Commission").

"Wars are rooted in the very essence of capitalism; they will cease only when the capitalist system ceases to exist, or when the enormity of the human and financial losses caused by military-technical development, and the popular indignation caused by armaments, will lead to the elimination of this system" ("Militant militarism") .

"The war cannot be ended "at will". It cannot be ended by the decision of one side ... The war cannot be ended by the "agreement" of the socialists of different countries, the "action" of the proletarians of different countries, the "will" of the peoples - etc. - all phrases of this kind ... - nothing but the empty, naive, kind wishes of the petty bourgeois. There is nothing more harmful than these phrases ... It is impossible to achieve peace without the overthrow of the power of capital, without the transfer of state power to another class, to the proletariat (" Tasks of the proletariat in our revolution.")

"Every party who wants to belong to the Third International is obliged to expose not only frank social patriotism, but also the falsity and hypocrisy of social pacifism: to systematically prove to the workers that without the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, there will be no international arbitration courts, no talk about reducing armaments, no" democratic "reorganization of the League of Peoples will save mankind from new imperialist wars" ("On the conditions for admission to the Comintern").

"The socialist, revolutionary proletarian, internationalist argues differently: ... my task, the task of the representative of the revolutionary proletariat, is to prepare the world proletarian revolution as the only salvation from the horrors of the world war" ("The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky").

In these statements of V. I. Lenin, an integral Marxist formulation of the question of the fight against war is given. What does Lenin teach?

- 1) To the fact that without a revolutionary overthrow of the power of capital there can be no question of the possibility of preventing new wars;
- 2) that "outside of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat, the struggle for peace is only a pacifist phrase";
- 3) the fact that the slogans of peace without revolutionary propaganda, references to the possibility of an agreement with the

imperialists, to the action of the proletarians of all countries, to the will of the peoples, etc. – *(are)* empty, naïve wishes;

4) the fact that there is nothing more harmful than these phrases and wishes, since they inspire the masses with "a deceptive idea of a shallow contradiction between capitalism and socialism", sow illusions, corrupt the proletariat by instilling confidence in the humanity of the bourgeoisie - that is, the fact that objectively all these naïve phrases and wishes ultimately lead the proletariat away from the revolutionary struggle towards the reformist struggle and, consequently, objectively help not to prevent war, but to bring it closer.

According to VI Lenin, THE ONLY MEANS OF SAVING HUMANITY FROM NEW WARS IS THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, THE REVOLUTIONARY OVERTHROW OF THE POWER OF CAPITAL.

According to the Program of the CPSU, humanity can be saved from new wars without overthrowing the power of capital, by pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, which amounts to an agreement with the imperialists to renounce war.

Does the call mean "to curb the warmongers", "raise the sacred wrath of the peoples against those who are obsessed with crazy ideas of war and militarism", etc. slogans Lenin's call for a revolutionary overthrow of the power of capital? No, it doesn't.

Does the statement that "when the adherents of a more or less moderate policy prevail under the pressure of the masses, international tension is defused" mean Lenin's call for a revolutionary struggle against imperialism? No, it doesn't.

Does the statement that "we are convinced that the revolutionary struggle of the working people, the general democratic upsurge, the growing might of socialism ... can and must force the imperialists, against their wishes, to reckon with the demand of the peoples for disarmament" mean Lenin's call for revolutionary struggle? against imperialism? No, it doesn't.

Does the assertion of the Program of the CPSU mean that the policy of peaceful coexistence meets the vital interests of all mankind, with the exception of "big monopolies and the military," does it mean Lenin's call for a revolutionary struggle against imperialism? No, it doesn't.

All these statements, assertions and positions objectively mean one thing, namely: the substitution of Lenin's call for a revolutionary struggle for peace, which "without a series of revolutions is a petty-bourgeois utopia", a call for a "revolutionary struggle" against individual "immoderate" representatives of imperialism, which suits the imperialist class perfectly.

Speaking at the February Plenum on February 14, 1964, M. A. Suslov said:

"It is absurd to oppose the struggle for peace, for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, to the revolutionary class struggle of the working class ... For Marxist-Leninists, there is no and cannot be a dilemma; either the struggle for peace, or the revolutionary struggle. Both struggles are interconnected and ultimately directed against imperialism."

Doesn't the very formulation of this question reveal the fundamental difference between Lenin's directives on the struggle for peace and the position of the theoreticians and defenders of the policy of peaceful coexistence? In my opinion, it is revealed, because only by separating the revolutionary struggle - the struggle to overthrow the power of capital - from the struggle for peace, it is possible to assert, as Suslov does, that both struggles are interconnected and, in the final analysis, directed against imperialism.

This is not a Leninist posing of the question. For V. I. Lenin, there was not and cannot be a genuine, real struggle for peace without a struggle to overthrow the power of capital.

In connection with all of the above, in this section, the attitude of V. I. Lenin to the contemporary movement of supporters of peace is of particular interest. This attitude is most clearly expressed in his article

"Notes on the Question of the Tasks of Our Delegation in The Hague," an article that has been completely forgotten today. And this article is worth quoting in full:

"On the question of combating the danger of war in connection with the conference at The Hague, I think that the greatest difficulty is to overcome the prejudice that this question is clear, simple, and comparatively easy.

Let us answer the war with a strike or a revolution—that is what all the leaders of the reformists usually say to the working class. And very often the seeming radicalness of these answers satisfies and reassures the workers and peasants.

Perhaps the most correct method would be to begin with the sharpest refutation of such an opinion: to declare that, especially now, after the recent war, only the most stupid and hopelessly deceitful people can assure that such an answer to the question of combating the war where anything is suitable. To declare that it is impossible to "respond" to the war with a strike, just as it is impossible to "respond" to the war with a revolution in the simplest and literal sense of these expressions.

It is necessary to explain to people the real situation of how great is the mystery in which the war is born, and how helpless the ordinary organization of workers, although it calls itself revolutionary, in the face of a really impending war.

It is desirable... to show with special concreteness that the theoretical recognition that war is criminal, that war is unacceptable for a socialist, etc., turns out to be empty words, because there is no concreteness in such a formulation of the question.

... Perhaps the most important means of attracting the masses to war are precisely those sophisms with which the bourgeois press operates, and the most important circumstance explaining our impotence against war is that we either do not

analyze these sophisms in advance, or, even more , we get off in relation to them with a cheap, boastful, and completely empty phrase that we will not allow war, that we fully understand the criminality of war, etc. ...

It seems to me that if we have several people at the Hague Conference who are able to ... make a speech against war, then the most important thing (Sub. - GM) will be to refute the opinion that those present are opponents of war, that they understand how war may and must attack them at the most unexpected moment, as if they were somehow aware of the method of struggle against the war, as if they were in a position to take a reasonable and attainable path in the struggle against war ...

I think that this question should be explained with unusual detail and explained in two ways. Firstly, by telling and analyzing what happened during the previous war, and declaring to all those present that they do not know this or that they pretend to know it, in fact they turn a blind eye to what the crux of the matter is, without knowing which there can be no talk of any struggle against war. Secondly, we must take examples of present-day conflicts, even the most insignificant ones, and explain by their example how war can break out every day...

On the question of fighting the war, I remember that there are a number of statements by our Communist deputies, both in parliaments and in speeches outside parliament, statements of this kind, which contain monstrously wrong and monstrously frivolous things about fighting the war. I think that such statements ... must be opposed with all resoluteness and mercilessly naming each such speaker. You can soften as you like, especially, if necessary, your opinion about such a speaker, but you cannot pass over in silence a single such case, because a frivolous attitude to this issue is such an evil, the second (*the main Ed*) outweighs everything else and to which it is absolutely impossible to be indulgent.

There are people who say that such an attitude of Lenin and the movement of supporters of peace was explained by the concrete historical situation of his day - that it was a question of the era of the undivided rule of imperialism on earth, when socialism was still very weak; when a small peace movement was the privilege of Western European Social Democracy, and when, finally, the war itself did not threaten mankind with such grave disasters as now.

It is argued that today, when humanity has realized what disastrous consequences a new world war would lead to for it, when, therefore, a multi-million army of peace supporters in all countries has risen under the banner of peace, and when this army has the opportunity to rely on such a material force as the might of a united socialist camps - imperialist governments can be forced to renounce war.

Quite a lot has been said about this.

But what do the theoreticians and defenders of the Program of the CPSU say about the contemporary peace movement? They say (see, for example, Suslov's report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on April 14, 1964) that the modern peace movement does not and cannot set itself the specific revolutionary tasks of fighting the war, because it has a "general democratic character."

And what does this mean? In a Leninist way, and I am convinced that V.I. Lenin was fully and completely right in his attitude towards the so-called "general democratic" peace movement, this means that the present peace movement, in essence, is engaged only in clouding the consciousness of the working people with hopes for the possibility of a lasting peace without overthrowing the power of capital, diverting the forces of the people from the revolutionary struggle to the reformist struggle, from struggle against imperialism as such, to fight against its individual representatives - that is, it is engaged not in preventing war, but in bringing it closer.

That is why V. I. Lenin believed that such an "occupation",

"there is an evil that outweighs everything else."

Among bourgeois pacifists, the "theory" was widely spread, which was very clearly and briefly stated by the President of India Radhakrishnan at the meeting of Soviet-Indian friendship on 18/IX-1964:

"The destructive nature of nuclear weapons, which have now become part of the military equipment of the armed forces, is in itself a factor preventing war. We came to the very edge of the abyss, but then we retreated. Why did this happen? Because we realized how destructive of nature is nuclear weapons. We realized that if they were used, no one would be left on earth, and humanity would perish completely and irrevocably."

Is it necessary to repeat that such theories have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism? Answering people who claim that in the event of a nuclear war, all of humanity will perish, perish "finally and irrevocably", Mao Zedong once said:

"If we fight, then atomic and hydrogen weapons will be used. I personally think that there will be such suffering in the whole world when half of humanity will die, perhaps more than half. I argued with Nehru on this issue pessimistically. I told him that if half of humanity is destroyed, then half will remain, but imperialism will be completely destroyed and there will be only socialism in the whole world, and in half a century or a whole century the population will grow again, even more than half " (cited in Pravda dated 21/IX-1963).

Around this statement of Mao Zedong, an unhealthy hype was raised, in my opinion. We "remembered" this statement, made back in 1957, in order to assert that since the

"Chinese leaders argue that half or one hundred percent of humanity will be destroyed in the fire of a new war", then according to them "it turns out that it is possible to risk war, since a "beautiful future" awaits the other half" (Statement of the Soviet Government of 21/IX-63).

This statement is a clear overstatement. We ourselves gave the words of Mao Zedong a monstrous meaning that was not characteristic of them, while they are directed against the anti-Marxist views of bourgeois pacifists who see "the end of the world" in a possible thermonuclear war.

From the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, we must, if we are Marxists, not ignore statements like the one made by Radhakrishnan - we must immediately refute them, as Mao Zedong did. If we are Marxist-revolutionaries, we must immediately refute such views, for they inexorably lead to propaganda of the slogan "peace at all costs", to the policy of class cooperation, class reconciliation of states with different social systems. If we are Marxists, we, as V. I. Lenin taught us, "must not allow ourselves to be intimidated by war ... crush our thoughts with the horror of war." They are speaking:

"If the imperialist aggressors nevertheless dare to unleash a new world war, the peoples ... will sweep away and bury imperialism" (Program of the CPSU).

"If the imperialist madmen unleash a world war, then capitalism will be swept away and buried" (Suslov. Report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 14/11-64).

"If the enemies unleash a war, our hand will not tremble to use all our capabilities, all our military might in order to defeat the enemy with a retaliatory strike" (Khrushchev. Speech at a meeting of Soviet-German friendship on 13 / VI-64).

The question is, are in fact all these statements of ours in any way contrary to the statement of Mao Zedong? Do they have any other meaning? Don't we also assume that if the imperialists unleash a new world war, it will bring enormous destruction and sacrifice to all peoples and countries, especially small ones? Do we, declaring that in the event of war, the peoples will sweep away and bury imperialism, do we not proceed from the fact that, despite all the horrors and destruction of a possible thermonuclear war, socialism will triumph on earth, i.e. great future of mankind?

And Mao Tse-dong, and, this time, we, have not forgotten V. I. Lenin's instructions that

no matter what the destruction of culture may be, it cannot be expunged from historical life, it will be difficult to renew it, but no destruction will ever bring this culture to disappear completely. In this or that part of it, in this or that material remains, this culture is ineradicable, the only difficulties will be in its renewal" (vol. 27, pp. 104-105).

The modern peace movement seems to me to be assembled on a very shaky and unreliable basis - on the basis of liberal-bourgeois humanism and pacifism. And only one factor unites it - the fear of the huge destructive power of nuclear weapons.

Of course, nuclear weapons are terrible weapons, "inhuman" weapons. But are there any humane weapons at all? Is there a guarantee that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow a new, no less effective, but more "humane" weapon will not appear? Something like the notorious American "sleep" bomb? Is there a guarantee that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow there will be no weapons that, without causing any harm to human health, will allow us to seize other people's territories and enslave peoples without bloodshed? There is no such guarantee and cannot be because the possibilities of the human mind are unlimited.

And I have no doubt that if such a weapon appears tomorrow, the entire modern movement of peace supporters will quickly fall apart, since what unites it - nuclear weapons - will disappear.

Did V. I. Lenin foresee the appearance in the future of weapons of enormous destructive power? Undoubtedly, for he was a great dialectic Marxist. And, in my opinion, it was precisely such a weapon that Lenin had in mind when he wrote that:

"Wars are rooted in the very essence of capitalism; they will stop only when the capitalist system ceases to exist, or when the enormity of the human and financial losses caused by military-technical development, and the popular indignation

caused by armaments, will lead to the elimination of this system" ("Militant militarism").

V. I. Lenin pointed out:

"Conferences with the so-called programs of "actions" up to now have been reduced only to the fact that they proclaimed with more or less completeness the program of simple pacifism. Marxism is not pacifism. It is necessary to fight for the speedy prevention of war. But only when calling for a revolutionary struggle is the requirement, "world" takes on a proletarian character. Without a series of revolutions... the world is a petty-bourgeois utopia. The only real program of action would be a Marxist program that gives the masses a complete and clear answer to what has happened, explaining what imperialism is and how to fight it.. Only such a program, which would show that we believe in ourselves, we believe in Marxism ... would ensure us sooner or later the sympathy of the genuine proletarian masses" ("Socialism and War").

I would like to end this section with a reminder of what, according to V.I. Lenin, was and is the very crux of the issue of combating war:

"The crux of the question of pacifism ... the idea that war is not connected with capitalism is not a continuation of the politics of peacetime.

This is theoretical falsehood, practical-bypassing the social revolution "(Letter to I. Armand).

The modern peace movement, which bears a "general democratic" character and does not set itself the task of fighting capitalism, has thrown away, like unnecessary, rusty rubbish, the Leninist nail of the fight against the war and, consequently, is objectively an accomplice of imperialism in its striving to circumvent the socialist revolution.

The program of the CPSU and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the socialist revolution

The next big and, perhaps, the most important and most difficult question to dwell on when analyzing the Program of the CPSU - this is the complete expression of the "theoretical carelessness" of Khrushchev and his like-minded people - this is the question of the socialist revolution, that is, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of forms of transition of various countries to socialism.

Strictly speaking, the question of the revolution has long been resolved by the classics of Marxism-Leninism and backed up by the experience of the historical development of society. And it would not be worthwhile to turn to it again if this question did not arise before us in connection with the new Program of the CPSU and with those disagreements on it that have been revealed with such sharpness in the world communist movement.

This issue is also very important from the point of view of preventing a world thermonuclear war.

In the previous sections of the letter, I have already said that the new Program of the CPSU asserts that under the present concrete historical conditions it is not at all necessary, as Lenin taught, to get rid of wars, to overthrow capitalism - it can be forced into an agreement on the renunciation of war.

Of course, the Program of the CPSU does not directly reject the revolution as a means of preventing wars, but it considers revolution not the only means for this, as Lenin taught, but one of the means of preventing war, which cannot be resorted to now, since there are no appropriate methods for this in the developed capitalist countries. conditions.

To the best of my ability and capacity, I tried to understand the reality and feasibility of one of the means (according to the Program of the CPSU) to prevent a new world war - the policy of peaceful coexistence - and came to the conclusion that such an idea not only fundamentally contradicts Marxism-Leninism, but also objectively serves not preventing war, but bringing it closer.

As regards the problem of the socialist revolution, the Program of the CPSU interprets the revolution as follows:

“In the new historical situation, the working class of many countries, even before the overthrow of capitalism, can impose on the bourgeoisie the implementation of such measures, which, going beyond the framework of ordinary reforms, are of vital importance both for the working class and for the majority of the nation. By uniting broad sections of the working people, the working class can force the ruling circles to stop preparing a new war, to use the economy for peaceful purposes, can beat off the offensive of fascist reaction, achieve a national peace program, national independence, democratic rights, and a certain improvement in the living conditions of the people.

The working class directs its main blow against the capitalist monopolies. All the main strata of the nation are vitally interested in the elimination of the omnipotence of the monopolies.

This makes it possible to unite all democratic movements that oppose the oppression of the financial oligarchy into one powerful anti-monopoly stream.

The proletariat advances a program of struggle against the omnipotence of the monopolies, taking into account not only today's but also tomorrow's interests of its allies. It stands for broad nationalization on terms most advantageous to the people, for the control of parliament, trade unions and other democratic and representative organizations over the nationalized sectors, over the entire economic activity of the state.

It supports the demands of the peasantry for radical agrarian reforms.

The proletariat, together with other sections of the people, is waging a resolute struggle for broad democracy... In this struggle, the alliance of the working class with all working people is forged...

The proletarian revolution in each country, being a part of the world socialist revolution, is carried out by the working class, the masses of the people of that country. Revolution does not come by order. It cannot be imposed on the people from outside. It arises as a result of the profound internal and international contradictions of capitalism...

The working class and its vanguard, the Marxist-Leninist parties, prefer to carry out the transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the proletariat by peaceful means, without civil war. Relying on the majority of the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements, unable to renounce the policy of conciliation with the landlords and capitalists, the working class has the opportunity to defeat the reactionary anti-popular forces, to win a solid majority in parliament, to turn it from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument, serving the working people, develop an extra-parliamentary broad mass struggle, break the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for the peaceful implementation of the socialist revolution. All this will be possible only through a broad, continuous development of the class struggle of the workers,

In conditions where the exploiting classes resort to violence against the peoples, it is necessary to bear in mind the possibility of a non-peaceful transition to socialism. Leninism teaches, and historical experience confirms, that the ruling classes do not voluntarily yield to power. The degree of bitterness and the form of the class struggle under these conditions will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the strength of the resistance of the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the use of violence by these circles at one stage or another of the struggle for socialism" (pp. 38, 40 - 41) .

Here is the entire section of the Program of the CPSU devoted to the question under consideration. And it seems to me that if we look a little more closely at the order of presenting the material on this question given by the Program, we will pay attention to the fact that

the Program of the CPSU itself divides this section, as it were, into three parts.

In the first part of this section, the Program of the CPSU assures us that peace, national independence, the use of the economy for peaceful purposes, the expansion of democratic rights, and a "known" further improvement in living conditions in many capitalist countries can be achieved without overthrowing the power of capital, but only by fighting with his omnipotence.

In the second part of the section, the Program of the CPSU assures us that if we are to speak of a revolution, we should first of all speak of a peaceful revolution, for which all the conditions are ripe in many capitalist countries, of a revolution by parliamentary means, by "democratic" means, without civil war.

And, finally, in the third part of its section devoted to the question of the socialist revolution, the Program of the CPSU very briefly, as if in passing, says that we have in mind the "possibility" of a non-peaceful transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class.

Here again one cannot fail to recall Khrushchev's statement that the Soviet people are still living worse than the workers of the developed capitalist countries, even worse than they lived before the revolution. Let us recall the thesis of the Program of the CPSU about the revolutionary influence of example on the course of the world revolutionary process, let us recall Khrushchev's statements that peaceful economic competition also benefits the working people of the capitalist countries, forcing the ruling classes to make concessions in the field of raising the material standard of living of the working people - let us recall all these and statements and statements similar to them, and compare them with the statement of the Program of the CPSU that the working class of many capitalist countries, the working class, which, in our own words, lives better than we, can, without overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, through a general democratic struggle for "unusual reforms"

What is the outcome of this comparison? And it turns out that you cannot hurry with the revolution. Why is that? Why rise up for a

revolution, and even, God forbid, shed your blood in it, if for the time being socialism does not give the worker those material benefits that he achieved under capitalism, if he can achieve a further improvement in his position by democratic struggle for the usual ordinary and unusual reforms?

Refrain from revolution, fight for "unusual" reforms, do not shed your blood in vain - wait until communism wins in the Soviet Union and for all working people, including the petty bourgeoisie (or, as the Program of the CPSU says, the middle urban strata), it becomes clear that communism is good, it's better than capitalism. When this becomes clear to the working people, that is, to the overwhelming majority of the nation, as the Program of the CPSU states, then, undoubtedly, the communist and workers' parties will have every opportunity to obtain a lasting majority in parliament, for a peaceful and relatively painless transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class. .

Such is the formulation of the question of the socialist revolution given by the Program of the CPSU.

It is said that there is nothing anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist in such a formulation of the question, because Marxism-Leninism did not and does not connect the onset of the revolution with any specific date, that, as the Program of the CPSU correctly says, "revolution does not come to order", "that it cannot be imposed from outside" that "it arises as a result of deep internal and external contradictions of imperialism".

It is said that there is nothing anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist in the very call to "wait for our example", because, firstly, this expectation does not mean that passive waiting is obligatory, and, secondly, it will allow, after some time, when the appropriate conditions for this will come, to realize world revolution peaceful, i.e. the most acceptable way for the peoples.

I agree that Marxism-Leninism does not tie the onset of the revolution to any specific date, I agree that there is nothing anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist in the desire to carry out the revolution in a peaceful way, without civil war. But one cannot help but dwell on the very

possibility of a PEACEFUL implementation socialist revolution and on the paths propagated for this by the Program of the CPSU.

We affirm that in the new historical situation the possibilities for a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism have increased.

All supporters and defenders of this assertion remember and write that Marx, Engels and Lenin admitted the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. But for some reason they forget about those specific conditions under which, in each specific country, the classics of Marxism-Leninism allowed for this very possibility. It seems to me that there is no need to refer to quotations in order to show that under these specific conditions the classics of Marxism-Leninism understood the absence of militarism and bureaucratization of state power in any given country.

In the presence of militarism and bureaucratization of the state apparatus in a given country, according to Marx, Engels, Lenin, there can be no question of the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. V. I. Lenin posed this question without any appeal:

"In that particular situation, which throughout the world, and most of all in the most advanced, powerful countries ... has been created by militarism, imperialism ... any assumption of the thought of a peaceful, reformist transition to socialism, of the peaceful subordination of capitalists to the will of the majority, is not only extreme petty-bourgeois stupidity, but also a direct deception of the workers, embellishment of wage capitalist slavery, concealment of the truth" (Theses on the main tasks of the Second Congress of the Comintern).

In connection with the question of the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, I cannot fail to mention a large article in the journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism" (PTG 8, 1964) by member of the Politburo of the CEPT Central Committee K. Hager, in which, in my opinion, with the greatest all the arguments of supporters and

defenders of the thesis of a peaceful transition are fully disclosed. K. Hager writes:

"With whatever sense of responsibility the communists may prepare themselves and the working class for the non-peaceful path as a possible necessity, nevertheless now, more than ever before, they are looking for every opportunity to follow the peaceful path of the revolution, since today for there exist incomparably more favorable conditions than before (especially in the developed capitalist countries).

Absolutely the opposite of Lenin! K. Hager writes:

"Even Marx and Engels were supporters of the peaceful path of the revolution wherever it was possible. Even in the "Principles of Communism" (1847), F. Engels, to the question of whether it is possible to eliminate private ownership of the means of production by peaceful means, unequivocally answered: "It is possible one would wish it to be so, and the Communists, of course, would be the last to object to this.

And here is how V. I. Lenin assessed these same words of Engels:

"Engels is careful enough not to tie his hands. He admits that in countries with a republic or with very great freedom one can imagine (only "imagine"!) peaceful development to socialism..." (State and Revolution).

How magnificent is this Leninist remark - just "imagine", isn't it?

K. Hager, defending the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, like all supporters of this thesis, by the way, tries to rely on historical experience. And he does it very awkwardly:

"Wherever possible, the communists have always tried to follow the peaceful path of the revolution or have followed it. It is known that the revolutionary seizure of power by the Paris Communards was carried out peacefully, almost without a single drop of blood. Not a single bourgeois revolution can boast of the fact that so few human casualties

were brought to it, as was the case when the Bolsheviks took power in the October days of 1917. A similar situation occurred at the beginning of the proletarian revolution in Hungary in 1919. But in all these cases, the bourgeoisie responded with armed resistance and white terror only after that, and with full right, did the proletariat use all means to protect and secure the revolution and continue it further.

Blimey! This is "revolutionary"! - only after the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie tries to kill the revolution by armed force and terror, only after that does the proletariat, it turns out, have the right to respond to it in kind. And here is what V. I. Lenin said:

"Great revolutions, even when they began peacefully ... ended in furious wars, which were opened by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. It cannot be otherwise, if you look at this question from the point of view of the class struggle, and not that petty-bourgeois phrase-mongering about freedom, equality, labor democracy and the will of the majority... There can be no peaceful development towards socialism."

As evidence of the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class, Comrade K. Hager, like all other supporters of a peaceful revolution, by the way, refers to the example of the countries of people's democracy. He's writing:

"Today, on the basis of the new alignment of forces in the world, the possibilities for a peaceful solution of political and social contradictions on a national and international scale have increased incomparably. This is already evidenced by the peaceful course of the development of the socialist revolution in a number of European countries of people's democracy."

The question is whether it is appropriate for Marxist-Leninists to resort to this kind of "evidence" because someone else, and they should have been well aware that the revolution in the European countries of people's democracy at the beginning of its occurrence had

a national liberation anti-fascist character, and when the transition from that to the socialist revolution directly and indirectly relied on the armed forces of the Soviet army.

History has given us no examples of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. On the other hand, she gave us many new examples confirming the correctness of Lenin's words.

The main argument of the theoreticians and defenders of the thesis of the Program of the CPSU about the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power from the bourgeoisie to the working class is the same that they also use to prove the possibility of peaceful coexistence of states with opposite social systems - a new historical situation, only here we are not talking about external, as in the theory of peaceful coexistence, but on the internal historical situation.

Let us recall once again that historical situation, in the analysis of which V. I. Lenin at one time categorically rejected the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class - militarism, the bureaucratization of state power, the state apparatus, or, in short, imperialism, unthinkable without militarism, without turning the state apparatus "into an office for managing the affairs of monopolies."

Does this situation still exist or has it really changed? And if it has changed, in what direction?

Here is the evidence of the CPSU Program itself.

"State-monopoly capitalism combines the power of the monopolies with the power of the state into a single mechanism for the purpose of enriching the monopolies, suppressing the labor movement...salvation of the capitalist system State-monopoly capitalism strengthens militarism in an unheard of way. The imperialist states maintain huge armed forces in peacetime...

Imperialist states are turning into militaristic, military-police states: militarization permeates the life of bourgeois society. ... The financial oligarchy is resorting to the establishment of a fascist regime, relying on the army, police, gendarmerie as

the last anchor of salvation from the wrath of the people ...
"(Program of the CPSU, pp. 25 - 35. Subm. - GM).

The program of the CPSU seeks to convince us that the militarization and bureaucratization of bourgeois social life has increased in an unheard of way, and at the same time it advocates a peaceful transition of power.

Doesn't something fit, ends don't match in the Program of the CPSU.

Yes, indeed, the situation has changed significantly compared to the one that was under V. I. Lenin. And it has changed not in the direction of increasing the possibility of a peaceful revolution, but on the contrary, in the direction of an even sharper DECREASE in such a possibility. And as soon as this is so, and that it is so, we are convinced by the Program of the CPSU itself, V. I. Lenin's indication that

"... a socialist or anarchist who has not gone mad, or whatever you want to call it, cannot decide to say before any meeting that socialism can be reached without a civil war. You can review the entire literature of all the somewhat responsible socialist parties, factions, and groups, and you will not find such an absurdity that someday socialism can come otherwise than through a civil war and that the landowners and capitalists will voluntarily cede their privileges. This is naivety bordering on stupidity "(The final word on the fight against hunger at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Moscow Council and trade unions).

Perhaps, under the new historical situation, the theorists, and defenders of the CPSU Program do not mean the Leninist conditions for the possibility of a peaceful revolution, but, as the Program says, "the successes of the USSR and the entire world socialist system, the deepening crisis of world capitalism, the growth of the influence of communist parties, the ideological collapse of reformism "?

If this is so, then, in my opinion, these circumstances do not in the least diminish the role and significance of the Leninist conditions for the possibility of effecting a peaceful transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class. Vice versa. The

deepening crisis of world capitalism, the growing influence of the communist parties on the masses, the ideological collapse of reformism, TOGETHER with the growth of militarization and bureaucratization, TOGETHER with the growth of reaction along all lines - in the Marxist, in the Leninist way - INEVITABLY leads to an even sharper and fiercer class struggle, to complete impossibility of a peaceful transition of power.

The question is curious - how does the Program of the CPSU imagine the peaceful revolution itself? How will it happen?

"By relying on the majority of the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements who are unable to renounce the policy of conciliation with the landowners and capitalists, the working class has the opportunity to defeat the reactionary forces, win a solid majority in parliament, turn it from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument of serving the working people, develop an extra-parliamentary broad mass struggle, break the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for the peaceful implementation of the socialist revolution.

The program of the CPSU explains that

"All this will be possible only through a broad, uninterrupted development of the class struggle of the workers, peasant masses, and middle urban strata against big monopoly capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms, for peace and socialism."

So, the scheme of a peaceful revolution is evident. Now let's try to fill it with real content.

According to the Program of the CPSU, the main elements of a peaceful revolution are: 1) a statement of support from the majority of the people; 2) victory in the election campaign and obtaining a strong majority in parliament; 3) the development of an extra-parliamentary "broad mass struggle for peace, against big monopoly capital, for profound social reforms, for socialism."

Let us consider these main stages of the peaceful revolution.

Lenin's proposition that the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people is necessary for the victory of the revolution is well known and indisputable.

M. A. Suslov in his report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 14/11-1964 said:

"The revolution is the work of the popular masses, led by the proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard. It is quite clear that this does not mean at all that Marxist-Leninists are obliged to wait passively until a favorable situation develops. The experience of the CPSU shows that even a small, hardened party, enjoying the support of the proletarians and the advanced part of the peasantry, is capable of leading the revolution, leading the people. But for this it is necessary, as V.I. the lower classes "do not want to live in the old way."

I think this quote is worth reading.

From the perfectly correct statement that Marxist-Leninists are not obliged to wait until a favorable situation for the revolution develops, Suslov immediately makes a voluntary or involuntary reservation that nullifies this correct statement - the reservation that this favorable situation is still not enough - it is necessary, to create a revolutionary situation in the country.

According to the scheme [of the Program] of the CPSU, it appears that the support by the proletariat and the advanced part of the peasantry of a party advocating under the slogans of a socialist revolution is not yet a favorable situation, not a revolutionary situation.

Indeed, V. I. Lenin said that "Marxism has always denied pushing revolutions that are brewing as the sharpness of class contradictions develops." But in Suslov's interpretation, Lenin's words take on a different meaning. It literally follows from the quoted statement of M. A. Suslov that although Marxist-Leninists are not obliged to passively wait until a favorable situation develops, at the same time they cannot act actively until the revolutionary situation matures.

According to the [Program] scheme of the CPSU, it turns out to be some kind of vicious circle - the communists are not obliged to passively wait, but they cannot actively act either. Where is the way out of this situation?

Let us turn to V. I. Lenin, to that work of his, from which M. A. Suslov took the phrases "upper" and "lower".

weakens the government and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to quickly overthrow it" ("Children's disease of leftism in communism").

Does V. I. Lenin have an answer to our question? There is. And it consists in just one word - "achieve!" Lenin's pointing out that for the success of the revolution in each specific country, it is necessary to have a certain revolutionary situation that arises as a result of the development of internal and external contradictions of imperialism in this country, contradictions, the most important component of which is precisely the contradictions between the exploited and the exploiters, between revolution and reaction—it should be a call to action for every Marxist-Leninist—not to oppose the “favorable situation” of the revolutionary situation, but to AVOID that situation by active revolutionary struggle, that is, to achieve both the support and sympathy of the proletariat and the "Couldn't manage in the old way.

One condition follows from the other. Having managed to achieve, having managed to win support for these slogans and ideas by the proletariat with the help of the slogans and ideas of the socialist revolution, and stop before the "tops" - is this Marxism-Leninism?!

According to V. I. Lenin, the absence of a revolutionary situation in a particular country does not and cannot mean at all that in such a case there is no need for direct propaganda of the ideas and slogans of the socialist revolution.

“Yes, even if the situation were non-revolutionary, the entire history of the Bolshevik Party proves that the Second International is mistaken and takes great responsibility on

itself, if in fact it does not want and cannot organize revolutionary propaganda and agitation even in a non-revolutionary situation. and the difference between socialists and communists is that we do not want to do this (i.e., take this blame on ourselves. - GM)" (Second Congress of the Comintern. Theses on the conditions for admission).

"The present situation in Europe is exactly the same: it would be senseless to call for an "immediate" assault. But it would be a disgrace to call yourself a Social Democrat and not advise the workers to break with the opportunists and do everything possible to strengthen, deepen, expand, and sharpen the beginning revolutionary ferment and demonstrations. Revolution never falls completely ready from the sky, and at the beginning of revolutionary ferment, no one ever knows whether and when it will lead to a "real", to a "genuine" revolution" (Principal Provisions on the Question of War).

"Recognizing the dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean: no matter what happens, launch an assault, an uprising at any moment. This is nonsense. For a successful uprising, a long, skillful, stubborn preparation is needed, worthy of great sacrifices... To recognize the dictatorship of the proletariat means: to radically remake the day-to-day work of the party, to go down to those millions of workers, laborers and peasants who cannot be saved from the calamities of capitalism and wars without overthrowing the bourgeoisie. this is what the dictatorship of the proletariat is" (Notes of a Publicist, 1920).

I cannot but digress from the topic of this section and return for a second to the problem of peaceful coexistence.

How revolutionary is Lenin's thought! To tell the masses, tens of millions, that without the overthrow of the bourgeoisie they cannot be saved from the calamities of capitalism and war! And how opposite it is to the current concept of the peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-economic systems.

So, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, even the absence of a revolutionary situation in a particular country does not mean that the Communists can refuse or refrain from direct agitation and propaganda among the masses of the ideas and slogans of the socialist revolution in favor of "small concessions, hesitation, indecision, evasiveness, evasions and omissions", in favor of the struggle for "unusual" reforms.

In the materials on the Program of the CPSU, a view is taken of the revolution as a one-time act, which necessarily needs the sympathy and support of the majority of working people for the very possibility of its implementation to arise, i.e. in the sympathy and support of the majority of the population. Such a position does not in any way correspond to either the theory or the practice of Marxism-Leninism. V. I. Lenin taught:

"The opportunist gentlemen "teach" the people, in mockery of the teachings of Marx, that the proletariat must first win a majority through universal suffrage, then, on the basis of such a majority, obtain state power, and only then, on this basis ... organize socialism. And we say, on the basis of the teachings of Marx: the proletariat must first overthrow the bourgeoisie and win state power for itself, and then use this state power, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an instrument of its class in order to win the sympathy of the majority of the working people "(Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the dictatorship of the proletariat).

"In fact, only after the vanguard of the proletariat, supported by all this, the only revolutionary class, or the majority of it, overthrows the exploiters, crushes them, frees the exploited from their slave position, improves their living conditions at the expense of the expropriated capitalists, only after that and in the very course of the acute class struggle enlightenment, education, organization of the broadest and most exploited masses around the proletariat, under its influence and leadership, is feasible" (Second Congress of the Comintern. Theses on the main tasks).

"The main source of misunderstanding of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the part of the 'socialists' lies in their misunderstanding that state power in the hands of one class, the proletariat, can and must become an instrument for winning the non-proletarian working masses over to the side of the proletariat, an instrument for wresting these masses from the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois parties." (vol. 30, p. 239).

V. I. Lenin speaks out, as always, exactly, and definitely: the proletariat must first overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power, and only then, using this power as an instrument of its domination, win the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people.

This is understandable. Revolution is not a one-time act. And the initial stage of the revolution - a revolutionary uprising, a revolutionary seizure of power, the primary, but not the main task of the revolution - can be carried out with relatively small forces. The most complex and difficult task of the revolution is to retain and consolidate the seized state power.

"For victory, you must have the sympathy of the masses. An absolute majority is not always necessary; but to win, to retain power, you need the sympathy not only of the majority of the working class ... but also of the majority of the exploited and working people, the rural population" (III Congress of the Comintern. Speech in defense of tactics).

If the task of a revolutionary uprising—the seizure of state power—can be carried out with the sympathy and support of the working class as the most revolutionary class in society, or with the support and sympathy of its conscious majority, and not at all with the support and sympathy of the majority of working people, as the Program of the CPSU interprets, then it is quite natural that the task of retaining, winning back, and strengthening the finally seized state power cannot be solved without the sympathy and support of the majority of the population of this particular country.

Theorists and defenders of the Program of the CPSU deliberately confuse this issue, reduce its solution to the fact that only when the communists will be supported by the majority of the population of a given country, that is, only when they have almost 100% confidence in the victory of the revolution, only then will they "risk" the revolution.

Needless to say, such a formulation of the question of acquiring the sympathy and support of the majority has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism? Recall the following statement by Khrushchev, and I think you will agree with me:

"... Which capitalist country, the working class of which country, which party wants to start a revolutionary uprising now? If the working class of any of the countries rises to such a struggle, we will welcome it and say: on the way, if you are sure that it is, the uprising will end with your victory!" (Highlighted by me. - GM) (Speech at a rally of Soviet-German friendship 13/U-64).

The program of the CPSU considers the beginning of the revolution not a revolutionary uprising to seize state power, but victory in the electoral struggle, obtaining a solid majority in parliament. And it is clear that obtaining a "strong majority" in parliament can only be ensured by first winning the support and sympathy of the majority of the population of a particular country. I will not now touch on the question of whether it is possible, not theoretically, but practically, whether it is possible to obtain a stable parliamentary revolutionary majority under the domination of capital in a given country.

Let us turn to the question of what ways, methods, slogans, and ideas communists must win the sympathy and support of the majority of the population. How do we want to win him over to the side of socialism? What tactics should communists follow in order to win over to our side from the bourgeoisie and its accomplices in the working-class and democratic movement, the opportunists, and revisionists, that still fairly significant section of the workers who are for the time being following the bourgeois parties?

According to the theorists and followers of the CPSU Program, and from the Program itself, it follows that these slogans and ideas, ways and methods are:

1) The struggle for peace as a struggle for a policy of peaceful coexistence;

2) "A general democratic struggle against the omnipotence of the monopolies", which consists in "broad nationalization on terms most favorable to the people, for the control of parliament, trade unions and other representative bodies over nationalized enterprises, overall economic activity of the state", in support of the demand "of the peasantry to carry out radical agrarian reforms";

3) The unity of all social forces opposed to war, against the policy of monopolies, for democracy and socialism.

Quite a lot has been said about the struggle for peace, which for theorists and followers of the CPSU Program is tantamount to a struggle for a policy of peaceful coexistence.

Here, in my opinion, it should only be emphasized once again that the Program of the CPSU conceives a policy of peaceful coexistence, the cornerstone of which is an agreement between the socialist and imperialist states on the renunciation of war, which is really feasible without a struggle to overthrow the power of capital.

It is clear that such a slogan and such an idea can certainly win the sympathy and support not only of the majority of bourgeois parties, but even of those sober representatives of monopoly capital who, under cover of high-profile phrases about peace, are working out aggressive military plans directed against socialism.

As for the "general democratic" struggle against the omnipotence of the monopolies, there is much to dwell on here.

The program of the CPSU introduces a new term into the dictionary of Marxism-Leninism - "omnipotence". It seems to be a short word, but its application in Marxist-Leninist theory fundamentally changes

the very meaning of those of its provisions into which the Program of the CPSU introduces this new term.

"The general democratic struggle against the omnipotence of the monopolies..."

Doesn't such a formulation of the question smack of a kind of half-heartedness, narrow-mindedness? It smells and it's great.

An examination of the Program of the CPSU leads to the conclusion that this first impression is by no means accidental, for everywhere it speaks of big monopolies, bigwigs, financial oligarchy, and so on. etc.

Why?

Yes, because the statements about the unity of all the main sections of the nation, about the "general democratic" struggle can be justified to some extent only by such a formulation of the question - the struggle of all sections of the people against the omnipotence of the monopolies.

One has only to put the question deeper, in a Marxist way—not about the abolition of the omnipotence of the monopolies, but about the abolition of their power, about the abolition of private ownership of the means of production—and the whole shaky foundation of the affirmation of a general democratic struggle and the unity of all sections of the nation collapses like a house of cards.

It is collapsing because none of the Marxist-Leninists can come up with such an absurd idea, from the point of view of the class struggle, that for the elimination of the power of monopolies, for the elimination of the power of capital, for the elimination of private ownership of the means of production, which constitutes the basis, the root cause of the power of capital, the power of the monopolies - it is possible and necessary to fight in a "general democratic", that is, non-revolutionary, that is, reformist, way.

It is clear that such a slogan and such an idea can win the support and sympathy of the majority of the bourgeois parties, the majority of representatives not only of the petty bourgeoisie, but also of the

middle bourgeoisie, who dream of limiting the omnipotence of the big monopolies so that they do not interfere with their own profit ...

The Program of the CPSU and its theoreticians and supporters devote much space to the problem of the struggle for the so-called "unusual" reforms. What is their uniqueness?

The answer to this question must be sought in the program documents of the Western European communist and workers' parties. An analysis of these documents shows that it was from them that the very concept of "unusual" reforms migrated to the Program of the CPSU.

In his "Memorandum" P. Togliatti wrote:

"Entirely new problems arise in the system of state-monopoly capitalism, which the ruling classes are no longer able to solve in traditional ways. In particular, today in the largest countries the question of centralizing the management of the economy arises, which they are trying to solve with the help of programming from above, in the interests of large monopolies and through state intervention ... It is obvious that the workers' and democratic movement cannot remain indifferent to this issue. We need to fight in this area as well.

This requires the development and coordination of the immediate demands of the working class and proposals for the reform of the economic structure (nationalization, agrarian reform, etc.), combining them into a general plan for economic development, which must be opposed to capitalist programming. Of course, it will not yet be a socialist plan, because there are no conditions for this. However, this is a new form and a new means of struggle for moving forward towards socialism.

In the journal "Problems of Peace and Socialism" 8 for 1964), K. Renard, a member of the Central Committee of the Belgian Communist Party, said:

"Indeed, the question of structural reform directly raises the question of power... It is clear today that the long overdue economic structural reforms demanded by the working people cannot be carried out without stronger united action than before, and without liquidation as a result of these actions political privileges of the capitalist monopolies, that is, without a substantial democratization of the system.

From these statements, you can get an idea of what is the so-called structural reform and how it is unusual, how it differs from ordinary reforms.

Structural reform is a reform that, firstly, combines into one common program previously disparate "demands and proposals" of the working class, for example, such as nationalization, agrarian reform, etc., and, secondly, requires control of the parliament, trade unions and other representative bodies over the nationalized industries, over the entire economic activity of the bourgeois state.

None of the Marxist-Leninists has so far denied that the demands of nationalization, agrarian reform, etc. -reformist demands. V. I. Lenin spoke about this more than once.

Requirements for the control of parliament, trade unions, etc. democratic organizations are also far from new demands, which have been put forward more than once by international social democracy. Remember what Lenin wrote about such control:

"Control without power is the emptiest phrase... In order to control, one must have power. If this is incomprehensible to the broad masses... one must have the patience to explain it to them, but in no case tell them a lie. And if I obscure it the main condition for control is that I tell lies and play into the hands of the capitalists and imperialists... Control without power is a petty-bourgeois phrase..." (T. 24, p. 201).

If we talk about something unusual that has now been introduced into these, in general, old, reformist slogans, it is the unification of these hitherto disparate reforms into one common platform-program.

One cannot but agree with P. Togliatti himself when he writes about such a program as a non-socialist program. This is true. But along with this, I can in no way discern in this program either a "new form" or a "new means of struggle for moving forward towards socialism" - I can't, because none of the newly-minted Marxist theoreticians anywhere explains:

- 1) What kind of nationalization are we talking about when we talk about structural reforms? About the nationalization of all or most of the monopolies, or the nationalization of only the big monopolies?
- 2) What kind of economic activity of the bourgeois state are we talking about? About the current tax or the proposed planning one?
- 3) What kind of parliament are we talking about? The current bourgeois or imaginary, expressing the interests of the entire people?
- 4) What kind of political privileges of the monopolies are we talking about, and by what active actions can we achieve the elimination of these privileges and the "substantial democratization of the system"?
- 5) And what is meant by "substantial democratization of the system"?
- 6) And finally, what does it mean to say that "in reality, the question of structural reform directly raises the question of power"?

Does all this mean that the communist parties of Western Europe are embarrassed to directly raise the question of power before the working people, because, as Togliatti notes, "there are no conditions for this", but they can raise the question of structural reforms, since these reforms "actually raise the question of authorities"?!

It is not clear whom some of the communist parties of Europe and America are trying to confuse or outwit - either themselves, or the ruling classes, or the working people themselves - demanding reform, raising the question of power, but not demanding power? ..

VI Lenin said that "no redistribution of the land and no change in the state towards democratization will yet eliminate the domination of capital, the domination of the bourgeois system" (vol. 20, p. 211).

"Capitalism and imperialism cannot be overthrown by any 'ideal' democratic transformations, but only by an economic revolution..." (vol. 23, p. 13).

V. I. Lenin taught that "... the socialists do not give up the struggle for reforms. They must, for example, now vote in bourgeois parliaments for all sorts of, even small, improvements in the condition of the masses, etc. But a simple bourgeois deception is the preaching of reforms to solve problems that history and the actual state of affairs have raised in a revolutionary way..." (Proposal of the Central Committee of the RSDLP of the Second Socialist Conference).

The already mentioned member of the Central Committee of the SED K. Hager, joining a whole choir of prominent European figures of the labor movement, assures us that "a revolution (especially a peaceful one) can also include evolutionary moments as one of the ways of its development. It turns out that it is possible to use reforms in the interests of leading the masses to the revolution, to turn the reforms into one of the forms for the development of the revolution itself.

It is impossible not to recall V. I. Lenin and his answer to Comrade Hager and others -

"The "principled conciliators" will try to present a falsification of Marxism in the spirit, for example, of such an argument that reforms do not exclude revolution ... that reforms are possible "along with the revolutionary movement, as one of the moments in the development of this movement," etc., etc....

This would be a falsification of Marxism. Of course, reforms do not exclude revolution. This, however, is not the point now, but that the revolutionaries should not exclude themselves before the reformists, that is, that the socialists should not substitute reformist work for their revolutionary work" ("Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism").

It is impossible not to admire the foresight of Lenin.

If we, speaking of structural reforms as reforms that raise the question of power, are embarrassed to openly call on the working people who demand these reforms to a direct struggle for power, then we, it seems to me, are becoming like the comrade about whom V.I. Lenin wrote as early as 1916:

"... Junius, firstly, did not completely free herself from the" environment "of German, even left-wing Social Democrats, who are afraid of a split, afraid to finish talking revolutionary slogans. This is an erroneous fear ... Secondly, Junius wanted, apparently, to put into practice something in the nature of the Menshevik, sad memory, "theory of stages", she wanted to start carrying out the revolutionary program from its "most convenient," "popular," end acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie. Something like a plan to "outwit history," outwit the philistines... Once adopted, such a program would itself lead, they say, to the next stage: the socialist revolution.

Probably, such reasoning consciously or semi-consciously determined Junius's tactics. Needless to say, they are erroneous" ("On the pamphlet of Junius").

As we have found out, winning the sympathy and support of the majority by the Program of the CPSU and its supporters is conceived primarily in winning this majority over to the side of the communist parties by fighting for peace, which does not require a struggle to overthrow the power of capital; the struggle for "a certain improvement in the conditions of existence", "for the democratization" of the existing system, which envisages the struggle for "unusual" reforms; the struggle for socialism, which provides for the struggle for a peaceful revolution, for a revolution without civil war, in which the electoral struggle and parliament are brought to the forefront of this peaceful revolution.

Is there a need to turn to V. I. Lenin for help on the issue of parliament and the parliamentary struggle?

His works in this direction are so numerous and well-known among all who consider themselves Marxists, that, it would seem, it is

definitely not worth refreshing them again in the memory of individual forgetful people.

But it seems to me that it would not be superfluous to remind these people of V. I. Lenin's main idea that

"forgetting that universal suffrage, as long as the property of the capitalists is preserved, is one of the instruments of the bourgeois state, means shamefully betraying the proletariat, passing over on the side of his class enemy, the bourgeoisie, to be a traitor and a renegade" (vol. 28, p. 410).

"Only scoundrels or fools can think that the proletariat must first win a majority in voting held under the yoke of the bourgeoisie, under the yoke of wage slavery, and then must win power. This is the height of stupidity or hypocrisy, this is the replacement of the class struggle and revolution by voting under the old regime, under the old system" (vol. 30, p. 40).

"The proletariat cannot win without winning the majority of the population over to its side. But to limit or condition this conquest by winning a majority of votes in elections under the rule of the bourgeoisie is an impenetrable stupidity or a simple swindle of the workers" (Vol. 30, p. 242).

"We see what boundless theoretical absurdity, what stupidity is the current petty-bourgeois idea of the transition to socialism through "democracy"... The prejudice inherited from the bourgeoisie about the absolute, non-class content of "democracy" is the basis of this error" (vol. 30, p. .96).

V. I. Lenin was not shy in his expressions when he spoke of people preaching a peaceful, parliamentary, democratic transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class. V. I. Lenin categorically rejected this path. He proceeded from an analysis of objective reality, from the fact that

"The strength of the proletariat in any capitalist country is incomparably greater than the share of the proletariat in the total population. This is because the proletariat economically

dominates the center and nerve of the entire economic system of capitalism, and also because the proletariat economically and politically expresses the real interests of the vast majority of the working people Therefore, the proletariat, even when it constitutes a minority of the population (or when the conscious and truly revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat constitutes a minority of the population), is capable of both overthrowing the bourgeoisie and then winning over to its side many allies from such a mass of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeois, which will never the rule of the proletariat will not speak out, it will not understand the conditions and tasks of this rule" (vol. 30, p. 250).

We will not find anything new about the role of parliament in the modern revolutionary movement in the arguments of the theoreticians and defenders of the thesis about the parliamentary path of transition to socialism. They only say:

"The goal is not to preserve the bourgeois parliament, but to use the parliamentary form and give the parliament a new, truly democratic, and then also proletarian content. This is possible only on the path of continuous extra-parliamentary struggle of the workers, peasant masses and urban middle strata, of all anti-monopoly forces against reaction, for radical reforms, revolutionary in their content, for peace and socialism" (K. Hager. Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 8, 1964).

And it all starts over...

The logical continuation of the thesis of the Program of the CPSU about a peaceful transition to socialism by parliamentary means, by transforming parliament into an organ "expressing the interests of the people", for which transformation it is necessary to win a strong parliamentary majority, which, in turn, requires the support and sympathy of the majority of the nation, is the provision of the Program of the CPSU on "the unity of all democratic forces," on "the unity of all parties of the working class, irrespective of the ideological differences dividing these parties."

Indeed, Marx, Engels, Lenin cared for and strove for the unity of all the forces of the working class.

V. I. Lenin pointed out:

"... The absolute necessity for ... the Communist Party to resort to maneuvering, conciliation, compromises with different groups of proletarians, with different parties of workers and small proprietors, follows with absolute necessity" ("Children's disease of leftism in communism").

But, Lenin emphasized,

"the whole point is to be able to apply these tactics in order to INCREASE, and not lower, the GENERAL level of proletarian consciousness, revolutionary spirit, ability to fight and win" (ibid.).

THE ALL POINT IS ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IDEOLOGY - MARXIST-LENIN OR BOURGEOIS-REFORMIST - THIS UNITY IS THOUGHT, ON WHAT TACTICS - EVOLUTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY - THIS UNITY IS CALCULATED, WHAT CHARACTER IT IS

I have already said and must repeat again that the unity of all parties fighting for peace without overthrowing the power of capital, fighting for socialism through structural reforms and envisioning revolution as a peaceful transition of power, requiring first to win the support and sympathy of the vast majority of the nation, is quite imaginable, possible.

But will such unity be the one to which Marx and Lenin called for the working class? Of course not.

The fundamental contrast between the Marxist-Leninist position on questions of the unity of the workers' parties and the position of the majority of the current leaders of the Western European communist and workers' movement emerges especially clearly, especially clearly, from a comparison of their views with those of V. I. Lenin.

"We must contribute to eliminating one of the few arguments of the Social Democrats against an alliance with the Communists - the argument that the Communists are striving for the violence of the minority over the majority" (Member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany K. Hager. Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 8 for 1964, p. 80).

"The communist thesis about the diversity of the paths of transition to socialism and the possibility of this transition under certain conditions by peaceful means greatly favors the rapprochement between communists and socialists. This thesis breaks the old lie about the communists, who are supposedly principled "supporters of an active minority and instigators of violence" "(General Secretary of the French Communist Party V. Roche, *ibid.*, p. 26).

And here is V. I. Lenin:

"In defining dictatorship, Kautsky did his best to hide from the reader the main feature of this concept, namely, revolutionary violence. And now the truth has come out: it is about the opposite of peaceful and violent revolutions.

This is where the dog is buried. All the subterfuges, sophisms, fraudulent falsifications are exactly what Kautsky needs in order to dissuade violent revolution, in order to cover up his renunciation of it, his going over to the side of liberal labor politics, that is, to the side of the bourgeoisie. That's where the dog is buried.

Kautsky must interpret dictatorship as a state of "domination," for then, revolutionary violence disappears, violent revolution disappears. The "state of domination" (hegemony) is the state in which there is any majority under "democracy"! With such a fraudulent trick, the revolution safely disappears!" (vol. 28, pp. 317-318).

"You cannot make the development of unity of action dependent on ideological differences" (V. Roche, *ibid.*, p. 25).

"The unity of all socialist forces in common action, so that they stand even above ideological differences" (General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party L. Longo, Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 11 of 1964, p. 7).

"Unity is a great cause and a great slogan! But the workers' cause needs the unity of the Marxists, and not the unity of the Marxists with the opponents and perverters of Marxism" (vol. 20, p. 211).

"The mere thought of 'consigning to oblivion' fundamental disagreements is absurd and cannot occur to a sane person" ("Letter to a Comrade").

And here is the international department of CPSU and French CP

"In order to promote the success of the advance towards socialism by peaceful means, thanks to the close cooperation of both parties and all democratic and anti-monopoly forces, the 17th Congress of our party categorically rejected the idea of the obligatory existence of one party to achieve socialism in France" (V. Rocher. Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 8, 1964, p. 27).

"The stumbling block between communists and socialists was the question of the force representing the working class in the struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution and in the construction of socialism. Usually the position of the communists on this issue was distorted, and until now it is not always correctly understood by the social democrats. The communists are credited with striving to "excommunicate" all other parties from participating in the construction of a new society... Communists are not principled supporters of the concept of a "single party" (Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU BN Ponomarev. Ibid., p. 26).

"The widely held opinion ... that socialism means the domination of one party, namely the communist one, owes its origin to a special historical development in the first

socialist country - in the Soviet Union. It has found such wide circulation that it has penetrated deeply into the masses and is so tenacious because for some time it was even supported by the communist parties, which often understood the dictatorship of the proletariat - as opposed to bourgeois democracy - only as the domination of one party. This is a simplified, primitive position of vulgarizing Marxism "(Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Austria Furnberg. Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 11, 1964, p. 25).

And here is V. I. Lenin:

"When we are reproached for the dictatorship of one party and proposed, as you have heard, a united socialist front, we say:

"Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand on it and cannot leave this soil" (vol. 29, p. 497).

"In order to split the bourgeois bloc, isolate big capital, create a new ruling bloc capable of replacing the old ruling classes and opening the way to socialism, a strategy is needed that meets the specific conditions of each country" (Member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the Italian Communist Party V. Gerratana. Problems of Peace and Socialism , No. 8, 1964, p. 87).

And here is V. I. Lenin:

"In a capitalist society, when it develops, holds firm or when it perishes, it doesn't matter - there can be only one of two powers: either the power of the capitalists, or the power of the proletariat. Every average power is a dream, every attempt to organize something in the middle leads to the fact that people, even with complete sincerity, slide one way or the other" (vol. 29, p. 498).

"The main thing that socialists do not understand, and what constitutes their theoretical short-sightedness, their captivity

to bourgeois prejudices and their political betrayal of the proletariat, is that in capitalist society, with any serious aggravation of the class struggle underlying it, there can be no nothing in between, except the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Every dream of something else is the reactionary lamentation of the petty bourgeois" (vol. 28, p. 441).

"In the European West (unlike the Asian, i.e. the barbarian East, where this was not the case. - GM) the socialist solution ... must not only provide bread and work, but also be able to guarantee (!) a high rate development of production; to carry out economic planning in which the initiative of everyone would find a place and be stimulated; to lead society, guaranteeing (!) a wide system of autonomy and political freedoms (!); to promote the development of searches in the field of culture and the constant comparison of ideas (!) Only if we act now in this direction and with this perspective will we be able to win over and unite the majority of the working class and people" (V. Jerratana, Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 8, 1964, p. 87).

"We constantly say... that the revolution requires sacrifice. There are comrades who argue in their propaganda as follows: we are ready to make a revolution, but it should not be too hard... I must declare that such agitation is non-communist and non-revolutionary. Naturally, every revolution entails enormous sacrifices for the class that produces it" (vol. 32, p. 464).

One could cite more than a dozen examples of similar statements by many, many current leaders of the international labor movement in the countries of Europe and North America. And in their refutation one could cite no fewer quotations from the works of V. I. Lenin.

It is quite clear to me that the aforementioned views of the majority of the leaders of the Communist Parties of the West on the questions of unity have nothing in common with the views of V. I. Lenin on this question. In the light of Lenin's statements, it becomes obvious that the modern formulation of the question of the need for the unity of all

parties that "consider themselves" parties of the working class as an indispensable condition for a successful peaceful transition to socialism - in fact, is reduced to complete oblivion or only to verbal recognition as communist parties of some Western European states
QUINTESSIONS of Marxism-Leninism - DOCTRINES ABOUT THE
DICTATORY OF THE PROLETARIAT.

How else to evaluate the official statements of the leaders of these communist parties about "preliminarily enlisting the majority of the people on the side of the revolution", about the role of violence and coercion in the revolution, about the "new ruling bloc", about the possibility and necessity of two or more parties in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, about structural reforms etc. etc.?

Such a position cannot be called a communist, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist position. This is the position that V.I. Lenin called centrist and characterized as follows:

"The 'Center' swears and swears that they are Marxists, internationalists, that they are for peace, for all sorts of 'pressure' on governments, for all sorts of 'demands' to their government to 'develop the will of the peoples for peace', for all kinds of campaigns in the benefit of peace, etc., etc... The center is for "unity", the center is against a split.

The crux of the matter is that the "center" is not convinced of the need for a revolution against its governments, does not preach it, does not conduct a selfless revolutionary struggle, puts forward, invents the most vulgar - and arch-"Marxist"-sounding excuses from it.

"Centre" - people of routine, eaten away by rotten legality, spoiled by the atmosphere of parliamentarism, etc., officials accustomed to warm places and "calm" work" ("Letters on tactics").

Theorists and supporters of the Program of the CPSU are very indignant when they hear this quote from V. I. Lenin. Wherever possible and as soon as possible, they refer to the fact that all the principles of the Program of the CPSU on the issues of the

international working-class movement, as the Program of the CPSU itself indicates, can be implemented only as a result of "a broad, mass struggle for peace, for democracy, for socialism" . And it seems to many that these concepts - "revolutionary", "peace", "socialism", "struggle" - cover everything.

But these many are mistaken. They forget or do not understand the most essential circumstance that the very formulation of the question of revolutionary mass struggle, as it is given by the Program of the CPSU, does NOT contain anything concrete, only general appeals and phrases.

V. I. Lenin said:

"What is the aim of the revolutionary mass struggle?.. It is considered self-evident or directly admitted that this aim is 'socialism.' Capitalism (or imperialism) is opposed to socialism.

But this is just in the highest degree (theoretically) illogical, and practically devoid of content. It is illogical because it is too general, too vague. "Socialism" in general, as a goal, in contrast to capitalism (or imperialism), is now recognized not only by social-chauvinists and Kautskyites, but also by many bourgeois politicians. But NOW it is not about a general opposition of two social systems, but about the SPECIFIC goal of a SPECIFIC "revolutionary mass struggle" - against a SPECIFIC evil, namely against TODAY's high cost, TODAY's military danger ...

The entire Second International ... opposed socialism in general to capitalism, and JUST on this too general "generalization" it failed. He ignored precisely the specific evil of his era, which F. Engels almost 30 years ago, on January 10, 1887, characterized with the following words: "... In the Social Democratic Party itself ... a certain kind of petty-bourgeois socialism finds its place. It finds expression there in such a form that the basic views of modern socialism and the demand for the transformation of all means of production into public property are recognized as correct, but THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS IS RECOGNIZED POSSIBLE

ONLY IN THE REMOTE, PRACTICALLY UNCERTAIN FUTURE, THIS SAME PROBLEM FOR THE PRESENT IS DEFINED ONLY AS SIMPLE DARNING "" ("On the housing issue".

Further, V. I. Lenin writes:

"The concrete goal of the "revolutionary mass struggle" can only be SPECIFIC measures of the SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, and NOT "socialism" in general. very specific measures in an official resolution of the party and systematically explain them in the most popular form through daily party propaganda and agitation at meetings, in parliamentary speeches, in initiative proposals - then again you get the same delaying or evasive, through and through sophistical answer that the people - do not yet prepared for this, etc.!

BUT THE POINT IS EXACTLY IN THAT NOW TO START THIS PREPARATIONS AND CARRY OUT IT steadfastly!" ("The Fundamental Provisions on the Question of War").

It is hardly possible to add anything to the words of Engels and Lenin.

REALLY, FROM A CONSIDERATION OF THE PROGRAM OF THE CPSU (its part devoted to the world revolutionary process) AND THE RELATED PROVISIONS OF SOME WEST COMPARTIES, IT INEVITABLY FOLLOWS THAT FOR THEM THE PRESENT TASK IS DEFINED AS A SIMPLE SOCIAL darn.

Peaceful Competition

Meanwhile, both the Program of the CPSU itself and numerous materials for it are trying to convince us that

"in the course of the peaceful competition between the two systems, capitalism has suffered a deep moral defeat in the eyes of all peoples. Ordinary people are daily convinced that capitalism is not able to solve any of the urgent problems that face humanity. It is becoming more and more obvious that

only on the path of socialism a solution to these problems can be found. Confidence in the capitalist system and in the capitalist path of development is declining...Under the influence of the ideas of socialism, the liberation struggle of the working people and the general democratic movements of the peoples are merging into a common world stream that is eroding the foundations of imperialism...

The 20th Party Congress, analyzing the situation in the capitalist countries, concluded that they were steadily moving towards new economic and social upheavals... Over the past years, there has been a further aggravation of contradictions both within and between them, the collapse of colonial empires, the struggle of the working class and the national liberation movement of the peoples has acquired an enormous scope" (Khrushchev. Report of the Central Committee to the XXII Congress of the CPSU).

"Imperialism is decaying and dying capitalism. The eve of the socialist revolution. The world capitalist system as a whole is ripe for the social revolution of the proletariat.

More and more countries falling away from capitalism, the weakening of the positions of imperialism in economic competition with socialism; the sharpening of the contradictions of imperialism with the development of state-monopoly capitalism and the growth of militarism; increased internal instability and decay of the capitalist economy; the growing struggle between labor and capital; a sharp aggravation of the contradictions of the world capitalist economy; an unprecedented intensification of political reaction along all lines, the renunciation of bourgeois freedoms and the establishment of fascist, tyrannical regimes in a number of countries; a deep crisis in the policy and ideology of the bourgeoisie - this is the expression of the general crisis of imperialism" (Program of the CPSU).

But that's not all, that's just one side of the issue. Here is another

"The condition of the working people ... is deteriorating in all areas ... The strike struggle of the working people is steadily growing. In 1960 alone, more than fifty-eight million people took part in the strike struggle ... The struggle of the working people of the capitalist countries for their economic and political rights is becoming more and more acute. .. The actions of the working people are increasingly acquiring a political character. In 1960, more than forty million people, or 73% of the total number of strikers, took part in political strikes. Powerful actions of the working class and the masses in 1960 led to the fall of governments in Japan, Italy , Belgium...

The social situation that has developed over the past five years in the large capitalist countries is also characterized by the growth of the peasant movement ... "(Khrushchev. Report of the Central Committee to the XXII Congress of the CPSU).

"The international revolutionary movement of the working class has won world-historic victories. Its main achievement is the world socialist system.

In the depths of capitalist society, social forces are formed, multiplied, and tempered, designed to ensure the victory of socialism ... Marxist-Leninist parties have been created and grown. They are becoming more and more authoritative and universally recognized national forces, leading the broad sections of the population. The international revolutionary movement has accumulated vast experience in the struggle against imperialism and its accomplices in the ranks of the working class. It has become ideologically more mature, has great organized power and an offensive fighting spirit.

The countries of capitalism are constantly shaken by class battles. Fighting actions of the working people are unfolding in defense of their economic and political interests. More than once the working class, the working people, have posed a threat to the class rule of the bourgeoisie...

A more favorable environment for the working-class movement has now been created in the world. The successes of the USSR and the entire world socialist system, the deepening crisis of world capitalism, the growth of the influence of the communist parties among the masses, and the ideological collapse of reformism have significantly changed the conditions of the class struggle in favor of the working people. Even in those countries where reformism continues to maintain a strong position, a significant shift to the left is taking place in the labor movement" (Program of the CPSU).

Consequently, the Program of the CPSU assures us that now, right now, in a new concrete historical situation 1) Marxist-Leninist parties have been created and strengthened, numbering about forty million members; 2) the revolutionary movement has accumulated vast experience in the struggle against imperialism. It has great organized strength and fighting spirit; 3) the struggle of the broad working masses has become very acute. More than once the working class, the working people, have posed a threat to the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Their speeches acquired a clearly expressed political character; 4) there is a growth of the peasant movement; 5) there was a significant aggravation of the contradictions both within and between the capitalist states; 6) there is a final collapse of the colonial empires. The national liberation movement of the peoples has acquired an enormous scope; 7)"

It's a strange thing.

Following V. I. Lenin, repeating that imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution, emphasizing in every possible way that much more favorable conditions have now been created for this revolution than in the time of Lenin, listing in detail all these favorable conditions, including, among other things, increased the might of the Soviet Union and the formation of the world socialist camp, and even speaking of the superiority of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism, the Program of the CPSU nonetheless directs all the organized might and fighting offensive spirit of the modern revolutionary movement not towards the path of revolutionary transformation of society, but onto the path of reformism, calls the

working class and its parties not to a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the power of capital, but to struggle for "unusual" reforms, do not follow Lenin's call" an alliance with the reformists is to be admitted as a temporary evil in a situation that is obviously non-revolutionary, a break and a split with them is to be considered inevitable at any serious intensification of the struggle, and even more so at the beginning of a revolution "(vol. 29, p. 506), but on the contrary, proclaims the need for a close alliance with them, etc.

The question is, what happened?

In my opinion, what happened was what V.I. Lenin once said:

"Kautsky is completely confused and has given himself away.

Note: he himself admitted that "Europe is advancing towards the decisive battle between labor and capital."

Therefore, the former methods of economic and political struggle of the proletariat, which consisted in the use of bourgeois democracy, are insufficient. Therefore? .. Therefore ... it is now insufficient for the working class. And if the preparatory work for the proletarian revolution, the training and formation of the proletarian army were possible (and necessary) within the framework of the bourgeois-democratic state, then, since it came to "decisive battles", to limit the proletariat to these frameworks means to be a traitor to the proletarian cause" ("Proletarian revolution and the renegade Kautsky").

There are people who admit that the Program's interpretation of the state of the contemporary international revolutionary movement is the Program's mistake; that in the camp of socialism, not everything is so well, and in the camp of imperialism, not everything is as bad as the Program of the CPSU says (see, for example, P. Togliatti's memorandum).

There are people who assert that later, after the adoption of the Program of the CPSU by the 22nd Congress, "Khrushchev himself" "somewhat" retreated from the picture drawn by the Program of the complete revolutionary situation in the world, "took a more realistic point of view."

Ultimately, one could agree with these people on this issue as well. It would be possible ... if these comrades did not forget to take into account that in this case the Program of the CPSU, which determines the tactics and strategy not only of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but, in fact, of the entire world revolutionary movement, turns out to be built on sand, turns out to be built NOT ON THE BASIS OF REAL; OF THE REAL STATE OF THINGS, BUT IT TURNS OUT TO BE BUILT ON THE POSSIBLE, ON THE DESIRED.

"The most dangerous mistake for revolutionaries," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "is to accept their wishes, their ideological and political attitude as objective reality" ("Children's disease of leftism in communism").

Comrades who consider the general picture of the revolutionary situation in the world drawn by the Program of the CPSU to be erroneous, lose sight of the fact that in this case the entire logical outline of the Program of the CPSU collapses in all its main political principles, the basis of which is the thesis of the superiority of the forces of peace and socialism over forces of imperialism and war.

Everything collapses - the assertion that it is objectively necessary for the imperialists to follow the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic competition, and the assertion that it is possible to prevent a new world war with the help of this policy, and so on. etc. It is clear that I do not have in mind the class content of these theses themselves, which from this point of view, as I have tried to prove, do not withstand any criticism.

Or

Either we admit that the picture of the state of the modern world as a whole, the picture of the state of the international revolutionary movement - in particular, given by the Program of the CPSU, does not correspond to the true state of affairs, that the compilers of the Program made a mistake here, or we say that no such mistake was made.

In the first case it was necessary to

"openly admit the mistake, reveal its causes, analyze the situation that gave rise to it, carefully discuss the means to correct the mistake" (V. I. Lenin, Works vol. 31, p. 39).

We didn't. Having made at the XXII Congress of the CPSU the most dangerous mistake for the revolutionaries, then not yet the worst, in the future

"We made a monstrously big mistake out of a small mistake, insisting on this mistake, trying to substantiate it in depth and bring it to the end" (V.I. Lenin. "Children's disease of leftism in communism").

As a result, we came, as V. I. Lenin said about Kautsky, to a direct betrayal of the proletarian cause, the cause of the socialist revolution.

As a result, we came to a complete revision of Marxism-Leninism under the flag of the fight against dogmatism.

In fact, look what happens. There is no doubt that the Marxist-Leninist teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action; there is no doubt that as human society develops, Marxist-Leninist theory, like any other scientific theory, can and must creatively develop and enrich itself, starting from the experience of this development. But, like any scientific theory, the Marxist-Leninist theory of scientific communism has its FUNDAMENTALS.

OBJECTIVE PREREQUISITES, which, in fact, give us the right to assert the strictly scientific nature of the teachings of Marx-Lenin. Such laws and *prerequisites in the science of Marxism-Leninism* are:

1) The doctrine of classes and class struggle, the most important component of which is the theory of the state as a political organ of the economically dominant class, an organ that has arisen, exists and must exist as long as and insofar as human society remains a class society.

2) The law of the inconsistency of the social nature of production with private ownership of the means of production, from which the

doctrine of the socialist revolution inevitably follows, continuing until the destruction of class society on Earth.

3) The doctrine of the historical mission of the working class as the only class capable of completing the construction of a classless society, communism - a social system without any violence against the individual, without wars, without a state, without democracy.

These laws of Marxism-Leninism are IMMOLABLE AND UNDESTROYABLE, they are FAIR AND APPLY IN ANY MODERN SPECIFIC HISTORICAL SITUATION, AND THEIR ACTIVITY IS TERMINATED ONLY WITH THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL CLASS CONTRADICTIONS, WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE HISTORICAL MISSION OF THE WORKERS.

Peaceful Existence

The program of the CPSU tries to assure us that under present-day conditions one can and should talk about the peaceful existence of socialism with capitalism for an indefinitely long period, about the possibility of preventing wars by agreement between the governments of the imperialist and socialist states, about the peaceful, parliamentary transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the working class, about the uselessness of the dictatorship of the proletariat - the state of the working class - for building a communist society, about the uselessness of a class proletarian party for building the foundation for a communist society, etc. etc.

What does it mean? This means that the Program of the CPSU, under the guise of loud phrases about loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, in fact completely departs from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, with all the ensuing consequences.

This means that the Program of the CPSU (and the parties defending it) fully fall under the following characterization of V. I. Lenin -

"Protection of class cooperation, renunciation of the idea of socialist revolution and revolutionary methods of struggle, adaptation to bourgeois nationalism, turning into a fetish of

bourgeois legality, rejection of the class point of view and class struggle for fear of alienating the "broad masses of the population" (read: petty bourgeoisie) - these are undoubtedly the ideological foundations of opportunism" (vol. 21, p. 19).

It seems to me that the Program of the CPSU gives a remarkably accurate characterization of itself when speaking of the Program of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia:

"In modern conditions, the main danger in the communist movement is revisionism, right-wing opportunism, as a reflection of bourgeois influence. Covering their apostasy from Marxism with arguments about the need to take into account the latest conditions for the development of society and the class struggle, the revisionists are in fact playing the role of peddlers of the bourgeois-reformist ideology in the communist movement. They seek to eradicate its revolutionary soul from Marxism-Leninism ... The revisionists deny the historical necessity of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party, undermine the foundations of proletarian internationalism, and slide into nationalism.

Considering the Program of the CPSU and the materials to it, one cannot but admire - sincerely, from the bottom of the heart - the genius of a simple human mind, recalling and pondering such seemingly ordinary words of V. I. Lenin that "precisely because Marxism is not a dead dogma, not some finished, ready-made, unchanging decision, but a living guide to action, precisely because of this, he could not but reflect on himself the astonishingly abrupt change in social life. - a most serious internal crisis of Marxism. A resolute rebuff to this disintegration, a resolute and stubborn struggle for the foundations of Marxism, again stood on the order of the day ...

The "reassessment of all values" in various areas of social life led to a revision of the most abstract and general philosophical foundations of Marxism..." (vol. 17, pp. 23-24).

Such is my personal point of view on the foreign policy part of the Program of the CPSU, on some of its fundamental guidelines for

Marxist-Leninist teaching. Of course, I am not so presumptuous as to assert that everything stated here is entirely and completely true. But still, I am sure that if I am mistaken, if to some extent I belong to those people who, according to M. A. Suslov, is inclined to assimilate only superficial schemes of the revolutionary struggle, then in any case the issues I raised.

I am convinced of this by the fact that I am not alone in my "delusions", that I share them with such experienced and oldest Marxist-Leninists as some of the members of the so-called anti-party group - the former core of the Leninist-Stalinist leadership of the CPSU, with the communists of many communist parties, including such a major communist party of our time as the Chinese Communist Party, and, perhaps, to some extent with the current leadership of the CPSU itself, which, after many years study came to the conclusion about the "political subjectivism and theoretical carelessness" of its leader Khrushchev.

Whether the leaders of the CPSU wanted it or not, at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU the point of view on the questions considered by such a person as Molotov was most fully expressed.

Speakers at the 22nd Congress said:

"Even before the XX Congress of the CPSU, Molotov, in a report at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, openly questioned the fact of building a socialist society in the USSR. He said: "Along with the Soviet Union, where the foundations of a socialist society have already been built, there are also people's democratic countries that made only the first, but very important steps towards socialism. " According to Molotov, it turned out that socialism in the USSR had not yet been built ...

You understand that on the basis of such attitudes one cannot even think of a plan for the construction of communism... It is clear that if only the foundations of socialism have been built, then one cannot even raise the question of a transition to the full-scale construction of communism. If the people's democracies have only taken the first steps towards

socialism, then the world socialist system has not yet taken shape and, consequently, one cannot speak of its growing influence on the course of social development. This was a fundamentally erroneous, non-Leninist assessment of the alignment of class and political forces in the modern world.

The underestimation of the forces of socialism, and, consequently, the exaggeration of the forces of capitalism, led Molotov to serious mistakes on issues of international development - on peaceful coexistence and the possibility of preventing a world war, on the variety of forms of transition of various countries to socialism. Molotov generally rejects the line of peaceful coexistence, reducing this concept only to a state of peace, or rather, to the absence of war at the present moment and to the denial of the possibility of preventing a world war "(Mikoyan. Stan report of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, vol. 1, p. 449).

"On April 18, 1960, Molotov sent an article to the editors of the *Kommunist* magazine ... The article distortedly described the difficulties of 1921 caused by the intervention and the civil war. The impression was created that the difficulties experienced by our country were inevitable for other countries that they would embark on the path of socialist construction... It underestimated the new alignment of forces that took shape after World War II... rejected the real possibility of preventing a world war in our time" (Ilyichev, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 186).

"The delegates of the 22nd Congress should know that ... just before the opening of the Congress, Molotov sent a letter to the Central Committee, in which he again attacks the Central Committee, the Draft Program of the CPSU ... Molotov claims that the new Program is anti-revolutionary in spirit ... Molotov declares in his letter that the draft Program does not, you see, link the communist construction in the USSR with the prospects for the revolutionary struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries, with the prospects for a socialist revolution on an international scale...

Molotov goes so far as to make monstrous statements that the draft Program circumvents the difficulties of the struggle for communism, orients the Party and the people to the fact that the further advance towards communism of the countries of the socialist community will proceed without revolutionary struggle. It follows from his assertions that without the most serious political conflicts with the imperialist countries, and hence without war, progress towards communism is impossible.

It is strange and monstrous ... the assertion that Lenin nowhere and never spoke of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems "(Satyukov. Ibid., p. 350 -" ... Molotov began to speak out not only against the condemnation of Stalin's personality cult .. Molotov spoke out against the most important principled position of the 20th Party Congress on the possibility of preventing war in the modern era ... Molotov makes a statement, monstrous in its absurdity and hostility to the entire course of the Party. He falls upon the following most important thesis of the final part of the Program: "When the Soviet people will enjoy the benefits of communism, new hundreds of millions of people on earth will say: We are for communism!..."

Molotov slanderously claims that this orientation of the Program is in deep contradiction with the revolutionary essence of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Pospelov, *ibid.*, p. 461).

Reflecting on this criticism of Molotov, on the basis of my own conclusions and conclusions from the analysis of the Program of the CPSU, I can only say one thing - honor and praise to him! I can only repeat what I started this letter with - I remain deeply convinced that criticism of the so-called Stalin's personality cult, in the form in which it unfolded after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, was aimed at discrediting the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU - Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Bulganin - who did not agree with that the general course of the party to which the new first secretary Khrushchev sought to turn the party. They are earlier than others, and

there is nothing surprising in this, because they went through the Leninist school of revolution and revolutionary, Marxist hardening,

Internal Development

Along with a number of new guidelines on the theory and practice of the modern revolutionary movement, at the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU, at numerous Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU of this period, many major issues of the internal development of the USSR were raised and resolved in a new way.

Let me dwell on some of these questions.

On the restructuring of industrial management and the new order of production planning.

Before me are the theses of Khrushchev's report on the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the further improvement of the organization of management of industry and construction."

It follows from the second section of these theses (pp. 11-13) that the leitmotif of the planned restructuring of industrial management was "increased demands for more efficient and concrete local leadership of industry."

Based on Khrushchev's theses, I drew for myself the following scheme for the development of organizational forms of management of our socialist industry:

Supreme Council of National Economy and local economic councils - Recovery period.

Weakly developed industry.

Ministries - The period of industrialization. The growth of ministries "associated (see Khrushchev's theses) with the growth of new technology, with the tasks of technical progress ..."

The period of extensive construction of communism. Creation of the material and technical base of communism.

Supreme Council of National Economy and local economic councils.

And I somehow could not find any logic in this scheme - why the increased requirements for the management of industry led us again to that organizational form of management that corresponded to the first years of the existence of Soviet power, when our industry took the very first, light steps, when the question of industry ran into "nails and kerosene" and when there was still no single national economic plan, no state planning bodies?

In his theses, Khrushchev rightly points out that the transition from economic councils to a system of people's commissariats, and then ministries, was dictated by "the growth of new technology, the tasks of technical progress, new achievements in science, opening up major qualitative changes in the organization of modern industrial production."

So one asks why the transition to the full-scale construction of communism, which, according to the logic of things, should have been characterized by an even greater growth of new technology, an even greater growth of technical progress, even deeper scientific achievements, etc. etc., that is, even more compelling reasons for maintaining the ministries, called upon to be responsible for the state of all these indicators in their sectors - why did this transition require a return to the old principles of industrial management?

Theses substantiate the need to restructure the management of industry by the presence of major shortcomings in the existing system, -

"3. A major shortcoming in the practice of managing industry and construction is the presence of departmental barriers, which often hinders the solution of many important issues of the development of the national economy. Numerous facts indicate that as a result of a narrow departmental approach to business on the part of some economic leaders, the state suffers heavy losses, the solution of a number of urgent national economic tasks is delayed for a long time...

4. The departmental approach leads to the weakening and often to the disruption of normal production links between enterprises of various industries located in the same economic administrative region. With a narrow departmental approach, the opportunities to quickly resolve economic issues on the ground are far from being fully used, it is more expedient to distribute the available material, labor and financial resources and take specific measures to quickly eliminate the shortcomings that are revealed in the implementation of plans.

6. With the existing forms of industrial management ... each ministry in many cases strives to manufacture everything for itself, regardless of the cost of funds and materials ...

7. One of the most important reasons that makes it necessary to reorganize the management of industry ... is also to use specialists more correctly and to involve numerous cadres of local workers in the management of industry ...

... Restructuring the management of industry ... will significantly reduce and simplify the apparatus ... "(pp. 13 - 17).

As is clear from the theses, the main, biggest shortcoming of the existing system of industrial management is the presence of difficult departmental barriers, a "departmental approach to business."

It is known that we have switched over to a new (or new?) system of industrial management, we have abandoned the sectoral principle of management in favor of the territorial principle. In the opinion of the authors of this perestroika, this principle will make it possible "to promptly solve the problems of developing the industry of a given region or republic on the basis of national interests" (p. 22).

According to the initiators of this restructuring, the replacement of several dozen sectoral ministries by an even greater number of economic councils built according to the territorial, and not only according to the territorial, but also according to the NATIONAL principle, should lead to the elimination of departmental barriers, to more efficient and concrete management of industry on the ground, to more correct consideration of national interests by local economic bodies.

This idea is very, very controversial.

And it seems to me that, if we ignore such an inevitable circumstance, in my opinion, as the fact that the new territorial system of industrial management will lead to the separation of enterprises of the same branch of industry, located in different economic regions and under the jurisdiction of different economic councils, will inevitably affect the growth of technical progress of the entire industry as a whole - in fact, when deciding on one form or another of industrial management, we were faced with the problem of choosing between departmental barriers and interests and barriers and local and national interests.

At one time, V. I. Lenin warned:

"Perhaps you will say, is it really so bad in the Soviet Republic that it is necessary to force the fulfillment of the will of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Comrades, you have to force it, and it's better to say it frankly than to hide it under your wing and imagine that everything is going well ... It is better to tell the truth, that our local bodies must be compelled steadily and mercilessly... This is very difficult... The struggle against localism, against small-ownership habits is difficult. so that they repeat this truth and put it into practice, because without this it is impossible to build socialism" (vol. 28, p. 377).

We decided that today V. I. Lenin's remark is quite outdated, as, indeed, the vast majority of all his other instructions, and that now our local comrades have grown so much that localism has become a lesser evil than a departmental approach to business.

"The most important thing that guarantees strict observance of the principles of democratic centralism and the interests of the whole state is the presence in the republics of a large army of profoundly international, theoretically trained cadres of our Party with extensive experience in practical work" (ibid., p. 145. Mukhitdinov).

The overwhelming majority of the comrades who spoke during the discussion of the question of restructuring the management of

industry opposed the proposals of some to create the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR - the Supreme Council of National Economy in the center, against the creation of Committees under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, noting that their creation would mean a return to the old forms of management, that the comrades who put forward such propositions are supposedly infected with a feeling of distrust of local cadres.

In practice, we had to create both the Supreme Council of National Economy and a multitude of committees directing various branches of industry.

Practice has shown that criticism of members of the so-called the anti-party group on the planned restructuring of industrial management was of a fundamental nature and was based on a more sober and objective assessment of the existing (and existing) state of affairs than the assessment of the initiators and supporters of this restructuring.

Speaking at the 21st Congress of the CPSU in 1959, Khrushchev said that "the gradual transition to communism cannot be understood as some kind of slow motion. On the contrary, this is a period of rapid development of modern industry, large-scale mechanized agriculture" (Stand report of the 21st Congress, p. 95).

This was the meaning of the restructuring of industrial management. The new organizational forms of industrial management were called upon to eliminate departmental barriers, to improve the efficiency and concreteness of the management of the national economy, etc., that is, in short, to open a wider and freer path for the furthermore accelerated advance of the economy of the "transitional period from socialism to communism" .

Were the activities justified?

Let's turn to the numbers. (See appendix) (The mentioned appendix is missing in the manuscript. - Ed.).

Here is Table No. 7. It summarizes the statistical data on the production of the main types of industrial products since 1928.

Table No. 2 is built on the basis of Table No. 1, and indicates the growth rates of production of the main types of industrial products for the corresponding periods in% by 1929 (the level of 1929 was taken as 100).

This table is also based on absolute figures, but if we pay attention to its final part - the result of comparing growth rates for individual periods - we can see that the period 1959 - 1963 in absolute terms, the growth of industrial output by no means surpassed previous periods in all respects. Of the 23 first places in this table, the period 1959-1963 occupies 13 first places.

Table No. 3 touches on one of the most important qualitative aspects - it summarizes data on the production of the main types of industrial products per capita, data on the growth rates of industrial output per capita.

Of the 15 indicators in this table, the period 1959 - 1963 is clearly defined in 1st place only by two indicators - by the growth rate of oil and electricity production per capita. According to three other indicators - the production of steel, iron, and meat - the period 1959 - 1963 hardly differs from previous years, according to the remaining TEN indicators it is significantly inferior to previous years in terms of growth rates of industrial output per capita.

Table No. 5 contains a summary of the data of all other tables under four main points:

- 1) by growth in absolute figures by periods;
- 2) by the percentage of this increase;
- 3) by average annual growth in absolute figures;
- 4) by % of average annual growth.

It seems to me that this table opens all the brackets for seemingly significant absolute numbers and allows you to do all the "and", which I do in table No. 5.

It shows that even in terms of purely quantitative indicators (to which I include absolute figures of growth both for the period under review

as a whole and average annual absolute figures), even in terms of these indicators, out of 64 first places, the period 1959-1963. occupies only 29 first places.

As for the 64 first places in terms of quality indicators, i.e. in terms of growth in percentage terms - both for the period as a whole and on average for years - we do not see the period 1959-1963 in any of the 64 first and even second places.

It turns out a rather curious picture: the period 1958 - 1963, i.e. the period that has passed in the new organizational forms of industrial management, conceived as a real means of improving the work of industry, as a real, effective means of accelerating the pace of our economic development, has in fact passed under the sign of a noticeable slowdown in the pace of development of our economy. Here is the accelerated movement towards communism!

There are people who say that we must not lose sight of the fact that today each percentage increase in industrial output far exceeds in material terms the percentage of increase in previous years. They say that if, for example, each percentage increase in coal in 1937 was expressed in the figure of 1.3 million tons, in 1950 - in 2.6 million tons, then in 1963 it was expressed in the figure of 5, 3 million tons.

Is this statement convincing?

No, not convincing. For it should be clear to every adult person that it was equally difficult for our country to achieve an increase in production by, say, 10% over the level achieved both in 1937 and in 1963. A weightlifter-lightweight is no less heavy than a barbell weighing 100 kg than a heavyweight 200.

This statement is false and essentially, from table No. 5 it is not so difficult to see that, the period 1959 - 1963. and in terms of the absolute size of the average annual growth of the main types of industrial products in those industries in which it ranks first, for many of them it differs very slightly from the previous period (out of 13 indicators, this phenomenon occurs in 7 cases).

The program of the CPSU proclaimed that

"The CPSU sets a task of world-historic significance - to ensure in the Soviet Union the highest standard of living in comparison with any country of capitalism" (p. 92).

The program of the CPSU solemnly assures us that this task will be accomplished in "the next decade (1961-1970)" (p. 66).

According to our statistics, per capita production of the main types of industrial products in the USSR and the USA was (in 1963):

	the USSR	USA	USSR in % to the USA
Steel	357	535	69
Cast iron	263	347	76
Oil	924	1965	47
Cement	272	312	88
Chemical fibers	1.4	6.0	23
Sulfuric acid	30.6	98.3	31
Mineral fertilizers	88.7	206	43
Electricity	1824	5636	32
Meat	45.7	97.0	50
Cereals	496.4	900.0	55

Assuming that the natural increase in the population in the USSR and the USA will remain at the current level (1.6% and 1.3%, respectively), and that the annual increase in the main types of industrial products will also remain at the current level (8% and 3% respectively), then we will catch up with the United States in terms of per capita production of these types of industrial products.

	Absolute production		Population (million)		Production (per capita)		Year
	the USSR	USA	the USSR	USA	the USSR	USA	
Cast iron	93.3	77.7	245	207	380	375	1969
Steel	156.3	131.8	258	216	606	610	1972
Oil	778.0	652.0	303	250	2570	2608	1982
Cement	83.0	67.0	238	203	373	332	1967
Chem. fibers	3900.0	3000.0	375	300	10.4	10.0	1997
Min. fertilizer	70.3	58.0	280	231	25	25	1977
Electricity.	2692	2165	323	260	3334	8327	1987

It follows from the table that even if the average annual growth of the main types of industrial products of the USSR is 2.5 times higher than the average annual growth of the corresponding industries in the United States, then the task set by the CPSU Program - in 1970 to catch up with any country of capitalism in per capita production - will not be able to be fulfilled. And this is all the more true if we remember that in recent years the rates of development of the main branches of industry in such capitalist states as the USA, the FRG, France, Japan, and Italy have not lagged behind the rates of development of the industries of the Soviet Union.

The question arises: was the promise of the Program of the CPSU, given in 1961 - to catch up with the most advanced capitalist states in terms of living standards by 1970 - mere boasting or did it have a real basis?

To answer this question, we must go back and consider the entire period 1946-1960, the period, the analysis of the economic development of which led the authors of the CPSU Program to the above-mentioned solemn promise.

If we turn to table No. 2, we will see that the period 1946-1960 gives the following figures for the average annual increase in the most important types of industrial products: for steel - 28%, for cast iron - 27%, for oil - 41%, for mineral fertilizers - 51%, for electricity generation - 36%, etc.

A simple calculation shows that such rates of development, if they were sustained, would undoubtedly enable our country to overtake by 1970 the main capitalist countries in per capita output of the listed types of industrial products. Thus, the authors of the Program of the CPSU stood on quite real ground when in 1961 they made a promise on behalf of the Party to ensure by 1970 the Soviet people the highest standard of living in the world.

Unfortunately, the CPSU Program turned out to be discredited in this area as well, because even now it can be stated with absolute certainty that even an annual increase in production of 50% is unlikely to help us catch up with the advanced capitalist countries in the remaining 5 years before 1970.

The question is - are there any objective reasons that have led to a significant slowdown in the growth rates of our industry in the recent period?

Bourgeois economists and sociologists - defenders of the capitalist mode of production - have always sought to prove that the high rates of development of production that characterized the socialist economy are allegedly inherent in any country "in the initial stage of industrialization", during the transition from a period of low level of development of productive forces to a certain high level, upon reaching which these rates must inevitably slow down.

It seems to me that by declaring, as some people do, that the percentages of 1963 are not at all the same as the percentages of 1937, we are willingly or unwillingly playing into the hands of the fabrications of bourgeois economists and sociologists. Meanwhile, statistics reject the arguments of such scientists. One cannot deny that a country like the United States has long passed the initial stage of industrialization. Therefore, it is interesting to compare the rates of development of those branches of industry in the USA and the USSR for which there is relevant data in our official reference materials.

	Growth in the USSR				Growth in the USA			
	1950- 1955		1958 - 1963		1950 - 1955		1958 - 1963	
	Absol.	AT %	Absol.	AT %	Absol.	AT %	Absol.	AT %
Coal (million tons)	130	150	36	107	62	88	41	110
Oil (million tons)	37	212	93	182	69	126	43	113
Steel (million tons)	18	166	25	146	18	120	22	128
Pig iron (million tons)	14	173	19	148	11	119	13	125
Electricity	89	197	176	175	254	162	299	139
Cement (million tons)	12	220	28	183	thirteen	229	29	197

This plate indicates that in such a highly developed country as the United States, the main industries developed at a fairly high pace. Curious in this regard is the next tablet, which somewhat deciphers the previous one (see table, on p. 70).

What do “ the obtained data” show? They testify that in recent years US industry not only has not lagged behind Soviet industry in terms of growth rates, but has even outpaced our country in some of the most important branches. This fact cannot be denied and cannot be justified by any theoretical references.

Capitalist production, whose goal is to extract a certain rate of profit for the enrichment of the capitalist class, is characterized by a general slow growth of production, with periodic ups and downs. The socialist economy, whose goal, as the Program of the CPSU says, is to satisfy the growing material needs of the working people in every possible way, is characterized by rapid and steady growth in production.

	Year max. growth	Producti on of the previous year	Absolute. growth. an d in %	Absol. pr oduction	Growth 1962	AT %
USSR, 1963						
Pig iron (million tons)	1962	50.9	4.4 - 3.6	55.3	3.4	6.1
Steel (million tons)	1962	70.3	5.5 -7.1	76.3	3.9	5.1
Coal (million tons)	1955	347.1	38.6 -11.1	454.4	12.0	2.6
Electricity	1963	369.3	40.0 -10.8	369.3	40.0	10.8
Oil (million tons)	1962	166.0	20.2 -12.1	186.2	19.9	10.7
USA, 1963						
Cast iron	1955	-	17.3 -	60.1	7.0	11.6
Steel	1955	81.8	26.6 -	90.8	10.0	11.0
Coal (stone)	1955	-	63.4 -	398.6	29.0	7.3
Electricity	1955	-	34.4 -	648.6	64.0	9.9
Oil	1955	-	22.9 -	365.0	7.0	1.9

Absolute increase in 1963 as a percentage of that year's volume

	Cast iron	Steel	Coal	Electricity	Oil
the USSR	eight%	7.3%	7.5%	12%	eleven%
USA	24.6%	24.5%	14.3%	12.7%	7%

This goal of the socialist economy, and all the more, the entry of our country into the period of the full-scale construction of communism, a social system that means the distribution of material goods according to needs, proclaimed by the Program, requires and cannot but require high rates of production growth.

My analysis of the state of affairs in our industry, as far as possible, reveals the opposite picture: after the reorganization of industrial management on new organizational lines, the growth rates of industrial production in our country slowed down, despite a significant absolute increase in capital investment in industry, the rate of capital investment in industry also decreased compared to the previous periods of socialist construction, such an important indicator of the work of industry as the output of gross output per worker has deteriorated, the cost of capital construction has risen in price, and so on.

What led to this? In my opinion, the reasons for the deterioration in the work of our industry should be sought in the fact that, firstly, 102 economic councils and a dozen government committees headed by the Supreme Economic Council turned out to be not the best, but the worst management system than fifty-two branch union and union-republic ministries, and, secondly, that thanks to the new, territorial management system, the branch specialization of enterprises was violated, which, under the modern level of engineering and scientific thought, is the main condition for the continuous and rapid growth of production.

All of the above, of course, does not mean that the forms of industrial management that existed before perestroika were inviolable and did not need further refinement and improvement. Recently, both our press and the press of other (European) socialist countries have been devoting much attention to a new, yet another restructuring of industrial management and new principles of industrial production planning. According to the initiators of the new restructuring of industrial management and the new principles of planning, they should be carried out mainly in the direction of narrowing the range of planned indicators that are mandatory for the implementation of each specific enterprise, in the direction of providing these enterprises with complete economic independence.

Until now, when it came to a single national economic plan, I understood it as a program of action drawn up on the basis of the results and experience of work of previous years and development prospects for the future, on the basis of generalization and taking into account each branch of industry separately, the entire industry binding directive indicators.

The comrades who advocate a new restructuring of planning principles and the granting of "broad" economic independence to enterprises by significantly narrowing the range of indicators that are mandatory for every industrial enterprise are trying to prove that such a restructuring will in no way diminish the role of the unified national economic plan, the role of the socialist state, since in the most important economic levers for regulating production remain in his hands, such as state planned prices, for example.

If I am not mistaken, the concept of "price of products" at our socialist enterprises includes the following components: COST OF PRODUCTS, i.e. cash costs for the raw materials, materials, fuel, electricity used for the production of this type of product, depreciation charges, for the wages of workers and employees with various types of accruals on it, the expenses of the enterprise for administrative and managerial needs, and plus the so-called "net income" of the enterprise, PROFIT, defined as the difference between the cost of production and the STATE PLANNED PRICE FOR IT, the higher the state planned price for it, the greater the income of the enterprise, its profit. This is understandable.

Until now, the state has centrally determined each and every indicator included in the concept of the cost of production, and prices for all types of raw materials, materials, fuel, and electricity, for transport services, etc., established the staff of the administrative and managerial apparatus, determined the number of workers, established the wage fund, etc. It was on the basis of the average cost of a given type of product that the state determined, taking into account the needs of expanding reproduction, the state price for this type of product.

And I ask myself: is it possible to establish sufficiently correct state prices for commercial products without taking into account and planning in a centralized manner all those indicators and standards that ultimately determine this price itself? Is the establishment of state

planned prices conceivable without taking into account and planning the needs of society in each specific type of product, without taking into account and planning the needs of each specific enterprise in raw materials and materials, machine tools and equipment, fuel, and transport, etc.? etc.? Is it conceivable to establish state planned prices without taking into account and planning the quantity and assortment of coal mining, oil production, steel smelting, non-ferrous metals, production of machine tools, aircraft, instruments, etc.? etc.?

It seems to me that it is unthinkable. I think that all the main indicators and standards of our state plans are so closely related to each other, so It follows one from the other that, speaking of a single national economic plan, of the planning and regulating activity of the socialist state, it is impossible to limit this activity to one or several aspects and indicators of the plan.

A socialist state, if it wants to remain socialist, in the Marxist-Leninist sense of the word, cannot abandon or weaken the principles of socialist planning. It cannot but plan and regulate such indicators of the work of industry as the volume and range of goods produced, as well as the price of goods produced.

The planned system of a new restructuring of production planning and management is closely linked to the problem of workers' material interest in the results of their labor. It is assumed that since the new planning system will not bind enterprises with mandatory quantitative indicators and the planning and regulatory role of state plans will be expressed through economic incentives and levers, such a reform will allow a new approach to solving the problem of material interest, will allow it to be sufficiently successfully solved, and this, in turn, will lead to the most efficient use of the production capabilities of each enterprise and the entire socialist economy as a whole. Economists and politicians argue about what to put as the basis of the system of material incentives for employees of enterprises - whether their participation in the profits of the enterprise, or in gross income, etc. They even agree that the state should not determine the wage funds and the number of employees of this or that enterprise.

There is talk of granting the right to the administration of enterprises itself to determine the number of required personnel and determine the amount of remuneration for work, based only on their production

capabilities and needs. They put forward the slogan: "What is beneficial to production is beneficial to the people."

The comrades who advocate a new planning system, which gives individual enterprises the maximum possible economic independence, argue that the old planning system had a negative effect on technical progress, because manufacturing enterprises were not really interested in improving the quality of their products, since they were not directly connected with the interests of consumers, since the amount of material remuneration depended only on the fulfillment of planned indicators. The material interest of enterprises in the fulfillment of quantitative targets causes them to strive to receive from the center the smallest possible targets, not to disclose their true production capabilities, and so on. etc., since "experience has taught them that if they reveal their unused reserves.

Indeed, all these, yes, plus and many other shortcomings take place and are widespread in the existing planning system. This is a fact that cannot be escaped. But, one wonders, under the proposed planning system, will the amount of remuneration, the principles of material incentives NOT be linked to the fulfillment of certain planned indicators? Will the amount of remuneration for work be irrelevant to how this or that worker performs the work entrusted to him? Both in quality and quantity? Will the new system of planning and material remuneration assume unchanging targets for a number of years? Is it possible that under the new planning system, the planned indicators set for enterprises, whatever they may be, for example, the volume of products sold? (I take this indicator not by chance, but intentionally.)

It seems to me that there cannot be such a system of remuneration, such principles of material incentives, which would be divorced from the qualitative and quantitative planned state indicators, which would not depend on how this or that worker or this or that enterprise copes with its planned tasks that would remain unchanged despite the growth in labor productivity, the reduction in production costs, etc.

And if so, since such a system of remuneration for work cannot exist - any system of central planning under socialism, i.e. in conditions of actual inequality of people, will always cause in people "the desire to receive from the center the smallest possible planned targets, not to

reveal their true production capabilities," etc. etc., in order to get the maximum material reward for each given moment of time.

It is clear that when I say this, I do not mean all the Soviet people, for a large part of whom almost 50 years of Soviet power mean something. But try to ponder for a moment the arguments of the initiators and supporters of the new planning system, the arguments of the supporters of granting individual enterprises complete economic independence.

What do the assertions mean that enterprises do not actively care about improving the quality of their products, about technical progress, etc.? What does the desire of enterprises to get the smallest possible plan, not to fully disclose their production capabilities mean? What does "distorted presentation of information to the center" mean, etc.?

What does all this mean?

Of course, an entire philosophical treatise could be wound up around this issue if desired. But it seems to me, in short and to the point, that all these and similar arguments of the initiators and supporters of the new system of planning and production management mean only one thing: they do not characterize objective shortcomings inherent in the very nature of the existing system of planning and management, but serve as just another vivid example of the still low level of socialist consciousness among many and many of our economic workers - those for whom personal material interests are higher than the interests of society.

This means that V. I. Lenin's instruction that "the will of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee must be forced to fulfill ..." has not yet lost its force ... This means that in 1957, declaring "his disagreement with the and referring to the fact that allegedly the time has not yet come for such a reform in our country" (see E. A. Furtseva's speech at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. Stenotchet, p. 396), Molotov was right, and not Furtseva and others like her.

"Being determines consciousness" - no one disputes this Marxist position. It is so, and only so. No one disputes the need to perfect and improve the system of material incentives, which under socialism, under conditions of class society, remains an effective instrument in the hands of the socialist state for creating an abundance of material

and spiritual goods, without which the transition from socialism to communism is unthinkable. Nobody disputes this.

But, in my opinion, putting forward the principle of personal material interest to the forefront of the struggle for communism and at the same time endowing individual enterprises (i.e., the leaders of these enterprises) with broad economic powers, granting these enterprises broad independence, etc., - in my opinion, we are making and aggravating the same mistake that we made in 1957 - we are overestimating the ability of very many of our workers to think according to the state, subordinating their personal material interests to the interests of the whole people.

I believe that in the present conditions, when in recent years, despite assurances to the contrary, the principle of material interest has actually been significantly undermined, that is, when the real wages of the majority of working people are still quite noticeably behind the fairly high subsistence minimum, such a mistake would have been even more dangerous in its consequences than in 1957.

It is my deep conviction that in order to restore our economy to its former rates of development, in order to exceed them, to use more fully all the numerous reserves, all the advantages of the socialist mode of production over the capitalist, all the advantages of planned, centralized production over anarchic, market production, -First of all, we should return to the sectoral principle of industrial management, to the system of sectoral ministries. Only such, branch,

A STATE-WIDE SPECIALIZED system is able to follow the continuous and ever-accelerating growth of technological progress. As one of the most important, obligatory for the fulfillment by each enterprise of state planned indicators, it is necessary to put into practice the indicator of "introduction of new technology."

Our national economic plans must be precise and concrete documents and have a strictly prescriptive character that is binding on every enterprise. All the attention of Party, state and Soviet bodies must be directed not to one more, new reorganization of our national economy on yet another new basis, but all their attention must be directed to the improvement, strengthening and expansion of the old one that existed before 1957, proven by many years of practice. systems of strictly centralized management of the entire national economy; all

their attention should be directed to concrete measures to correct the shortcomings and errors in it, which are quite possible and explainable in such a complex matter as planning and management in such a gigantic and "difficult" state as our country.

Our planning and regulating bodies must first of all have accurate information about the state of affairs at each concrete enterprise, in each branch of industry, and in the entire national economy as a whole. With accurate information as the main input, we will be able to correctly build all our planning and regulatory work.

Without having such information - mistakes and miscalculations are INEVITABLE. And here, as I am sure, neither the granting of broad independence to enterprises, nor the participation of workers in the profits of enterprises will help.

In my opinion, the cause of a new qualitative and quantitative rise in our industry should be started from the bottom - from the improvement and strengthening of the planned activities of individual enterprises, and in them - directly from the workplace.

It is no secret that with the existing armchair approach to the matter of setting production standards and prices for certain types of work, with the widespread practice of frequent and REALLY unsupported increases in production standards and price reductions in pursuit of quantitative indicators - among the majority of workers there is and is growing an insurmountable tendency to conceal or underestimate their productive capacity.

This trend objectively exists, is widespread, and not only the majority of workers, but also many production teams as a whole are infected with it.

And it is this trend, from my point of view, that is the main brake on the path of further progress in our industry.

It seems to me that until we get rid of the practice of annual increases in production rates, an increase based in the overwhelming majority of cases not on the basis of a real improvement in the organization of labor and methods of work, not on the basis of a real introduction into production of more productive equipment, etc., but ONLY IN CALCULATION OF THESE, ONLY BECAUSE THE PLAN REQUIRES IT, ONLY BECAUSE OTHERWISE OUR LEADERS WILL

SUFFER BOTH MATERIALLY AND MORALLY - until then we will not be able to obtain either sufficiently accurate information from the field, or correctly solve the problem of material interest.

Establishment of progressive, technically substantiated production standards, taking into account not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative side, is the first, obligatory step not only on the way to obtaining accurate initial data for the preparation of state plans, but, at the same time, the first and obligatory step towards the correct resolving the issue of material interest.

Production rates (and, accordingly, prices) must be constructed in such a way that the working day does not turn into a pursuit of quantity at the expense of quality, does not turn into a pursuit of some maximum monetary reward.

We recognize, and I have already said this, that even at the present stage of development of our society, small proprietorship survivors are still very tenacious in it. And if we cannot go far on bare enthusiasm, then, in my opinion, we must not get carried away and overestimate the importance of the principle of material interest. In my opinion, it is they, these material incentives, which cause facts of eyewash, distorted presentation of information, etc. in life.

We must clearly define in our economic policy what is more important for us at the present stage of development of our economy - the exact fulfillment of plans based on objective data, or the fulfillment (and over fulfillment) of plans essentially based on underestimated figures, on incorrect information with places. In accordance with this distinction, a system of material incentives should be built.

If we base our plans on real and accurate baseline data, the first step towards which are technically sound production rates, raw material consumption rates, these plans SHOULD NOT serve as the starting point for a system of material incentives.

It seems to me that all employees of enterprises, including workers, should establish strictly defined, firm, differentiated wages.

It may be advisable to grant the right to the administration of enterprises, in agreement with public organizations, to set the amount of remuneration (wages) for certain employees of the enterprise,

guided by the business qualities of this person - qualifications, work experience, the specific benefits that he brings to the enterprise, etc., of course, without going beyond the general framework of the wage fund allocated to the enterprise according to the plan.

It is impossible not to plan the wage fund on a national scale, since in this case the state will not be able to correctly take into account the necessary proportions of the purchasing power of the population and the growth of industrial production. The fulfillment of the plan should be the law for the enterprise.

But I feel it necessary to emphasize once again that the plan should not be the object of the pursuit of additional earnings. No additional payments to the basic rate for the implementation and over fulfillment of the plan as a system. Bonuses for excellently working comrades at the end of the year - material and moral. Not necessarily cash. Strict material and moral responsibility for the assigned work - transfer to a lower rank, demotion.

SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE, TECHNICALLY SUBSTANTIATED OUTPUT RATE, RAW AND MATERIAL CONSUMPTION RATES, etc. - plan, built on the basis of these norms, is a salary that guarantees an employee with a conscientious attitude to entrusted work a certain firm earnings corresponding to or at least closely approaching the existing real subsistence minimum, - this is the way that we should go with in order to really and effectively increase the efficiency and profitability of the work of our socialist industry, to improve the quality of its products, and to properly build a system of material remuneration.

Having failed to establish sufficiently accurate initial data for drawing up our national economic plans, having failed to establish the amount of material remuneration for labor that closely corresponds to the real subsistence minimum, all our attempts in one way or another to solve the problem of the most complete and effective use of the advantages of socialist, centralized, and planned production over capitalist economy, it seems to me, are doomed to failure.

The Party and the Government must resolutely condemn the practice of unreasonably raising production rates and lowering prices. The Party and the Government must turn to the working class of our country, to all the working people with a direct and open appeal to

help them establish technically substantiated production standards at every concrete enterprise, at every workplace. They must explain to them that otherwise it is impossible to bring their own wages into line with life. And I am sure that the working people of our country will respond to such a call.

In concluding this section, it should be noted that on the same pages of our newspapers, where advocates and defenders of narrowing the range of planned indicators, supporters of granting broad independence to individual enterprises, one can find hundreds of examples of how many enterprises that are in the same conditions of strict centralization and directiveness of all planned indicators with all other industrial enterprises, without complaining about this centralization and directiveness, without turning to the state for compensation for the costs of improving their work, they are looking for and FIND large reserves that allow these enterprises to raise labor productivity and reduce the cost of production and improve its quality.

These hundreds of examples only once again convince us that the cause of a new qualitative upsurge in our socialist industry should not begin with a relaxation of the principle of planning and centralized management of it by the state, to which, in fact, all talk about granting enterprises a "broad" economic independence, on direct contracts, etc. - but FROM THE IMPROVEMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF EXACTLY THESE PRINCIPLES, AND ABOVE ALL AT EACH SPECIFIC ENTERPRISE.

Agriculture

From the very beginning of the consideration of this question, it must be said that our Party, our leaders (including J. V. Stalin) never concealed the fact that, despite certain and undeniable successes in the development of our agriculture, on the whole it developed unsatisfactorily. The pace of development of agriculture lagged far behind the pace of industrial development. The productivity of the fields was low. The state of animal husbandry left much to be desired. Anyone who wants to be convinced of this should at least glance at the materials of all party congresses, ending with the 21st Congress of the CPSU in 1959.

September 1953, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in its resolution stated:

"What are the reasons for the insufficient level of agricultural production in general and the definite lag in important branches of agriculture?

The Communist Party has consistently pursued a policy of developing heavy industry in every possible way as a necessary condition for the successful development of all branches of the national economy, and has achieved great success along this path.

The main attention was paid to the solution of this priority national economic task, the main forces and means were directed here. Our best cadres were engaged in the industrialization of the country. We did not have the opportunity to ensure the simultaneous development at high rates of heavy industry, agriculture, and light industry. For this it was necessary to create certain prerequisites "(" On measures for the further development of agriculture in the USSR. "Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 7/IX 1953, based on the report of N. Khrushchev. Gospolitizdat, 1953, p. 5)

It is impossible not to agree with these words. And every unprejudiced person, without any reference to the relevant authorities, will undoubtedly understand that these words equally apply both to the pre-war period of the development of our agriculture, and to the post-war period - 1946-1950.

I would like to remind some comrades with a short memory what the Great Patriotic War brought to the national economy of the USSR.

"The regions of the USSR that were under temporary occupation, on the eve of the Patriotic War, in relation to the entire territory of the USSR, occupied a significant share: in population - 45%, in gross industrial output - 33, in sown areas - 47, in livestock (translated into cattle) - 45% ... On the territory of the USSR, which was occupied, 31,850 plants, factories and other industrial enterprises, not counting small ones, were completely or partially destroyed and looted, 1876 state farms, 2890 MTS, 98,000 collective farms, 216,700 shops,

canteens, restaurants and other commercial enterprises, 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 postal and telegraph institutions, telephone stations, radio stations and other communications enterprises, 6,000 hospitals, 33,000 clinics and outpatient clinics, 976 sanatoriums and 656 rest houses, 82,000 primary and secondary schools , 1520 technical schools, 334 universities, 605 research institutes and other scientific institutions, 427 museums, 43,000 public libraries and 167 theaters, 175,000 machine tools, 34,000 hammers and presses, 2,700 cutters, 5 million kW of power plant capacity, 62 blast furnaces, 213 open-hearth furnaces, 45,000 looms... 7 million horses out of a total of 11.6 million horses were destroyed or stolen by the invaders, who were in these areas before the occupation; 17 million heads of cattle were exterminated out of a total of 31 million heads; 20 million heads of pigs were destroyed out of a total of 23.6 million heads; 27 million sheep and goats were exterminated out of a total of 43 million ... The material base of the mechanization of agriculture was undermined: 137,000 tractors, 49,000 combines were destroyed or stolen by the invaders in the areas of the USSR that were occupied ... 285,000 livestock buildings were destroyed and destroyed , 565,000 hectares of fruit plantations and 156,000 hectares of vineyards ... Of the 122,000 km of railway track that was before the war on the territory of the USSR, occupied, 65,000 km of track were destroyed and plundered. 15,800 locomotives and 428,000 wagons were damaged. The occupiers destroyed, sank, and seized 4,280 passenger, cargo, and tugboats of river transport and 4,029 non-self-propelled vessels. Of the 26,000 bridges, 13,000 were destroyed... Of the 2,567,000 residential buildings in the cities of the USSR that were occupied, 1,209,000 houses were destroyed and destroyed ... Of the 12 million residential buildings of the rural population ... 3.5 million were destroyed and destroyed residential houses... Stocks of goods, agricultural products, semi-finished products, raw materials, fuel, materials, finished products and other material assets were looted and destroyed... More than half of the household property of the population in the areas subjected to occupation was destroyed and plundered" (N.

Voznesensky "The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War".

This is what the war brought to our people.

Our national economy reached the milestones of the first post-war five-year plan - 1946 - with the following indicators (including restoration work during the liberation of the occupied territories of the USSR):

In the field of industry.

Coal production in 1945 was 90% of the 1940 level, oil - 62%, steel production - 68%, pig iron - 59%; production of machine tools - 66%, turbines - 19%, cars - 52%, tractors - 24%, combines - 4%, mineral fertilizers - 35%, meat (industrial production) - 44%, butter - 52%, granulated sugar - 21%, shoes - 30%, etc.

In the field of agriculture.

The total sown area in 1946 was 75.7% of the 1940 level, including the sown area of cereals - 77% (wheat - 62%), cotton - 58%, sugar beet - 68%, etc. The gross grain harvest in 1946 was 40% of the 1940 level, raw cotton - 48%, sugar beet - 22%, potatoes - 77%, etc.

Grain yields in 1946 fell by 50% compared to 1940, sugar beets by 67%, raw cotton by 17%, and so on. The number of cattle fell to 87% of the 1940 level, sheep, and goats - to 70%, pigs - to 38%.

Meat production was 55%, milk - 78%, eggs - 40%, etc. The number of harvesters in agriculture decreased by 20%, the supply of mineral fertilizers - by 80%, etc. (see appendix table) (the table is missing in the manuscript. - Ed.).

At the same time, we must not forget that the war claimed the lives of 20 million Soviet people and left tens of millions disabled. We must not be distracted from such a circumstance as the increase in the proportion of women, adolescents and the elderly in the war and post-war years. The share of women in industry in 1942 increased in comparison with 1940 from 41% to 52%, in railway transport - from 25% to 36%. The share of workers and employees under the age of 18 increased from 6% of the total number of workers and employees in industry in 1939 to 15% in 1942, the share of workers and employees over 50 years of age - from 9% to 12%.

Even more significant changes occurred in the composition of the rural working-age population. The proportion of women among the able-bodied rural population increased from 52% in 1939 to 71% at the beginning of 1943. ("War Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War", pp. 111 - 113).

It is clear that during the subsequent war years, as the losses on the war fronts were replenished, similar processes in the structure of industrial and agricultural personnel deepened and expanded. Our country faces gigantic tasks of rapid restoration and further development of our entire national economy.

Our country during 1946 - 1950 in general, successfully coped with the task. But if by 1950 industry not only fully restored the level of industrial production of 1940, but even surpassed it, then agriculture had much more modest success. The above quote from the resolution of the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU answers why this happened. And, as I said, a sane person cannot but agree with this decision.

After these few preliminary remarks, let's move on to the numbers. Tables No. 6, 7 and 8 bring together absolute data on agriculture, starting from 1929 - the first year of the first five-year plan. Table No. 9 characterizes the growth rates of the main branches of agricultural production, the growth rates of the level of mechanization. Tables No. 10 and 11 decipher the previous tables (for each period under review) according to four main indicators: 1) by absolute growth; 2) by absolute growth in percent; 3) by average annual absolute growth; 4) by average annual growth in percent. And, finally, table No. 12, compiled on the basis of all the previous ones, sums up all of them (the mentioned tables are absent in the manuscript. - Ed.).

And the result, I would say, is striking. Of the 120 possible first places in the main quantitative and qualitative indicators of the development of our agriculture over the 35 years of Soviet power (since 1929), the period 1959-1963. occupies only 10 (!!) places, and only in absolute numbers, and not in general or average annual growth rates.

Speaking at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 13/UP 1964, Khrushchev said:

"Everyone who understands at least something about agriculture should be clear that its development cannot be judged by the results of one year. Year after year, as the people say, is not necessary. To have a correct picture, one must take the appropriate data in a few years. Only with this approach can one see the actual state of affairs, the trends in the development of agriculture "(Khrushchev, "On the Measures for the Implementation of the CPSU Program in the Field of Improving the Welfare of the People." Report at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Gospolitizdat, 1964, p. 7).

Khrushchev is right. Of course, one cannot judge the trends in the development of agriculture by the results of one year, whether it be high-yielding (as was 1958) or low-yielding (as was the year 1963). But it seems to me that the tables I cite fully meet Khrushchev's requirement.

And look at the whole period 1959 - 1963. generally. Gross harvests of grain grew slowly, and grain yields stagnated at the level of the pre-war years, despite the increased consumption of mineral fertilizers, etc.

Gross yields of sugar beets have been steadily creeping down since 1959, despite the expansion of sown areas. The yield of sugar beet fell year after year. Potatoes are pretty bad. Curious data are also given in the collection "The National Economy of the USSR" for 1963. Here they are (Tables on productivity, growth in sown areas and gross harvests for grain, cotton, sugar beets and potatoes in 1932-1963 - not reproduced. - Ed.) ...

Crop yield is the most important indicator in agriculture. From the above table it can be seen that if in the prewar years there was still a clearly expressed tendency to increase the yield of all crops, which was observed, however, to a lesser extent and not for all crops, until 1958, then starting from 1959 our agriculture actually marking time - gross crop yields barely follow the expansion of sown areas, and for the most part do not keep up with it. The number of livestock increased during this period. And the production of meat and milk remained at the level of 1958. The average annual milk yield per cow has steadily declined. And I consider it necessary to emphasize this circumstance once again, all this took place in conditions when the

level of chemicalization and mechanization (theoretical, tabular level) increased.

What happened to our agriculture? What are the reasons for his trampling in one place? After all, indeed, as was repeatedly noted in party decisions, by the end of the 1950s, all the prerequisites for its further qualitative and quantitative growth had been created in our agriculture.

To answer this question is, in my opinion, to answer the question about the ways of development of our post-war agriculture, to answer the question about the intensive or extensive way of its development, to answer the question about virgin and fallow lands.

From the very beginning of the consideration of this issue, it must be said that the question of the development of virgin and fallow lands, an issue that became so acute in 1955-1957, during the period of the struggle against the so-called. anti-party group, then not for the first time rose in the party.

As early as the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1930, when discussing the ways of developing our young socialist agriculture, many delegates said that "the development of new areas is not always the cheapest way to obtain an additional amount of products", that "we must go not only along the line of expanding the area under crops, but also focus on the quality of farming: not only in breadth, but also in depth" (Stenotchet of the 16th Congress, pp. 603, 625, etc.).

It is interesting to note that on 20 / GU 1940, a Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was published, which outlined measures to improve agriculture in the eastern regions of our country - Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Akmola, Kustanai and other areas. The agricultural workers of these regions were tasked with developing virgin and fallow lands by the beginning of 1943 to increase the area of arable land in these regions by 4345 thousand hectares, bringing the total area of arable land in these regions to 13830 thousand hectares, and the gross harvest of grain crops up to 1 billion 875 million poods (Coll. "Socialist agriculture"). So Khrushchev, if it came to that, was by no

means original, putting forward in 1955-1957 the task of developing virgin and fallow lands.

And the so-called anti-party group in 1955-1957 did NOT oppose the PRINCIPLE of the development of virgin and fallow lands. And the dispute between Khrushchev's supporters and members of the so-called. The anti-Party group arose, of course, not about whether it was necessary or not to develop the virgin lands, i.e. to expand or not to expand the sown areas - it was clear to everyone that they could and should be expanded as one of the reserves for increasing the yield of agricultural products. The dispute revolved around the question of the methods and timing of the development of these lands, the choice of an intensive or extensive path for the further development of our agriculture. The essence of the dispute, wittingly or unwittingly, was betrayed by Khrushchev himself at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, when he said:

"If we carried out the development of virgin lands through the usual, so to speak, gradual resettlement of working people to new areas, we would need a huge number of people, a lot of money and time. Then, of course, we would not be able to solve the problem of lifting 30 million hectares in two years' new lands" (Stenotchet of the XX Congress of the CPSU, 1956, vol. 1, pp. 57 - 58).

Characteristic in this regard was the speech of the penitent Bulganin at the February Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1958:

"I remember well the situation in the Presidium of the Central Committee," said Bulganin, "when Comrade Khrushchev raised the question of virgin lands and their development ..." This is a gamble, "said Molotov ..." We will be left without bread, "they said Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich "We must stifle the movement for the slogan - to catch up with the United States in the production of livestock products per capita, we will not have enough feed," they said "(Stenotchet Plenum, M., 1958, p. 340).

Many "kind" words addressed to members of the so-called the anti-party group was also said at the XXII Congress of the CPSU.

"When the issue of developing virgin lands was discussed, Molotov objected fiercely. He stated, these are his true words,

that virgin lands are not worth it, that it will not pay off the invested funds" (from the speech of N. G. Ignatov, stenographic report, p. 104).

In the speeches of some other delegates to the XXII Congress of the CPSU, it was indicated that the members of the so-called the anti-party group objected to the development of virgin lands, arguing that most of the areas for the development of virgin and fallow lands are areas with unproductive, low-yielding lands (see, in particular, Satyukov's speech).

Of course, it is difficult to consider any controversial issue without knowing the motivated objections of one of the parties. But, it seems to me, from the above statements, with a sufficient degree of accuracy, one can get an idea of the position of the members of the so-called anti-party group on the development of virgin and fallow lands. This position seems to me to be the following. First, they did NOT object in principle to the need to develop virgin and fallow lands. The dispute was only about the SCALE of this development, about the physical capabilities of the state, so to speak, to raise and REALLY develop tens of millions of hectares of new lands in the shortest possible time. In other words, it was ABOUT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE REAL POSSIBILITIES OF OUR STATE.

Secondly, they were for the development of virgin and fallow lands in the usual way, i.e. by preliminary creating conditions for the resettlement of people in new, uninhabited, and remote areas.

And thirdly, they tried to prove that the development of virgin and fallow lands on such a scale as planned would not pay off the invested funds because of the low quality of these lands and because of the physical impossibility for the state to improve the quality of these lands.

Members of the so-called the anti-Party group believed that it was NECESSARY for the state to invest the planned funds in other, more productive lands in order to further raise the quality level of our agriculture.

In the collection "The National Economy of the USSR in 1963" p. 275 gives data on the gross yields and yields of all grain crops in the Union republics since 1950.

Pay attention to the data on the Kazakh SSR - the main area for the development of virgin and fallow lands. Of the 15 union republics of Kazakhstan, according to the average annual grain yield for the period 1949 - 1954. took only 13th place (after the Tajik and Uzbek SSR).

Life itself decided the dispute between Khrushchev and his supporters and members of the so-called anti-party group. And, as expected, not in favor of the former. Life has shown that the state really did not have enough funds for the development of agricultural production "not only in breadth, but also in depth." Life showed that obtaining additional products due to an unjustifiably wide expansion of sown areas was indeed not the cheapest and most economically advantageous way.

In December 1958, at the next Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev said:

"When the idea of developing virgin lands (??!) arose, Molotov and other members of the anti-party group, opposing this event of the party and government, tried to prove that the costs of developing virgin lands would not pay off and this business was supposedly economically unprofitable. According to the Central Statistical Service and the Ministry of Finance , in 1954 - 1958 the state invested 30 billion 700 million rubles in the development of virgin lands ... The state not only covered these investments, but moreover, it already received a net income for the specified period of over 18 million rubles "(Stenotchet of the Plenum Central Committee of the CPSU of 15 / KhP-58, pp. 44 - 15).

I have no reason to question the data of the Central Statistical Bureau and the Ministry of Finance given in Khrushchev's report. But upon careful consideration of the documents of congresses and plenums of the Central Committee, the thought involuntarily arises that in this case Khrushchev operated with the figure of only DIRECT capital investments of the state for the development of new lands, completely ignoring the INDIRECT state expenditures for these purposes. Already in Khrushchev's most cited report at the December 1958 Plenum of the Central Committee, there is a significant phrase about "more than three million students, young workers and

employees" who worked on the virgin harvest (see p. 14 of the Stenotcheta).

The then member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan N. I. Belyaev, speaking at the same Plenum, "let slip" that "for the harvest of 1958, our agriculture (Kazakhstan. - GM.) did not have enough 277 thousand workers. The turnover of labor is still high. In four years, 163,000 people left the state farms of the republic, which is completely abnormal. Kazakhstan has to attract temporary workers. In 1956, 118,000 students worked in the fields of Kazakhstan, in 1957 - 125,000, and in 1958 - 160,000. young people for a long distance, but usually in the midst of their studies - an extremely undesirable thing. It is expensive for the state. For four years, only transportation costs amounted to 590 million rubles. In addition, this disrupts the study and life of young people "(Stenotchet, p. 104).

"Poor" Belyaev let it slip and ... got burned.

But the fact remains that the figures given in Khrushchev's report on the state's expenditures on the development of virgin and fallow lands in no way take into account the state's losses from the costs of annually sending hundreds of thousands of people to virgin regions, and on the annual transportation of numerous detachments of machine operators from other regions to virgin regions. with its own fleet of vehicles, etc. etc. With these expenditures taken into account, the overall balance of state expenditures and revenues for the development of virgin and fallow lands will undoubtedly be reduced to a minimum, if not to zero.

I am convinced that if we were in 1956-1957 listened to the opinion of the members of the so-called anti-Party group and the enormous funds that we have invested in the development of unproductive and uninhabited virgin areas, would be used for the mechanization and chemicalization of our agriculture - such an event would give us a much greater quantitative, and most importantly, qualitative effect.

Based on various statistical sources, I have compiled (according to 1950 or 1952) the following small tablet.

	Wheat yield (c/ha)	Average annual milk yield (thousand liters)	Number of tractors ha -X. lands
the USSR	9.0	1.0	2
Austria	17	2	13
Belgium	28	3.6	8
Denmark	32	3.4	16
France	16	2	25
Germany	27	2.7	25
Sweden	25	2.9	21
England	23	2.8	27
Holland.	34	3.8	12

From the table it is clear that there is a direct and inseparable relationship between the level of agricultural mechanization and the productivity of agricultural crops, between the productivity of agricultural crops and the productivity of animal husbandry.

I do not have data for this period on the consumption of mineral fertilizers in various countries. But it should be clear to everyone, even without any figures, that the level of agricultural [production] in a particular country is as directly and inseparably dependent on the level of chemicalization as it is on the level of mechanization.

The journal *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*) (No. 7, 1965) published interesting information on the development of the level of mechanization of agricultural production in the capitalist countries on pages 155 and onwards.

If we trace the growth rates of the level of agricultural mechanization in the capitalist countries over the past decade, using table No. 1 of the journal, we will get the following picture (table, not reproduced. - Ed.) ... our agriculture in terms of mechanization from the developed capitalist countries. And the most unpleasant thing is that it lags behind them not only in absolute figures, but, strange as it may seem, but strange because, for example, I thought the opposite, it lags far behind them in terms of the rate of mechanization of agriculture.

What would have happened if at one time we had limited ourselves to the size of the sown area in 1953 and invested the funds that in

subsequent years were directed to their expansion into the production of agricultural machinery and mineral fertilizers?

The sown area in 1953 was 157.2 million hectares, of which 106 million were occupied by grain crops. 744,000 tractors and 318,000 grain combines worked in the country's agriculture, that is, there were 4.7 tractors per 1,000 hectares of arable land and 3.0 combines per 1000 ha of grain.

In 1958, the tractor park was 1 million tractors, and the combine - 502,000, but already on 196 million hectares of crops, of which grain occupied 125 million hectares, that is, in 1958, 1000 hectares of arable land accounted for 5.1 tractors and about 4 combines per 1000 hectares of grain crops.

Thus, we can say that during the five years of 1953-1958. the level of mechanization of agriculture remained virtually unchanged. I find it difficult to answer what specific number of tractors, combines, etc. we could get by spending an additional 40-45 billion rubles on their production.

If we focus on the figure of 18-20 billion rubles, named by Khrushchev as the price for the main agricultural equipment sold to collective farms (see the brochure "Materials of the February 1958 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU", p. 47), then I think that there will be not a big mistake to assume that 40 - 45 billion rubles appropriations for the production of basic agricultural machinery would enable our industry by 1958 to increase the number of tractors to 1,200,000-1,200,000 units and combine harvesters to 550,000-600,000. Then, for 160 million hectares (and 110 million hectares of grain) the country would have about 9 tractors per 1,000 hectares of arable land and about 6 combines per 1,000 hectares of grain.

It can be assumed that the entire amount allocated for the development of new lands would be directed to expanding the production of mineral fertilizers. From the collection "The National Economy of the USSR in 1963" we learn that during the years 1960 - 1963 the state invested 5.3 billion rubles in the development of ALL branches of the chemical industry (or 53 billion according to the old price scale) and that during this time the production of mineral fertilizers increased by 5 million tons) from 13.8 million tons in 1960 to 20 million tons in 1963 - see p. 141 of the Collection). If we accept

that the entire amount (40-50 billion rubles, or 4.0-5.0 billion in the new price scale), the state will direct to the production of chemical fertilizers only, then I think that by 1958 we would not have doubled, but tripled the production of chemical fertilizers in comparison with 1958, reaching a figure of 20 million tons not in 1963, but already in 1958. 20 million

In connection with the foregoing, Khrushchev's speeches at a meeting of agricultural workers of the North Caucasus in Krasnodar on January 26, 1963, are of particular interest (see the brochure "Creating a Stable Basis for High Yields." Gospolitizdat. 1963). Khrushchev said:

who provides a large increase in yield? This will be a state approach to business" (p. 12 - 13).

Using the example of the Krasnodar Territory, Khrushchev quite convincingly proves that by applying 5-6 centners of fertilizers per hectare in the region, it is possible to double the marketable output of grain, bringing it to 400-450 million poods.

Moreover, as Khrushchev teaches, "it doesn't matter whether you apply fertilizers or not, but you must do such work as plowing, sowing, and preparing seeds. Now you add fertilizers to the labor already invested and immediately double the production of marketable products" (p. 15) . Khrushchev rightly said further that "we have many such regions where mineral fertilizers give the highest return" (p. 16), that "as science proves and practice confirms, when five centners of mineral fertilizers are applied per hectare under favorable conditions, you can get an increase in winter wheat: in the regions of the North Caucasus - 15 - 17 centners per hectare, in the Central Black Earth regions - 10 centners; in the forest-steppe and woodland regions of the Ukrainian SSR - 12 centners "(p. 17).

Khrushchev did not even hesitate to give a table of the zones most favorable for the use of mineral fertilizers and calculate the effect of their use in these zones. Here is this sign (not reproduced. - Ed.) ...

"Consequently," Khrushchev said, "if five centners of mineral fertilizers are applied in these zones per hectare of crops, then the gross harvest of wheat grain will increase from 1 billion 46 million poods to 1 billion 858 million poods, or an additional 800 million poods of fertilizers for this will require 5 - 6 million tons.

How useful these 800,000,000 poods of grain would be useful to us now, and yet we could have had them with more attention to production and a more reasonable approach to the use of mineral fertilizers" (p. 18).

This is what is called self-criticism! After all, in fact, throughout his entire hour and a half speech (it barely fits on 30 pages of a pamphlet), Khrushchev is only engaged in mercilessly slashing himself in one place, because everything he talks about in 1963 was absolutely right. and in 1953, and in 1957, and in any other year.

THE PUBLIC, REASONABLE APPROACH TO THE BUSINESS both in 1963 and in 1957 IS, AND WILL ALWAYS BE CONSIDERED, TO SEND MONEY WHERE THEIR EXPENSES WILL GIVE THE MOST EFFECT, PROVIDE THE BIGGEST RETURN. And, as I have already said, IT WAS IN THIS QUESTION AND THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE "SO NAZ" CONSISTED IN ITS TIME ANTI-PARTY GROUP AND KHRUSHCHEV'S SUPPORTERS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LANDS.

The state approach to business was shown by people who saw not only the mountain, but also what was beyond it, while it took Khrushchev and his supporters five years to go around the mountain and show a state approach to business ... After all, Khrushchev knew and like him, both in 1953 and 1957, about the insufficient level of chemicalization and mechanization of our agriculture, about the low productivity and low quality of the lands planned for development, about the natural and climatic conditions unfavorable for agriculture in the areas of development of these lands, etc. .

Khrushchev and his supporters then, in 1957, rejected the path of intensifying our agriculture and set a course for its extensive development. The resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of April 14, 1964, as if to justify Khrushchev's speech in Krasnodar, read:

"Until now, we solved the problem of increasing the production of agricultural products mainly by expanding the sown areas. This was the right line, since the state had no other way to sharply increase grain production in the shortest possible time, then it did not have sufficient material resources for the widespread chemicalization of agriculture"

("On the intensification of agricultural production." Decree of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 14 / P 1964, Politizdat, 1964, p. 5).

In the light of the foregoing, the reference to the lack of material resources seems to me very, very doubtful. After all, the state has found several billion rubles (in the new scale of prices) for the development of virgin and fallow lands.

By the way, about the scale of prices. In the preface to the collection of the Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR "The National Economy of the USSR in 1963" it is indicated that "Indicators in monetary terms for all years, in particular and in cases where these indicators are given in prices of the corresponding years, are indicated in the yearbook at new prices introduced on January 1, 1961, that is, at the ratio of 10 rubles of old money are equal to 1 ruble of new money".

Is this methodology correct? I think it's wrong, incorrect.

It seems to me that 1 ruble of new money in its real value is in no way equal to 10 rubles. 1955 - 1960s. It is difficult for me to judge what exact ratio should be followed here - either 7 to 1, or 8 to 1, but in any case it is clear to me that this amount of 31 billion rubles, which was named by Khrushchev as state expenses during 1954 - 1958 for the development of new lands - is by no means identical to the amount of 3.1 billion rubles. in the new price range.

Therefore, with even greater confidence I can repeat that the total amount of state spending on the development of virgin and fallow lands during 1953-1958. (taking into account indirect costs) amounted to at least 4.5 - 5.0 billion rubles. (45 - 50 billion). Therefore, I can repeat with even greater confidence in the correctness that these funds, plus the funds allocated for these purposes according to the plan, being invested in the development of the chemical fertilizer industry, would allow us to increase their production by 1958 to at least 20-25 million tons. .

The traditional question: this is how one asks, unless in 1963 Khrushchev and his supporters became aware that "science has proven, and practice has confirmed that the application of one centner of mineral fertilizers additionally yields two or three centners of grain, and 10 million tons - this is 20-30 million tons of grain, or 1 billion 300

million - 1 billion 800 million poods of additional grain" (see Khrushchev's speech in Krasnodar, p. 17).

A great many similar questions could be put to Khrushchev and his supporters on this subject. But I'll just ask one question. If we admit that a state, reasonable approach to the use of mineral fertilizers is to direct them to where their use can provide the greatest effect, then does not the conclusion that the state approach to the extension case follows a completely correct statement AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LANDS CONSISTED OF AND IS TO USE THESE LANDS FIRST OF ALL FOR THE CROPS WHICH PROVIDE THE BIGGEST YIELD IN THE AREAS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT?

In the collections "The National Economy of the USSR in 1963" (pp. 255 - 335) provides numerous data on agriculture in the USSR both as a whole and for individual republics and economic regions. Based on these data, as well as data reported in the collections "National Economy of the RSFSR" for 1962 and 1963, I compiled the following tables:

Table No. 13 summarizes data on the yield of grain crops in individual republics and economic regions. According to this table, it is easy to identify those areas that are most favorable for the cultivation of grain crops. These are the Central Chernozem, North Caucasian regions of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian, Moldavian, Estonian and Georgian SSRs and, to a lesser extent, the Latvian, Lithuanian, Armenian and Azerbaijan SSRs, the West and East Siberian regions of the RSFSR (for spring wheat).

Table No. 14 shows the results of the development of new lands in the field of grain crops. It follows from this that the sown area under grain crops in areas with high and stable yields has decreased, and often to a fairly significant extent, in favor of medium and low-yielding areas, among which the Kazakh SSR has occupied a special place.

Within 10 years (1953 - 1963), the area under grain crops in the Central Black Earth region decreased by 1.5 million hectares, in Ukraine - by 3 million hectares, in Estonia - by 150 thousand, in Latvia - by 360 thousand, in Moldova - by 270 thousand, in Georgia - by 400 thousand, etc.

Table No. 15 shows how things were for the main food and grain crop - winter and spring wheat. It indicates that the sown area under wheat

in areas with high and stable yields of this crop during 1953-1963. were significantly reduced in favor of low-yielding areas.

Over 6 million hectares (of which 4.5 million hectares during 1959-1963) of fertile land in areas most favorable for wheat cultivation were used for other purposes, while in other regions unfavorable for wheat cultivation and low-yielding regions of the USSR sown area under wheat - and mainly less productive, spring - increased by 16 million hectares.

If we adhere to the method of comparing the yields of individual crops with the structure of their sown areas, we will get the following, I will say, a strange picture:

For potatoes (Table No. 16), the most high-yielding were the North-Western, Volga-Vyatka, Central Black Earth, Ural, and West Siberian regions of the RSFSR, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Armenian and Estonian SSR.

As a result, 1959 - 1963. sown areas under potatoes increased in the Volga and North Caucasian regions of the RSFSR, in the Uzbek and Georgian SSR, and decreased significantly in all regions with higher yields.

For vegetables (table No. 16) - a similar picture.

For sugar beet (Table No. 17) - with an overall positive balance of sown areas, one can also notice obvious inconsistencies when comparing this table with the previous ones.

It is not clear, for example, why in the Ukrainian SSR, which is much more favorable for the cultivation of grain crops than the Kazakh SSR, it was necessary to reduce the sown area under grain crops in favor of sugar beet, while in the Kazakh SSR the yield of sugar beet is greater than in Ukraine, and the sown area below it in Kazakhstan practically did not increase. It is not clear, for example, why in the Central, Volga-Vyatka, Povolzhsky and in most other regions of the RSFSR the sown areas under sugar beet increased, while under vegetables and potatoes, which give a greater harvest in these regions, decreased?

In general, on the basis of the foregoing, it is possible to give a quite definite NEGATIVE answer to the question of whether there was a

STATE APPROACH to the development of new crop areas - THERE WAS NO SUCH APPROACH.

Results of agricultural policy for 1953 - 1963 in the field of development of new lands on the scale of the entire Soviet Union are summarized in table No. 18. The table shows how, along with the general expansion of sown areas due to the development of new lands; they were redistributed between individual crops.

The sown areas of four grain crops - spring wheat, spring barley, corn for grain and legumes (mainly peas) - increased over the period 1953-1963. on 44.4 million hectares, conquering not only 27.2 million hectares of new land, but also "winning" over 17 million hectares from winter wheat, rye, oats, buckwheat, and millet.

Of the increase in sown areas under industrial crops of 2.6 million hectares, the lion's share, over 2 million hectares, was won by sugar beets.

Potatoes and vegetables were satisfied with the old sown areas.

And, finally, sown areas under fodder crops increased by 34.5 million hectares, of which the queen of fields - corn - occupied 27.2 million hectares, or 78% of all sown areas under fodder crops.

By the way, according to this table, one can clearly see how certain Khrushchev's directives were reflected in our agriculture.

Let's take the same fodder crops. Remember how harshly the grass-field system of agriculture was condemned, or how fervently in late 1961 and early 1962 Khrushchev stood up for peas. And the table clearly shows how, starting from 1961, the area under annual grasses has significantly (by 6 million hectares) decreased in the country, how the area of pure fallows has sharply decreased, and what a jump upwards the area under peas has made during 1962-1963.

Particularly interesting are the areas of development of virgin and fallow lands. These regions, according to our official sources, include the following: in the RSFSR - Volgograd, Saratov, Kurgan, Orenburg, Tyumen, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk regions, Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Chita, Irkutsk and Amur regions, Buryat, and Tuva Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kazakh SSR. These areas are called the main areas for the development of virgin and fallow lands.

Table No. 19 summarizes data on the annual increase in sown areas under grain crops and on their productivity in the main areas of virgin and fallow lands.

This table is very, very interesting. In my opinion, it reveals with sufficient depth the trends in the development of grain farming in the areas of development of new lands. And the main thing in these trends is a systematic decrease in yields in recent years.

Is this phenomenon random? I don't think so. In my opinion, it was this phenomenon that people had in mind, who considered the expansion of sown areas in the country by several tens of million hectares as a real adventure, which had no real material and technical base. And so it happened.

After all, what, in essence, does the systematic decrease in the productivity of fields in virgin and fallow regions mean? This is nothing but a reflection of the fact that the state has not coped with the necessary minimum of agricultural work to maintain the fertility of the land, which faced it in connection with the enormous expansion of the area of cultivated land. There was not enough agricultural machinery, fertilizers, or people. Of course, those objectively unfounded recommendations and instructions from above that were given to agricultural workers also played their certain negative role.

But the main thing is not in these recommendations. The main thing is the insufficient level of mechanization and chemicalization of agricultural production,

AGGREGATED by an unjustifiably wide increase in the area of cultivated land, an increase that blocked the growth of mechanization and chemicalization, which COULD NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT ON AGRICULTURAL CULTURE. It is clear that such a circumstance takes place not only in the areas of development of virgin and fallow lands, but also on the scale of the entire Union.

In table No. 19, it is very interesting to compare the areas marked with the sign "g" in the column for the growth of sown areas with the state of grain yields in these areas. When compared, it is clearly seen that the greatest drop in productivity (or its trampling at the same level) in recent years took place precisely in those areas where the increase in new sown areas was the maximum, in comparison with other areas, for the development of new lands.

Table No. 20 shows data on the yield of grain crops in most of those regions of the RSFSR in which the sown area under grain throughout the last five years (1959 - 1963) remained at the same level. As can be seen from the table, in these areas there was no tendency for a systematic decrease in grain yields. This fact is another confirmation of what has been said about virgin and fallow lands.

There has been a lot of talk lately about the unprecedentedly unfavorable climatic conditions for agriculture in 1963. Unfortunately, in none of the numerous official sources I was able to find (or derive them in any indirect way) the results of the 1963 agricultural year for individual regions of the RSFSR, including those that make up the main areas for the development of new lands.

In the collections "The National Economy of the USSR" for 1961, 1962 and 1963, "The National Economy of the RSFSR" for 1961, 1962 and 1963. There are separate pages where data relating to areas of development of virgin lands as a whole are published (see, for example, "The National Economy of the RSFSR in 1963", p. 271). If we take these data and data on gross collections for other republics, then we will be able to compile the following table (see table on the next page).

From the table it is possible to deduce the average level of gross yields of grain crops for the period 1958 - 1963, both in the RSFSR as a whole and in the areas of development of virgin lands. For the RSFSR as a whole, this figure will be expressed in the amount of 76.4 million tons, and for areas of virgin lands - 38.1 million tons.

And here's what's extremely interesting. It can be seen from the table that, on the whole, in the RSFSR in 1963, the gross harvest of grain, compared with the average annual level of 1958-1962, was decreased by 10.6 million tons, which coincides with almost perfect accuracy with a decrease in gross collections in areas of virgin and fallow lands (10.8 million tons).

It is also clearly seen from the table that the overwhelming share (more than 80%) of the reduction in gross grain harvests in 1963 compared with 1962 falls precisely on those areas that we attribute to the areas of development of virgin and fallow lands of the RSFSR and to the Kazakh RSFSR.

Thus, it turns out that the drought of 1963 took place mainly only in the areas of development of new lands in the RSFSR and in the Kazakh SSR. Weird drought...

In addition, the same table shows that the gross grain harvest in the Kazakh SSR - the most important center of new wheat sown areas - has been steadily falling from year to year and without any droughts.

Gross grain harvest (in million tons)

years	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
RSFSR (as a whole)	76.8	68.4	76.2	73.7	86.7	65.8
including districts						
Development of virgin lands	38.6	35.9	40.0	36.0	40.1	27.3
Ukraine	27.5	23.4	21.8	34.0	29.7	22.9
Belarus	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.2	1.8	2.2
Latvia	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.45
Estonia	0.3	0.35	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Lithuania	0.7	1.0	0.85	0.8	0.6	1.0
Uzbekistan	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.9
Kyrgyzstan	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.8
Tajikistan	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3
Turkmenistan	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07
Georgia	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
Armenia	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2
Azerbaijan	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.5
Moldova	2.0	2.0	1.6	2.4	2.4	1.6
Kazakhstan	22.0	19.0	18.7	18.7	14.6	10.6
the USSR	134.7	119.5	125.5	130.5	140.2	107.5

All of the above reinforces the conclusion that the declining fertility of land in the newly developed areas and regions of our country, the systematic decrease in the productivity of fields in these areas, the trampling of our entire agriculture at the level of previous years is explained, from my point of view, by the objective impossibility for the state to provide all The array of cultivated lands, which has grown enormously in recent years, with the minimum of agro-technical measures that would give us the opportunity, if not to increase, then at least maintain at a certain level the indicators achieved in the first years of the development of virgin lands. It can be said that in the first years of the development of virgin lands, the land gave away the wealth accumulated in it, but subsequently, without receiving

sufficient compensation, sufficient care, every year the return decreased.

The desire at all costs to maintain the gross harvest at a certain level by expanding the sown area more and more and thus compensate for the drop in field productivity due to the insufficiency of agro technical measures - only gave rise to new difficulties in our agriculture.

In animal husbandry, something also happened that Khrushchev and his like-minded members of the so-called. anti-party group - despite the sharp expansion of sown areas under fodder crops, the fodder base gradually lagged behind in its development from the growth in the number of livestock. In the balance of fodder crops, corn dominated (out of 34 million hectares of new sown areas under fodder crops, it occupied 27 million hectares). It was on corn that all our hopes were pinned in the development of animal husbandry.

It seems to me that it would be superfluous to recall with what zeal the Queen of the Fields was promoted. Let us recall at least the following passage from Khrushchev's speech at the June 1958 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

"Is it not possible at the present time to make an assessment not of corn .., but an assessment of those workers who do not want to master the art of cultivating this crop, or else force them to give up their stubbornness, to finally study corn and engage in it according to reality. And if they are not capable of this, then is it possible to replace them "(Materials of the June (1958) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, brochure. 1958, p. 52).

Corn did not justify the hopes placed on it. The yield of corn for silage and green fodder (stalks and cobs) throughout the USSR in the best years did not rise above the ridiculous figure for this crop of 73-74 centners per hectare (see the collection "The National Economy of the USSR in 1961", p. 301 and 329); thus, its yield was lower than that of potatoes and half that of sugar beet, which can serve as an excellent fodder for livestock.

With a sober assessment of the existing state of affairs in our agriculture, this was to be expected. This very heat-loving crop, requiring a soil rich in fertilizers, did not receive (and could not receive) in most regions of our country either a sufficient amount of

heat (according to natural and climatic conditions) or a sufficient amount of fertilizers (due to their shortage).

Just as in the grain economy, the forage crops, which have more than doubled since 1953, do not receive proper care, and their yield falls year after year. If we take the gross harvest of such crops as legumes, oats, corn for silage and green fodder, grasses, including hay from natural hayfields, fodder melons and fodder root crops (sugar beets for livestock feed), then, according to Sat. "The national economy of the USSR in 1961", we get that in 1958 there were 442.2 kg of fodder crops per head of livestock per year, in 1959 - 396.0 kg, in 1960 - 407.0 kg and in 1961 - 338.6 kilograms. I do not have data for 1962 and 1963. But there is no doubt that in these years this indicator not only did not increase, but, on the contrary, decreased.

In many parts of the country, millions of hectares of natural pastures and hayfields fell under the heading of virgin and fallow lands. They were plowed up for food crops. It is not surprising that in recent years the productivity of animal husbandry has been declining. Here, for example, is the situation with the average annual milk yield per 1 cow. If in 1959 it was equal to 1853 liters per year, then in 1960 - 1818, in 1961 - 1796, in 1962 - 1759 liters and in 1963 - 1584 liters per year. And in animal husbandry, as well as in crop production, there was a tendency to reduce the productivity of production.

When I was already finishing my letter, the March Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party took place, and the stenographic report of the Plenum (Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1965) went on sale. Very curious phrases and figures are contained in this Party document. And it is impossible, speaking of the state of our agriculture, not to mention some of them.

"The subjectivist approach to solving the most important problems of the development of the national economy and especially agriculture was manifested in a gross violation of the principles of planning, in administration and ignoring the basic laws of economic development, and in many ill-conceived restructurings. All this still costs our country dearly, especially collective farms and state farms. It must be said frankly that only our socialist system, the devotion of the best cadres of the Communist Party, the faith of our people in

a better future and their patience could withstand various ill-conceived experiments.

Comrades! Violations of the economic laws of economic development can lead to an adventure in politics. We know the slogans - to surpass and overtake in the near future the United States of America in the production of milk and meat per capita. We know the slogans - the seven-year plan in 3-4 years, we also know the slogans - today we live well, and tomorrow we will live better - and immediately there are lines for bread" (p. 36 - 37).

"The main food crop in Ukraine is winter wheat. However, in recent years, its sown area has been groundlessly reduced by more than 2 million hectares. wheat" (p. 41 - P. Shelest - 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine).

"The report of L.I. Brezhnev highlighted the issue of the extreme neglect of agriculture in the entire non-chernozem zone of our republic ... The nature, comrades, of this intolerable neglect consists primarily in the vicious practice of ignoring the specifics, natural and climatic conditions of production, the history of agriculture and animal husbandry in this zone ... In this zone, earlier than anywhere else, the negative influence of personal, I would say pathological fantasies on the "reconstruction" of agriculture was felt. Giant unmanaged state farms and collective farms were created ... Various zigzags in agrotechnical and zootechnical politics were intertwined with the ambitious aspirations of individuals with sick eyesight. Many "introductions" were not caused by the interests of the cause and often ended in disappointment. Also confusing was the unjustified patronage of some scientists and, I would say, the cruel attitude towards others ...

Due to the lack of roughage, and especially hay, collective farms and state farms were forced to occupy arable land for sowing annual grasses. It turned out that meadows and pastures are overgrown, so we do not invest in them... Over the past five years, up to 10.5 million hectares have been cultivated with annual grasses in the non-chernozem zone, or

about 2 million hectares on average per year. And they got to the point where they began to sow oats for hay" (pp. 47 - 48. K. Pysin - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR).

For a grain harvester - 240 hectares of grain crops, for a continuous tillage cultivator - 230 hectares. This is an unbearable burden! With such loads, it is impossible to carry out work in a timely manner, to ensure high agricultural technology ... Due to the large lack of equipment - tractors, combines, cars that have worked out their depreciation period are not written off; they require large expenditures to maintain them in working capacity, give low labor productivity, and poor quality of work. At present, about 20% of our tractors have been used for more than 15 years. ... Last year, the state and collective farms of our region spent more than 100 million rubles on the purchase and maintenance of equipment without the cost of fuel and wages for machine operators, which is equal to 40% of the cost of the entire annual gross agricultural output.

All speakers at the plenum spoke without exception about the low level of mechanization and animal husbandry, about the acute shortage, along with the main agricultural machinery, of such simple machines as cultivators, harrows, etc., about the high cost of repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery, about its low productivity.

The speech of the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus Comrade Mazurov is characteristic:

"In our country, we have been too late in the practice of extensive farming. This has especially affected the non-chernozem zone. The experience of European countries that are in almost the same natural conditions as we are - Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the GDR - suggests that in our conditions it is possible to have intensive highly productive agriculture and animal husbandry. We praised those who expanded the area under crops in the non-chernozem zone. And in this zone the main task is to increase soil fertility, improve the use of lands already included in agricultural land "(p. 75).

The Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Comrade Grishin pointed out that

"Daily output per tractor on state farms from 1960 to 1963 decreased by 20%, and shift output - by 25%. In state farms, the indicators of the use of combines worsened. There are serious shortcomings in this matter also on collective farms" (p. PO).

The secretary of the Pskov regional committee of the CPSU, comrade Gustov, even stated, referring to such a specific branch of crop production as flax growing, that

"in the Kalinin region in 1933 (!) ... the level of mechanization of flax growing was higher than at present" (p. 146).

What can be said about all these and similar speeches? Just what I said earlier: it took all these people five years to go around the mountain and see what was beyond it...

Many of those who spoke in the debate at the Plenum noted the low level of training of machine operators in the collective farms, their high turnover (for example, Comrade Grishin noted that in the state farms and collective farms of the RSFSR, for every 100 newly arrived tractor drivers in recent years, there were 84 (!) Dropped out).

The plenum participants spoke about the incorrect structure of sown areas, livestock keeping technology, fodder balance, mistakes and shortcomings in planning, in the practice of rural construction, about the wrong policy of harvesting, pricing, etc. etc., attributing all these shortcomings and errors to Khrushchev's "pathological fantasies", strong-willed pressure on his part and on the part of some others (who they were - they were silent at the plenum) on the "poor" current participants in the plenum.

Khrushchev and some others were removed.

What measures were proposed by the participants of the March plenum freed from "willed pressure" to correct the deplorable state of affairs in our agriculture? What measures did they propose to correct the fundamental, in my opinion, and perhaps, from the point of view of the plenum participants themselves, shortcomings in our agriculture - the low level of mechanization of agriculture and animal husbandry, the low quality of agricultural work?

Comrade Mazurov, one of the first to speak, spoke in the following spirit:

"It seems to me that we need to correct the mistake that has been made in agricultural engineering, we need to create some kind of body, perhaps the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering" (p. 77).

Similar proposals were made by all the other speakers. Furthermore T. Akhundov, 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, said:

"I don't know, I'm expressing my opinion, whether we have a big gain from the fact that part of the higher property - state property - was transferred to another form - collective-farm-cooperative property" (p. 125).

Florentiev, First Secretary of the Kostroma Regional Committee of the CPSU, in his speech, without denying the fact that the reorganization of the MTS did not bring the expected results, tried to prove that, after all, it was a progressive undertaking. He says:

"The level of production costs of the collective farms, their economy was also affected by the hastily carried out, economically ill-conceived sale of MTS equipment. The reorganization of the MTS, in our opinion, is a progressive measure, but it was carried out in such a way that the economy of many collective farms was undermined" (p. 171).

The 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia Comrade Zarobyan, to the approving exclamations of the audience: "That's right!", "Objected" to Comrade Florentiev: he said that in the report of L. I. Brezhnev

"for quite understandable reasons (!!) it is cautiously said that during the period of the reorganization of the MTS, the repair base of agriculture was undermined. I think that Comrade Florentiev will agree with me that it is impossible in any way the degree of reorganization of the MTS should be considered a progressive measure. This was done prematurely, thoughtlessly. In essence, it was not a reorganization, but simply measures to undermine the repair and technical base

of the machine and tractor fleet of agriculture "(p. 216. Emphasized - GM).

The essence of these statements, in my opinion, is clear, despite somewhat vague references to prematurity, thoughtlessness, improper conduct, etc.: the reorganization of the MTS, the SALES OF BASIC AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT TO KOLHOZES, was an event fundamentally erroneous in its very idea. I. V. Stalin was fully and completely right when, in *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, he said that the sale of agricultural machinery to collective farms would undermine the economic foundations of our agriculture, and would undermine not only because our collective farms for the most part still are economically weak to acquire basic agricultural machinery, and MAINLY BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUOUSLY FOLLOW THE SAME CONTINUOUS AND INCREASING PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY,

Many of the comrades who spoke at the plenum advocated the creation of a wide network of so-called machine-rolling stations in our country.

It seems to me that the implementation of such an event would be a significant step forward in creating a more solid material and technical base for agriculture compared to its current state. But at the same time, it seems to me that in itself the concentration of the main agricultural machinery in machine-rental stations - although it frees the collective farms from the cost of acquiring, repairing and operating machinery, although it improves the quality of repairs - will be a half-measure, because another decisive condition for the growth of agricultural production is providing equipment with qualified permanent staff of machine operators will remain unresolved in this case.

In order to restore and strengthen the material and technical basis of our socialist agriculture and advance the cause of agricultural mechanization, it is necessary to restore the MTS system.

The overwhelming majority of those who spoke at the plenary session, along with the problem of mechanization, pointed to the wrong policy of procurement prices as one of the most important reasons that led to the difficult situation in our agriculture, due to

which the production of many important types of agricultural products turned out to be unprofitable, unprofitable for collective farms and state farms.

At one time, at the December Plenum of the Central Committee in 1958, Khrushchev argued that there were two ways to increase the income of collective farms. He said:

"One way is to increase the incomes of collective farms and collective farmers by raising prices for agricultural products. In a capitalist society, all the hopes of the peasant ... are really riveted to the market, to the price game. Higher prices for agricultural products - more income, lower prices - less income "Such are the laws of capitalism, with its anarchy of production, the elements of the market, the profit of some at the expense of others. This path is not suitable for us. The socialist economy has other laws. Of course, an increase in prices for agricultural products would lead to an increase in incomes on collective farms for some time, but then it would turn against them with its other side. The state is the main purchaser of agricultural products of collective farms in our country.

In order to raise prices for collective-farm products, it is necessary to withdraw funds from some other branch of the national economy, for example, from industry. This, of course, would raise prices for industrial products, in which the collective farms and collective farmers are vitally interested. That is why increasing the incomes of collective farms and collective farmers by systematically raising prices for agricultural products is unacceptable to us. It is unprofitable for the collective farms and collective farmers themselves. We have another sure way of raising the incomes of collective farms and collective farmers... This is the path of a constant, steady increase in the output of agricultural products by each collective farm, by all socialist agriculture... a sharp increase in output per each worker on the collective farm, by better organization of labor and growth of its productivity. Only on this basis can a real increase in the incomes of collective farms and collective farmers be achieved" (Stenotchet of the Plenum, pp. 63-64).

Was Khrushchev right when he made such a statement in 1958? Essentially, he was right. Speaking about the profitability, the profitability of our agricultural enterprises (as well as industrial ones), from my point of view, one cannot help but dwell on such an interesting circumstance as the division of our collective farms into advanced and backward, into those working profitably and working unprofitably.

Everyone knows that, despite all the assurances to the contrary (see the quoted speech by Khrushchev), our state was forced to repeatedly resort to raising procurement and purchase prices for agricultural products, thus trying to stimulate the growth of agricultural production. And everyone knows that every time this event did not bring the desired results. Back in 1958, at the same plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the same Khrushchev said:

“With the current purchase prices, thousands of collective farms and state farms are running their economy profitably, increasing their fixed capital, and increasing the production of agricultural products. training, a set of necessary mechanisms, the development of production technology.

For the period 1958 - 1963. a dozen plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU were held, more than a dozen top-level conferences devoted to agricultural issues were held, and at all these plenums, conferences and meetings, the comrades who spoke, among whom were participants in the current plenum of the Central Committee, cited numerous examples of collective farms and state farms working profitable, profitable.

Is it cheating? No, not cheating. Indeed, in our agriculture there have existed and still exist, just as in industry, thousands of enterprises that run their economy profitably and in an organized manner. So the question is - what's the matter? Why, out of two collective farms or state farms located in the same region, in exactly the same soil, climatic and other conditions, does one work well, profitably, and the other poorly, unprofitably?

How can this be explained? Is it really a matter of procurement prices, all the more so since there has been and still exists such a system under which the products handed over to the state by lagging farms are paid at higher prices than those handed over by advanced ones?

It seems to me that in this respect Khrushchev was to a large extent right when he said that very often the difference in the level of profitability of one or another farm depends entirely on the organizers of the farm, on their skill, on the correct organization of labor, etc.

In bourgeois society, enterprises that for some reason lag behind in their development from others, do not keep pace with them in terms of profitability, eventually become bankrupt, are destroyed in the competitive struggle. We cannot take this path. We should render all possible assistance to Lagging farms, to bring them up to the level of the advanced ones.

Having chosen for this purpose the path of a new increase in procurement prices for agricultural products, we, in my opinion, are once again embarking on the wrong path. Indeed, by raising procurement prices, we thereby not only DO NOT improve the organization of agricultural production on lagging collective farms, DO NOT increase labor productivity in them, DO NOT reduce costs per unit of output, etc., but, on the contrary, we simply try to cover up, disguise due to the difference between the high cost of production in lagging farms and an even higher purchase price for it, the poor performance of these farms.

By raising purchase prices, we not only DO NOT create genuine material incentives for improving the work of poorly performing farms, but on the contrary, we undermine these incentives, we undermine the principles of socialist emulation.

The question is, why should a lagging economy equal the advanced economy, strain its forces, if, even so, our good state, by increasing the prices of its products, will not only cover its losses - the result of poor work, but also provide funds for raising wages, for "increasing "His income?

We are artificially creating "incomes" for lagging farms by using the difference between the cost of production and the purchase price for it, in the hope that these revenues will allow these farms to increase the wages of collective farmers and thus materially interest them in intensifying production. We are embarking on the path of increasing agricultural output AT ANY price, in the expectation that the growing mass of this output will eventually create the conditions under which

we will succeed again in lowering purchase prices and, in general, the prices of agricultural products.

The future will show whether we can achieve significant qualitative changes in our agriculture in this way. The history of the recent past casts doubt on this. It is known, for example (see Khrushchev's report at a meeting of leading officials of party, Soviet and agricultural bodies 24/P last year), that over the past ten years (1953-1963) procurement prices for the main types of agricultural products have been increased: for wheat - almost 8 times; for corn - 14 times; for peas - more than 15 times; for sugar beet - 3 times; for vegetables - 4 times; for potatoes - almost 15 times; for beef - 40 (!) times; for pork - more than 14 times; for milk - 5 times; for an egg - 3.5 times, etc.

And what? The next plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU again raises the question of the deplorable state of affairs in our agriculture.

Further. When examining the materials of the March plenum of the Central Committee of this year, the following question also arises: the increase in purchase prices for basic agricultural products, plus allowances for excess delivery, require large additional funds, amounting to many billions of rubles. The Minister of Finance of the USSR, Comrade Garbuzov, in his speech at the plenary session, gave figures of some additional expenditures, and in particular on animal husbandry, which are required to establish new purchase prices. Noting that even the old purchase prices for livestock products are significantly higher than retail prices for it, the minister pointed out that "a surcharge on the current prices for livestock products will require additional government spending in the amount of 1.9 billion rubles a year. As a result, subsidies from the state budget will increase and amount to more than three billion rubles.

Collective farms should be written off (or deferred) debt in the amount of 2.25 billion rubles. The minister pointed out that the new procedure for calculating and collecting income tax from collective farms would require additional costs in the amount of 3.9 billion rubles in year.

"In the calculation for the next five years," said Comrade Garbuzov, "ADDITIONAL aid from the state to collective farms and state farms

will be expressed in a huge amount - more than 22 billion rubles" (pp. 130-133. Emphasis mine. - GM.).

Indeed, the amount is huge. Especially if we take into account that we are not talking about the main costs of the state in agriculture, but about additional ones intended to cover the losses of the state from such measures as increasing purchase prices for crop and livestock products, a new procedure for collecting income taxes from collective farms, etc. .d.

Where to get these huge funds?

T. Garbuzov said that for these purposes it is planned to use part of the reserve fund of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as half of the reserve funds of the councils of ministers of the Union republics.

Here, by the way, one could say: this is what Khrushchev's agricultural policy brought with it - not 8.5 billion in net income from virgin lands, but 22 billion in net loss.

Examining the materials of the March plenum of the Central Committee, I again cannot get rid of the impression that, as in the period of the development of virgin lands, we are directing huge funds not into the mainstream. We recognize that the basis for the sharp and progressive development of agriculture is the path of its equally sharp intensification, that is, mechanization and chemicalization. The same Garbuzov said at the Plenum that

"For 1,000 hectares of arable land in the United States, there were almost 4 times more tractors than in the USSR, and grain harvesters per 1,000 hectares of grain (excluding corn) - 3.7 times. The number of trucks in US agriculture was more than 3 times more than in the USSR, although it is known that the area of cultivated land in the Soviet Union is much larger ... If we add to this that we use less chemical fertilizers and pesticides than the United States, it becomes clear why our labor productivity is much lower in agriculture and higher production costs.

As a result, we cannot yet reduce retail prices for meat, milk, and other agricultural products" (p. 128).

On the page of this section, I cited our official data on the number of tractors and the growth rate of the tractor fleet in the developed capitalist countries. From these data one can see how vigorously the process of intensification of agriculture proceeded in all the capitalist countries without exception in the post-war period. Increase over the five years 1949 - 1954 tractor fleet 2, 3, 4 and even 5 times was observed in many countries. Even American agriculture, where the saturation of tractors in comparison with other capitalist countries was already quite high, in the course of five years managed to increase its tractor fleet by one and a half times.

In the journal "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya" No. 7, 1965, on p. 156, there is a plate characterizing such an important indicator of the development of agriculture as its saturation with tractors and combines. I will reproduce this tablet in its entirety (the table mentioned above is not reproduced. - Ed.) ... From the table it is clear how far we lag behind the developed capitalist countries in terms of the level of mechanization of agriculture.

An even more ugly picture emerges if we compare the level of chemicalization of our agriculture with the level of chemicalization in capitalist countries. And, as Comrade Garbuzov rightly noted, this is where most of our troubles in agriculture come from.

In the report of L. I. Brezhnev at the plenum, it was indicated (p. 22) that during the five-year plan (1965 - 1970) it is planned to supply agriculture with 1,790 thousand various tractors, including 780 thousand arable, 1,100 thousand trucks, by 10.7 billion rubles. other agricultural machines. LI Brezhnev pointed out that to carry out this program it would be necessary to build about 80 new factories and workshops, in the construction of which the State Planning Committee of the USSR plans to invest more than 4 billion rubles over the five-year period.

These are the numbers I want to focus on. What does it mean to supply the agriculture of our country with 1,800,000 tractors within five years? This means that by 1971 our agriculture will have a tractor fleet of 3,200,000 units against 1,450,000 in 1963. This is a big achievement.

But at the same time, this means that even in 1971 we will be more than twice behind the United States in the level of agricultural

mechanization. And I ask - is it not more correct, would it not be more reasonable instead of directing 22 billion rubles in order to ARTIFICIALLY, by raising the purchase prices for agricultural products, writing off debts, various kinds of subsidies, etc., purely MECHANICALLY TRANSFER lagging farms into the category of advanced, profitable ones - wouldn't it be more reasonable to direct these colossal funds to a sharp, broad strengthening and expansion of the material and technical base of agriculture? Why don't we invest these 22 billion rubles, or at least some of them, in the construction of agricultural engineering plants, chemical fertilizer enterprises, and in the electrification of agriculture?

Why don't we build 160 instead of 80 factories and workshops? Why shouldn't we allocate at least part of these funds, these additional funds, to a direct and immediate increase in the wages of agricultural workers, if we see this as one of the main reasons for the low productivity of labor in our agriculture?

And then - what does it mean to increase the number of tractors alone in agriculture by 2,800,000 units in five years, that is, to increase their fleet by the same amount in five years as it has grown during all the previous 47 years of Soviet power? This means - again, but with even greater urgency, to confront the collective farms with the problem of buying, operating, repairing, and storing this entire huge mass of commodity values, with the problem of its renewal.

Will the collective farms cope with this problem this time? Will it absorb, as it did yesterday, the vast majority of their income? In my opinion, if you look at things soberly, you should admit that such a phenomenon is more than likely.

TO RESTORE MTS, REMOVE COLLECTIVE FARMS EXPENDITURE ON ACQUISITION, OPERATION AND REPAIR OF BASIC AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT - this, from my point of view, is so far the only real way that will allow us to double and triple the fleet of agricultural machinery without harm to our agriculture, while maintaining its correct operation, reducing the cost of its repair, increasing the coefficient of its use.

It was pointed out above that all participants in the plenum, without exception, recognized the vast majority of agricultural measures taken in recent years as "unsuccessful". But for some reason, no one

said a word about the virgin lands. And meanwhile, what, in fact, this entire section was devoted to, in my deepest conviction, was precisely the virgin lands, precisely the unjustified, adventurous, expansion of sown areas in the country in a short period of time by more than 60 million hectares, which absorbed a lot of funds and forces, it is she who is the root of all the current evils in our agriculture.

Forgive me my self-conceit, but it still seems to me that I have sufficiently convincingly proved this fact.

And it is the virgin lands that suggest to us one more, quite real, quite accessible and, perhaps, the most necessary way out of the difficult situation that has arisen in our agriculture: I believe that we should go for a significant reduction in sown areas in unproductive, neglected, or hard-to-reach areas. Such an event would make it possible to free up a considerable amount of funds, would make it possible to concentrate our monetary, material, technical and human reserves in the direction of the main blow - on a sharp rise in the intensification of our agriculture.

And, finally, the last remark on the materials of the March Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Causes bewilderment, or to be honest, indignation, the common position, the general tone of the majority of the participants in the plenum. All of them, indignantly so-called. subjectivist, so-called. Khrushchev's voluntaristic actions, justifying by them all the mistakes and miscalculations that have taken place in our country in recent years, strange as it may seem, they forget about their own existence, they forget about themselves.

The question is - where were they when they prepared, or considered, or voted for all those numerous events that they themselves now characterize as thoughtless, premature, etc.? etc.? Perhaps, while preparing, considering, or approving these measures, they did not understand their fallacy, prematureness, etc.?

I think that such an assumption would by no means testify to the political and practical farsightedness of these comrades, who, moreover, WERE TIMELY WARNED about the erroneousness, prematureness and thoughtlessness of these measures by quite experienced and authoritative people.

If they understood, comrades present participants in the plenum, that these measures were either wrong in essence or wrongly carried out, then the question is why did they not put a stop to their implementation in a timely manner? Why?

Where, in what materials after 1957 and up to October 1964, can one find even the slightest objection to Khrushchev? They are not in any of the thousands of pages published over all these years, according to the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, according to party congresses, in dozens and hundreds of meetings at the highest level, both all-Union and republican scale.

All these thousands of pages are filled with mere praises to Khrushchev, greetings to any of the proposals he put forward. The picture is unpleasant in the light of the October and March plenums of the Central Committee.

During the period of exposure, the so-called. Stalin's personality cult, under the guise of involvement in this cult, to its negative consequences, the oldest and most prominent figures of our party and state were expelled from the party, removed from their posts ONLY FOR THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO SEE ALL THE ADVENTURE, THAT, AND Erroneousness of the planned or partly carried out, against their will, Khrushchev's "new course" in all areas of foreign and domestic policy of our state, including in agriculture.

Now, these same people, with the help of whom Khrushchev managed at one time to break the resistance of his IDEOLOGICAL opponents and who for 7 years, tirelessly, on any occasion and on any occasion, sang laudatory hymns to him - these same people bow him at all seams, referring to "volitional pressure" ...

Let us open page 144 of the steno report of the March plenum and read the following lines there:

"All of us, the secretaries of the regional committees, remember how we were annually summoned to the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the RSFSR, where the structure of sown areas was determined, our signatures under this structure were collected under pressure, and then all this was presented as a proposal from below - the regional committees and regional executive committees." (Emphasized by me. - GM).

Poor, weak-willed comrade Gustov, poor, weak-willed secretaries of regional committees ...

To some extent, one can still understand those communists who, in the so-called. During the period of Stalin's personality cult, under the threat of physical destruction, put their signatures or voted for proposals against which their conscience and their convictions rebelled. As for the current party and state workers, communists who put their signatures or vote for decisions with which they do not agree, submitting to some kind of strong-willed pressure, then, forgive me, these communists can neither be understood nor, moreover, cannot be justified.

The March Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1965 gave its participants a characterization that would be fatal for a communist - a characterization of careerists, people who fear not for their lives, but for their places.

The plenum once again showed how unscrupulous people were able to lead the party and the country for about 10 years and push into life their "pathological fantasies" such a figure as Khrushchev, who brought enormous moral and material damage to our socialist state.

It is to these people that Khrushchev owes his "honorable" retirement "for health reasons", whereas in other times he would have been judged, and judged NOT BY THE LETTER, but BY THE SPIRIT OF REVOLUTIONARY legality.

CONCLUSION

Finishing this section, and with it the entire letter, I cannot help but dwell on the speech of such an ardent supporter of Khrushchev as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Mzhavanadze, who announced at the March plenum about the separation of party and Soviet bodies on the production principle, carried out in 1962, which

"many members of the Central Committee ... endured everything, but the members of the Central Committee could not bear the encroachment on the Party, could not bear it, and acted absolutely correctly" (p. 89).

With full responsibility for my words, I must declare that Mzhavanadze is wrong in considering the division of party bodies in

1962 according to the production principle as an encroachment on the party. Without exception, Khrushchev's entire activity as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was a complete encroachment on our Leninist party, on our socialist state, on our heroically patient Soviet people.

Scolding Stalin, attributing personally to him and his closest associates the totality of those mistakes and miscalculations that took place on the gigantic territory of the USSR for all 35 years of their being in the leadership of the party and the state, and depriving them of all the good that was done by them - Khrushchev discredited and buried the history of the struggle of the party and the people for socialism.

Khrushchev smashed in our people, through decades of hard work, the nurtured faith in the correctness of the party, scattered to the wind, especially among young people, the authority of the party, its leading centers, and leaders, presenting the fierce struggle of the party with its political opponents, enemies of Soviet power and socialism - like squabbles in the struggle for the throne, as a settling of personal scores.

Khrushchev introduced into the crystal clear teaching of Marxism-Leninism numerous malignant elements of the typical petty-bourgeois, conciliatory, Menshevik-opportunist persuasion.

Under the guise of new historical conditions, Khrushchev subjected the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism to a radical revision, turning it from a militant, revolutionary doctrine into a compromise-renegade theory of reconciling socialism with capitalism.

Intimidating everyone and everything with the catastrophic consequences of a possible thermonuclear war, Khrushchev, under the flag of "peaceful coexistence" of states with opposite social systems, under the flag of "peaceful competition", rejected the socialist revolution as the only Marxist means to put an end to wars in general.

Having dragged into the Program of the CPSU the old anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist opportunist ideas about the possibility and necessity of winning over to the side of the working class, to the side of its vanguard of the "majority of the nation" as a precondition for a successful revolutionary uprising, about the possibility of a peaceful, parliamentary path for the development of the revolution at the

present stage of the world communist movement etc., Khrushchev tried, at least theoretically, to bury the revolution before the Greek Kalends.

By introducing confusion and inconsistency into the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, Khrushchev achieved the sharpest ideological war between the communist parties of all countries of the world. He was the first in many decades to achieve an almost complete disruption of the unity of views and actions among the communist and workers' parties, he succeeded in achieving the emergence and expansion of "centrifugal tendencies" among the communist and workers' parties.

All his measures in the field of domestic policy turned out to be untenable, bringing to our state, and hence to the cause of socialism throughout the world, colossal material, and even greater moral damage.

Tselina, a new system of industrial management, a system that, of which I have no doubt, will be rejected in due time, the reorganization of the MTS, the division of party and Soviet bodies along the lines of production - all these and many other measures of Khrushchev turned out to be, in essence, aimed at undermining economic and social foundations of our socialist state.

Isn't all this strange?

If all of Khrushchev's activities mentioned above are declared the fruit of a diseased imagination and "pathological fantasies", then one involuntarily begins to think that many, many of our leading party and state leaders have been infected with even more sick imagination and even greater pathology for a whole ten years.

What happened was what V. I. Lenin warned us about when he said:

"If we do not close our eyes to reality, then we must admit that at present the proletarian policy of the party is determined not by its composition, but by the enormous, undivided authority of that thinnest layer that can be called the old party guard. A little internal struggle in this layer is enough, and his authority will be, if not undermined, at least weakened to such an extent that the decision will no longer depend on him" (vol. 33, p. 229).

Thunderclouds hung over the country, and we saw a clear sky... But, as they say, thank God that the thunder that was about to strike finally struck: the peasants crossed themselves and... were cured of both the sick imagination and the pathological fantasies of their leader. I really, really want to believe that they are completely cured. Future will tell.

In the meantime, let me finish this letter with the following words of I. V. Stalin, spoken by him on May 24, 1945, at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the commanders of the Soviet Army:

"Comrades, allow me to raise one more, last toast. I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, above all, the Russian people.

I drink to the health of the Russian people, first of all, because they are the most outstanding nation of all the nations that make up the Soviet Union.

I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people because in this war they have earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people, not only because they are the leading people, but also because they have a clear mind, steadfast character, and patience.

Our government made many mistakes, we had moments of desperate situations ... Other people could say to the government: you have not justified our hopes, go away, we will install another government ... But the Russian people did not agree to this, because they believed in the correctness of the policy of his government and made sacrifices ... And this trust of the Russian people in the Soviet government turned out to be the decisive force that ensured the historic victory over the enemy of mankind - over fascism.

Thanks to him, the Russian people, for this trust!

For the health of the Russian people!"

(JV Stalin, "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union", ed. M. 1949, pp. 351 - 353).

To this paragraph in the margins a note was made: "It is not clear enough about the dictatorship of the workers' class." This remark, as well as the notes of authorship found in the explanations in the quotations: "G. M.", as well as the mention of Molotov in the third person, make us assume that this document, which does not have a signature, may not belong to Molotov, as the RGASPI manuscript attributed, and G. M. Malenkov. - Ed.

Reflecting on this criticism of Molotov, on the basis of my own conclusions and conclusions from the analysis of the Program of the CPSU, I can only say one thing - honor and praise to him!



I can only repeat what I started this letter with -
I remain deeply convinced that criticism of the so-called Stalin's personality cult, in the form in which it unfolded after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, was aimed at discrediting the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU - Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Bulganin - who did not agree with that the general course of the party to which the new first secretary Khrushchev sought to turn the party. They are earlier than others, and there is nothing surprising in this, because they went through the Leninist school of revolution and revolutionary, Marxist hardening.

The main objective is to give reference to, familiarize with the context of transcripts and make them available and accessible to the largest possible readers

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